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MALI

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MALI

Country Information Package

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Within the framework of LET4CAP and with the financial support to the Internal Security Fund of the EU

LET4CAP aims to contribute to more *consistent* and *efficient* assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase.

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Table of contents

1. Country Profile

- 1.1 Country in Brief
- 1.2 Modern and Contemporary History of Mali
- 1.3 Geography
- 1.4 Territorial and Administrative Units
- 1.5 Population
- 1.6 Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion
- 1.7 Health
- 1.8 Education and Literacy
- 1.9 Country Economy

2. Political and Security Context

- 2.1 The Constitution of Mali
- 2.2 Elections
- 2.3 Political Parties
- 2.4 Key Political Leaders
- 2.5 Media Landscape and Civil Society
- 2.6 Security Sector

3. Law Enforcement Structures and Actors

- 3.1 The Police
- 3.2 Other Security Forces
- 3.3 The Judiciary

4. Migrations and Human Rights issues

- 4.1 Internal and International Migration
- 4.2 Human Rights Situation

5. The UN and Mali

- 5.1 The UN in Mali
- 5.2 . UN Security Council Resolutions on Mali

6. The EU - Mali Relations

- 6.1 The challenge for stabilisation
- 6.2 EU – Mali security cooperation

7. Other regional organisations and Mali

- 7.1 Mali and African Organisations
- 7.2 G5 Sahel and Mali

8. Other Practical Info

- 8.1 Local Customs Cultural Awareness
- 8.2 Medical Travel Recommendations for Mali
- 8.3 Other Travel Info
- 8.4 Radio Transmissions

9. Useful contacts

Sources

Bibliography

1. Country Profile

1.1 Country in Brief



Formal Name: Republic of Mali (Rèpublique du Mali)

Previous formal names: French Sudan (under France colonial rule)

Population: 14,5 million (2009 census)

Term for Citizens: Malians

Area (sq km): 1,240,192

Capital City: Bamako

Independence: 20 June 1960, from France, as Mali Federation.
22 September 1960 as Mali

1.2 Modern and Contemporary History of Mali

Early History

The embryo of the modern Malian State dates back to the Kingdom of Ouagadou, founded by Kaya Magan Cissé, a noble of the Soninke ethnic group and progenitor of the Cissé Tounkara dynasty, and started to develop from the 3rd century AD. in a region between central-northern Mali and south-eastern Mauritania. Thanks to the fruitful trades of salt and gold and to slash-and-burn agriculture methods, the Kingdom of Ouagadou began to expand in the surrounding territories, building a rudimentary administrative organization, based on vassalage, and transforming itself into the Ghanaian Empire (Ghana is the Soninke word for "warrior", "hero"). At its height, in the eleventh century, the Ghanaian Empire was one of the richest states of Africa and of the then known world, and its capital, Koumbi Saleh, counted 20,000 inhabitants. The empire's borders extended to southern Mali and to part of the territory of present-day Senegal. Beginning in the twelfth century, the empire entered its declining phase and started to disintegrate for the rebellions of the southern vassal tribes (Songhai, Mandè) and the simultaneous expansionist pressure of the Tuaregs from the north and the Muslim Berber dynasty Almoravid from the east. In the 13th century, on the ashes of the Ghanaian Empire, thanks to the conquests and to the diplomatic skill of King Soundiata Keïta (Diata Konat), the Empire of Mali was born. It was the first state with an Islamic majority in West Africa. Soundiata Keïta was able in building an alliance between the Malinke, Bambara, Wolof and Toucouleur peoples, creating a multi-ethnic, multi-religious confederal state entity administered by local governors. The Empire of Mali, whose boundaries retraced those of the Ghanaian Empire in its greatest expansion, was an example of tolerance and multiculturalism, as evidenced by the famous "Charte du Manden", the transcription of the coronation speech of Soundiata Keïta, one of the first historical documents concerning the recognition and protection of fundamental human rights. Like its predecessor, the Empire of Mali was also crushed by internal struggles, especially the ones about the succession to the throne, and by the expansionist pressure of the Tuareg tribes of the north, which culminated with the conquest of Timbuktu in 1433. In the early decades of 1400, the arrival of Portuguese colonists and merchants enriched the coastal communities of today's Senegal, prompting them to rebel against the emperor. All these factors of destabilization led to the disintegration of the Mali Empire in the fourteenth century and its progressive absorption by the Songhai Empire. The latter, born as a vassal state (Kingdom of Gao), experienced an extraordinary territorial expansion that transformed it into the largest empire of West Africa from the fifteenth century, with an authority that expanded from present-day Mali to Senegal. and to northern Nigeria. The main architect of this expansion was the warlord Sonni Ali Ber, who defeated the Tuareg and Fulani tribes and recreated the administrative and legal structure of the Mali Empire, based on decentralization and religious tolerance. However, the heirs of Sonni Ali Ber decided to start a different religious policy, beginning with the forced Islamization of the populations of the

Empire. This work was initiated by King Sarakollè Mohammed Tourè (Askia Mohamed), the progenitor of the Askia dynasty, the one who brought the apex to the Songhai Empire in the middle of the 16th century. However, the decline rapidly followed the apogee, again due to internal ethnic conflicts and pressure from outside, particularly from the troops of the Moroccan Kingdom led by the Saadi dynasty. In fact, in 1591, in the famous battle of Tondibi, the Saadian troops, led by Djouder Pacha, defeated the Songhai army, decreeing the end of the Empire. From then on, in West Africa there would not have been other kingdoms as vast and powerful as the Songhai Empire. The disintegration following the defeat of Tondibi generated several minor kingdoms: the Bambara Kingdom of Kaarta (17th century - 1854), the Bambara Kingdom of Sègou (17th century - 1861) and the Fulani Empire of Macina (1818 - 1861). All three of these kingdoms were attacked and defeated by el-Hadj Oumar Tall, founder of the Toucouleur Empire, who absorbed them after declaring the jihad against them in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, Oumar Tall's aspirations for greatness had to surrender to the inexorable advance of French colonization, destined to incorporate today's states of Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania and Senegal by the end of the nineteenth century.

French colonization

The French colonization of Mali was part of the second wave of colonial expansion started by Paris soon after the conquest of Algiers (1830). France, eager to build its second colonial empire by increasing its African possessions, began the conquest of West Africa with Senegal (1870). The territories of present-day Mali were assimilated between 1878 (conquest of Saboucirè) and 1899 (conquest of Gao), according to a mixed strategy that employed both the military and the diplomatic instrument to subject the tribal kingdoms of the region. The Malian territory, called Haut-Sénégal-Niger in 1890, became part of French West Africa in 1895, the federation that united the colonial possessions corresponding to the current countries of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Benin and Niger. The current borders of Mali were established by a French decree of 1904 which, at the time, marked the administrative division of colonial possessions. In 1920, Mali assumed the name of French Sudan. Based on the bureaucratic and administrative model of *assimilation*, French colonial domination was strongly centralized. French West Africa was governed by a Governor-general, appointed by Paris and assisted by a Vice-Governor-General and a dense network of administrators and mayors, one for each city. The French mainly developed irrigated crops, whose products were exported to the metropolis. The investments in the period 1928-1939 amounted to 4 billion francs and concentrated on the production of peanuts, cotton and rice.

Decolonization process and independence

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the economic unsustainability of the management of the colonies and the

progressive aspiration for independence, inspired by the UN Charter and by the activism of local African political leaders, pushed the colonial empires towards disintegration. Initially, it was France itself that led the process of colonial reform and gradual self-determination of the indigenous peoples. In 1945, with the amendment of the Constitution and the birth of the Fourth Republic, France and its colonies were transformed into the French Union, a political structure composed by the French Republic (Metropolitan France), the Overseas departments and the Overseas territories. Mali became an Overseas territory, retaining its name of French Sudan. This change in status led to new rights for the inhabitants: the subjects of the colonial empire became French citizens and could elect their representatives in Parliament for the first time. However, the new status was not egalitarian, since two categories of citizens were maintained: citizens with French civil status and citizens with local status, with two separate constituencies in the Overseas territories: that of French nationals and that of the natives. In most territories the right to vote was limited to a few citizens with special administrative functions or civil / military decorations and local assemblies had limited power. In any case, in the first elections of 1945, Fily Dabo Sissoko, the first citizen of French Sudan to sit in the French National Assembly, was elected. Ten years later, with the modification of the legal regime of the Overseas Territories and the administrative decentralization provided for by the Defferre law, it was also possible in French Sudan to elect local bodies with more executive powers. In this context, two positions clashed in French West Africa: the first, called federalist and supported by the Malian and Senegalese political elite, pressed for the creation of a federation that would bring together all the Overseas territories in a single state structure; the second, called anti-federalist and backed by the Ivorian political elite, was responsible for maintaining the administrative division in force, creating one General Council for each State that were to send delegates to the Grand Council of French West Africa. The anti-federalist position prevailed. In 1956, Modibo Keita, one of the leaders of the Sudanese Union - African Democratic Rally (SU-ADR), the first Malian political party, was elected mayor of Bamako. In 1958, as part of the French constitutional reform, promoted by General De Gaulle and functional to the birth of the Fifth Republic, the French Union was transformed into a French Community, modelled on the British Commonwealth. In this sense, three alternatives were proposed to the Overseas territories: 1) to maintain their status; 2) to become an Overseas department and to be fully integrated into the French Republic; 3) to become independent of the French Republic and be a member of the French Community. Mali opted for the third option, officially becoming an autonomous republic within the French Community and changing its name to Sudanese Republic. Leading the process of progressive independence from France was Modibo Keita, elected the next year as President of the Grand Council of French West Africa. Between 1959 and 1960, in accordance with federalist principles, the Sudanese Republic and the Republic of Senegal joined and formed one new state, the Mali Federation, with Modibo Keita as President. The political experiment was short-lived because of the differences between the Malian and Senegalese leaders, culminating in the crisis of August 1960, when disagreements arose over institutional appointments. Specifically, August 18, 1960, fearing Senegalese secession,

President Keita ordered Colonel Soumare, head of the armed forces, to mobilize some units to guard polling stations and institutional buildings in view of the looming presidential election. The following day, during an extraordinary Council of Ministers, Keita dismissed the Vice-President, the Senegalese Mamadou Dia, and decreed a state of emergency. In response, on 20 August, Dia, supported by the gendarmerie led by the Senegalese, arrested Colonel Soumare. The same evening, the Senegalese parliamentarians voted for the independence of Senegal and the dissolution of the Mali Federation. Subsequently, after a month of intense negotiations, Keita accepted Senegalese independence and proclaimed the independence of the Sudanese Republic, giving it the official name of the Republic of Mali. It was September 22, 1960.

The First Republic

Once it became independent, Mali renounced the development model created by France and turned towards a socialist economy inspired by the Soviet system. Thus, the Malian economic system became strongly centralized and based on three pillars: collective farms (maliforo in the Bambara language), export of raw materials (gold and salt) and construction of a small local industry (ceramics, cement, conservation of food). The adoption of a socialist economic model corresponded to a diplomatic rapprochement with the Warsaw Pact countries. In fact, Mali, after denouncing the French interference in the internal affairs of his former colonies, took a critical attitude towards Paris and officially entered the block of non-aligned countries. This stance allowed Bamako to maintain excellent relations with both Moscow and Washington. With regard to domestic politics, the first years of independence were characterized by the outbreak of the Tuareg uprising, a conflict that would have accompanied the country throughout its future history. Specifically, in 1962, the Tuareg tribes of the north, wishing to gain independence from Mali, whose administration was dominated by Christians ethnic Mandè, and form their own state (called Azawad), began a long campaign of guerrilla warfare against the Armed forces. The rebellion took the name of "Alfellaga" (revolt, revolution in the Tuareg language). The rebels took advantage of their great knowledge of the desert terrain and of the successes of a military tactic based on hit and run attacks. However, the Malian army, equipped with modern Soviet weapons and strong supported by Morocco and Algeria, managed to repress the uprising, forcing the Tuareg to sign a ceasefire agreement (1964) and establishing a tough military administration in the northern territories. In addition to the Tuareg revolts, President Modibo Keita had to face a fierce internal opposition. In fact, Keita had progressively centralized power in his own hands, creating a system of government based on a de facto dictatorship of the Sudanese Union - African Democratic Rally, to which was integrated a youth militia charged with increasing surveillance and repression of potential subversive subjects. Keita's cesarist ambitions and willingness to repress the opposition culminated in the two-year period 1967-1968, when the Sudanese Union-African Democratic Rally's political office was replaced by the National Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (NCDR) and the National Assembly was dissolved, allowing the President to govern by decree. Keita's growing authoritarianism further exacerbated opposition's positions, including within civil

institutions and Armed Forces. The discontent exploded violently on November 19, 1968, when a group of Army officers, led by Lieutenant Moussa Traorè, made a coup and overthrew the Keita regime. The Sudanese Union - African Democratic Rally was dissolved, declared illegal and had to go underground.

