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CHAD

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CHAD

Country Information Package

This Country Information Package
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Within the framework of LET4CAP and with the financial support to the Internal Security Fund of the EU

LET4CAP aims to contribute to more *consistent* and *efficient* assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase.

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1. Country Profile

1.1 Country in Brief



Source: Nations Online Project

Formal Name: Republic of Chad - République du Tchad - Jumhūrīyat Tshād (in Arabic)

Previous formal names: N/A

Population: 12.1 million

Term for Citizens: Chadians

Area (sq km): 1,284 million sq km

Capital City: N'Djamena

Independence: 11 August 1960, from France

1.2 Modern and Contemporary History of Chad

French administration

French colonial expansion led to the creation of the Protectorate of Chad in 1900.

After French conquest of Chad was completed, the country became a colony within French Equatorial Africa in 1913. French rule in Chad was characterised by an absence of policies to unify the territory and total absence of modernisation compared to other French colonies. Additionally, the colonial administration in Chad was critically understaffed and had to rely on the dregs of the French civil service. Only the extreme South was governed effectively; whereas French presence in the Islamic North and East was nominal. Soon after the end of World War II, France granted Chad the status of overseas territory with its own territorial representatives in the National Assembly.

A large measure of autonomy was conceded under the constitutional law of 1957, when the first territorial government was formed by Gabriel Lisette, a West Indian who had become the leader of the Chad Progressive Party (PPT), the largest political party based in the Southern half of the colony.

An autonomous Republic within the French Community was unilaterally proclaimed in November 1958. Back in the late 1950s, the country's stability was often endangered by tensions between North and South. If the South was inhabited by more economically progressive black and Christian populations, the North had a conservative, Muslim, non-black leadership of the old feudal states.

Independent Chad

Chad's post-colonial history has been marred by instability and conflict. Since gaining independence on 11th August 1960, there has been a division between the Muslim North and the Animists-Christians of the South of the country. This divide was reflected in the existence of numerous rebel groups that often procured their identity from the ethnicity they belonged to. Southern Christian leader, Sara François Tombalbaye, was the first President of the Republic.

In 1963, in the wake of the banning of all opposition parties and the establishment of a one-party system decided by Tombalbaye, violent opposition was triggered in the Muslim North, thanks to a movement called Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT). Tombalbaye's autocratic rule and mismanagement exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions to the point that in 1966 the Northern uprising developed into a guerrilla warfare and eventually led to a civil war. Once again, the external security provider and former colonizer, France, intervened with French troops putting down the revolt. However, FROLINAT operations continued until the 1980s thanks to the ongoing support provided by Libya's weaponry. Tombalbaye was overthrown and killed in 1975 by Southern Christian rival Félix Malloum in a coup, but the insurgency continued. In 1979 a coalition government headed by a Muslim from the North, Goukouni Oueddei, assumed power for a brief period of time thanks to the support of Libyan troops. The main goal was to win the fight against the leader Hissene Habré and his group called Army of the North, which was the dominant rebel group in the North along the border with Libya. In 1982 the leader of the Army of the North Hissene Habré managed to seize power

in Chad after a strong power contest. Back then the Organisation of the African Union recognised his government, while Oueddei's forces continued the resistance along with Libyan troops. Libya had moved to fill the power vacuum, but its adventure ended in disaster in 1987 when FROLINAT troops, the Chadian government alongside with French and US assistance, forced Libya out of the North, except for the Aouzou strip and Tibesti, which later became a contested area between the two countries.

Habré's Presidency (1982 – 1990)

The French-supported President, Hissene Habré, consolidated his dictatorship through a power system that relied on corruption and violence, with thousands of people estimated to have been killed under his rule. The President favoured his own Toubou ethnic group and discriminated against his former allies, the Zaghawa. He was later accused of mass political killing during his rule and there were attempts to prosecute Habré led to his placement under house arrest in Senegal in 2005. In 2013, Habré was formally charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during his rule. In May 2016, he was found guilty of human-rights abuses, including rape, sexual slavery, and ordering the killing of 40,000 people, and sentenced to life in prison.

Déby's Presidency (1990 – present)

Habré's General, Idriss Déby, overthrew him in 1990 and soon attempted to reconcile the rebel groups and reintroduce multiparty politics. In 1993, during the interim government guided by Déby, a national democracy conference called for free elections to be held within a year. In 1996, Déby easily won Chad's first multiparty presidential election and in the following year his Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) also obtained a landslide victory in legislative elections.

During his term in office – and after winning a very controversial presidential poll in May 2001 – Déby had to face serious security challenges from different rebel groups such as the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad – led by Déby's former Defence Minister Youssouf Togoimi – which began an armed rebellion against the government, not recognising his rule. Some 64 people were killed in the outbreak of fighting in 2001. Despite signing a Libyan-brokered peace deal in 2002, rebel and government forces continued to clash until 2003 when a new peace accord was signed, but soon rejected by the movement hardliners. In 2003 the government signed a peace deal with another rebel group active in the East called National Resistance Army (ANR). The agreement called for an immediate ceasefire and amnesty for all ANR rebels as well as their supporters. The Chadian government also said that former rebels could be integrated into either the National Army or civilian life.

Spill-over of the Darfur Conflict

Oil exploitation began in Chad in 2003, bringing with it hopes that Chad would at last have some chances of peace and prosperity after the opening of a pipeline connecting its oil fields with Cameroon. Hopes were soon dashed between 2004 and 2006,

when Chad had a spill-over of the Darfur conflict, with thousands of Sudanese refugees escaping the fighting in the Darfur region of Western Sudan. Chad became highly involved in the Darfur conflict to defend its borders and protect Sudanese refugees as well as its own population. In April 2005, Chad accused Sudan of recruiting Chadian rebels who were committed to the destabilization of the country. In a related development, by August 2005, reports emerged about Sudanese militias crossing the border into Chad and attacking villages. The Sudanese "janjaweed" militias, active in the hot spot of Darfur in Sudan, were believed to be responsible for the cross-border attacks. Another issue facing the Déby government was the influx of refugees from neighbouring Sudan. Nearly 200,000 refugees from the Darfur region of Sudan crossed into Chad to escape the ethnic-based conflict. In the meantime, Déby unilaterally modified the constitution in 2005 to remove the two-terms limit on the presidency, which caused an uproar among the civil society and opposition parties because this way he was eligible for a third term. In 2006 Déby won a third mandate in elections that the opposition boycotted, while United Force for Change rebels were seeking to oust President Déby and defied government forces in the outskirts of the capital. President Déby was also under pressure from critics accusing him of corruption, cronyism and political repression. Moreover, he was accused of favouring his own Zaghawa clan in a country made up of at least 100 ethnic groups.

Regionalisation of the conflict and Chad-Sudan war (2005-2010)

Beside the unstable situation in the capital N'Djamena, Chadian rebels attacked the town of Adre, near the Sudanese border, and Chad accused Sudan of being behind the incident. Since then, Chad and Sudan were also at war, with Chad continuously accusing Sudan of leading Chad into turmoil due to the spill-over of the Darfur conflict. Additionally, Chad was accusing Sudan of supporting and arming the United Force for Change Chadian rebels who wanted to topple Déby's government. It was a charge denied by Sudan, which countered by accusing Chad of backing anti-government factions operating in the conflict-ridden Sudanese Darfur. All this confirmed that the boundary between Chad and Sudan had become a key fault-line.

In April 2006, tensions between Chad and Sudan reached a new high when the Chadian government revealed 160 rebels in a public square and announced that it was breaking off diplomatic ties with Sudan. A state of emergency was imposed in Eastern areas of Chad bordering Darfur in December 2006, when ethnic violence soared to unprecedented levels. In early 2007, Chadian rebels of the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) continued their attacks inside Chad, attempting to overpower the government forces. Other Chadian rebel groups mushroomed as they were operating close to the conflict zone along the border with Sudan, resulting in a failed attempt to oust President Déby from office. The different rebel groups said that they were opening several fronts in their attempt to overthrow President elect Déby. The UN agency for refugees UNHCR warned that a genocide like that in Darfur may have occurred in Chad too. The UN Security Council authorised a new UN-EU peace keeping force to protect civilians from violence spilling over from Darfur.

In late 2007 the emergency area was declared to be both along the Eastern border and in the desert North, while the EU was sending its peace-keeping force to protect refugees from violence in Darfur.

The start of December 2007 saw clashes take place between Chadian government troops and rebels from the Rally of Forces for Change (RFC). South of the clashes between troops and the RFC, the military was also fighting with another rebel enclave - the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD). The violence showed the inoperable state of the peace deal signed between the government and the two rebel groups - the RFC and the UFDD - earlier in 2007.

In 2008 rebel forces offensive attempted to take the capital by force and violence reached the streets of N'Djamena, close to the presidential palace. In May 2008, a rebel attack on the suburb of Omdurman in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum led to the devolution of ties with the neighbouring Chad. At issue was Sudan's accusation that Chad's assistance to Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) rebels in Darfur directly contributed to the attack. Violence between Chadian and Sudanese militias flared up, leading to Sudan responding by closing its border and cutting economic ties with Chad. Moreover, eight rebel groups decided to merge and form a rebel alliance called the Union of Resistance Forces (URF) led by Timan Erdimi. To counter the actions and violence in conflict-ridden areas, the EU peace keeping mission in Eastern Chad - which had been deployed - left place to an UN-led larger force called MINURCAT.

In 2010, President Déby and his Sudanese counterpart, Omar al Bashir, held talks and an agreement for the restoration of harmony between Chad and Sudan, which was signed on 15th January 2010, marked the end of a five-year war. The fix in relations led to the Chadian rebels from Sudan returning home, the opening of the border between the two countries after 7 years of closure, and the deployment of a joint force to secure the Chad-Sudan border.