The Second Republic

The first political action of Moussa Traorè was to establish a National Liberation Military Committee that governed by decree under a state of emergency. In this context, the Military Committee abolished the 1960 Constitution, replacing it with a new Basic Law, and rising to the supreme body of the State, with Moussa Traorè as President. The new head of state immediately adopted the same style of government of his predecessor, centralizing all the powers in their hands, eliminating possible competitors and, above all, repressing the opposition, among which stood out the Malian Labor Party and the National Union of Workers of Mali. Cleared the field of possible obstacles, Traorè approved a new Constitution (1974) after a referendum - farce that obtained 97.71% of the consents. Two years later, in 1976, the President banned all political parties, establishing the single-party regime of the Malian People's Democratic Union, assisted by the National Youth Union of Mali, an organisation created to control young people and to reduce the influence of the student union and other clandestine organizations favourable to the democratization of the country. Despite the strict control of society and national political life, Traorè was unable to prevent the slow, but gradual, consolidation of a widespread opposition. It was the young people who led the first protests against the regime in 1977, followed shortly after by the Mali Party for Democracy and the Revolution, the first political organisation to publicly stand against the President at a convention in Timbuktu in 1979. After a decade of stalemate and limited activities due to government repression, the struggle for the democratization of Mali resumed vigorously in the 90s, led by the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adéma), an organization that brought together the main parties and the main groups of civil society under the banner of the fight against the Traorè regime. Although the government had forbidden the activity of Adéma and all the parties that composed it, the popular protest continued to mount. In a country paralyzed by strikes and peaceful demonstrations, the Armed Forces again decided to intervene, as had happened in 1968 to remove Modibo Keita. On March 26, 1991, Moussa Traorè was arrested by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré. The management of the process of democratic transition was entrusted to the Transition Committee for the Salvation of the People, a council composed by ten soldiers and fifteen civilians, including four representatives of youth associations and two of the Tuareg movements. In 1992 the multi-party system was reintroduced and a referendum was held to change the Constitution, approved with 98.35% of the votes. Subsequently, municipal and parliamentary elections enshrined the victory of the Adéma bloc and the rise to the peak of the state of its candidate Alpha Oumar Konaré, elected President on April 26, 1992. In addition to the political protests in Bamako, a decisive role for the fall of the regime Moussa Traorè was played by the Tuareg rebel movements, who returned to fight in 1990. The Tuareg had strong resentment towards the Malian central government since 1964, when the repression of the Armed Forces

caused the exodus of the local populations in neighbouring countries. Taking advantage of the crisis of the Moussa Traorè regime, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (PMLA), led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, began to attack outposts and military bases in the northern regions, causing the outbreak of the civil war. Compared to 1962-1964, this time the Tuareg manage to mobilize a large part of the population in the armed conflict, obtaining the support of the Arab groups, gathered in the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad. As evidence of the rebels' unity, they gave life to a common front, called Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad, composed of the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad, of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (PMLA), expression of the Tuareg tribal confederation Ifoghas (town of Kidal), of the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Azawad (RALA), expression of the Tuareg Imghad tribe, and of the Popular Front of Liberation of Azawad, expression of the Tuareg tribal confederation Ansar (Timbuktu). The desire to end the hostilities and drive the country towards democratic stability led the new government of Konaré to sign a peace agreement with the Tuareg in 1992. This agreement included the integration of former rebels into public institutions, including the Armed Forces, the reduction of the military presence in the northern regions, the decentralization of powers in favour of local organizations in the northern regions, the resumption of economic activities and the implementation of the main programs of socio-economic development in the medium and long term. However, the Bamako government delayed the implementation of the peace agreements, prompting the Tuareg to resume the armed struggle. However, to avoid the degeneration of the civil war, President Konaré did not send the army to the North, but supported the creation of Songhay ethnic militias that opposed the Tuareg armed groups. Among these, the most important was the Patriotic Movement Ganda Koy, mainly active in Gao. The Tuareg guerrilla warfare continued until 1996, when the start of economic development programs in the northern regions pushed the Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu militias to lay down their arms.

The Third Republic

The first parliamentary term of Konaré was focused on the peace process with the Tuareg rebels and on the implementation of democratic reforms after about 30 years of authoritarian regime. Despite promises of change and expectations of economic development, the country continued to be characterized by widespread poverty, corruption and nepotism. In 1997 the presidential and municipal elections were called in an atmosphere of tension between the opposition and the authorities. The first round of elections, organized on April 13, 1997, was invalidated by the Constitutional Court for fraud. The government's refusal to stop the electoral process as required by the opposition, grouped in the Collective of Opposition (COPPO), contributed to exacerbate the tensions. The elections, held July 20, 1997 and August 3, 1997 but boycotted by the opposition, decreed the victory of Alpha Oumar Konaré and his party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali-African Party for Solidarity and Justice (ADM-APSJ). In any case, the authoritarian attitude of the government, that arrested the main opposition leaders, specifically Me Mountaga Tall, Almamy Sylla, Youssouf Traore and Seydou Badian Kouyatè, weighed on the electoral process. In September 2001, Amadou Toumani Touré,

known as ATT and hero of the revolt against the Moussa Traoré regime, obtained his early retirement from the Army to run for the presidential elections of the following year. His popularity allowed him to win both in 2002 and in 2007, with results exceeding 62%. Like its predecessors, ATT was also accused of having a personalist and self-referential management of power, a repressive attitude towards the opposition and a weak will to progress the peace process with the Tuareg rebel groups of the North. In terms of foreign policy, the administration of Touré was characterized by a significant rapprochement with China, the Persian Gulf countries and the United States. In particular, the partnership with Washington became fundamental in the context of the common fight against jihadist terrorism that, since the mid-2000s, had become the main threat to the security and stability of both Mali and the whole Sahel-Sahara area.

The Tuareg rebellion of 2012 and the ongoing conflict in the North

Dissatisfied with the failure to implement the 1996 peace deal and inspired by the revolutionary wave of the so-called "Arab Springs" of North Africa, the Tuareg decided to resume the armed struggle in order to achieve the so desired independence. In this sense, a very important role was played by the Libyan crisis and the collapse of the Libyan regime (September 2011). Indeed, the collapse of state institutions and the disintegration of the Armed Forces drove thousands of Gaddafi-loyalist Tuareg mercenaries to return home and declare war on the Bamako government. In this sense, the looting of the Libyan arsenals and the availability of a large quantity of modern armaments offered the Tuareg a significant advantage over the Malian Armed Forces. Two organizations were leading the rebellion against the Bamako government: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), formed by the secularist Tuareg tribal confederation Idnan of Timbuktu, and by Ansar al-Din (the Protectors of the Faith), formed by the jihadist Tuareg tribal confederation Ifoghas of Kidal. Ansar al-Din, led by the old rebel Iyad Ag Ghali, had the support of the main terrorist organizations in the region, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), the Movement for the Oneness of God and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Boko Haram. In this sense, Ansar al-Din represented the process of penetration of the North African jihadist networks in the Sahel and the radicalization of part of the Tuareg tribes, disappointed by the behaviour of the central government. The disruptive military offensive allowed the rebel militias, between January and April 2012, to conquer the main cities of the North, including Kidal, Timbuktu, Menaka, Gao, Tessalit and Douentza. During the conflict, the jihadists destroyed some Sufi monuments in Timbuktu, including the historic library and the tombs of the Sufi saints, both judged to be idolatrous or anti-Islamic. On 6 April 2012, Ansar al-Din and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad declared the independence of Azawad and the conclusion of their military operations. The advance of the rebels and the disbandment of the Malian Armed Forces provide a strong wave of discontent with President Touré, accused of being primarily responsible for the bad conduct of the conflict. Between 21 and 22 March, Army members stationed in Bamako carried out a coup d'état, dismissing Touré and creating an emergency military government, called the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and the State (NCRDS) and chaired by Captain Amadou Sanogo. The

coup was condemned by the European Union and the African Union. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took charge of the mediation efforts between military and civil authorities, favouring amnesty for the coup leaders and allowing, on April 6, the transfer of powers to the National Assembly and to the new Interim President Diounkounda Traoré. The following months, between June and September, while the new Malian transitional institutions were settling and managing the delicate relations with the Armed Forces, within the self-declared State of Azawad a conflict broke out between Ansar al-Din and the NMLA. In fact, while Ansar al-Din and its jihadist allies intended to build an administration based on the Koranic law (Sharia), the NMLA intended to impose a secularist legal regime based on the Tuareg customary law. Military and numerical superiority allowed the victory of Ansar al-Din and the jihadist front, which turned Azawad into an Islamic emirate. For the first time in its history, a North African jihadist organization had become territorialized, had built a complex administrative and bureaucratic system and had managed the administration of goods and services for the local population. Unable to defeat the rebels alone, the Malian government asked for help from ECOWAS, who immediately prepared the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), a force of about 2,000 soldiers. However, the presence of AFISMA failed to hinder Ansar al-Din's military operations. In fact, starting from January 2013, the Tuareg jihadist militias began a new offensive that led them to conquer Konna and Mopti. Concerned by the possibility that the jihadist forces could arrive in a few days to threaten the capital Bamako, the French government decided to intervene militarily in support of Mali. On 11 January, the French Armed Forces launched the Serval operation. Almost simultaneously, the NMLA militias of Timbuktu, disappointed by the attitude of Ansar al-Din, decided to join the government front, also seduced by the political offerings of greater institutional participation in the new Malian government. The French intervention proved decisive for the fate of the conflict. In fact, thanks to the support of French troops, the Malian army managed to reconquer all the northern regions by April 2013, forcing the militias of Ansar al-Din and other terrorist groups to take refuge in the desert and rural areas. From then on, the military campaign of the Tuareg rebels would have been marked by terrorist attacks and guerrilla operations against the Malian Armed Forces, French troops and African military contingents. Once the bloodiest phase of the conflict had passed, the United Nations approved the creation of a stabilization mission for Mali. On April 25th, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission Multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali, MINUSMA) began its activities. MINUSMA, currently active, is composed of 12,000 soldiers from over 20 countries, most of whom Africans. A few days later, the remaining Tuareg militias, gathered under the banner of the High Council of Azawad, abandoned the armed struggle and began negotiations with the government of Bamako. On 11 August, were held the first elections after the coup of the previous year, won by Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, former Prime Minister between 1994 and 2000. The cease-fire was established in September 2013 and went on, among many difficulties and violations, until June 20, 2015, when the Algiers Peace Agreement was signed, the contents of which corresponded those of 1996. From that moment, the conflict

in the north of Mali continues. The presence of terrorist groups and ethnic militias continues to be widespread and attacks on foreign and Malian military personnel take place on a weekly basis. The campaign of insurgency seems destined to continue, albeit in the guerrilla form, until the Tuareg will achieve independence. France, once the Serval mission ended, has prolonged its presence in the Sahel, including the north of Mali, starting, on August 1, 2014, the Barkhane mission, whose aim is to combat jihadist terrorism throughout the region. At the same time, the efforts of the countries of the region have also multiplied. Also starting in 2014, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania founded the G5 Sahel group, a platform aimed at coordinating efforts for development and stability in the area. In 2017, the United Nations authorized the creation of a Task Force of about 10,000 men formed by the military contingents of the G5 Sahel countries. The aim of the Task Force, funded by the European Union, is to create a better security architecture in the region and to neutralize the jihadist groups.

more than 50% of the vote in the first round, a runoff was held on 12 August 2018 between the top two candidates, incumbent President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of the Rally for Mali and Soumaila Cissé of the Union for the Republic and Democracy. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita won a landslide victory in a runoff thanks to 67 percent of the vote, in an election marred by militant attacks and claims of fraud by the opposition. Voter turnout of more than 2.7 million people was a muted 34 percent of the electorate. In his second mandate, Keita will continue to face the task of lifting Mali out of a spiral of Islamist and ethnic bloodshed in the centre and north, where attacks worsened in the months leading up to the vote despite the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force and French troops. The security situation and the militants' ability to spread their influence to other West African countries is a concern to Western powers. Mali is also a main transit point for migrants trying to reach Europe via North Africa's shores.

2018 Presidential elections and the second mandate of Ibrahim Boubakar Keita

Presidential elections were held in Mali on 29 July 2018, with 15 candidates running for Head of the State. As no candidate received

1.3 Geography

Location: Mali is located in north – western Africa. It is bordered by Algeria to the northeast, Niger to the east, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast to the south, Guinea to the south-west, and Senegal and Mauritania to the west.

Area: Mali's total area is approximately 603,550 square kilometres. 1,242,248 square kilometres of landmass

Land Boundaries: Mali is bordered by Algeria (1,376 km), Niger (821 km), Burkina Faso (1,000 km), Ivory Coast (532 km), Guinea (858 km), Senegal (419 km) and Mauritania (419 km). The total length of boundaries is 7,243 kilometres.

Length of Coastline: landlocked country

Maritime Claims: none

Topography: Desert or semi-desert covers about 65% of the country. The territory encompasses three natural zones: the southern cultivated Sudanese zone, central semi-desert Sahelian

zone and northern desert Saharan zone. The terrain is primarily savanna in the south and flat to rolling plains or high plateau (200–500 meters in elevation) in the north. Rugged hills are located in the northeast, with elevations of up to 1,000 meters.

Natural Resources: Mali land is particularly rich in natural resources- The most important are bauxite, copper, diamonds, gold, granite, gypsum, iron ore, kaolin, limestone, lithium, manganese, phosphates, salt, silver, uranium, and zinc. Not all deposits are being exploited.

Land Use: only 5,63 % of Mali's territory is arable land, and 0,1 % is planted to permanent crops

Environmental Factors: in Mali territory is plagued by many environmental issues, including desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, drought, and inadequate supplies of potable water. Soil erosion, deforestation, and loss of pasture land are all major problems for Mali pastoral communities.


1.4 Territorial and Administrative Units

Mali is a unitary republic. Since 2016, Mali is divided into ten regions and the District of Bamako. A new reorganization of the country from eight to nineteen regions was passed into law in 2012, but of the new regions, only Taoudénit and Mènaka have slowly begun to be implemented. They have the governors and the local bodies, but not clear boundaries. So, de facto, Mali is still divided into eight main regions. Each region has a governor. The ten regions in turn are subdivided into 56 cercles and 703 communes.

List of Malian Regions:

- Kayes Region


- Koulikoro Region
- Sikasso Region
- Sègou Region
- Mopti Region
- Tombouctou Region
- Gao Region
- Kidal Region
- Taoudénit Region
- Mènaka Region




1.5 Population

Mali's population has an estimated population of 18 million, according on 2016 data. Population growth rate is 2.7%. The majority of the population lives in rural areas (68%) and about 7% of it is nomadic. Malian population density is 14.7 people per sq. km, but more than 90% of the population lives in the southern part of the country, especially in Bamako, which has over 1 million

residents. The biggest Malian cities are Bamako, Gao, Mopti Sikasso and Segou. The birth rate is 43.9 births over 1,000 population and total fertility rate is 6.14 births per woman. Life expectancy at birth is 49.5 years total (47.6 for males and 51.5 for females), but Mali has one of the world's highest rates of infant mortality, with 106 deaths per 1,000 live births.





SOURCE: Clingendael Institute

1.6 Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion

Ethnic Groups

Mali, like many African countries, has a wide ethnic variety. However, the ethnic groups are highly territorialized and concentrated in specific areas of the country. The most numerous ethnic group is Bambara (34.1% of the population), followed by Fulani, or Peul in Wolof language, (14.7%), Sarakole (10.8%), Senufo (10.5%), Dogon (8.9%), Malinke (8.7%), Bobo (2.9%), Songhai (1.6%) and Tuareg (0.9%). Other smaller ethnic groups are the 6.1% of the population. Tuareg and Maurs (known also as Azawad Arabs) lives in the northern region, while the other ethnic groups lives in the southern regions and share similar historic, cultural, and religious traditions. The Tuareg traditionally have opposed the central government, seeking greater autonomy or full independence. Starting in 1962, Tuareg regularly clashed with the military. The southern ethnic groups are predominantly farmers and benefit from greater representation and greater influence in the civil and military institutions of the country. In contrast, the populations of the north are semi-nomadic breeders and have traditionally suffered marginalization and under-representation in civil and military institutions. The Bambara belongs to the Mandè ethnic group, spread in all West Africa. Their society is patrilineal and patriarchal and their culture is known for its strong fraternal orders and sororities (Ton). The Fulani / Peul are one of the largest ethnic groups in the Sahel and West Africa, widely dispersed across the region. About 2 million Fulani live in Mali, concentrated in the central and southern region of the country. The Tuareg people are a large Berber ethnic confederation. They principally inhabit the Sahara in a vast area stretching from far southwestern Libya to southern Algeria, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Tuareg society is clan-based: each Tuareg clan (tawshet) is made up of family groups constituting a tribe, each led by its chief, the Amghar. A series of tawsheten (plural of tawshet) may bond together under an Amenokal, forming a Kel clan confederation. The Tuareg have been called the "blue people" for the indigo-dye coloured clothes they traditionally wear and which stains their skin. Tuareg society has traditionally featured clan membership, social status and caste hierarchies within each political confederation. The Tuareg still control several trans-Saharan trade routes.

Languages

French is official language of the country, used in public institution, for bureaucracy and official documents. French is the language used in government and in the education sector. French is mostly spoken by people who live in the urban areas. Along with French,



Mali government recognizes the status of national language to other 13 native languages. Between them, the most spoken is Bambara, Manding language said to be spoken by 80% of the population as a first or second language, usually in central and southern Mali. Moreover, Bambara is used as a trade language. Other languages include Soninke (in the region of Kayes in western Mali), Dogon (in central Mali), Bozo, Senufo (in the Sikasso region), Fula as a widespread trade language in the Mopti region and beyond, Songhay along the Niger, Tamasheq and Arabic in the northern regions.

Religion


90 percent of Malian population is Muslim, mostly Sunni belonging to Maliki school of jurisprudence but deeply influenced by Sufism. Very small Ahmadiyya and Shia minorities are also present. Approximately 5% is Christian (about two-thirds Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant denominations) and another 5% percent adheres to indigenous or traditional animist beliefs. Malian Islam is relatively tolerant and moderate. Women participated in economic and political activity, engaged in social interaction, and generally did not wear veils. Islam in Mali has absorbed mystical elements, ancestor veneration and the African Traditional Religion that still thrive. Many aspects of Malian traditional society encourage tolerance, trust, pluralism and respect. Relations between the Muslim majority and other religious minorities are generally stable. It is relatively common to find adherents of a variety of faiths within the same family. Many followers of one religion usually attend religious ceremonies of other religions, especially weddings, baptisms, and funerals. However, during the last decade, various forms of more conservative Wahabi school of thought had begun to spread in some area in the northern and central regions. Starting from 2012, terrorist groups attempted to institute a strict version of Islamic law in the northern parts of the country. Implementation of Sharia in the rebel-controlled north included banning of music, cutting off of hands or feet of thieves, stoning of adulterers and public whipping of smokers, alcohol drinkers and women who are not properly dressed. There are foreign Islamic preachers, usually associated with Dawa groups, that operate in Kidal, Mopti, and Bamako. The Dawa sect has a strong influence in Kidal, while the Wahabi movement has been reported to be growing in Timbuktu.

1.7 Health

Mali faces numerous health challenges related to poverty, malnutrition, and inadequate hygiene and sanitation. Its health and development indicators rank among the worst in the world. Only 65 % of the population has access to safe drinking water and only 69 % to sanitation services of some kind. Moreover, only 8 % has access to modern sanitation facilities. Only 20 % of villages and livestock watering holes had modern water facilities. Mali is dependent on international development organizations and foreign missionary groups for much of its health care. In 2001 general government expenditures on health constituted 6.8% of total general government expenditures and 4.3 % of GDP, totalling about US\$4 per capita. There are three major public hospitals in the greater Bamako region. Medical facilities in Mali are very limited, especially outside of Bamako, and medicines are in short supply. However, Mali still lacks a great number of physicians, as there are only 5 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants. Malaria and other arthropod-borne diseases are prevalent in Mali, as are a number of infectious diseases such as cholera, hepatitis, meningitis, and tuberculosis. The degree of risk for contracting major infection diseases is very high in Mali. Some of the most common food or waterborne diseases include diarrhoea (bacterial and protozoal), hepatitis A, and typhoid fever, all of which pose serious threats to the communities. Malaria and dengue fever are also very common. In 2013 and 2014 there was also a massive Ebola virus outbreak.






Source: WHO



Source: WHO

1.8 Education and Literacy

Mali has a 6-3-3 formal education structure. Primary school has an official entry age of seven and a duration of six grades. Secondary school is divided into two cycles: lower secondary consists of grades 7 - 9, and upper secondary consists of grades 10 - 12. In Mali, the first nine grades of education are referred to as "Enseignement Fondamental". In principle, public education school is free and compulsory through the end of grade 9. Students sit for the *Diplôme d'études fondamentales* (DEF) at the end of grade 9, and the *baccalauréat* at the end of grade 12. The academic year lasts about 24 weeks. However, Mali's primary school enrolment rate is low, in large part because families are unable to cover the cost of uniforms, books, supplies, and other fees required to attend public school. According to UNESCO data and estimates (2015), literacy rate is 33% of the population older than 15 and 13,6% of the population older than 65. Generally speaking, literacy rate is higher within men. For social and religious reasons, female population has little access to education system.



	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	
Literacy rate (%)				
15-24 years	49.37	60.53	39.21	(2015)
15 years and older	33.07	45.07	22.2	(2015)
65 years and older	13.6	21.23	2.66	(2015)

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics


1.9 Country Economy

The economy of Mali is based on agriculture, mostly subsistence agriculture. The country possess also a well-developed mining industry. The country is among the ten poorest nations of the world and is a major recipient of foreign aid from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, Arab Funds, European Union and United States. Mali GDP was 14.05 billion USD in 2016 and the pro capita income was 2,040 dollar per year. The country economy is highly undiversified and vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations and to climate change. Agricultural activities occupy 70% of Mali's labour force and provide 42% of the GDP. Cotton and livestock make up 75%–80% of Mali's annual exports. Small-scale traditional farming dominates the agricultural sector, with subsistence farming of cereals (primarily sorghum, pearl millet, and maize). The most productive agricultural area lies along the banks of the Niger River between Bamako and Mopti and extends south to the borders of Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso. Mali's resource in livestock consists of millions of cattle, sheep, and goats. Approximately 40% of Mali's herds were lost during the great drought in 1983–85 drought. The overall size of Mali's herds is not expected to reach pre-drought levels in the north of the country, where encroachment of the desert has forced many nomadic herders to abandon pastoral activities and turn instead to farming. On the other side, mining has long been an important aspect of the Malian economy. Gold, the third largest source of Malian exports, is still mined in the southern region: at the end of the 20th century Mali had the third highest gold production in Africa. Gold accounted for some 80% of mining activity in the mid-2000s, while there remain considerable proven reserves of other minerals not currently exploited. Unluckily for Malian citizen, most staff employed in the mining industries are foreigners, and residents in the areas of intensive mining complain of little benefit from the industry. Despite deteriorating security, due to conflict in the north, economic performance is strong, with robust growth and, more recently, an apparent drop in poverty rates overall. Robust performance in the agriculture and services sectors led to an estimated growth rate of 5.8% in 2016 (down from 6.0% in 2015) despite volatile security conditions. Inflation has dropped to -1.8%, due to falling food prices and low international oil prices. Substantial public investments have contributed to deterioration in the fiscal position. The overall fiscal balance (including grants) widened from -1.8% of GDP in 2015 to -4.0% in 2016 due to increased public spending, despite big improvements in domestic revenue. Public expenditure and net lending to the central government rose sharply to 22.4 % of GDP from 20.9% in 2015, due to the expansion of capital expenditure. Improved fuel tax policy and reforms to broaden the tax base and rationalize exemptions allowed an increase of tax revenue by 1% of GDP. Growth is projected to stay robust at about 5% over the medium term, in line with Mali's long-run potential growth rate. Agricultural growth is underpinned by favourable weather and positive effects from input subsidy reform. Services growth will continue in telecoms, transport, and trade. Inflation is projected to be moderate for as long as agricultural production keeps food prices at bay. Sustained efforts on fiscal adjustment through the rationalization of current expenditure and improved tax revenue

would lower the fiscal balance from 4.3% of GDP in 2016 to 3.0% in 2019. However, debt sustainability is vulnerable to a tightening of financial conditions, such as lower remittances, lower foreign direct investment, or lower commodity prices. Despite economic recovery and efforts to gradually restore the government's ability to provide basic social services, three major challenges remain. First is lasting improvement in the security situation, a key factor in development. Second is private-sector development, which requires improving governance in public management by better mobilizing resources for growing investment needs, boosting the quality of public investment, distributing resources equitably across the country's regions and priority sectors, and achieving transparency in public procurement. Third is generating strong and inclusive economic growth, given the constraints created by the structural fragility of the economy and strong population growth of 3.6%.

Main Indicators	2015	2016	2017	2018 (e)	2019 (e)
GDP (billions USD)	13.11	14.04	15.00e	16.34	17.30
GDP (Constant Prices, Annual % Change)	6.0	5.8	5.3e	5.0	4.7
GDP per Capita (USD)	740e	768e	794e	837	858
General Government Gross Debt (in % of GDP)	30.665	35.887	34.698e	35.519	36.855
Inflation Rate (%)	1.4	-1.8	0.2e	1.2	1.6
Current Account (billions USD)	-0.70	-1.00	-1.05e	-0.91	-0.98
Current Account (in % of GDP)	-5.3	-7.1	-7.0e	-5.6	-5.7

Source: IMF – World Economic Outlook Database - Latest available data.



Source: INSTAT.

2. Political and Security Context

2.1 The Constitution of Mali

The current Constitution of Mali was approved a referendum on 12 January 1992, after the fall of Moussa Traorè regime. The constitution is largely inspired by the constitution of the French 5th Republic. The constitution provides for multi-party democracy within a semi-presidential system. The President is the chief of state and head of the armed forces. He is elected to a five-year term, with a limit of two terms, and appoints the prime minister as head of the government. The Prime Minister is responsible to the National Assembly of Mali and can be removed by a no confidence vote. The constitution provides the only prohibition against parties on ethnic, gender, regional or religious grounds. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the National Assembly. The Judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. The National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale) has 160 members, elected for a five-year term, 147 members elected in single-seat constituencies and 13 members elected by Malians abroad. The National Assembly is the sole legislative arm of the government. The term of office is 5 years. In 2017, there was the attempt to change the Constitution In the aftermath of the 2012 uprising in northern Mali, the Algiers Accord was signed in June 2015. Its purpose was to provide greater autonomy to the country's sparsely populated northern regions, put an end to the cycle of violence and bring about much-needed stability. Because Mali's 1992 Constitution only recognizes a central government, while the accord called for devolving political and economic powers to the regions, implementing the Algiers Accord requires changing the constitution. Since 1992, two attempts to reform the constitution failed for lack of political or popular support. They were regarded as attempted power grabs. In 2017, the revision called for the establishing a Senate as a second parliamentary body, with two-thirds of senators elected and the remaining third simply appointed by the president. The president would also gain the right to dismiss the prime minister and appoint the head of the constitutional court which decides on the constitutionality of laws as well as validates the winner of presidential elections. The revision would also allow changes to the constitution without a referendum. The constitutional changes concerning new regions were supposed to happen as part of a 2015 peace deal, aiming to end the separatist Tuareg movement. It would also recognise their claims to a degree of autonomy by officially labelling the northern desert regions by their Tuareg name, Azawad. A constitutional referendum was planned to be held in Mali on 9 July 2017. However, in late June it was postponed with no date set, after thousands of Malians have taken to the streets to protest against it.

2.2 Elections

Parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held on 25 November and 16 December of 2018, but were moved to April 2019 due to organization problems and security concerns

Presidential election, July the 28th (first round) and August the 11th (second round), 2013

Emerging from a severe political crisis that had encapsulated the country for almost a year and a half, Mali staged a remarkably comeback when the country held successful presidential elections. The Presidential elections of 2013 came after the most bloody phase of the civil war (2012-2013) and the ceasefire agreement of 2013. Behind the exceptionally high turnout of 48.9%, there was a strong sentiment of national revival. The winner was Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (nicknamed IBK) after defeating Soumaila Cissé in the run-off with the 77.7% of the votes. The result proved that he has gained a legitimate mandate that should allow him the political space necessary to implement the difficult reforms needed to overcome the crisis. The quality of the 2013 elections and the victory of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita were interpreted as a signal of a possible break with the political culture of patronage and corruption that had come to dominate in Mali. The first and second rounds of the presidential elections on July 28th and August 11th 2013, respectively, were conducted in a very particular context, following as they did on the heels of the most severe crisis that Mali has ever experienced. However, the outcome of the elections is a clear sign that the Malian people wanted to use the ballot box to bring about a change in the way in which their country was governed. The Malian electorate signalled clearly that it desired to see a renewal of the political class and the emergence of a real democracy, and not a "banana-republic-type" democracy based on bribes, corruption and lies. Thus, faced with significant internal pressure as well as from external donors eager to see the emergence of a legitimate power that could contribute to the stabilisation of Mali, the transitional government of Mali (TGM) was forced to hold presidential elections on July 28th against the advice of the Independent Electoral Commission, which was in favour of a much later date. In the first round the voters had 28 candidates to choose from. However, only four of these were considered real political heavyweights: Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Soumaila Cisse, Dramane Dembele and Modibè Sidibè. Keita won the first round with 39.23% of the vote; Cisse came second with 19.44%, while Sidibé and Dembele only collected, respectively, 9.59% and 4.87%, finishing third and fourth. Because no candidate gained more than 50% of the vote in the first round, on August 11th Keita and Cisse contested the second round of presidential elections as the two frontrunners from the first round.