Recent developments in Deby's Presidency

Chad held parliamentary polls in February 2011 and Presidential elections in April 2011, which were boycotted by the opposition. President Déby was declared winner once again, but in May 2013, security forces foiled a coup against President Déby that had been in preparation for several months. Several people – including some opposition Members of National Assembly and army officers – were arrested since they were responsible for the alleged coup plot. In the meantime, the country committed itself to stabilise the entire region by sending Chadian troops to help France drive al Qaeda allies out of Northern Mali and - on another front - to Central African Republic after a recent *coup d'état*.

In July 2014 France set up a new military operation called Multidimensional Joint Task Force (MJTF) in the Sahel region to stop the emergence of jihadist groups, based in Chad's capital and involving 3,000 French troops alongside with Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. Boko Haram perpetrated its first attack along the shore of Lake Chad in early 2015, one month after a bilateral agreement with Cameroon to stand together in the fight against terrorism. In January 2015, Chadian troops joined Cameroonian and Nigerian to combat Boko Haram. Chad has been at the forefront of this operation to root out terrorism. Suicide bombings hit N'Djamena in June/July 2015, causing dozens of fatalities and injuries.

President Déby and his party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement, have dominated Chadian politics since ascending to power in 1990. Déby won the 1996 elections - the first multi-party elections held in Chad - as well as the 2001, 2006, and 2011 elections. The electoral processes during these elections have, however, been controversial. While the opposition contested the results each time, its voice became louder during the last elections as civil society organizations joined to protest austerity measures. Although the term of the current legislature ended in March 2015, Déby announced a further postponement of parliamentary elections for "budgetary reasons". Legislative elections scheduled to take place in November 2018 have been postponed to May 2019. The government cited the need to implement electoral reforms and gather funds prior to the vote, the date of which has not yet been determined. Indeed, the country is facing economic difficulties as a result of a drop in global oil prices. Déby was sworn-in for a fifth term in August 2016 during a public ceremony attended by 14 Heads of State. However, the Chadian government has received subdued criticism for ongoing political repression of the opposition, student unions, women's groups, and the press. This weak international criticism highlights not only that Déby has successfully consolidated domestic political power, but also that the administration in Chad has managed over the last five years to solidify the country's reputation as a crucial Western ally in a sub-region plagued by chronic instability. This is in part due to the emergence of Chad as an invaluable ally in the fight against violent extremism throughout the region.

Habré's Trial

In 2012, Senegal and the African Union acted together to set up a special court – the Extraordinary African Chamber – to try Chad's former leader Hissene Habré for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Habré was arrested in Senegal in 2013 and 3 years later the trial ended with the conviction of former leader, found guilty of crimes of war and against humanity and sentenced to life in prison.

Trump's travel ban to Chad in 2017

Recently, Chad has been included in the expanded version of United States President Donald Trump's Executive Order 13780, which restricts entry by nationals from 8 countries, including Chad, into the US. A few weeks later, on 24th September 2017, US President Trump included Chad on the list of terror states, banning the arrival of all Chadians on US soil from 1st October 2017. While Chad is still an official US partner in the fight against terror in the Sahel, Washington no longer has confidence in Chadian intelligence. Incomprehensible to most Chadians, both among the opposition and Déby's entourage, the US travel ban has caused rage and astonishment in the capital N'Djamena.

1.3 Geography

Location: Chad is located in Central Africa and it is the largest of the 16 land-locked countries on the continent. It is bordered to the North by Libya, to the East by Sudan, to the South East by Central African Republic, to the South West by Cameroon and to the West by Nigeria and Niger. The frontiers of Chad, which constitute a heritage from the colonial era, do not coincide with either natural or ethnic boundaries.

It covers an area almost nine times the size of New York state, and slightly more than three times the size of California.

Area: Chad can count on a total area of nearly 1,284 million square kilometres of landmass, of which 1,259,200 square kilometres of land and 24,800 square kilometres of water.

Land Boundaries: Chad's total length of its borders is 6,406 kilometres. The nation's longest borders are with Central African Republic (1556 km), with Sudan (1403 km) and with Niger (1196 km). The state also shares a border with Cameroon (1116 km), with Libya (1050 km) and with Nigeria (85 km).

Length of Coastline: 0 km. It is a land-locked country.

Maritime Claims: None

Topography: A largely semi-desert country in the North, it has arid plains in the centre and lowlands in the South. Its terrain is that of a shallow basin that rises gradually from the Lake Chad area in the West and it is rimmed by mountains to the North and East. Lake Chad is the most significant water body in the whole Sahel region and is a remnant of a former inland sea (paleolake Mega-Chad) which used to cover an area roughly the size of today's Caspian Sea. As for Chad's river network, the most important rivers are the Chari and the Logone rivers and some tributaries, which flow from the South-East into Lake Chad. The capital N'Djamena is 1,600 km by road from the Western African coastal ports.

Natural Resources: Chad's rich in gold, uranium and oil and stands to benefit from its most recently-acquired status of oil-exporting state. Other natural resources include natron, kaolin (mineral), limestone, sand and gravel, salt and fish (Lake Chad).

Land Use: Chad's overall agricultural land (39.6%) is subdivided into arable land (3.9%), permanent crops (0%) and permanent pasture (35.7%). A great deal of territory is also occupied by forest (9%) and other (51%).

Environmental Factors: As far as the natural hazards are concerned, dry, hot, dusty harmattan winds occur in the North, period droughts and locust plagues. Overall, the state is characterised by some very serious environmental issues such as inadequate supplies of potable water; improper waste disposal in

rural areas, which contribute to soil and water pollution; desertification.

1.4 Territorial and Administrative Units

Chad is a presidential republic that inherited the French system of general and territorial administration. From independence to 1999 the country had 14 préfectures, later replaced by 28 départements (départments). The country was again reorganised in 2002 to produce 18 régions (régions) and an additional four were created in 2012. Ennedi Region was split in two parts in the same year 2012, establishing 23 régions. Currently, the country is divided into 23 régions (Arabic: manāṭiq, French: régions). Each région is divided into between two and four départements ('aqālīm or départements). The only exception is represented by the capital N'Djamena which has got 10 arrondissements (dawā'ir).

List of Chad Regions:

- Batha Region
- Chari-Baguirmi Region
- Hadjer-Lamis Region
- Wadi Fira Region
- Bahr El Gazel Region
- Borkou Region
- Ennedi-Ouest Region
- Ennedi-Est Region
- Guera Region
- Kamen Region
- Lac Region
- Logone Occidental Region
- Logone Oriental Region
- Mandoul Region
- Mayo-Kebbi Est Region
- Mayo-Kebbi Ouest Region
- Moyen-Chari Region
- Ouaddai Region
- Salamat Region
- Sila Region
- Tandjilé Region
- Tibesti Region
- N'Djamena Region



Source: Wikipedia


1.5 Population

According to 2017 estimates, Chad has a population of 12.1 million people. However, the population is not evenly distributed over the territory due to contrasts in climate and physical geography. A great deal of Chadian nationals lives in the main cities, located in the South-Western part of the country, in particular nearby the capital and Lake Chad Basin. On the other hand, a minority of people is distributed in a fragmented patchwork bordering the dry Sahara zone to the North.


Chad has got a large and growing youth - some 65% is under the age of 25 and some 28% belongs to the 25-54 years old age group. The population will continue to grow rapidly because of the country's very high fertility rate and large youth cohort – the average age is 17 years old. However, Chad has got the world's third highest maternal mortality rate (856 death/100,000 live births). Among the primary risk factors are poverty, anaemia, high fertility, poor education, and a lack of access to family planning and obstetric care. Only about a quarter of women are literate, less than 5% use contraceptives, and more than 40% undergo genital cutting. Impoverished, uneducated adolescents living in rural areas are most affected by these issues.

Furthermore, because of the country's high illiteracy rate (more than 70%), high unemployment, and widespread poverty, Chadian life expectancy remains low, i.e. 50 years old. According to the latest official estimates, the birth rate is 35.6 births/1,000 population, and the death rate is 13.8/1,000 population. The overall fertility rate is 4.34 children born per woman. As of December 2017, the infant mortality rate was 85 deaths/1,000 live births.

Moreover, according to UN figures as of October 2017, more than 350,000 refugees from Sudan and more than 75,000 from the Central African Republic strained Chad's limited resources and created tensions in host communities. Thousands of new refugees fled to Chad in 2013 to escape worsening violence in the Darfur region of Sudan. The large refugee populations are still hesitant to return to their home countries because of continued instability. Chad was relatively stable in 2012 in comparison to other states in the region but fighting between government forces and opposition groups and inter-communal violence have left nearly 60,000 of its citizens displaced in the Eastern part of the country.



Source: Joshua Project Research Initiative



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Chad: Ethnolinguistic composition

Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

Source: Encyclopædia Britannica

1.6 Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion

Ethnic Groups

Like many other African countries, the linguistic variety always reflects an ethnic composition of great complexity. The basic population of Chad derives from indigenous African groups, whose composition has been altered over the course of years through successive invasions from the Arabic North. The present population is a mixture of at least 200 ethnic groups. There are about 150,000 non-indigenous inhabitants, of whom about 1,000 are French.

The Sara group is the largest group of population (25%) and lives in the central parts of the Chari and Logone river basins and the South. This is because the Southern part of the country was historically the cross roads of the caravan routes below the Sahara, forming a link between West Africa and the Arabic region, as well as one between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

The second most populous group (12%) is represented by the Sudanic Arabs who inhabit the Central and Eastern part of the country, while the Mayo Kebbi peoples (9%) are the third ethnic group and mainly reside in the small Mayo Kebbi region in the South West area. In addition, the Kanem Bornu and Ouaddai peoples account for 9% and 8.7%, respectively.

Other relevant ethnic groups are the Arabised groups of Arabised Berbers, Chadic people – Marba (subdivided in minor groups); Nilo-Saharan people, which include Ouaddai, Saharan – Kanembu, Kanuri, Zaghawa and Toubou; Eastern Sudanic minority of Daju; Central Sudanic inhabitants such as Baguirmi and Sinyar.