Parliamentary election, November the 24th, 2013


Shortly after the presidential elections, Mali people elected the Members of Parliament. The two most important contenders were the parties liked to the President Keita and his main opponent Soumaila Cissé. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's party, Rally for Mali, won 66 of the 147 seats in the National Assembly, with its allies winning an additional 49 seats, giving it a substantial majority. The

Union for the Republic and Democracy, led by Soumaila Cissé, won 17 seats, becoming the opposition.


The elections had originally been planned for July 2012, but were postponed after the Tuareg Rebellion and the March 2012 coup d'état. Turnout was put at 37.2%, a fall from 48.9 % of the presidential elections, which itself was considered disappointing.

Upcoming elections, from April to November 2018


Mali will hold regional, presidential and national elections in various stages, beginning in April and ending in November. In December 2017, prime minister Abdoulaye Maiga resigned along with his government, dealing a devastating blow to president Keita, who is seeking re-election. Last September, Kalifa Sanogo, the mayor of Sikasso, also declared himself a candidate for the 2018 presidential polls. The move complicates the situation given that his party, the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adema), supports Keita's Rally For Mali (RPM) in parliament and was not expected to field a separate presidential candidate. The political and security situation significantly deteriorated since mid-2017. The resumption of fighting between the signatory armed groups in northern Mali, growing insecurity in the centre of the country and mounting political turmoil surrounding the constitutional review process delayed the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. In response to these challenges, MINUSMA extended its good offices to assist Malian parties in finding solutions to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement. The decision by Mali's government to postpone regional and municipal council elections, amid concerns over security, sent a bad signal for the prospect of long-term stability in the West African country. The territorial, administrative and municipal council elections, planned for 17 December 2017, were postponed to April 2018 to give the government "more time to organise absolutely inclusive elections", Tieman Hubert Coulibaly, Mali's minister of territorial administration, said in a statement 26 November 2017. The Malian government's main problem is that it suffers from a lack of legitimacy.



Presidential election first round – source electionguide.org



Presidential election second round – source electionguide.org



National Assembly composition – source Wikipedia

2.3 Political Parties

RASSEMBLEMENT POUR LE MALI



Rally for Mali (Rassemblement pour le Mali, RPM)

Full member of the Socialist International, the Rally for Mali is a leftist party created by Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in June 2001, after he resigned from Prime Minister in 2000. Keita created Rally for Mali in the attempt of putting together the institutional opposition to President Konaré. In the first round of 2002 presidential election, Keïta won 21.04% of the vote, finishing third, after the official Soumaïla Cissé and Amadou Toumani Touré. In 2013, RPM candidate Keita was elected President of Mali the party took first place in parliamentary elections, winning 66 seats, although not enough for a majority.



Adéma-PASJ

Alliance for Democracy in Mali – Pan-African Party for Liberty, Solidarity and Justice (Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali – Parti Pan-Africain pour la Liberté, la Solidarité et la Justice, ADEMA-PASJ)

ADEMA was founded in 1990 by the opponents of the dictatorship of Moussa Traoré as an umbrella movement including Sudanese Union/African Democratic Rally (Soudanaise-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, US-RDA), the Malian Party for Revolution and Democracy (le Parti malien pour la révolution et la démocratie, PMDR), the Malian Party of Labour (Parti malien du travail, PMT) and the Malian Popular and Democratic Front (le Front démocratique et populaire malien, FDP). On 1991, after the regime of Moussa Traoré was

overthrown by General Amadou Toumani Touré, ADEMA transformed itself into an official political party and took the name Alliance for Democracy in Mali-African Party for Solidarity and Justice (ADEMA-Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice, ADEMA-PASJ). The party is a full member of the Socialist International. At the parliamentary elections of 2013, the party took the 11,5% of the votes and won 16 seats, stabilizing its position of third political force of Mali.



Union for the Republic and Democracy (Union pour la République et la Démocratie, URD)

The Union for the Republic and Democracy was formed as a splinter cell of ADEMA made by the supporter of who supporter of Soumaïla Cissé during the 2002 election. Actually, URD is the second largest force in Mali, as granted by the results of 2013 presidential elections (23% for its candidate Soumaïla Cissé) and parliamentary elections (22,6% of the votes and 17 seats earned).



Alternative Forces for Renewal and Emergence (Forces Alternatives pour le Renouveau et l'Emergence, FARE)

FARE was founded in 2013 as a platform to sustain the presidential candidature of Modibo Sidibé. He finished fourth, with around 5% of the vote. In the 2013 parliamentary elections

FARE won six seats, becoming the fourth-largest party in the National Assembly.



Convergence for the Development of Mali (Convergence pour le développement du Mali, CODEM)

CODEM is a party created in 2008 by Housseini Guindo. Its ideology is pan-Africanism and economic liberalism. In 2013 parliamentary elections it gained 5 seats.



African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (Solidarité Africaine pour la Démocratie et l'Indépendance, SADI)

SADI is the one of the last Malian communist and pan-Africanist parties. It was founded by Cheick Oumar Sissoko and Oumar Mariko in 1996. In 2013 elections it won 5 seats.



National Congress for Democratic Initiative (Congrès national d'initiative démocratique, CNID)

CNID is one of the most long-lived party of Malian political landscape. Created in 1990, it soon became the core of Moussa Traorè opposition movement. Its civic and non-violent activities drove the rebellion that ended in Traorè dismissal in 1991. Between 1992 and 2002, CNID was one of the most important opposition party during the Konaré and Touré political eras. Now, CNID holds a peripheral place in national political scenario. In 2013, it took only 4 seats in the parliament.

2.4 Key Political Leaders



Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta

Born in 1945, Keita was elected President in 2013. Nicknamed IBK or "Kankeletegui" (a man of his word" in the Bambara language), Keita is the leader of RPM and unsuccessfully stood for the presidency in 2002 and 2007. He advocates a tough approach to Islamist and Tuareg separatist rebels in the north, and has a long political career, as stated by his curricula. In fact, he was Prime Minister from 1994 to 2000 and President of the National Assembly from 2002 to 2007. His son Karim is a member of the National Assembly and married to a daughter of Issaka Sidibè, President of the National Assembly. He is seeking re-election for a second mandate in upcoming 2018 presidential elections.



Modibo Keita

He has been Prime Minister on two separate occasions, from March 2002 to June 2002 and from January 2015 to April 2017. In April 2014, he was appointed as President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita's chief representative for negotiations with Tuareg rebels. He is a relative of both President Keita and nation founding father Modibo Keita, his namesake.



Moussa Sinko Coulibaly

Former minister and director-general of the Peacekeeping School in Bamako, Moussa Coulibaly was a former army general who quitted the Armed Forces to begin the political career. Graduate of the prestigious French military school of Saint-Cyr, General Coulibaly was Minister of Territorial Administration. He will run for the presidency in upcoming elections of 2018.



Abdoulaye Idrissa Maïga

Maïga was the Prime Minister from April 2017 to December 2017. Previously he was Minister of Defence since September 2016. Maïga previously served as Minister of Territorial Administration and Minister for the Environment, Water and Sanitation. Maïga was born in Gao.



Moussa Mara

Moussa Mara was Prime Minister of Mali from 2014 to 2015. At the time, he was the younger Malian Prime Minister. Previously he served in the government as Minister of Town

Planning, and he was an unsuccessful candidate in the 2013 presidential election.



Mohamed Ag Intalla

Member of the National Assembly since 2013, is also the Amenokal (tribal chief) of the Tuareg confederation Ifoghas of Kidal. When the war in Mali began in 2012, he refused to join a rebel movement, unlike his father, who supported the MNLA and his brother Alghabass, who joined Ansar al-Din. On May 2, 2013, Mohamed Ag Intalla founded the High Council of Azawad, which later became the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) a non-violent group that support a negotiated political solution to the northern Mali crisis. He is considered the most important negotiator between the central government of Bamako and Kidal Tuareg community.



Issaka Sidibè

Issaka Sidibè has been President of the National Assembly of Mali since January 2014. He previously served in the National Assembly from 2002 to 2007.. He had a career as a customs official before his turn to politics. In the 2002 parliamentary elections he was elected to the National Assembly. He served a single five-year term. Sidibè was the general rapporteur for the finance commission during his time in office. He is a RPM member and close ally of president Keita.



Soumaïla Cissé

Born in Timbuctu in 1949, Cissé was the contender of Keita in 2018 presidential elections. Soumaïla Cissé studied at l'Institut des Sciences de l'Ingénieur de Montpellier in France to become a software engineer. He worked in several large French companies (IBM-France, le Groupe Pechiney, le Groupe Thomson and the aerospace company Air Inter) before returning to Mali in 1984 to work at the Compagnie malienne pour le développement des textiles (CMDT). Cissé was elected as the Third Vice-President of ADEMA-PASJ at the party's first extraordinary congress, held between November 25 and November 28, 2000. In January 2002, he resigned from the government to devote himself to preparation for the 2002 presidential election, and ADEMA-PASJ selected him as its candidate to succeed Alpha Oumar Konaré. Cissé took second place in the first round of the election but he lost to Amadou Toumani Touré in the second round. Considering himself overthrown by a faction of ADEMA-PASJ, Cissé left the party with a group of loyalists to found the URD in June 2003.



Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga

Born in June 1954, he is Prime Minister of Mali since 31 December 2017. The leader of the Alliance for Solidarity in Mali, he previously served in the government as Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Amadou Toumani Touré from April 2011 until the March 2012 coup d'état. Later he was

Minister of Defense from 2013 to 2014 and was Secretary-General of the Presidency from 2016 to 2017. Fine strategist, he is a specialist in security and Defense issues.



Mohamed Ag Erlaf

Born on July 12, 1956 in Tessalit (Kidal Region), he held his first ministerial post as Minister of Tourism in 1991, after the March Revolution. He later became Minister of Health, Minister of Sport, Minister of the Environment, then Minister of Employment, Public Service and Labour, before heading the Department of Public Works and Transportation. Mohamed Ag Erlaf was also coordinator of the Special Program for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali (PSPSDN). Since 2000, he has been the Director General of the National Agency for Local Government Investments (ANICT), position he held until his appointment to the Department of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development in the government led by Modibo Keita. Now he is the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization.



Tièmoko Sangarè

Born in 1957 in Sanankourouni in the Bougouni circle, he is a founding member and current president of ADEMA-PASJ. Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs from September 2018. Holder of a PhD in geodesy at the Institute of Geodesy Engineers, Aerial Photos and Cartography of Moscow, Tièmoko Sangarè taught at the National School of Engineers of Bamako (ENI). He was Deputy Director General of ENI from 1991 to

1992. In 2003, he became technical adviser at the Ministry of State Property and Land Affairs and, in 2007, he was appointed Minister of Agriculture in the first government of Modibo Sidibè. After working to secure the support of his party to the Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta candidate for re-election, Tièmoko becomes the vice-president of the latter's campaign.

2.5 Media Landscape and Civil Society

Media Landscape

The media environment in Bamako and the rest of the south is relatively open, with sporadic reports of censorship and self-censorship. However, Mali's ongoing conflict in the north and attacks by Islamist militants undermines the security situation, making reporting in some areas of the country a dangerous task for domestic and foreign journalists alike. Mali's media landscape remained relatively open, allowing new media businesses to expand and journalists generally free to continue their work. Freedom of speech is guaranteed under Article 4 of the 1992 constitution, but no legislation guarantees the confidentiality of journalists' sources. A press law passed in 2000 criminalizes offenses such as undermining state security, demoralizing the armed forces, offending the head of state, sedition, and consorting with the enemy. However, journalists are rarely prosecuted. In May 2015, the National Assembly approved the establishment of a new regulatory body, the High Authority for Communications (HAC), replacing the previous High Communications Council.

The media are pluralistic overall, but some private outlets display partisan bias in their reporting, and the state broadcaster, the Malian Office of Radio and Television Broadcasting (ORTM), tends to carry pro-government programming. Continuing instability in the north, as well as the November 2015 terrorist attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, continues to place pressure on journalists to engage in self-censorship when reporting on sensitive topics such as security issues and the performance of the military against jihadist groups. Mali has long hosted a diverse media environment, with more than 300 radio stations operating across the country, as well as roughly 50 newspapers that publish on a regular basis, including the state-owned *L'Essor*. Print circulation. Radio is by far the most popular medium. Most radio stations are community based and receive funding from international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to operate. Some serve larger markets, such as the popular Studio Tamani in

Bamako, which reaches more than 80,000 listeners. Foreign news services, including the British Broadcasting Corporation and Radio France Internationale, are broadcast on FM radio in Bamako and some other areas. The state broadcaster ORTM is the only domestic television station with national reach, and it is under the tight control of the executive branch; the president appoints its general manager based on the recommendation of the minister of communication. Just over 10 percent of Malians were able to access the internet. Online media is very popular with the educated elite and Malians living abroad. Users increasingly consume their content via internet-enabled mobile phones. But connectivity is extremely slow and unreliable, and there is only one private internet service provider currently licensed, resulting in high costs and poor service. Insufficient funding and access to equipment and electricity continue to prevent many media outlets in Mali from operating at full capacity, particularly in the north. Regular blackouts in Timbuktu and Gao, for example, force many radio stations to limit broadcasts to evenings, when power is available. Poor working conditions, including low or non-existent salaries, often lead journalists into unethical practices. Bribery is rampant, and financial pressure from media owners and advertisers force many outlets to skirt critical coverage or provide favourable reports on their backers.

Civil Society

Political and social instability, especially in the north of Mali, continues to negatively impact civic space conditions in the country. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2015, security issues remain a cause for concern, especially in the northern part of the country. Although conditions for free speech and activism were constrained in the immediate aftermath of a 2012 coup, over the last 2 years, people have been increasingly able to exercise their rights to association, peaceful assembly and expression. Nevertheless, police still use excessive force to disperse protests and journalists face a hostile environment when reporting on security issues and the military.

2.6 Security Sector

Central government weakness, adverse impact of climate change and upheaval in the neighbouring Arab world would have presented Mali with major governance challenges under any circumstances. However, it was the serious shortcomings in the Malian security sector that pushed the country over the edge. Under-equipped, under-trained, largely unsupervised and grossly under-representative of its Tuareg population, Mali's security forces failed to prevent the country from plunging into civil war and proved incapable of halting the violence once it was underway. The deficiencies facing the Malian security sector, then as now, are multiple: 1) the perception and, to a great extent, the reality that the primary role of the security actors is to protect the government and only secondarily the population; 2) the government's inability to provide security across national territory; 3) the far-reaching lack of transparency with regard to the activities of the security actors; 4) the lack of oversight over the security actors; 5) a pervasive culture of corruption and complacency in dealing with issues such as arms and drug trafficking; 6) a systemic lack of capacity owing to inadequate budgets, leading to serious equipment and infrastructure shortfalls; 7) weak leadership and managerial capacity on the part of those responsible for the security forces, both at the level of government and at that of the leadership of individual forces. There were several attempts to address these issues, even before the crisis. These included a ten-year Development Programme for the Northern Regions launched in 2008, a Shared Governance Programme for Peace and Security initiated the same year and a Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali that saw the light of day in 2011. In 2010, Mali also began work on a raft of laws on security sector issues and actors. These initiatives had not matured by the time the crisis broke at the end of 2011. In the last 5 years, that situation became worse as jihadist networks spread in Mali northern region and across all Sahel-Sahara areas. The growth and strength of the terrorist movements in the Sahara-Sahel region comes from the mixture of interconnected economic, political and social factors. From an economic point of view, extremist groups show the ability to create a financing system based on the control of illegal trafficking (drugs, weapons, archaeological assets, ivory, precious materials, human beings) in Africa and on the direct taxation of work activities (livestock, agriculture, fishing, trade). From a political point of view, the jihadist organizations of the Sahara-Sahel, well before the Islamic State (IS or Daesh), built a strongly territorialized model of power, based on the direct administration of the rural areas and villages under their control, thus creating emirates in the desert. The territorialisation process was possible thanks to the weakness of the institutions of the countries of the region and the co-optation of the policies and claims of the subordinate and discriminated ethnic groups, first of all the Tuareg, the Fulani / Peul and the Kanuri, favoured by a mixed marriage policy between militiamen of North African origin (mainly Algerian) and local women. Finally, under the social profile, the terrorist networks, thanks to the revenues of illegal trafficking, have established a welfare and education system more effective than the one of the state. The end result of this political, economic and social activity is the spreading of ethnic-tribal self-determination struggle with a strong jihadist imprint and the

establishing of a dense and indistinguishable network of cooperation and coordination between insurrection groups, criminal organizations and terrorist groups. Furthermore, the mixture of crime, insurgency and terrorism has favoured the sedimentation of a flexible, pragmatic and fluid structure comparable to that of the central and South American drug cartels, where lucrative logics and political logic merge into a single common objective. Currently, two main terrorist networks are active in the Sahel - Sahara region, including northern Mali: the Group for the Safeguarding of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State (IS or Daesh), the latter through its two branches of the Great Sahara (IS - GS) and West Africa (IS - WA), the latter better known as Boko Haram. All these organizations are particularly strong and rooted in the rural areas and in the smaller villages, while maintaining operative cells in the most populous capitals and urban centres. The GSIM, an organization part of the qaedist network, is a real jihadist cartel that brings together and coordinates the activities of the Saharan brigade of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM - BS), of the Macina Liberation Front (the MLF), of Ansar al-Din (The protectors of the Faith) and al-Mourabitun (the Sentinels). Ansar al-Din, born in 2012 on the side-lines of the Malian civil war, is the reference group for the Tuareg of the whole region, especially those of the Kel Adrar tribal confederation (Mali, Kidal) and, partially, of Kel Ayr (north of Niger) and Kel Ajjer (Libya, Ghat and Ubari). The tribal affiliation is the backbone of the power of Ansar al-Din, which can count on the control of a territory that extends from the south of Mali (Gao) to the Libyan oases of Ghat and Ubari and the Nigerien cities of Arlit and Agadez. Moreover, thanks to the parental bonds and the tribal identity, Ansar al-Din has capillary contacts with the passeurs (smugglers of migrants) and with the political and military leaders of non-jihadist Tuareg insurgency organizations, such as Aghali Alambo, Amoumoune Kalakouwa del Movement of Nigerians for Justice (MNG), Achafghi Ag Bohada, Alghabass Ag Intalla and Mohamed Ag Intalla of the High Council for Unity of the Azawad and Mustafa Salem of the union of the Libyan militias of the Ghat. The MLF, formed in 2015 and active between Mali and Burkina Faso, regroupes Fulani ethnic militia in the central-western part of the Sahel under its own banner and is led by spiritual leader Amadou Kouffa and military commander Abou Yehiya. Leading Ansar al-Din is Iyad Ag-Ghaly, one of the fathers of the Tuareg insurgency since the 1990s. Just like Ansar al-Din, the MLF also exploits tribal networks and parental affiliations to control a large slice of territory between the southwest of Niger (Tillaberi and Tahoua regions), the north of Burkina Faso and the Malian districts. south of Gao. Unlike the groups mentioned so far, al-Mourabitun does not have a strong ethnic connotation, but rather welcomes Tuareg, Hausa, Fulani, Berbers and Arabs.

In Mali, political and security situation significantly deteriorated since mid-2017. The resumption of fighting between the signatory armed groups in northern region, growing insecurity in the centre of the country and mounting political turmoil surrounding the constitutional review process delayed the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. In response to these challenges, MINUSMA extended its good offices to assist Malian parties in finding solutions to accelerate the

implementation of the Agreement. Progress was made with the signature of a truce between the Coordination des mouvements of Azawad (CMA) and the Platform coalition of armed groups on 23 August 2017 and of a document of commitments that includes a definitive cessation of hostilities. The full operationalization of the interim authorities continued to be hampered by internal rivalries and limited administrative, budgetary and planning capacities. Nonetheless, the interim authorities in Gao, Mènaka, Taoudenni and Timbuktu adopted a priority action plan aimed at enabling access to State funds for the delivery of basic services. In Kidal, disagreements between the armed groups over the establishment of mixed patrols prevented the return of the Platform members who were members of the interim authorities, thereby delaying their

operationalization. On 28 June, the Peacebuilding Fund launched a capacity-building project for the Mènaka and Taoudenni interim authorities on aspects relating to territorial division, public works and the provision of basic services. Owing to the prevailing insecurity, there was no progress with regard to the redeployment of the civil administration to northern and central Mali. Despite a slight increase in judicial officers, low deployment rates of State officials continued to adversely affect the delivery of basic social services and undermined citizens' confidence in the State. As at 11 September 2017, only 30 per cent of State officials were present at their duty stations in the northern regions and Mopti, compared with 38 per cent in January 2017.

3. Law enforcement structures and actors

3.1 The Police

National Police Force (Police Nationale du Mali) is the main organisation in charge of law enforcement and acts under the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. Due to its colonial past, Mali hold a civil law system and National Police is a civil one. The National Police shares responsibility for internal security with the Gendarmerie, an organisation shaped on the model of the French Gendarmerie. Police is responsible exclusively for urban areas, while the Gendarmerie is for rural areas, where it can support also support the activities of the Army. If needed, Gendarmerie can reinforce the police in urban areas. According to Interpol data, Police has a strength of 7.000 units, while Gendarmerie has about 2.000. Local police districts are headed by commissioners, who report to regional directors at national police headquarters. Malian policemen are poorly trained, equipped and led, and suffer from low morale. Usually, they behave unprofessionally, committing abuses and being vulnerable to corruption. After civil war in 2012-2013 and elections in 2013, the government began a program for improving the police capabilities and accepted the assistance of various countries and external organizations and states as United Nations, United States and European Union. Specifically, UN, through the police component of MINUSMA, is supporting National Police in its duties and in its stabilisation efforts. Mali has been a member of Interpol since 1969.

The National Police is divided into several departments, the most important being:

- Directorate of General Affairs
- Directorate of Public Safety
- Directorate for Judicial Police
- Directorate of Territorial Surveillance and Intelligence
- Directorate of Personnel, Administration and Materials Management
- Directorate of the Border Police
- Office for Studies, Cooperation and Informatics Office
- Directorate of Transmission
- Service for Social Affairs

3.2 Other security forces

National Guard (Garde Nationale)

Mali's National Guard was created in 1994. Its main duties are ensuring security for the benefit of institutions, political and administrative authorities, participate in public safety and the maintenance of public order, participate in the general police of the administrative districts, contribute to the operational defense of the territory, participate in border surveillance, participate in actions for peace and humanitarian assistance. Placed under the supervision of the Minister in charge of National Defense, she is assigned for employment to the Ministry of Security.

The National Guard is articulated in: 1) A headquarters based in Bamako; 2) Territorial Units, including territorial groups composed of companies, platoons, groups and permanent

security posts and specialized services. territorial Groups are located in the District of Bamako and are mainly responsible for ensuring the security of all state institutions, political and administrative authorities; 3) Mobile Units, including A Bamako-based Maintenance Group composed of three squadrons; 4) Two Rapid Intervention Groups, 5) Six meharist (dromedary patrol) companies, advanced observation posts; 6) Group of Maintenance of Order (G.M.O), composed of three squadrons in charge of maintenance of order. Its elements are always solicited to be deployed with the National Police and the Gendarmerie as part of the maintenance or restoration of order; 7) Rapid Response Groups (G.I.G.N.) in charge of monitor areas out of control, in need for rapid response and interception.

3.3 The judiciary

Mali's legal system derives from French civil law and customary law, and provides for judicial review of legislative acts in a Constitutional Court. Mali has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. The 1992 constitution guarantees independence of the judiciary, and constitutional provisions for freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion are generally respected. Nonetheless, the executive has considerable influence over the judiciary. The president heads the Superior Judicial, the body that supervises judicial activity, and the Ministry of Justice appoints judges and oversees law enforcement. Corruption and limited resources affected the fairness of trials. Village chiefs and government-appointed justices of the peace decided the majority of disputes in rural areas. Trials are public, defendants have the right to an attorney of their choice, and court-appointed attorneys are available to indigent defendants in criminal cases. However, the judicial system has a large case backlog resulting in long periods of pre-trial detention. Lengthy trial procedures, large numbers of detainees, judicial inefficiency, corruption, and staff shortages

contributed to lengthy pre-trial detention. Individuals sometimes remained in prison for several years before their cases came to trial. Many individuals lacked the financial resources needed to make bail. Approximately 67 percent of the prison population consisted of persons awaiting trial. A Supreme Court was established in Bamako in 1969. It is made up of 19 members, nominated for five years. The judicial section has three civil chambers and one criminal chamber. The Supreme Court has both judicial and administrative powers. The administrative section deals with appeals and fundamental rulings. The Court of Appeal is also in Bamako. There are two magistrate courts of first instance, courts for labour disputes, and a special court of state security. Customary courts have been abolished. The 1992 constitution established a separate constitutional court and a High Court of Justice charged with responsibility for trying senior government officials accused of treason.

4. Migrations and Human Rights Issues

4.1 Internal and International Migration

Mali has always been both a migrant sending and a transit country, characterised by a high fluidity of population movements inside the territory and across its borders. Traditionally, circular migration in the Sahel region consisted of pastoralist populations and seasonal workers moving across Mali towards neighbouring states such as Algeria, Libya, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. In the present day, these movements are facilitated by the freedom of travel that exists between states that belong to ECOWAS and by bilateral agreements between certain countries of the Sahel and North Africa. Current estimates suggest that some 30,000 to 40,000 migrants will pass through Mali (2016 data). These numbers can be explained with reference to the fact that, over the last decades, Mali has become a transit country for West African migrants that attempt to reach Northern Africa and Europe. Even though an armed rebellion in northern Mali has led to the internal and external displacement of refugees, migrants continue to use the Malian-North African road. Migrant travel that takes place within Mali is generally of a licit nature, as the majority of migrants come from origin countries that belong to ECOWAS maintains a free-movement protocol, which means that migrants from these countries can enter Mali in a legal fashion. Migration becomes irregular when migrants travel within Mali without proper documentation and/or when they cross the border into Algeria without a valid Malian passport. In practice, the transnational transport companies that travel from the West African capitals to Bamako and/or directly on to Gao navigate the rather grey territory between regular and irregular migration in a clever fashion. On-board passport controls are non-existent, and bribes to security forces are very common. When arriving in Gao, the organisation of migration starts to change. Bus services do not run further than Gao, meaning that migrants rely on local transport companies for the remainder of their journey through Mali. For this, they turn to the local smuggling networks run by 'passeurs', who connect migrants to transport companies, drivers, recruiters and state officials that need to be bribed to provide the migrants with transportation, fake passports and shelter in the main transit zones such as Gao. In addition, armed groups are linked to human smuggling in a more indirect way. In light of the new balance of power in the north, the passeurs tend to overlap with the leading elites of armed groups. Rather than saying that armed groups control the

migrant smuggling trade and/or irregular migration economy, however, this should be read to mean that the human smuggling economy functions as a single node in a much more complex relationship between smuggling, authority and the empowerment of no state armed forces in north Mali. The passeurs are influential members of their local communities, and as such they are tied to larger local and national personalised governance networks. The passeurs are well-established business (and trade) entrepreneurs that operate on a transnational basis, meaning that they usually offer services to citizens of a particular country of origin, very well connected to the transport companies and the security forces. Passeurs also work together with local ghetto operators, or chairmen, who run the locales where migrants await their passage northwards. These 'ghettos' have been established in Kidal and Gao, along the main routes to Algeria. The chairmen are mainly former migrants that have settled in Gao and have lived there long enough to establish connections with the passeurs and local authorities. Migrants stay in these ghettos and work in the city until they gather enough money to continue their journey. In exchange for the services they provide (shelter, water and food), the ghetto operators charge an illegal tax, often referred to as *droit de ghetto*. While the trip to Gao can be made using legal bus companies, crossing the Algerian border from Gao requires the help of smugglers and informal transport companies. Migrants are put on trucks and smuggled through Anêfis, Kidal and Aguelhok up to the border with Algeria. The drivers of the trucks transporting migrants are generally Tuareg, who know the terrain and the conditions along the routes. The road from Gao to Algeria traverses a complex, fragmented terrain, with smuggling itineraries and the popularity of the different border crossings therefore fluctuating, depending on the security situation on the ground and the strictness of Algerian border controls. Armed groups have started providing protection to convoys in exchange for a share in the profits. Despite this protection, the lawlessness of the area above Gao is such that human rights abuses are frequent, such as rapes or migrants being left in the desert when their families back home refuse to pay an extortion fee. In 2015, Malian emigrants amount to 1 million, mainly living in Ivory Coast and Nigeria, while immigrants in Mali are about 360 000. Mali is also hosting around 15 000 refugees.