Moreover, among the inhabitants of the semiarid tropical zone are the Barma of Bagirmi, the founders of the kingdom of the same name; they are surrounded by groups of, Fulani, Hausa, and Arabs, many of whom have come from outside Chad itself. Along the lower courses of the Logone and Chari rivers are the Kotoko, who are supposedly descended from the ancient Sao population that formerly lived in the region. The Yedina (Buduma) and Kuri inhabit the Lake Chad region and, in the Kanem area, are associated with the Kanembu and Tunjur, who are of Arabic origin. All of these groups are sedentary and coexist with Daza, Kreda, and Arab nomads. The Hadjeray (of the Guera Massif) and Abou Telfân are composed of refugee populations who, living on their mountainous terrain, have resisted various invasions.

Throughout the Ouaddai region are found groups of nomadic Arabs, who are also found in other parts of Southern Chad. Despite their widespread diffusion, Arabs represent a single ethnic group composed of a multitude of tribes. In Kanem other Arabs, mostly of Libyan origin, are also found. In the Northern Chad regions of Tibesti, Borkou, and Ennedi the population is composed of black nomads.

Languages

Chad has two official languages, French and Modern Standard Arabic, and some 134 indigenous languages. From 1900 until 1960, Chad was a French colony and all public services were carried out in the French language. Of the two official languages, French is the preferred language for communication in Chad and it is the language of education and government, while Arabic is the

language of commerce. Radio broadcasts are also done in Arabic, French and eight African languages.

However, the lingua franca of Chad is a local dialect of Arabic, called Chadian Arabic. Over 1 million individuals consider this dialect their native language. The majority of native Chadian Arabic speakers (around 12% of the total population) are concentrated in the Southern region. In total, between 40 and 60% of the population is fluent in this dialect. In fact, Chadian Arabic is the primary language of the capital of Chad, N'Djamena. Additionally, the residents and business people of the cities of Am Timan, Mao, and Abéché use Chadian Arabic as the principal means of communication. This dialect is believed to have originated among livestock herders during the 17th century, when the population of Arabic speakers grew within the historic nomadic territories. By the early 20th century, some linguist scholars had published grammar rule books for the local dialects throughout Chad and neighbouring countries, noting that the same dialect was used in several locations.

The total number of indigenous languages spoken is over 120. These are divided into 3 large language families: Afro-Asiatic, Niger-Congo, and Nilo-Saharan. The Afro-Asiatic language family is further divided into the following subgroups: Semitic languages (Chadian Arabic, for example) and Chadic languages. The Niger-Congo language family is made up of the Adamawa subgroup, which consists of 5 specific tongues. The Nilo-Saharan language family is further divided into the following subgroups: Saharan, Bongo-Bagirmi, Fur, Eastern Sudanic, Maban, and Sinyar. Each of these subgroups consists of several specific languages. Of these indigenous languages, Sar (also known as Sara) is the most widely spoken.

Religion

The population can be broadly divided between those who follow the Islamic faith (80%), and Animist-Christians (20%). The vast majority of Muslim people is concentrated in the North and Center of the country, while the southernmost part inhabited by the Sara ethnic group observes an Animist-Christian faith. A further subdivision of Muslim can be found between the Arab which are often dubbed as “white Muslim” and Wadai who represent the “black Muslim”.


The Arab invaders brought Islam, and today their descendants form a relatively homogeneous group, are localized in the regions of Chari Baguirmi and Ouaddai, but mostly seminomadic. Muslim indigenous groups include Arabs, Toubou, Hadjerai, Fulbe, Kotoko, Kanembou, Baguirmi, Boulala, Zaghawa, and Maba. Some indigenous groups, such as the Salamat and the Taoudjor, were largely Arabised by intermarriage over the years. Other Muslim peoples include the Fulani, the great sheep and goatherders of Chad.

1.7 Health

According to the latest available figures, the Chadian government expenditure on health amounted to 3.6% of GDP in 2014. However, the country had a very low physician density, i.e. 0.04/1,000 population which corresponded only to 345 doctors working in the country during the decade 2000-2010.

The healthcare system has a network of health centres in cities and large towns, but overall facilities are very poor and understaffed. Like many other African countries, Chad suffers from a severe shortage of medical staff, medicines and equipment, which is surely not enough to cover the needs of the population. There are major hospitals at N'Djamena, Sarh, Moundou, Bongor, and Abéché, while other health facilities include dispensaries and infirmaries dispersed throughout the territory.


Moreover, only roughly 50% of the population has got access to improved drinking water sources, whereas around 15% to improved sanitation facility access. Despite a slight improvement in drinking water resources, a consistent gap remains between urban areas where 70% of people has direct access to drinking water sources, and in rural areas where only nearly 30% can make use of this service. As for the sanitation facility access, the situation is still concerning as the vast majority of people living in rural and often out-of-reach areas has no access to hospitals facilities. Further, malnutrition remains the primary cause of morbidity and mortality for the most vulnerable populations of pregnant women, new mothers and children under five. The nutrition crisis is especially acute in eastern Chad, where in 2016 UNICEF estimated global acute malnutrition in Ouaddai Region at 16.9%, with severe acute malnutrition at 3.6%. The primary causes of death in Chad include lower respiratory infections, malaria, and HIV/AIDS.




Source: WHO

... Data not available or applicable.

Adult risk factors




Population using improved water and sanitation



Top 10 causes of death


Lower respiratory infections was the leading cause of death, killing 24.7 thousand people in 2012



Burden of disease, 2012

Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) are the sum of years of life lost due to premature mortality (YLL) and years of healthy life lost due to disability (YLD).

DALYs, YLL and YLD (thousands) by broad cause group




*Other noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) including non-malignant neoplasms; endocrine, blood and immune disorders; sense organ, digestive, genitourinary, and skin diseases; oral conditions; and congenital anomalies.

** Infectious diseases other than acute respiratory diseases, HIV, TB and malaria.

YLL YLD

Source: WHO

Deaths by broad cause group



Causes



Probability of dying, 2012

Probability of dying between relevant exact ages, for a person experiencing the 2012 age-specific mortality risks throughout their life.

Before age 15, all causes	Male	44%
	Female	39%
Before age 70, all causes	Male	85%
	Female	80%
Between ages 15 and 49, from maternal causes	Female	81%
Between ages 30 and 70, from 4 major noncommunicable diseases (NCDs)~	Both sexes	23%

~Cancers, cardiovascular diseases, chronic respiratory diseases and diabetes

Source: Country statistics and global health estimates by WHO and UN partners

For more information visit the Global Health Observatory

(http://who.int/qho/mortality_burden_disease/en/)


Last updated: January 2015

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

Indicators	Statistics	
	Baseline*	Latest**
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births)	215	148
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100 000 live births)	1700	980
Deaths due to HIV/AIDS (per 100 000 population)	141.5	104.8
Deaths due to malaria (per 100 000 population)	217.8	135.9
Deaths due to tuberculosis among HIV-negative people (per 100 000 population)	36	22

*1990 for under-five mortality and maternal mortality; 2000 for other indicators








**2012 for deaths due to HIV/AIDS and malaria ; 2013 for other indicators



Source: WHO

1.8 Education and Literacy


According to UNESCO Institute for Statistics figures, education in Chad is challenging due to the nation's dispersed population and a certain degree of reluctance on the part of parents to send their children to school. If around 80% of children attended primary school, the percentage plunges to slightly over 20% for secondary education and only between 3% and 4% for tertiary education. Although the government expenditure on education amounted to 3% of GDP in 2014, there is still a consistent number of out-of-school children in the state (more than 600,000 males and roughly 400,000 females) based on the latest data available for the country. To counter this trend, the government has recently developed an interim education plan (Plan Intérimaire de l'Éducation au Tchad, PIET) for the period 2018-2020, which seeks to increase supply of education services, improve the quality of learning, ensure balance between financing and selected development ambitions, foster equity and reduce disparities, and make the management and governance in the education sector more effective. Illiteracy (60%) remains an element of great concern which affects 6 million people out of a total population of 12 million; the situation is further compounded in households in rural areas that lack road connections to the main facilities and town centres.




Education expenditures

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Government expenditure on education										
as % of GDP	...	2.31	1.98	2.26	2.21	2.85
as % of total government expenditure	...	9.54	8.12	10.08	9.21	12.46
Government expenditure per student (in PPP\$)										
Primary education	...	159.87	132.83	109.05	125.16
Secondary education	...	303.03	282.98	395.88	253.56	365.9
Tertiary education	...	2736.91	3967.78	3458.59

Illiterate population aged 15-24 years




Illiterate population aged 15 years and older




	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	
Illiterate population				
15-24 years	2,012,956	876,824	1,136,133	(2016)
15 years and older	5,884,942	2,596,511	3,288,432	(2016)


Literacy rate among the population aged 15 years and older



Literacy rate among the population aged 15-24 years



Literacy rate among the population aged 65 years and older



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics

1.9 Country Economy

Chad's landlocked location, inadequate infrastructure, troubled contemporary history of war and instability, drastic weather conditions and long-standing dependency on a single cash-crop (cotton) for export have jointly contributed to make the state one of the poorest of the world. Besides, remoteness and distance are prime features of economic life in Chad. Transportation and communications are difficult, both internally and externally. Douala (Cameroon), the nearest port from N'Djamena, is 1,700 kilometres away. More than 80% of the work force is involved in agriculture-small-scale subsistence farming, herding, and fishing.

Agriculture, oil and other natural resources

Nowadays oil and agriculture are the mainstays of Chad's economy. Chad's economy has been based almost entirely on agriculture and pastoralism ever since early days. Historically, Chad's cotton revenues peaked in 1984, but in 1985 world cotton prices fell. This decline forced a major economic restructuring under the auspices of the World Bank and other foreign donors. To revive the cotton industry, a 1986 restructuring program curtailed all cotton-derived revenues to the government until world prices rebounded. The processing of raw cotton provides employment for a majority of those in industry and still accounts for some of the most consistent Chad's export earnings.