4.2 Human Rights Situation

Universal and regional human rights instruments ratified

Mali is a signatory country to many international human rights instruments, including: the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, The Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty, the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children child prostitution and child pornography, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity

Insecurity in Mali worsened as Islamist armed groups allied to Al-Qaeda dramatically increased their attacks on government forces and United Nations peacekeepers. The peace process envisioned to end the 2012-2013 political-military crisis stalled in 2017. Government forces conducted counterterrorism operations that resulted in arbitrary arrests, summary executions, torture, and ill-treatment. In the north, armed groups made scant progress on disarmament and the government made inadequate progress on the restoration of state authority. This deepened a rule of law and security vacuum, facilitating rampant banditry and displacement. In central Mali, Islamist armed group presence and intimidation of the population steadily increased through the year, resulting in numerous serious abuses including summary executions of local officials and alleged government informants. Intercommunal violence in central and northern Mali left scores dead, displaced thousands, and was exploited by ethnically aligned and abusive vigilante groups to garner recruits. Banditry and attacks undermined the delivery of basic health care, education and humanitarian assistance. In central Mali, Islamist armed groups increasingly imposed their version of Sharia (Islamic law), establishing courts that did not adhere to fair trial standards. They threatened villagers collaborating with authorities, recruited children, destroyed schools, and beat villagers who engaged in cultural practices they had forbidden. Armed groups in the north and centre, including those allied with the government, continued to recruit and use child soldiers.

Government forces took steps to protect civilians by patrolling and intervening to stop communal tension, but military operations to counter the growing presence of Islamist armed groups resulted in serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and arbitrary arrest. Numerous men and some children accused of crimes against the state and terrorist-related offenses were detained by the national intelligence agency without respect for due process. Some members of the security forces were also implicated in acts of extortion, bribe-taking, and theft, including from detainees. Judicial authorities failed to open investigations into ongoing violations against civilians by security forces and made little progress in ensuring justice for the victims of violations committed during Mali's 2012-2013 armed conflict. A bill for the protection of human rights defenders was adopted by the National Assembly in December 2017. The government postponed the revision of the Constitution following protests. Full implementation of the 2015 Algiers peace agreement remained delayed. Joint operations between the Malian army and some armed groups began in Gao under the Operational Coordination Mechanism. About the freedom of expression, freedom of speech was under threat in the run-up to a referendum on amendments to the Constitution. In June 2017, at least eight people were injured when protesters against the constitutional changes clashed with police using tear gas and batons. Physical and verbal threats against opponents of the referendum were reported in July. The law criminalizes rape, but spousal rape is legal, and most cases of rape were unreported. Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse is tolerated and common. Spousal abuse is a crime, but police were reluctant to enforce laws against or intervene in cases of domestic violence. The law does not specifically address sexual harassment, which occurred commonly. Societal discrimination continues against Tuareg servile caste members. Often these castes formed distinct settled communities traditionally bonded to semi-nomadic Tuareg aristocratic castes. Hereditary servitude relationships between certain ethnic groups continue in some places to the present day. Members of hereditary Tuareg servile communities reported that they have not benefited from equal education opportunities and were deprived of civil liberties by other groups and castes. While technically legal, the prevailing cultural and religious beliefs of most Mali citizens view same-sex sexual activity and non-traditional gender roles as immoral. There are no anti-discrimination laws to protect the LGBT community from harassment and abuse. Although there is no official discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation at the national level, societal discrimination is widespread.

5. The UN and Mali

5.1 The UN in Mali

Mali is a country that suffers from many critical issues in terms of security, poverty and human development. For this reason, the UN action is extended and unravelled through the activities of its various agencies. Moreover, in the aftermath of the civil war of 2012-2013 and of the continuing conflict in the regions in the northern regions, the UN has shown a profound commitment to the stabilization and peacekeeping process through the MINUSMA mission. The precarious security situation in Mali is being further exacerbated by pervasive food insecurity and extreme poverty throughout Africa's Sahel region. In this context, in addition to the MINUSMA mission, the following agencies are present in Mali: UNICEF, UNESCO, UNDP, WFP, FAO, WHO, OCHA, OHCHR and UNHCR.

MINUSMA

MINUSMA was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013, after the ceasefire agreement signed by the Malian government and the Tuareg rebel groups. Since then, MINUSMA mandate has been renewed every year. Last renewal was on 29 June 2017, extending it until 30 June 2018. On 1 July 2013, MINUSMA took over the authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Under the terms of the resolution, the aims of mission are supporting the peace political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilization tasks. In detail, support, monitoring and supervision of the implementation of the ceasefire arrangements and confidence-building measures by the Government of Mali, support to the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, including support to the implementation of the political and institutional reforms provided for by the Agreement; support to the implementation of the defence and security measures of the Agreement, notably those relating to the ceasefire, support to the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, as well as the progressive redeployment of the Malian Defence and Security Forces especially in the North of Mali, support, within its resources and areas of deployment, to the conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent local elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement, support good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, in support of the Malian authorities, stabilization of the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk and assistance to the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management, protection of the United Nations personnel, notably uniformed personnel (military and UN Police), installations and equipment and ensuring the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; The Mission operates under robust rules of engagement with a mandate to use all necessary means to



address threats to the implementation of its mandate. This could include the conduct of operations on its own or in cooperation with the Malian defence and security forces. French forces deployed in Mali were also authorized to intervene in support of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General. MINUSMA has a military component, a police component and a civilian component. The majority of the military, police and civilian operates primarily in the north of Mali. According to UN data of March 2018, MINUSMA authorized personnel consists in 13,289 military personnel, 1,920 police personnel and 1,619 civilians. Personnel currently deployed consists in 11,791 military personnel, 1,737 police personnel and 1,180 civilians. Countries that contribute to the Police personnel are: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey and Yemen. Military contributors countries are: Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia And Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Salvador, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, United Kingdom, United States Of America And Yemen. Since 2013, MINUSMA has suffered 99 casualties and 358 seriously injured people.

FAO

The humanitarian situation in Mali is still extremely fragile. Given the socio-political instability, particularly in the northern region of the country, and the highest number of floods registered over a period of five years, the lives of over 3 million people have been affected. Approximately 970 000 people are severely food insecure and over 2.3 million people are moderately food insecure. Agriculture and pasture are the most important sectors for people's livelihood, representing 80% of the workforce. It is therefore essential for FAO to provide quality seeds, small ruminants and veterinary support to vulnerable families that have lost their assets, in order to reinforce food and nutritional security and quickly increase the resilience of the vulnerable population. In order to respond to both immediate needs of the population and structural vulnerabilities, FAO is setting up market gardens with fences, as well as rehabilitating water points and irrigation infrastructure. FAO is also distributing agricultural kits, tools, improved good quality seeds and small ruminants in order for refugees and internally displaced people to restore their livelihoods. In order to ensure livestock productivity, FAO is distributing feed concentrates and multi-vitamin blocks, providing animal health support and training to pastoralists on good livestock management practices. Moreover, with the

objective of increasing rehabilitation and resilience, FAO is distributing seeds, restoring vegetable production, increasing access to credit and supporting livestock breeders. Finally, in order to increase and diversify vegetable production, FAO is training beneficiaries on improved agricultural practices and creating small market gardens. FAO is also providing nutrition education to women and children in order for them to learn

how to grow, process, purchase and prepare healthier food. Furthermore, it is providing training on horticultural processing and marketing techniques. With the objective of increasing food availability in the market, FAO is supporting producers by facilitating their access to more secure market channels in order for them to trade their products.



Source: MINUSMA official website

5.2 UN Security Council Resolutions on Mali

The first UN resolution concerning the Malian crisis was the S/RES/2056 of 2012, in which the Security Council expressed full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the African Union and the transitional authorities in Mali trying to re-establish constitutionality and territorial integrity. Six months later, the council authorized African Union to intervene in Mali to help Malian authorities in restoring the constitutional order and the stability in the war-torn areas in the North. It was December 2012 and the resolution S/RES/2085 gave green light to the deployment of AFISMA for an initial period of one year. The following two resolutions, S/RES/2100 of April 2013 and S/RES/2164 of June 2014, were about MINUSMA. The first one just established the mission, while the second one established its benchmarks for MINUSMA, renewed it for a year and granted the Special Representative greater political authority. In June 2017, resolution S/RES/2359 welcomed the deployment of the G5 Sahel force, urging it, along with MINUSMA and the French forces to ensure adequate coordination and exchange of information, through relevant mechanisms. Moreover, the Security Council welcomed the commitment of the European Union to provide financial support

to the G5 Sahel Force worth of 50 million euros. Due to the international threat that Mali crisis represented, on September 2017, with resolution S/RES/2374, the Council established a targeted sanctions regime on Mali, consisting in travel ban and assets freeze for individuals involved in engaging in hostilities in violation of the Peace Agreement, obstructing implementation of the Agreement, terrorists or criminal activities, obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance, planning, directing, or committing acts that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law. Last resolution of the Security Council on Mali was on December 2017. With S/RES/2391 the Security Council outlined the ways in which MINUSMA is expected to support the G5 Sahel joint force. In detail, the resolution stressed the importance of the “Groupe de Soutien” of G5 Sahel Force as an useful and appropriate platform to exchange views on its operationalization, mobilization and coordination of international support. In addition, the resolution encouraged the G5 Sahel States to clarify the format and modalities of work of the Groupe de Soutien.

6. The EU - Mali Relations

6.1 The challenge for stabilisation

The humanitarian, security and development vulnerabilities afflicting Mali have not left the European Union indifferent, which since the period of decolonization has supported the growth of Malian institutions and contributed to its stabilization and democratization. The European support to Mali has become even more necessary in the aftermath of the civil war of 2012-2013 and the migration crisis that has affected Africa and Europe since 2014. In this sense, the development of Mali is the EU is a fundamental pillar for the security of the enlarged Mediterranean area. The National Indicative Programme for Mali outlines the main focal sectors of the EU cooperation with the country during the period 2014-20 under the 11th European Development Fund. In 2013, 327 million euro have been committed and 124.6 million euro have been paid under the 10th European Development Fund programmes. The development programmes that the EU is financing in Mali are designed to address complex challenges: immediate humanitarian needs, restoration of basic services, stabilisation of the country, restoration of public administration and rule of law, and contribute to resume conditions for long-term development. The 10th European Development Fund envelope of Mali has thus increased from 533 to 728 million euro. Support to Mali has been delivered in many different sectors such as state building contract, support governance and stability in the country, electoral process, access to clean water and sanitation, irrigation and food security. In the political domain, the collaboration is focused on political support for the peace and reconciliation talks and for modernisation of the State. About security activities, EU commitment develop in the frame of the strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011). This commitment centres around several interventions, including the EUTM Mali Mission (European Training Mission), EUCAP Mali and the European Sahel Counter-Terrorism programme (Sahel CT – 2011-2014). On the economic perspective, the partnership between the European Union and Mali runs in the context of Cotonou Agreement and Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). Regarding trade and investments, the Economic Partnership Agreement assures secure and predictable long-term partnership which aims to support countries in their objectives regarding integration into the world economy. In any case, the core of EU-Mali cooperation is humanitarian aid and support to development. The Directorate-General office for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) was reopened in Bamako in 2012, in order to better respond to the humanitarian needs that have arisen from the crisis in Mali since the outbreak of the armed conflict in the north. ECHO is providing substantial aid for people suffering extreme food insecurity and for the victims of violence remaining in these areas. Cooperation on Home Affairs is an integral part of the EU-Africa partnership. Moreover, the EU – Mali relations are developing on the basis of the euro-African Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) strategy, which is aimed at intensifying the dialogue on migration and mobility. GAMM covers topics like regular migration, intra-African

mobility, the fight against human trafficking, the protection of migrants, the promotion of asylum and international protection, capacity building in border control, the maximisation of the positive correlation between migration and development. The Commission is supporting financially and politically the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development with Western and Central African countries, including Mali, launched in 2006 in Rabat (the so-called Rabat Process).