Chad's livestock has grown to be another important economic resource, even though much of this wealth is not reflected in the national cash economy. Similarly, about half the fish caught is salted and dried for export. Cotton, cattle, livestock, and gum Arabic provide the bulk of Chad's non-oil export earnings.

Furthermore, oil provides about 60% of export revenues. Nearly all of Chad's fuel is provided by one domestic refinery, and unanticipated shutdowns occasionally result in shortages. The country regulates the price of domestic fuel, providing an incentive for black market sales. Chad officially joined the list of oil-producing countries in 2003 and since then its economy has been heavily dependent on oil. A consortium of three oil companies -U.S.-based Exxon Mobil and Chevron, joined by the Malaysian Petronas company- has been extracting oil from wells in the south of Chad and sending it to market via a pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the Gulf of Guinea. The consortium has invested more than \$7 billion in the Chad-Cameroon petroleum pipeline project, which originally had support from the World Bank in the form of Bank loans to Chad and Cameroon to enable them to participate in the project. In return, the Chad Government agreed to a set of unique mechanisms for World Bank, private sector, government, and civil society collaboration to guarantee that future oil revenues would benefit local populations and result in poverty alleviation. However, the 2014 drop in oil price and the deterioration of the security situation led to a deeper recession in 2016, with poverty expected to rise to 39.8% by 2019. Regional instability has been affecting economic activity by impacting trade, public expenditure, and private investment. These changes also reflect fiscal austerity and consequent cuts in public services, and loss of income caused by the disruption of cross-border trade in

livestock. These trends were partially offset by modest increases in agriculture, which constitutes the primary sector of employment for nearly three quarters of Chad's working age population.

As far as mineral and natural resources are concerned, Chad's principal mineral resource is natron (a complex sodium carbonate), which is dug up in the Lake Chad and Borkou areas and is used as salt and in the preparation of soap and medicines. There are deposits of gold located in various parts of Chad, including those mined in the southwestern part of the country. Other mineral deposits include uranium, titanium, and bauxite.

The support of foreign donors

Since independence, Chad has relied heavily on outside donors and regional institutions for economic survival and development. Public revenue management and corruption continue to plague the nation. Chad reached a decision point in 2001 for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief and was receiving assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. By 2002, however, the country needed an extension on the IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program's performance indicators. It continued to receive assistance from the international financial institutions but struggled to meet the program's financial targets, and the Fund ceased the program for non-performance. The IMF renewed Fund-managed programs with Chad in 2008 and 2009, but the country was unable to meet the targets.

Over the years Chad's principal sponsor has been France, which has subsidized the budget. Through the mechanisms of the Lomé Convention between the member of the European Economic Community (EEC) and their former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), France has also subsidized Chad's cotton production and exports. French companies have dominated trade, and French banks have controlled Chad's finances. Chad obtained a three-year extended credit facility from the IMF in 2014 and was granted debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in April 2015. The sums received exceed export earnings and constitute as much as a quarter of the gross national product.

Current economic outlook

In 2018, economic policy is being driven by efforts that started in 2016 to reverse the recession and to repair damage to public finances and exports. The government is implementing an Emergency Action Plan to counterbalance the drop in oil revenue and to diversify the economy. Chad's National Development Plan cost just over \$9 billion with a financing gap of \$6.7 billion. It emphasized the importance of private sector participation in Chad's development, as well as the need to improve the business environment, particularly in priority sectors such as mining and agriculture.

The Government of Chad also reached a deal with Glencore and four other banks on the restructuring of a \$1.45 billion oil-backed loan in February 2018, after a long negotiation. The new terms include an extension of the maturity to 2030 and a two-year grace period on principal repayments. The original

Glencore loan was to be repaid with crude oil assets, however, Chad's oil sales were hit by the downturn in the price of oil. Chad had secured a \$312 million credit from the IMF in June 2017, but release of those funds hinged on restructuring the Glencore debt. Chad had already cut public spending to try to meet the terms of the IMF program, but that prompted strikes and protests in a country where nearly 40% of the population lives below the poverty line. Multinational partners, such as the African Development Bank, the EU, and the World Bank are likely to continue budget support in 2018, but Chad will remain at high debt risk, given its dependence on oil revenue and pressure to spend on subsidies and security.

The National Development Plan 2017-2021 and Vision 2030

To counter this precarious and delicate financial economic crisis affecting the country, the Prime Minister together with the Ministry of Economy and Development Planning of Chad worked on "Vision 2030, the Chad we Want". This innovative exercise in Chad translates the Vision clearly expressed by Déby towards a common goal: Chad's Development by 2030. Translating this national objective into practice required the development of a strategic document ("Vision 2030") and a first operational planning document ("National Plan 2017-2021"). The Vision 2030 is based on 4 main Axes: Axis 1 is strengthening national unity; Axis 2 is strengthening the governance and rule of law; Axis 3 is developing a diversified and competitive economy and Axis 4 is improving the quality of life of the Chad people. It is consistent with Agenda 2063 of the African Union "The Africa we want" and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 2016-2030) to which Chad has subscribed. This Vision constitutes Chad's framework of reference for national socioeconomic development policy until 2030. However, this framework may be updated according to the lessons learned from its implementation and the evolution of the national, regional or global context.

Inflation indicators

(% unless otherwise indicated)

	2020	2021	2022
US CPI	1.3	1.8	1.9
OECD CPI	1.7	1.9	1.9
Manufactures (measured in US\$)	2.5	3.7	4.1
Oil (Brent; US\$/b)	57.8	60.6	63.3
Non-oil commodities (measured in US\$)	-1.8	0.9	0.2

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Economic growth

(% unless otherwise indicated)

	2017	2018	2019
US GDP	2.3	2.6	2.5
OECD GDP	2.4	2.3	2.2
World GDP	3.0	3.0	3.0
World trade	4.6	4.1	3.8

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Financial variables

(% unless otherwise indicated)

	2020	2021	2022
US\$ 3-month commercial paper rate (av; %)	2.6	1.7	2.0
¥ 3-month money market rate (av; %)	0.2	0.2	0.2
¥:US\$ (av)	104.0	100.0	100.2

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Economic indicators		2013	2014	2015	2016
GDP	\$ M	12949.9	13922.2	10888.8	9600.8
GDP growth	%	5.7	6.9	1.8	-7.0
Inflation (CPI)	%	0.1	1.7	3.7	-
Unemployment	%	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.8
Foreign direct investment	% of GDP	4.0	-4.9	5.5	5.8
Export growth	%	-13.7	5.6	27.8	-6.7
Import growth	%	-5.8	9.1	-20.6	-13.7
Current account balance	\$ M	-	-	-	-
Public debt	% of GDP	30.5	39.4	43.3	51.2
External debt	\$ M	2925.0	2395.6	1617.0	1655.0
Total debt service	\$ M	120.3	589.1	48.4	40.8
Net lending/borrowing	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Tax revenue	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Government consumption	% of GDP	7.9	6.2	5.2	4.4
Public education spending	% of GDP	2.8	-	-	-
Public health spending	% of GDP	1.8	2.0	-	-
R&D expenditure	% of GDP	-	-	-	-
Military expenditure	% of GDP	5.6	2.8	2.0	2.8

Sources (as of October 2017): The World Bank, World Development Indicators | International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database.

Source: The World Bank

2. Political and Security Context

2.1 The Constitution of Chad

The 7th Constitution of the Republic of Chad was adopted in 1996, six years after President Déby rose to power following a successful rebellion against President Hissene Habré.

This formal document establishes the framework of the Chadian state and government. The Constitution has been amended twice since its first approval in 1996, in 2005 and in 2018. In 2005 amendments were approved by the Chadian population amid fraud allegations, and term limits for the presidency were eliminated. This was deeply resented by the opposition and parts of the establishment as it directed the country as a kind of monarchy. As of 2018, the new amendments impose a 6-year mandate and a maximum limit of two presidential terms, which will not be applied retroactively.

The Constitution declares its attachment to the principles of the Rights of Man, as defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1948, and the African Charter of the Rights of Man and of Peoples of 1981.

Another important principle enshrined in the Chadian Constitution is the principle of state neutrality on religious affairs. This principle imposes on the three powers - the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary - a duty to refrain from interfering in religious matters or showing a preference for a particular religion in the exercise of their official functions.

Furthermore, Article 3 proclaims that sovereignty belongs to the people, who exercise it directly through referendums or indirectly through elected representatives.

Like many countries of francophone Africa, Chad's political regime is of presidential type, characterised by the supremacy of the President, who is the Head of State. The President of the Republic is elected directly by the people for a renewable six-year term by uninominal majority ballot in two rounds. The candidate having obtained the absolute majority of the suffrage expressed is declared elected at the first round. If no candidate has obtained the absolute majority in the first round, it proceeds, the second Sunday following, to a second round for the two candidates arriving ahead. The candidate having obtained the greatest number of votes at the end of the second round, is elected President of the Republic.

The President ensures respect for the Constitution and the proper functioning of public institutions; he is also the guarantor of independence, sovereignty, and national unity, of territorial integrity, and of respect for international treaties and accords. The Constitution grants important powers to the President, without real check-and-balances mechanisms. If, on the one hand, the President has the power to dissolve the National Assembly in circumstances of persistent conflict between the executive and the latter, on the other hand, only the responsibility of the Prime Minister and that of his ministers can be engaged by the National Assembly, through a vote of no confidence under the same circumstances. The government is therefore the shield which protects the President against any deposing attempt during his term of office. The President also serves as the Commander in Chief of Armed Forces. The first version of the 1996 Constitution provided for a National Assembly and a Senate as the two chambers of Parliament. However, since the 2005 amendment which saw the suppression of the presidential term of office, the Senate was suppressed and replaced by the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ESCC).

The ESCC advises the government on economic, social, and cultural matters. The power to pass laws is granted by the Constitution concurrently to the National Assembly and the executive.

The executive branch or government - led by a Prime Minister appointed by the President - defines and implements the political agenda of the nation. With the new constitutional changes of April 2018, the post of Prime Minister has been eliminated.