European Union, Trade with Mali

Key Figures

Indicator	Unit	Period	Imports	Exports	Total trade	Balance
Last year	Mio euros	2017	35	1,113	1,148	1,078
Rank as EU partner		2017	155	83	108	
Share in EU trade	%	2017	0.0	0.1	0.0	
Annual growth rate	%	2016 - 2017	-11.4	-0.2		
Annual average growth rate	%	2013 - 2017	-4.2	10.2		

Imports 2017

Exports 2017

AMA/NAMA product Groups

Product	Value Mio €	% Total	Product	Value Mio €	% Total
Agricultural products (WTO AsA)	21	59.4	Agricultural products (WTO AsA)	211	19.0
Fishery products	0	0.0	Fishery products	0	0.0
Industrial products	14	40.6	Industrial products	902	81.0
Total	35	100.0	Total	1,113	100.0

SITC product Groups

Product	Value Mio €	% Total	Product	Value Mio €	% Total
Primary products	21	59.8	Primary products	231	20.8
Manufactures	7	19.4	Manufactures	856	76.9
Other products	4	11.2	Other products	34	2.1
Other	3	9.8	Other	2	0.2


Top 5 - HS sections

Product	Value Mio €	% Total	Product	Value Mio €	% Total
8 Vegetable products	10	27.5	XVI Machinery and appliances	257	23.1
XI Textiles and textile articles	9	21.7	VI Products of the chemical or allied industries	157	14.1
XXX Not classified	7	20.1	XVII Transport equipment	148	13.1
VIII Raw hides and skins, and saddlery material	4	12.7	XI Textiles and textile articles	140	12.6
IV Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco	4	10.2	IV Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco	130	11.7

Top 5 - SITC sections

Product	Value Mio €	% Total	Product	Value Mio €	% Total
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	12	35.0	7 Machinery and transport equipment	410	36.9
0 Food and live animals	9	24.8	8 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	204	18.3
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	5	13.3	0 Food and live animals	193	17.4
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c.	4	11.0	5 Chemicals and related prod. n.e.s.	169	15.2
10 Other	3	9.8	8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles	78	7.0

% Total Share in Total: Total defined as all products



6.2 EU – Mali security cooperation

The EU commitment on Mali security dates from the adoption of the strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (2011). At the moment, there are two European mission in Mali: EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali.

EUCAP Sahel Mali


EUCAP Sahel Mali is based in Bamako and was launched on January 2015, following an official invitation by the Malian government to assist the internal security forces with reasserting the government's authority over the whole of the country, following the 'Northern Mali Crisis' that left large parts of the country under the control of various factions. The mission provides experts in strategic advice and training to the Malian Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard and the relevant ministries in order to support reform in the security sector, in support of Mali's active efforts to restore state authority and in close coordination with other international partners, including MINUSMA. The main goals of EUCAP Sahel Mali are improving operational efficiency of Malian Police, Gendarmerie and National Guard, re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains, reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities, strengthen the internal security forces capacity in the fight against terrorism and organised crime and Support institutions in managing migration flows and border controls. EUCAP Sahel Mali works on different so-called Lines of Operation. The first one is strategic advice, aimed at improve Malian security sector strategy for human resources and modernise management practices. The second one is training, aimed at providing training for the Malian Gendarmerie, Police and National Guard. The training will cover subjects such as management and command, professional ethics, human rights and gender equality, intelligence techniques, professional intervention, criminal policing, counter-terrorism and public order. The training is primarily addressed at senior and intermediate staff. In order to promote local ownership, the mission will also train trainers who, in turn, will pass on the training outcomes to future trainees. The third line of operation is coordination and cooperation, aimed at exploit synergies with other international and European players present in Mali and with civil society. Moreover, the growing cooperation between the G5 Sahel countries (Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) pushed EU to create a Regional Coordination Cell (RCC) to support cross-border cooperation in the Sahel,

regional cooperation structures and strengthening the national capacities of the G5 countries.

EUTM Mali

EUTM Mali was created in 2013, in order to provide military training and advice to the Malian Armed Forces. EUTM Mali train, advice and educate the Malian Armed Forces under the control of legitimate civilian authorities, in order to contribute to the restoration of their military capacity with a view to enabling them to conduct military operations aiming at restoring Malian territorial integrity, protecting the population and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups.

EUTM Mali is a non-executive mission, so the deployed servicemen do not participate in combat activities and do not accompany the Malian units in operations. EUTM Mali respond to the operational needs of the Malian Armed Forces through the provision of training support for the benefit of the Malian Armed Forces, the training and advising on command and control, logistical chain and human resources, as well as training on International Humanitarian Law, the protection of civilians and human rights, the contribution, upon Malian request and in coordination with MINUSMA, to the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process framed by the Peace Agreement, the support to the G5 Sahel process, by enhancing coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces.



EUTM organisational chart

7. Other regional organisations and Mali

7.1 Mali and African Organisations

Mali is an active member of African Union (Organisation for the African Unity) since 1963, shortly after its independence. Moreover, Mali is a member of ECOWAS, the region organisation of West Africa States in charge of promoting common security and shared development. Mali is part of one of the two sub-regional bloc of ECOWAS, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (also known by its French-language acronym UEMOA), an organization of eight, mainly French-speaking, states which share a customs union and currency union. Established in 1994 and intended to counterbalance the dominance of English-speaking economies

in the bloc (such as Nigeria and Ghana), members of UEMOA are mostly former territories of French West Africa. The currency they all use is the CFA franc, which is pegged to the euro. In recent times, the most important ECOWAS commitment to Mali was the stabilization effort enhanced by AFISMA mission. AFISMA was launched in January 2013, after United Nation Security Council resolution 2085 of December 2012. The mission aim was to help Malian government to restore order and peace after the Tuareg rebellion of 2012-2013. AFISMA ended in July 2013 and transferred symbolically its authority to MINUSMA.

7.2 G5 Sahel and Mali

The "G5 Sahel": is an institutional framework of Group five Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) created in February 2014. Its headquarters are in Mauritania. The G5 Sahel aims to guarantee conditions of development and security in the space of the member countries, offer a strategic intervention framework to improve the living conditions of the population and promote inclusive and sustainable regional development. The peculiarity of G5 Sahel is the creation of a Defence and Security Committee, which is the body that brings together the Chiefs of Defence Staff and those responsible for security issues by the Member States. The issue of security is crucial for the G5 Sahel agenda. So crucial to push the member states to create a joint military force. The G5 Sahel Cross-Border Joint Force was officially launched on 2 July 2017. The force was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in April 2017 and was strengthened by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2359 in June. The G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force cannot alone secure the Sahel, and national forces, operating within their own borders, will still bear the greatest responsibility for eliminating the terror and trafficking threat. But the force is an important first step toward greater regional cooperation and will address an immediate challenge of preventing fighters and traffickers from evading pursuit by slipping across national boundaries. The force would comprise up to 5,000 military and police personnel drawn from national battalions. It would incorporate the existing Liptako-Gourma task force established earlier in 2017 by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region. The Joint Force is intended to complement the mandates of MINUSMA. Funding is perhaps the most immediate challenge for the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Regional actors in the Sahel region lack financial resources. The budget for the regional security initiative is estimated at \$500 million for the force first year of operation and only about a third of that amount is currently pledged. The G5 countries themselves have each pledged \$10 million. The European Union, which is in strong support of the initiative, has pledged \$70 million.

8. Other Practical Info

8.1 Local Customs Cultural Awareness

Culturally speaking, Mali is a very complex country, where many ethnic-religious groups live together and where different traditions and cultural heritages are placed. Thus, if the colonial legacy is visible in the large cities of the south of the country, in the northern regions this dissipates, leaving the place of the absolute centrality of the Arab and Tuareg tribal customs. In general, Malians live in a country where everyday life is often unpredictable due to natural disaster risks, internal conflicts and neighbouring countries unstable situations. Malian citizens have adopted a day-by-day approach towards life and adapt to changing rules and laws. Using your right hand to shake, touch, eat food with or handle money is a must. Using the left hand is considered rude and dirty. Not greeting someone when you see them is very offensive

Social Etiquette

a) Meeting Etiquette

In Mali, greetings and the care given to them characterize the initial contact or assessment of a person values; discuss your urgent requests only after greeting the person properly. Many may find these greetings rather long or pointless, but they establish acceptance in a particular group (e.g., at the office, in the field, in social life, or with the employees under your supervision). A Malian will ask the person with whom he is speaking how he/she is doing and even ask about the person family, neighbours and acquaintances. Humour may rely on a shared culture and given the hierarchical Malian society, it is best to know the person before acting informally. The type of humour will depend on whether the person is older or younger, a man or woman, an employer or employee, a superior or junior colleague. Joking cousin relationships help resolve any crises or difficulties between casts. It is important to respect social, moral, and ethical distances; there are certain areas that are for women or for men. When meeting and greeting a Malian, it is very important that you inquire about family members as they are one of the main topics of conversation. Ask about their health and the well-being of the person with whom you are speaking. Then ask about the family, children, spouse, and parents in greater detail. This is part of the usual way of greeting people. Another good topic of conversation is to ask Malians about their background. The typical greeting is a handshake with the right hand. Handshakes tend to linger a bit and it is common for two men to continue shaking hands throughout the conversation. Once you get to know someone, using a nickname is very common. In general, direct eye contact is expected when meeting and greeting. During conversations though, direct eye contact can be seen as a sign of arrogance and one should often times look down when conversing. When speaking to peers of the same sex, direct eye contact is acceptable. When speaking to elders or people of authority, indirect eye contact is the most appropriate. In more rural, tribal settings, one must not look at the chief in the eyes. Lowering your eyes is a sign of respect. Not making eye contact is a sign of respect when talking to elders or a sign of deference when speaking to strangers. It is taboo for religiously observant Muslim men to touch women

and vice versa. Eye contact is not held except among people of the same standing (i.e., between people of the same age or hierarchy or once a friendship has been well established); looking someone directly in the eyes would cause everyone to feel uncomfortable. With people of the different rank (i.e., seniors/youth or colleagues at different hierarchical levels) individuals may not make contact at all for fear of breaking protocol or simply out of respect.

b) Gift Giving Etiquette

Gift-giving rules in Mali are complex. Gift giving of small items like a pen or notebook take place almost every day, between people of all sorts of affiliations. Typically, a gift is passed around to every person in the room, sometimes even making its way back to the original gift giver. Do not give a gift to a host or hostess when invited to their home for dinner: this is insulting and insinuates the host did not provide enough for the guests.

c) Dining Etiquette

Older people are highly respected. Avert your eyes when speaking to an elder. Dining etiquette for dining from a communal bowl. Dining is done around a communal dish or bowl. Diners are separated into groups around different bowls. Older men share one bowl, women share another, and children yet another. Dining etiquette for eating with your hands. Eat with your right hand and take food only from your side of the bowl. Do not point at people with your index finger. Burping is a sign that you have eaten your fill and is considered to be a compliment to the person who made the meal or a sign that you wish him/her peace. Table manners can be somewhat formal. Waiting to be shown your seat as seating is often a matter of hierarchy. Women and men may eat at separate tables in the same room or in different rooms. Do not start eating until the eldest male does. Food is often served from a communal bowl and you must eat from the section of the bowl in front of you. Never reach the bowl to get something from the other side. Use only the right hand. Leaving a little bit of food on your plate on your section of the communal bowl indicates that you have been looked after.

Business Etiquette and Protocol

a) Meeting and Greeting

Men shake hands when greeting one another. After shaking hands it is common to put your right hand to your chest as a show of respect. In case of greetings between women, a simple handshake is appropriate for an initial meeting. In case of man greeting woman, do nothing until you know local customs or religious rules. Always use the right hand when greeting. A slight bow of the head is appropriate when greeting elders. It is viewed as a sign of respect.

b) Communication Style

Malians use a lot of gestures in their daily life. However, you should not greet people by kissing them on the cheek unless you

know them very well and certainly not in the workplace. Invitations to weddings, baptisms, Ramadan, Tabaski celebrations, and even funerals are spur-of-the-moment and relationships are formed quickly. You should, nevertheless, be candid and direct if certain things that your acquaintances make you uncomfortable; be tactful and diplomatic, but firm. Malians also communicate with a number of expressions and sounds that indicate agreement or disagreement. Therefore, be careful to not give out ambiguous signals; a calm voice and direct approach are acceptable even if it does not satisfy the person you are speaking to. On the other hand, the Malian tradition/custom of "musalaha" (leaving things alone until the situation calms down) may cause Malians to not reply with a straightforward answer. Malians speak over 50 different languages, but the most common is Bambara. You can really impress your hosts by

learning a few phrases in the language. However knowing French is essential.

c) Business Meetings

Malians place great emphasis on protocol and courtesy. Discussions should begin with an extensive exchange of pleasantries. Meeting schedules are not very rigid in Mali. There may be an agenda, but it serves as a guideline for the discussion, hence it is broad and flexible. As relationships are highly important in this culture, agendas tend to be followed loosely and it is often the case that people go off-topic. The Malians are non-confrontational. They will avoid discussing unpleasant topics for as long as possible. They may agree to deadlines and timetables that they know are unrealistic in order to close the deal.

8.2 Medical Travel Recommendations for Mali

Mali is greatly affected by poverty, malnutrition, epidemics and inadequate hygiene and sanitation. Mali is heavily dependent upon international development organizations and foreign missionary groups for much of its health care. Medical facilities in Mali are very limited, especially outside of Bamako, and medicines are in short supply

Recommended Vaccinations:

- Cholera: spread through consumption of contaminated water and food. More common during floods and after natural disasters, in areas with very poor sanitation and lack of clean drinking water. It would be unusual for travellers to contract cholera if they take basic precautions with food and water and maintain a good standard of hygiene.
- Diphtheria: spread person to person through respiratory droplets. Risk is higher if mixing with locals in poor, overcrowded living conditions.
- Hepatitis A: spread through consuming contaminated food and water or person to person through the faecal-oral route. Risk is higher where personal hygiene and sanitation are poor.
- Hepatitis B: spread through infected blood and blood products, contaminated needles and medical instruments and sexual intercourse. Risk is higher for those at occupational risk, long stays or frequent travel, children (exposed through cuts and scratches) and individuals who may need, or request, surgical procedures abroad.
- Meningococcal Meningitis: spread by droplet infection through close person to person contact. Meningococcal disease is found worldwide but epidemics may occur within this country, particularly during the dry season. Risk is higher for those mixing with locals for extended periods.
- Rabies: spread through the saliva of an infected animal, usually through a bite, scratch or lick on broken skin. Particularly dogs and related species, but also bats. Risk is higher for those going to remote areas (who may not be able to promptly access appropriate treatment in the event of a bite), long stays, those at higher risk of contact with animals and bats, and children. Even when pre-exposure vaccine has been received, urgent medical advice should be sought after any animal or bat bite.
- Tetanus: spread through contamination of cuts, burns and wounds with tetanus spores. Spores are found in soil worldwide. A total of 5 doses of tetanus vaccine are recommended for life in the UK. Boosters are usually recommended in a country or situation where the correct treatment of an injury may not be readily available.
- Typhoid: spread mainly through consumption of contaminated food and drink. Risk is higher where access to adequate sanitation and safe water is limited.
- Yellow Fever: spread by the bite of an infected, day-biting mosquito. The disease is mainly found in rural areas of affected countries but outbreaks in urban areas do occur. Vaccination is usually recommended for all those who travel into risk areas. View yellow fever risk areas [here](#). In addition, certain countries may want to see proof of vaccination on an official yellow fever vaccination certificate - check above under Immunisations.

Diarrhoea

Diseases from food and water are the leading cause of illness in travellers. Prevention consists mainly in: “Boil it, wash it, peel it, cook it... or forget it”. Follow these tips for safe eating and drinking:

- wash your hands often with soap and water, especially before eating. If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand gel (with at least 60% alcohol);
- drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes;
- make sure food is fully cooked; avoid eating fruits and vegetables unless they have been peeled or cooked.

Malaria

Malaria risk is high throughout the year in all areas. Avoid mosquito bites by covering up with clothing such as long sleeves and long trousers especially after sunset, using insect repellents on exposed skin and, when necessary, sleeping under a mosquito net. Check with your doctor or nurse about suitable antimalarial tablets. If you have been travelling in a malarious area and develop a fever seek medical attention promptly. Remember malaria can develop even up to one year after exposure. If travelling to an area remote from medical facilities, carrying standby emergency treatment for malaria may be considered.

Dengue Fever

A viral illness that is transmitted to humans by mosquito bites. The mosquito that spreads dengue bites during the day and is more common in urban areas. Symptoms include fever, headache, severe joint, bone and muscular pain.

Schistosomiasis

A parasitic infection (also known as bilharzia) that is transmitted to humans through contact with fresh water. The parasite enters humans through the skin and prevention is dependent on avoidance of swimming, bathing or paddling in fresh water lakes and streams.

Gas Heater

You should never go to sleep with your gas heater switched on. The pressure may drop resulting in the flame extinguishing. As a result gas will then leak from the heater. Carbon monoxide poisoning can also be a problem with old appliances.

Road Traffic Accidents

Remember to:

1. wear your safety belt;
2. follow the local customs and laws regarding pedestrian safety and vehicle speed;
3. obey the rules of the road;
4. use helmets on bicycles and motorbikes;
5. avoid boarding an overloaded bus or mini-bus;
6. if not familiar with driving in Ukraine, hire a trustworthy local driver;
7. do not drink and drive.

8.3 Other Travel Info

Time

Time zone: Mali currently observes Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) all year.

Daylight-Saving Time (DST) has never been used here for summer. Clocks do not change in Mali. There is no previous Daylight-

Money

Mali uses CFA franc and belongs to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The CFA franc is the only currency used in Mali. Travelers are supposed to change foreign currencies against CFA franc in the currency bureaus (bureaus de change) when arriving in Mali. Bureaus de change are located in the international airport as well as in the major cities. Commercial banks also change foreign currencies against CFA franc and vice versa. Informal change is common especially in Bamako. It is possible to use debit cards to withdraw cash from ATMs. Some merchants will accept credit cards; however, cash remains the most common way to make transactions in Mali. International credit networks, particularly Visa, are accessible, as are regional and local networks. Travelers checks are often accepted by commercial banks.

Climate

In Mali there are three types of climate: 1- the desert climate of the Sahara in the north, 2- the semi-desert climate of the Sahel in the centre, with a rainy season from June to September, and rainfall going from 100 to 600 millimetres (4 to 23.5 inches) per year, 3- the tropical climate of the savanna in the south, with a more intense and a bit longer rainy season (May and October), and rainfall exceeding 600 mm (23.5 in). The vast northern area (zone 1 on the map), virtually lacking settlements except for a few rare oases, is occupied by the desert, and has an average temperature in January between 15 and 20 °C (59 and 68 °F), with some cold nights in the winter months (the cold records are around freezing), while in summer it's scorching hot. In the extreme north-west, the climate is typical of the Sahara desert, July is the hottest month, and it almost never rains, although in the summer some cloud banks can pass and very few downpours can occur. More to the south, the temperature decreases slightly in July and August, because this area can more often be affected by a bit of cloudiness and some rare showers.

8.4 Radio Transmissions

The radio is not a secure means of communication as it can be listened to by practically anyone. It is useful to establish a set of simple code words, which should be known by everyone in the network. In no case should military information be transmitted.

Basic Rules

Discipline: listen before transmitting. Brevity: be brief and to the point. Rhythm: use short complete phrases that make sense. Speed: not too fast, not too slow. Volume: don't shout. Preparation: know what you are going to say before transmitting.

Prior to transmission

- a. Check the power source and cables to ensure there is a power supply.
- b. Check the antenna and cables ensuring a tight and correct connection to the radio set.
- c. Connect the audio accessories and check the functioning of switches.

Transmitting

- a. Make your message brief but precise.
- b. Break the message into sensible passages with pauses between.
- c. Make sure no-one else is transmitting at the same time.
- d. When transmitting maintain a high standard of articulation, normal rhythm and moderate volume. Do not shout. Hold the microphone close to your mouth.
- e. Avoid excessive calling and unofficial voice procedure.

Four Golden Rules

Clarity; Brevity; Security; Simplicity.

Respect these rules; your radios may be the only link to the outside world. Don't interfere with radios unless you are a trained technician. Don't use the radio like a telephone, keep transmissions short. Organize your thinking and your message before transmitting. Security matters are best dealt with by using simple code words; likewise when dealing with sensitive issues.

Procedure Words

A proword is a word or phrase, which has been given a special meaning in order to speed up the handling of messages. The only authorised prowords are listed below:

Prowords explanation:

BREAK

I now indicate a separation of the text from other portions of the message.

CORRECT

You are correct, or what you have transmitted is correct.

CORRECTION

I have made an error in this transmission. I will continue from the last correct word.

I SAY AGAIN

I am repeating my transmission again.

MESSAGE

A message follows: prepare to copy or record it.

MORE TO FOLLOW

The transmitting station has additional traffic for the receiving station.

OUT

This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required.

OVER

This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is expected. Go ahead transmit.

READ BACK

Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as received.

ROGER

I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.

SPEAK SLOWER

You are speaking too fast. Please speak slower.

STAND-BY

Do not transmit until contacted: I need extra time.

THIS IS

Give call sign, i.e. "Delta one".

WAIT

I must pause for a few seconds, please wait.

WAIT OUT

I must pause longer than a few seconds, I will return.

WILCO

I have received your signal, understand it, and will comply (do not use roger and wilco together).

WRONG

Your last transmission was incorrect the correct version was ...

Phonetics

The international phonetic alphabet listed below shall be used. Numerals shall be transmitted digit by digit except round figures such as hundreds and thousands.

Examples:

Message examples:

To give you confidence, make sure you practise using the radio before you find yourself in urgent need of using it. An example of the kind of language you must learn to use is shown right. It is an example of a radio check:

Call

Five - Two, Five - Two, this is Hotel – Three - Niner, Hotel – Three - Niner. Radio check. Over.

Reply

Hotel – Three - Niner, from Five - Two. I read you loud and clear. Over.

Call

Five - Two from Hotel – Three - Niner. Loud and clear. Over.

Reply

From Five-Two. Roger. Out.

What to do in an emergency

Call for help as follows:

emergency. emergency. emergency.

Five-two five-two. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. emergency. do you copy? over. (Note: emergency is repeated three times).

Wait for response and then proceed. For a lesser degree of urgency, use the word "security" instead of "emergency". Any station hearing an "emergency" or "security" call, should immediately stop transmitting and listen out. If you need to interrupt another radio conversation wait for a pause (immediately after you hear "over"); call: break. break. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. I have an emergency. please stand by.

Pause transmission and listen to ensure the other communication has ceased, then proceed with emergency call.

12 wun too;

44 fo-wer fo-wer;

90 niner zero;

136 wun three six;

500 fi-yiv hundred;

7000 seven thousand;

16000 wun six thousand;

1278 wun too seven ate;

19A wun niner alfa

CHARACTER	MORSE CODE	TELEPHONY	PHONIC (PRONUNCIATION)
A	• —	Alfa	(AL-FAH)
B	— • • •	Bravo	(BRAH-VOH)
C	— • — •	Charlie	(CHAR-LEE) or (SHAR-LEE)
D	— • •	Delta	(DELL-TAH)
E	•	Echo	(ECK-OH)
F	• • — •	Foxtrot	(FOKS-TROT)
G	— — •	Golf	(GOLF)
H	• • • •	Hotel	(HOH-TEL)
I	• •	India	(IN-DEE-AH)
J	• — — —	Juliett	(JEW-LEE-ETT)
K	— • —	Kilo	(KEY-LOH)
L	• — • •	Lim a	(LEE-MAH)
M	— —	Mike	(MIKE)
N	— •	November	(NO-VEM-BER)
O	— — —	Oscar	(OSS-CAH)
P	• — — •	Papa	(PAH-PAH)
Q	— — • —	Quebec	(KEH-BECK)
R	• — •	Romeo	(ROW-ME-OH)
S	• • •	Sierra	(SEE-AIR-RAH)
T	—	Tango	(TANG-GO)
U	• • —	Uniform	(YOU-NEE-FORM) or (OO-NEE-FORM)
V	• • • —	Victor	(VIK-TAH)
W	• — —	Whiskey	(WISS-KEY)
X	— • • —	Xray	(ECKS-RAY)
Y	— • — —	Yankee	(YANG-KEY)
Z	— — • •	Zulu	(ZOO-LOO)
1	• — — — —	One	(WUN)
2	• • — — —	Two	(TOO)
3	• • • — —	Three	(TREE)
4	• • • • —	Four	(FOW-ER)
5	• • • • •	Five	(FIFE)
6	— • • • •	Six	(SIX)
7	— — • • •	Seven	(SEV-EN)
8	— — — • •	Eight	(AIT)
9	— — — — •	Nine	(NIN-ER)
0	— — — — —	Zero	(ZEE-RO)

9. Useful contacts

Emergencies

In case of emergency in Mali, call the following emergency numbers:

Fire – 18

Police – 17

Ambulance – 15

Mali police and emergency services are severely below Western European and U.S. standards in terms of training, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Visitors to Mali should note that Malian law enforcement and emergency response officials do not speak English but French, and translators are generally not readily available.

Embassies

Delegation of the European Union

Chief: Alain Holleville

Ambassador

Address: Quartier du Fleuve, Immeuble UATT, 4e étage

BP 115 - Bamako

Phone: 223 44 92 92 92

Email: Delegation-mali@eeas.europa.eu

Website: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali_fr

Website: www.bamako.diplo.de

Embassy of the Netherlands

Chief: Jolke Oppewal,

Address: Rue 437 Hippodrome, B.P. 2220, Bamako

Phone: (+223) 44 97 82 00

Fax: (+38 044) 272-68-01

Email: bam@minbuza.nl

Website: www.nederlandwereldwijd.nl/landen/mali

Embassy of the Republic of Belgium

Chief: Madame Myriam Bacquelaine, Chargè

Chargé d'Affaires a.i

Address: Rue 247 Porte 209, Quartier Hippodrome BP E1633

Bamako

Phone: (+223) 202 196 22 - (+223) 202 169 55

Fax: (+223) 202 112 79

Email: bamako.coop@diplobel.fed.be

Website: mali.diplomatie.belgium.be

Embassy of Norway

Chief: Ole Andreas Lindeman

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Address: Cité du Niger, Bamako

Phone: (+38 044) 200-12-60

Email: emb.bamako@mfa.no

Embassy of Sweden

Chief: Madame Eva Emnèus

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Address: Immeuble UATT, 2nd floor, Quartier du Fleuve, BP E2093, Bamako

Phone: (+223) 20 70 70 00 / 11

Fax: (+223) 20 70 70 10

Email: ambassaden.bamako@gov.se

Website: www.swedenabroad.com/bamako

Embassy of the Kingdom of Denmark

Chief: Mr. Winnie Estrup Petersen

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Address: Lots 94-95, Cité du Niger II, BP E1733

Phone: (+223) 20 70 53 00

Fax: (+223) 20 70 53 29

Email: bkoamb@um.dk

Website : mali.um.dk

International Organisations

Red Cross Office

Chief: Mr. Abdourahmane Cissé

President

Address: Djèlibougou, Rue 261, Porte 02, Route Koulikoro, Bamako

Phone : (+223) 20 24 45 69

Fax: (+223) 20 24 04 14

Email: crmaliennne@croixrouge-mali.org

Website: <http://www.croixrouge-mali.org>

Embassy of the Republic of France

Chief: Evelyne Decorps

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Address: Square Patrice Lumumba, B.P. 17, Bamako

Phone: (+223) 44.97.57.57

Fax: (+223) 20 21 31 36

Email: cad.bamako-amba@diplomatie.gouv.fr

Website: ml.ambafrance.org

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany

Chief: Mr Dietrich Becker

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Address: Badalabougou Est rue 14, porte 330, B. P. 100, Bamako

Phone: (+223) 20 70 07 70

Fax: (+223) 20 22 96 50

MINUSMA

Chief: Mr. Jean-Paul Deconinck

Major General, Commander

Address: Immeuble Magane, Rue 39 (Rue du PNUD),

Badalabougou Est, Lot N°2704, E2093, Bamako

Communications and Public Information Division

Ms. Myriam Dessables
Director of Communications - Spokesperson
Phone: +223 94 95 00 52
Email: dessables@un.org

UNIDO

Chief: Ms. Haby Sow Traore
Country Representative
Address: Badalabougou Est, BP 120 Bamako
Phone: +223 44980311
Fax: +22366716297
Email: office.mali@unido.org

FAO Representation

Chief: Mr. Allahoury Amadou Diallo

Country Representative

Address: Avenue de la Liberté - Dar Salam (Route de Koulouba)

Commune 3, Bamako

Phone: +223-20223713

Fax: +223-20223646

Email: FAO-ML@fao.org

Website:

<http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=MLI>

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https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali_en

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- African Union <https://au.int/>
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Useful contacts

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