The legislative branch is composed of a unicameral National Assembly (188 seats; 118 directly elected in multi-seat constituencies by proportional representation vote and 70 directly elected in single-seat constituencies by absolute majority vote with a second round if needed; members serve 4-year terms).

On the other hand, the judicial branch comprises a Supreme Court (Chief of Justice, 3 Chamber Presidents and 12 judges or councillors) and it is further divided into three chambers.

Secondly, Chad has got a Constitutional Council which consists of 2 judges and 5 jurists. The Supreme Court Chief of Justice is selected by the President, whereas 8 councillors are designated by the President and 7 by the Speaker of the National Assembly. The peculiarity of the judiciary system is that both Chief of Justice and Councillors are appointed for life. As for the judge selection and term in office of the Constitutional Council, 2 judges are appointed by the President and 1 by the Speaker of the National Assembly, while 3 jurists are nominated by the President and the other 3 the National Assembly Representative and remain in office for a 9-year term.

Thirdly, there are some subordinate courts – the High Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal as well as tribunals and Justices of the peace.

The direct appointment of judges and councillors has often raised questions about the independence of the judiciary branch from the executive and legislative ones.

Current controversial changes to the Constitution

As of April 2018, Chad's National Assembly approved a new Constitution that expands President Déby's powers and potentially allows him to stay in office until 2033. The vote – which was boycotted by most opposition parties – eliminated the post of Prime Minister and created a fully presidential system.

Another significant change concerned the length of presidential mandates, establishing a 6-year mandate and re-instating a maximum limit of two terms which had been scrapped in a 2005 referendum. These changes will not be applied retroactively and hence, President elect Déby could serve another two terms after the next Presidential elections in 2021. Tensions are on the rise in Chad after opposition groups boycotted a forum to discuss these changes.

2.2 Elections

Presidential Elections, 10th April 2016

Chad has never experienced a free and fair transfer of power through elections. Déby and his ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) took power in 1990 during a rebellion, and then overwhelmingly won elections in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011. In the run up to the 2016 election, Chad's opposition led a large-scale nationwide shutdown on 24th February 2016 to protest Déby's continuing 26-year tenure. A coalition of anti-regime civil society groups modelled after similar movements in Senegal (e.g. Y'en a Marre) and Burkina Faso (e.g. Balai Citoyen) emerged out of these protests and demanded that Déby step down from power. These frustrated younger generations organized regular rallies in N'Djamena: protests against the regime started when "untouchables", sons of high-ranking civil servants and ministers, gang-raped a 17-year-old schoolgirl in February 2016. The protests gained force as Déby prepared for his 5th presidential re-election in April 2016 and continued when President Déby introduced his "austerity measures" on 31st August. In fact, 2016 was the year of social protest in Chad. The nationwide strike brought many of Chad's towns and the capital N'Djamena to a halt with markets, schools, transport, and district centres. The campaign was run under the slogan "Ça Suffit", French for "That's enough". In the wake of these events, protest marches were banned and 4 activists campaigning against the President were given suspended sentences. During the election day, there was an online blackout as access to internet was cut and mobile phones were not able to send text messages. Furthermore, many foreign TV operators could not cover the post-election scene as their filming licenses were not renewed. French broadcaster TV5Monde had their equipment confiscated and their crew were held for several hours for filming at a polling station.

During the presidential campaign, Déby faced 13 challengers. Two of his closest rivals were former Ministers in his government. One was Saleh Kebzabo, a trained journalist and the country's main opposition leader who previously held various portfolios in Déby's cabinet between 1993 and 2001. The other top challenger was Joseph Djimrangar Dadnadji, Déby's former Prime Minister who resigned from the ruling MPS in 2015 to form the Popular Action Framework for Republican Solidarity and Unity party. Dadnadji has long criticized Déby's management of the former French colony.

Like every election, Chad's National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) was tasked with organizing and supervising elections, whereas the country's Constitutional Council was responsible for vetting and publishing the names of presidential candidates as well as for verifying and announcing election results. Chad's incumbent President, Idriss Déby, won a 5th term in office in a lopsided first-round victory (62%) according to the Nation's Electoral Commission. His supporters celebrated by firing guns into the air in the central square in N'Djamena. Opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo finished a distant second with 12.8% of the vote, followed by Laokein Kourayo Mbaiherem with 10.6%, which put turnout at 76.11%. However, opposition parties remarked that the vote counting lacked credibility, as hundreds of ballot boxes disappeared. The Constitutional Council validated the results on 4th May 2016, dismissing a joint appeal from opposition candidates,

who alleged irregularities, on the technical grounds that it could not review appeals submitted jointly. For the first time in the history of the country, biometric identification technology was used to register voters. This expensive technology provided by a French company led to a more accurate electoral roll, but, as opponents warned, it did not prevent fraud. Unlike in previous elections, the European Union sent no observers, and the only international observers were from the African Union (AU), which concluded that the vote allowed the citizens to "freely choose their leaders". Déby also dismissed the opposition claims that about 60 soldiers who had voted against him disappeared. Déby, who took power in a coup, is seen by Western governments as a bulwark against Islamist militants in central Africa. The headquarters of the regional multi-national force fighting Boko Haram insurgents is based in Chad.

Parliamentary Elections, 13th February 2011


The elections originally scheduled for 28th November 2010 were postponed in early February 2011. According to the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), this was due to timing constraints caused by complications encountered during electoral preparations.

The 2011 elections were the result of an accord signed by the ruling party and its opponents. In August 2007, under the auspices of the European Union, the government and the civilian opposition reached an agreement intended to guarantee that the next elections would be fair. The document included measures designed to foster an appropriate environment for participatory politics and credible elections. One of the most ambitious and important provisions was the depoliticization and demilitarization of the public administration by moving toward an independent, meritocratic civil service. That provision, however, was ignored by the government and its European Union supporters. The elections saw the MPS-led coalition retain its majority in the National Assembly, winning 134 of the 188 seats.

The parliamentary term that began in June 2011 was originally scheduled to end in June 2015, but it was extended. President Déby announced on 2nd February 2017 that the election would be delayed because the government did not have sufficient funds amid an economic slump.

As of April 2018, Déby, one of Africa's longest-serving leaders, announced the tenure of parliamentary elections in November 2018. The legislative election of a new parliament has been postponed since 2015, but in order to secure international aid, Déby has agreed to organise an election, three years after the end of the initial parliamentary term. No major political change is expected, but continuing socio-economic problems are likely to result in civil unrest and armed factionalism.

Presidential Elections, 10th April 2016

Candidate	Party	Votes	%
Idriss Déby	Patriotic Salvation Movement	2,219,352	59.92
Saleh Kebzabo	National Union for Democracy and Renewal	473,074	12.77
Laoukein Kourayo Médard	Chadian Convention for Peace and Development	392,988	10.61
Djimrangar Dadnadji	CAP-SUR	186,857	5.04
Delwa Kassiré Koumakoye		73,636	1.99
Malloum Yoboide Djeraki		67,019	1.81
Mahamat Ahmad Alhabo		58,533	1.58
Abdoulaye Mbodou Mbami		53,204	1.44
Clément Djimet Bagaou		48,471	1.31
Gali Gatta Ngothé		44,899	1.21
Brice Mbaimon Guedmbaye		36,647	0.99
Beassoumda Julien		24,125	0.65
Djividi Boukar		25,107	0.68
Invalid/blank votes		419,818	–
Total		4,123,730	100
Registered voters/turnout		6,252,548	65.95
Source: Constitutional Court 			

Source: Constitutional Court of the Republic of Chad

Parliamentary Elections, 13th February 2011

Party/alliance		Votes	%	Seats
MPS coalition	Patriotic Salvation Movement			83
	MPS-RDP			25
	MPS-RNDP			18
	MPS-RDP-RNDP			8
UNDR-PLD coalition	National Union for Democracy and Renewal			10
	UNDR-PLD			2
Union for Renewal and Democracy				8
National Rally for Democracy in Chad				8
Federation, Action for the Republic				4
ART-CNDS-MPDT-PPJE-RDP/R coalition	ART-CNDS			1
	MPDT-RDP/R-CNDS			1
	PPJE-ART-CNDS			1
Democratic and Socialist Party for Alternation				2
Chadian Convention for Peace and Development				2
Union for Democracy and the Republic				2
Chadian Democratic Union				1
National Action for Development				1
New Breath for the Republic				1
Rally of People for Democratic Alternation				1
Movement of Patriotic Chadians for the Republic				1
Democratic Party of the Chadian People				1
Union of Democratic Forces/Republican Party				1
Union of Chadian Ecologists				1
PDI-RPT				1
African Party for Peace and Social Justice				1
Total				188

Source: Wikipedia

2.3 Political Parties



Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut), MPS

The Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) is the most important political party in Chad. It was founded by General Idriss Déby in Sudan on 11th March 1990 and became the ruling party in December 1990 when Déby's soldiers entered N'Djamena. The party advocates Déby's one-party system and nationalism; its slogan is "Dying for Salvation". Its finances far outstrip those of a profoundly fragmented opposition.

National Union for Democracy and Renewal (Union Nationale pour le Développement et le Renouveau, UNDR)

The National Union for Democracy and Renewal (UNDR) is the main opposition party, with 18 Members in the National Assembly. Its leader, Saleh Kebzabo, is the Head of the country's democratic opposition. The UNDR is a member party of the Coordination of Political Parties for the Defence of the Constitution (CPDC), the core opposition coalition opposed to the rule of President Déby.

The UNDR is also the only organisation that truly rivals the MPS from a media standpoint and it is the most visible coalition, whereas the majority of coalitions have no media presence. As of ideology, the party belongs to the international affiliation of Socialist International (a worldwide association of political parties) which seeks to establish democratic socialism, committed to systemic transformation of the economy from capitalism to socialism, where the means of production are socially and collectively owned or controlled within a decentralized and participatory planned economy.

Union for Renewal and Democracy (Union pour le Renouveau et la Démocratie), URD

This party was created and led by one of the icons of Chad's political life, General Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue. It is the only party that succeeded in bringing President Déby to a runoff in the 1996 presidential elections. Since Kamougue's death in 2011, the party has been undermined by infighting amongst the leadership. One of the sons of the late president Kamougue was entrusted with the party's leadership during its last congress. As of 2008, the URD is a member of the Coordination of Political Parties for the Defence of the Constitution (CPDC) opposition coalition and can count on 10 members in the National Assembly.

Federation- Action for the Republic (Fédération, action pour la République, Parti Fédération), FAR

It is considered a radical opposition party which supports federalism and is led by Ngarlejy Yorongar.



Rally for Democracy and Progress (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progress), RDP

The Rally for Democracy and Progress is led by Lol Mahamat Choua. It was founded by Choua in December 1991 and was among the first batch of political parties to be legalized in March 1992. However, since the 2005 Chad constitutional referendum, when President Déby eliminated presidential terms, the RDP has been part of the opposition, with 9 members currently serving in the National Assembly.

Framework of Popular Action for Solidarity and Unity of the Republic, CAP-SUR

The Framework of Popular Action for Solidarity and Unity of the Republic (CAP-SUR) political party is an opposition party. Joseph Dagnadji Djimrangar was an activist of the party in power of MPS, and officially resigned in April 2015 to create its own party. Similarly, a number of former senior officials, who worked with him when he served as Prime Minister in 2013, left the MPS at the same time as he did. Djimrangar is the Head of the country's Republican opposition and came third during the last Presidential election in 2016.

The National Rally for Democracy in Chad – The Awakening (Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie au Tchad - le Réveil), RNDT

The National Rally for Democracy in Chad is the political party of the Prime Minister Albert Pahimi Padacke, who founded it in 1996, and currently has got 9 members in the National Assembly. It is considered a moderate opposition party allied with the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), and it participates in the government.

2.4 Key Political Leaders



Idriss Déby Itno

Idriss Déby was born in 1952 in Berdoba (Chad). On 1st April 1989, in disagreement with Habré, he and some companions decided to leave N'Djamena towards the East. The Survivors created the "Action of the 1st of April" fighting against the dictatorship to form in March 1990 the Patriotic Movement of Salvation (MPS). President of the MPS since its creation, he was appointed President of the Republic on 28th February 1991, on 8th August 1996 at the end of the first pluralistic elections in Chad, and again on 20th May 2001 and on 3rd May 2006, after controversial elections. President Déby was preached "Artisan of Peace" by the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs in 2010.

From an international perspective, he chaired the destinies of the regional and sub-regional organizations such as the Niger Basin Authority (ABN), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Inter-Permanent Committee Sahel Drought Control (CILSS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC). From 30th January 2016 to 30th January 2017, he was appointed Chairperson of the African Union. As a sign of respect and importance, 14 African heads of state were present in N'Djamena when Déby was sworn in as president on 8th August 2016. He currently holds the Presidency of the Economic Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CSS) and the Presidency of the G5 Sahel Group in charge of security issues in the Sahel.



Moussa Faki Mahamat

Moussa Faki was born in 1960, he belongs to the Zaghawa ethnic group (the same group as President Idriss Déby) and is a member of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS). He went into

exile when Habré took power in June 1982 and returned to the country in 1991 when Déby seized the Presidency.

A constitutional lawyer by profession, Faki occupied senior governmental positions in a career that has spanned over 30 years. If from 1996 and 1999 he served as Director-General of two Ministries, he was the Director of President Déby's Cabinet from March 1999 to July 2002, and the Director of Déby's campaign in the May 2001 presidential election. During his rich political career, he also carried out the role of Prime Minister of Chad (2003-2005), President of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council from 2007 to 2008 and Minister of Foreign Affairs and African Integration from 2008 to 2017. At the continental level and during his tenure as Foreign Minister of Chad, Faki chaired the Peace and Security Council of the AU in September 2013 and steered the Nairobi Extraordinary Summit on the fight against Terrorism. He also served as Chairman of the AU Executive Council.

As a diplomat he has gained a top-ranked position as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission since 14th March 2017. During his campaign that he declared that he harboured dreams of an Africa where the "sound of guns will be drowned out by cultural songs and rumbling factories". He has a formidable global reputation as a peace broker in Africa in a career that has placed a central focus on peace and security issues in Africa. He pledged to streamline the organisation in his four-year term in office.



Hinda Déby Itno

Hinda Déby Itno is was born in 1980 and she is Déby's wife as well as First Lady of Chad. Her political activity started in November 2003, when she was a successful Chief accountant in the Ministry of Health project "Strengthening Health System and Support to the Fight Against HIV and AIDS Epidemic Diseases". In 2005, she married the President of the Republic Déby. In January 2012, she launched a vast Action Plan for the elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and for the health of reproduction. This Program has received the approval of development partners including UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, UNAIDS, and many other key partners of the United Nations System.

In the political arena, the First Lady was appointed as Honorary President of the MPS Women's Organization at the head of the

organization for the participation of the Patriotic Movement of Salvation (OPF/MPS) in N'Djamena on 30th November 2012. Moreover, on 26th May 2013 in Addis Ababa, the First Lady of Chad was elected unanimously by other African First Ladies, as President of the Organization of First Ladies of Africa and committed solidarity in the fight against the pandemic of HIV / AIDS called OPDAS. As a triple sponsor of the Campaign to “Accelerate the Reduction of Maternal and Newborn Mortality in Africa” (CARMMA), violence against women and the fight against obstetric fistula, Hinda Déby has always played a great and instrumental role in educating girls, mobilizing and educating midwives for safe motherhood.



Saleh Kebzabo

Saleh Kebzabo was born in 1947 and he was a journalist by profession. Former Director at the Chadian Press Agency, a member of the Democratic Movement for the Restoration of Chad (MDRT), and a journalist at Jeune Afrique and Demain l'Afrique, he was the founder of N'Djaména Hebdo, Chad's first independent newspaper. In early 1990s, he started his activity in politics as one of the founding members of the UNDR political party in December 1992. In April 1993, he was appointed as Minister of Trade and Industry. He was a candidate in the June 1996 presidential election, placing third with 8.61% of the vote. After Déby's victory, Kebzabo became Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 1996, serving in that position until he was named Minister of State for Public Works, Transportation, Housing and Urban Development in May 1997.

Nowadays, he is seen as the main opponent to Déby's government. As a Chadian politician, he is currently the President of the National Union for Democracy and Renewal (UNDR), the main opposition party in the political arena and a Deputy in the National Assembly of Chad.



Albert Pahimi Padacké

Albert Pahimi Padacké was born in 1966 and, after completing his law studies at the University of N'Djamena, in 1992 he was the

founding member of the VIVA-RNDP party. He soon became the Executive Secretary and held several positions in ministries. As a lawyer by training, at the National Sovereign Conference of 1993, he contributed to the drafting of the Transitional Charter which served as a draft Constitution and in 1994 he was appointed Minister of Finances.

After participating in the 1996 elections, he created its own political party, the National Rally for Democracy in Chad – The Awakening (RNDT-Le Reveil). From 1994 to 2011, he served in 8 ministerial posts and took part in international conferences. On the national political scene, Padacké also served as Vice-President of the National Political Dialogue Framework from August to December 2014 and President of the said Framework from January to July 2015. He was the President of the Parliament of Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) from 2011 to 2016.

Currently, he is the President of the Parliamentary Group RNDT-The Awakening to the National Assembly and given his political charisma and career, President Déby appointed him by as Prime Minister, Head of Government.



Joseph Djimrangar Dadnadji

Joseph Djimrangar Dadnadji was born in 1954 and he is a Chadian politician who can count on a long political life. He held 7 ministerial posts from 1996 to 2008. Besides these, he served as Director of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency (2008-2009), and second stint as Secretary-General of the Presidency (2009-2010). He also served as Prime Minister for less than a year in 2013, when he voluntarily resigned after ruling party deputies called a vote against him on charges of “ordering arbitrary arrest of deputies”. In the 2016 presidential race, he came third with its party, The Framework of Popular Action for Solidarity and Unity of the Republic (CAP-SUR). He is currently a prominent leader of the opposition that vocally criticises and counters the actions of President Déby.

2.5 Media landscape and Civil Society

Media Landscape

Traditionally, the media landscape has been quite limited and almost entirely state-owned. The government directly controls two newspapers, Info Tchad and Victoire and shapes the weekly paper, Le Progres. Numerous private newspapers publish in the capital, including N'Djamena Hebdo, an independent weekly, L'Observateur, an independent bi-monthly, and two other key independent papers, Le Temps and Le Contact. The government, opposition parties, and other private parties such as the Catholic Church and nongovernmental human rights groups all publish newspapers too.

Television is a good source of public information, but the choice of channels is very limited. The only television station is the government-operated and government-oriented Tele Tchad, which broadcasts in French, Arabic, and seven African languages. Two other TV stations are privately owned: Electron TV and Al-Nassour. Private satellite TV channels and cable channels, while permitted by the government, reach only a small percentage of Chad's population due to low income levels and the high costs of owning a television set and special broadcasting services.

However, radio is the most common and important source of news preferred by the citizens, especially due to high illiteracy and poverty rates. The government-operated Radiodiffusion Nationale Tchadienne has a broadcasting station in N'Djamena that broadcast in French, Arabic, and seven African languages. Around a dozen private radios are on the air, some of them run by non-profit groups. The BBC and Radio France Internationale broadcast on FM in the capital. Other radio stations are privately owned, such as Al-Bayan, DJA FM, and Al-Nasr. State control on many broadcasting outlets is still present, which implies few dissenting views.

Moreover, as for internet access, internet penetration in the country is still very low as the number of internet users was of 387,063 people in 2016, which accounted for a share of Chad's population of 3%.

The 1996 multiparty Constitution officially guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which is also checked by the Higher Council on Communication. However, in practice the government severely restricts press freedom as well as freedom of speech. The government communication regulatory authority, the High Council of Communications (HCC), ruled in April 2001 that political debates during the election campaign would be banned from broadcasts on private radio stations, that no one would be permitted to comment on news bulletins, and that radio stations found to be in non-compliance with the stipulations would be banned from all broadcasting for the period of the entire election campaign. Overall, the HCC is designed to operate as an intermediary to encourage free access to the media, but it has no real enforcement power. Considerable censorship exists in Chad - both self-censorship practiced by editors, journalists, and broadcasters, and active censorship by the government, anxious to preserve its position and to not risk losing control again of the country in a coup or riot situation.

Even the state-owned media have not been immune from attacks by the government, which exercised censorship both officially and unofficially. The official media also tend to report much more about the government, especially in a favourable light, than about the political opposition views.

Civil Society

Contemporary civil society in Chad is composed of very young people. First and foremost, it is dynamic and motivated to continue and expand its involvement in the democratic development of the country, despite the challenges of accessing much needed resources and of operating in a restrictive political climate.

The change in government in 1990 laid the foundation for the operation of modern civil society by opening up the political space. Urban-based Chadian civil society is characterized by few dedicated leaders who dominate the running of their organizations. A cluster of 10-15 prominent N'Djamena-based organisations - working in the democracy and governance sector - have gained the confidence of donors and benefit from a large proportion of international funding for civil society. These organizations are sometimes accused of having a narrow constituency or base of supporters or members and minimal outreach to other regions or areas outside the city.

Secondly, the development of a "second tier" of civil society organisations in secondary cities has been slow but is gathering momentum. The three-major faith-based organizations and the largest unions have extensive national networks. Illiteracy and low education levels, though not confined to rural areas, are significant factors inhibiting the engagement of rural residents in civil society. These factors, as well as the logistical and cost issues, make radio the most appropriate form of mass media for outreach to rural areas.

Women's civil society activism is also very significant, and women's organizations are recognized as having a highly developed capacity to mobilize. Unlike other associations, women's groups are viewed as largely independent, and less politicized than others.

Further, youth civil society organisations are mushrooming, but they often suffer from fast turnover of volunteers and leaders, which hampers their development and credibility. There is a tendency for youth to be confined to "youth committees" or other structures specifically focused on youth, and their engagement in wider civil society and credibility on that level remains limited. The most credible and organizationally developed civil society organisations in Chad are primarily human rights associations, which are reported to be the most respected by the government. Despite government efforts to muzzle civil society, social discontent has been growing in recent years and has encouraged the creation of several civil society coalitions: Ça suffit (Enough), Trop c'est trop (Too much is too much), and the youth movement Iyina (We are tired). These coalitions involve human rights

organizations and more informal associations, as well as the powerful Union des Syndicats du Tchad (Coalition of Trade Unions). They are inspired by the Balai citoyen in Burkina Faso, a political grassroots movement that successfully called for strikes and helped precipitate the departure of President Blaise Compaoré. In March 2016, four leaders of those three groups - Mahamat Nour Ibedou, Younous Mahadjir, Nadjo Kaina Palmer, and Céline Narmadji - were arrested as they were planning peaceful demonstrations to protest Déby's re-election bid. They were charged with "disturbing public order" and "disobeying a lawful order" and, after being held in custody for weeks, received four-month suspended jail sentences ahead of the vote.

In contrast to limited civil society involvement in past elections, including a boycott in 2006, a large and diverse set of civil society organizations and networks have decided to engage in the upcoming election process. Their activities will range from voter education to observation of the elections themselves, though many CSOs are still waiting for funding requests to be granted by donors. Some CSOs have already collaborated with the CENI on voter registration via a specially established network called Network of Chadian Civil Society, but other organizations and networks are concerned that their independence being compromised and are planning their own mobilization and observation activities. In conclusion, there is good reason for optimism about the prospects for an increasingly active and influential civil society in Chad - provided that donor support is sustained and provided that the government continues to tolerate a fairly vocal civil society sector.

2.6 Security Sector

The unstable geopolitical and security context of the last 30 years – which includes turbulent transitions of power from Habré to Déby in the 1990s, a spill-over conflict from Darfur (Sudan), a proxy war with Sudan (2005-2010), internal turmoil between rebel anti-government groups and government forces, and an ongoing regional insecurity and unpredictability in neighbouring countries (Libya, Central African Republic and Sudan) – the country has had to tackle several security challenges. These challenges have surely often contributed to the erosion of law and order in the capital as well as in different peripheral areas of the state.

After decades of armed conflict and civil war, the political situation in Chad has been stable since 2010. However, the security situation remains tense as a result of instability in a number of neighbouring countries and Chad's socioeconomic problems. Civil wars in Libya, Sudan and the Central African Republic have led to a steady flow of refugees, which is giving rise to an increase in disputes over resources. In particular, Eastern areas bordering with the Darfur region of Sudan are still fragile and count thousands of refugees and internally displaced people after 5 years of spill-over conflict and direct clashes between the two countries.

The Northern frontier with Libya is still considered an off-limits zone without specific permission from the government of Chad due to smuggling networks, arm traffickers and jihadist movements infiltrations. In every respect the Chad-Libya border is an active conflict zone where landmines may still contain unexploded ordnance from the Chad-Libya conflict. The porous border between the two countries has also allowed some anti-Déby rebel groups to cross the frontier and carry out their resistance in a foreign state. In April 2018, some of these rebel groups such as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) and the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) were targeted by Libyan General Haftar air raids after President Déby's request to fight against Chadian rebels who are vying to overturn him. Chad has a long history of revolt by rebels staged from across its borders. Déby and his predecessor Habré were themselves rebels who seized power by force of arms. However, overall rebel groups today are relatively weak and divided, often using trafficking or extortion to raise funds to survive. Furthermore, failure to secure peace deals and to reintegrate rebels in Chad and Sudan has led to the phenomenon of cross-border combatants in desert regions – already crisscrossed by Islamist militants, people smugglers and arms traffickers. The Chad-Sudan-Libya triangle has become the core of a regional system of conflicts that keep fuelling chaos and instability.

Finally, the Nigeria-based Islamist terror group Boko Haram also poses a major threat to the country's political stability and socioeconomic development. Chad attempted to play a mediating role between Nigeria and Boko Haram in October 2014. However, when these efforts seemed unlikely to yield any ceasefire agreement, and as Boko Haram fighters in Cameroon moved to within striking distance of N'Djamena, Chad began to worry that it might itself become a target for the terrorists. Authorities in Chad were also concerned that Boko Haram had developed a regional network to sustain itself around Lake Chad and that dormant cells were becoming operational within Chadian territory, including in

N'Djamena. In addition, Chad feared an economic downturn if Boko Haram continued to impede the movement of goods between Chad and the Cameroon coast, as well as between Chad and northern Nigeria, two vital routes for Chad's economy. The South-West region near the Lake Chad Basin has been recently targeted by Boko Haram both in 2015 and 2017, after the establishment of G5 Sahel Joint Force to counter the jihadist terrorist threat in the region. The G5 Sahel Joint Taskforce is an institutional framework for coordination of regional policies and security related-issue in West Africa and comprises 5 Sahel countries, namely, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. This was a necessary step to counter the regional security complex of the Sahel region, which has always been the gateway for terrorist individuals or organisations, which find harbour, maintain a low profile and then decide to perpetrate attacks.

According to the Fragile State Index by the The Fund for Peace, Chad is ranked the 8th most fragile state in the world and has got a total score of 108 out of 120. The capital N'Djamena is a high-threat location for terrorist activities directed at foreign nationals. Terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram, ISIS-West Africa, ISIS-Libya, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), Al-Mourabitoun, and other affiliated or minor groups, which have pledged allegiance to them, can easily cross borders and target Westerners, local security forces and civilians, especially in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel due to porous and often unpatrolled borders. For example, in February 2017 Boko Haram conducted suicide attacks against Chadian military forces on Lake Chad Islands and more than 108,000 Chadians have been displaced in the wake of Boko Haram-related threats.

Moreover, as for internal assessment of threats, the capital of Chad has been deemed as a high-threat location for political violence and ongoing political tensions. Historically, Chad has been marred by rebellions, uprisings and coup attempts and there has never been a peaceful transition of power. The Chadian government, headed by President Déby and dominated by his Zaghawa ethnic group, is characterized by a strong executive branch that controls the political landscape. However, civil unrest, public demonstrations and workers strikes have been increasingly frequent due to salary and benefits cuts, rising taxes, and Chad's worsening economy. There is always a high risk that demonstration and large crowds, as even peaceful gatherings could turn violent unexpectedly. While checkpoints have become less common in N'Djamena since 2016, they may become more frequent during protest activities; police presence may also increase or become more visible around such activities. Demonstrations should also be avoided due to threat of crime, as large crowds attract petty criminals and pickpockets.

In more recent time, work has started on implementing a national reform plan for the security sector agreed on an inter-ministerial basis and supported by the EU.

3. Law enforcement structures and actors

3.1 The Police

Article 192 of the Constitution as well as Law 12/PR/2006 (Loi No 012/PR/2006) of 10 March 2006 outline the structure and division of Chad's security forces. National defence and security is provided by the Armed Forces, administered by a Major General. Armed Forces encompass the Chadian National Army, the National Gendarmerie, the National Police, the National and Nomadic Guard and two inter-armed services.

The National Police (Police Nationale)

The mission of the National Police is to ensure the security of the state, maintain or restore law and order, ensure the security and protection of citizens and properties, ensure public tranquillity and health, ensure that laws and regulations are followed. It operates throughout the national territory and it reports to the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration.

Under the authority of a Director General, National Police is responsible for coordinating and facilitating the activities of the following Directorates:

- Special Secretariat (S cretariat particulier)
- Directorate of General Information (Direction de Renseignement G n raux)
- Directorate of Public Security (Direction de la S curit  Publique)
- Directorate of the Judicial Police (Direction de la Police Judiciaire)
- Directorate of Immigration and Emigration (Direction de l'Immigration et de l'Emigration)
- Directorate of Transmissions and Informatics (Direction des Transmissions et de l'Informatique)
- Directorate of Human Resources (Direction des Ressources Humaines)
- High Command of mobile Police Action Groups (Un Haut commandement des Groupements mobiles d'intervention de police)

The National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale)

The National Gendarmerie is the national police force of Chad, equipped with more than 5,000 men organised into mobile platoons, which play a police role in rural and peripheral areas. It reports to the Ministry of Defence and its mission is to protect individuals and properties, maintain or restore law and order, ensure that laws and regulations are followed. The National Gendarmerie performs both Judicial Police and Administrative Police duties and it operates throughout the national territory. Furthermore, in 2013, after the dissolution of the Integrated Security Detachment (DIS), the National Gendarmerie became responsible for ensuring the security of Sudanese refugees, displaced Chadians and humanitarian personnel. From independence to the present day, Chadian gendarmes have experienced several civil wars and inter-communal conflicts. All the equipment of the DIS has been made available to the Gendarmerie, which took the baton of command in 2013 as it was the year in which the security of refugees, internally displaced persons and humanitarian workers in Chad was a

priority for UNHCR. For example, National Gendarmerie provided security in and around refugee and internally displaced camps and escorted relief workers to areas of operation.

National Gendarmerie is organised as follows:

- General Directorate (Direction G n rale)
- Mobile Units (Unit s Mobiles)
- Territorial Units (Unit s Territoriales)
- Specialised Units (Unit s Sp cialis s)
- Group of schools (Groupement de  coles)

A specialised Gendarmerie Unit, the Detachment for the Protection of Humanitarian Workers and Refugees (DPHR) is responsible for security in refugee camps and report to the Ministry of Public Security and Immigration. Another two Gendarmerie entities, the National Judiciary Investigations Section and the Special Intervention Squad of the Gendarmerie investigate all Gendarmerie, the National and Nomadic Guard, and National Army killings to determine whether they occurred in the line of duty or were otherwise justifiable, whereas the Judicial Police investigates police killings.

However, despite recent efforts to improve the overall police system, the police patrols in Chad are very limited in their ability to fulfil their public security responsibilities. They lack the institutional and human resources capacities to respond appropriately to the current security challenges. The police force is poorly equipped and lacks adequate training. In rural areas in particular, it has little or no physical presence. Additionally, there is a very high corruption risk in the police force. Security forces routinely engage in petty corruption, violence, and extortion. The abuse of power in the police force usually goes unpunished, and in various instances, the units of the Judiciary Police did not enforce court orders against military personnel or members of their own ethnic group.

The National and Nomadic Guard (Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad), GNNT

The National and Nomadic Guard was created at independence by the merger of two bodies: the Native Guard of French Equatorial Guinea (set up in 1910 as the first police force in Chad) and the Nomadic Guard, which was established in 1951 as a police force adapted to the country's desert regions.

The mission of the National and Nomadic Guard is to protect political and administrative authorities, protect public buildings, maintain orders in rural and nomadic areas, guard and monitor detention centres. The Guard can count on 4,000 individuals and it is commanded by President D by's cousin, Mahamat Saleh Brahim. National Nomadic Guard is another seasoned force that sometimes took part in operations abroad. This force is said to be better paid, trained, and equipped than National Army soldiers.

The National and Nomadic Guard includes the following units:

- Command (Commandement)
- Central Group (Groupement Central)
- Nomadic Groups (Groupements Nomades)
- Territorial Groups (Groupements Territoriaux)
- Training Centres (Centres d'Instruction)

Inter-armed services (Des Services Inter-Armée)

The mission of the inter-armed services is to ensure the support to the units of different armed and security forces. These incorporate:

- General Military Stewardship (L'Intendance Général Militaire)
- General Logistic Stewardship (La Logistique Général Militaire)
- Transmission services (Le Transmissions)
- A core military unit for fire-related emergencies (Le Génie Militaire et de l'Incendie)
- Health and Social Action Service (Le service de Santé et d'Action Sociale)
- Inter-Armed Military Training Schools (Ecoles Militaires Inter-Armées)

3.2 Other security forces

General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (Direction Générale des Services de Sécurité des Institutions de l'Etat), DGSSIE

The Republican Guard, a strong military unit of 5,000 men was officially dissolved in 2005, days after the government failed to reel in scores of hundreds of defecting soldiers who regrouped in the volatile East amid chaos of the two-year-old conflict in Darfur, Western Sudan next door. The Chadian government downplayed the desertions.

Since 2005, President Déby has decided to revive the Presidential Guard in the form of the new General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions (DGSSIE) for tasked-actions. Both a presidential guard and an elite force constituting the core of Chadian forces deployed abroad, since 2014 the DGSSIE has been managed by the president's son, Mahamat "Kaka," who was formerly the deputy Commander of the Chadian forces in Mali. Ever since its establishment, the numbers of DGSSIE troops have almost doubled, with around 14,000 members. The DGSSIE also receives disproportionate funding in comparison with the rest of the army. Its members are much better equipped, trained and paid if compared to the National Army. The elements of the DGSSIE are recruited from the Zaghawa and the Bideyat and to a lesser measure from the Gorans and Arabs.

Local security force posture remains elevated around the Presidential Palace Compound on Avenue Felix Eboue in N'Djamena. Taking pictures, walking or loitering in this area is not allowed as the General Direction of the Security Services of State Institutions has been known to respond to such activities in an extremely aggressive manner. Individuals should not take photos without a permit from the Government of Chad. While it is possible for visiting journalists and others to receive permission to take photos, most security authorities operate under the assumption that a foreigner who is taking photos is breaking the law.

The National Army of Chad (Armée Nationale du Tchad), ANT

The Armed Forces have always been the mainstay of the regime's power. Few figures on the size of it are reliable: estimates range from 20,000 to 50,000. The Chadian army is de facto composed of two armies: the ordinary army known as Armée Nationale Tchadienne (ANT), and the Presidential Guard, which was renamed the General Directorate of Security Services for National Institutions (DGSSIE) in 2005.

As for the National Army, it is also controlled by Idriss Déby's close relatives: one of Déby's cousin, Ahmat Yusuf, heads the Military Intelligence (Renseignement militaire); yet another, Bokhit Digin, heads the joint Chad-Sudan border force; Déby's brother, Omar, directs the strategic reserve (armaments and other supplies). However, the Army soldiers do not all belong to Déby's followers and to the same ethnic group. During the April 2016 presidential election, soldiers thought to be voting for the opposition disappeared and have not been heard from. The number of those missing is unknown: human rights organizations speak of 20 to 60 people.

The mission of the Chadian National Army is to defend territorial integrity and national unity and to protect national independence and the security of the country from any external aggression or threat. It also takes part in economic and social development tasks and humanitarian operations.

As per law 12 of 2006, the military service is mandatory for every citizen for a period of 18 months, except for those who have serious physical impediments. The eligible age for voluntary service is 18 years old and 20 years old is the compulsory age. Women are also subject to one year of service at the age of 21. Once the military level is over, they are enlisted in an extra contingent and can be called to serve in the military until they are 50 years old.

Ranks for the National Army

- Sergeant Major (Sergent Major)
- Staff Sergeant (Sergent – Chef)
- Sergeant (Sergent)
- Corporal (Caporal)
- Private First Class (Soldat Première)
- Private (Soldat)

Ground Forces (Armée de Terre)

Ground forces include infantry, two special forces, artillery, cavalry.

Ranks for ground forces

- Brigade General (Général de brigade)
- Colonel (Colonel)
- Lieutenant – Colonel (Lieutenant – Colonel)
- Major (Commandant)
- Captain (Capitaine)
- First Lieutenant (Lieutenant)
- Second Lieutenant (Sous Lieutenant)

Air Forces (Armée de l'Air)

This force encompasses a combat aviation, an aviation for heavy transport and helicopters, two fusiliers of the air and some specialised services.

Ranks for air forces

- Colonel (Colonel)
- Lieutenant Colonel (Lieutenant Colonel)
- Major (Commandant)
- Captain (Capitaine)
- First Lieutenant (Lieutenant)
- Second Lieutenant (Sous Lieutenant)

The Chadian National Army (both the DGSSIE and the ANT) has been transformed in a militia-style army over the years. The hierarchy has not disappeared, but there is considerable vagueness about the missions and responsibilities of the officers. Those who make the decisions are not always those who, according to official texts, should be taking them. Flexible

chains of command, an incomplete control over personnel, and the absence of esprit de corps are some characteristics of the Chadian corps.

An incomplete Reform Process

Overall, the large size of the Armed Forces puts a heavy burden on the state's budget. Since the seizure of power by Déby, this reform has been presented as a priority to reduce military expenditure in the context of structural adjustment programs and to transform the ANT into a disciplined army. Despite 25 of announcements and unfulfilled projects, the Chadian Armed Forces have never been seriously reformed.

In 2011, a major census was organized and 14,000 ghost soldiers or 'fake soldiers' were dismissed, including many former rebels who had been integrated into the army as a way of suppressing rebellions, such as the hundreds of Tubu members of the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad (Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad) who were made part of the National Army. This demobilization process was known as the "contrôle de Moussoro", the garrison town north of N'Djamena that serves as a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration centre. The operation was also seen as an opportunity to withdraw from the National Army elements from ethnic groups believed to be disloyal to the regime.

Despite this recent effort, Chad remains determined to expand the size of the Armed Forces overall. As a result, Armed Forces continue to recruit, far more than what is required by a response to regional threats. Even if from a statistical point of view the program is a success, it is however marred by high corruption, the refusal by demobilized troops to abandon their weapons, and even a reintegration of former troops. Moreover, the cohesiveness of the Armed Forces, however, is still threatened by ethnic differences and inequalities between elite forces and others who appear to be poorly paid, equipped, and motivated. They are often seen more as a force of warriors than as modern army.

National Security Agency (Agence Nationale de Sécurité)

The intelligence service - known as the National Security Agency (Agence Nationale de Sécurité or ANS) - reports directly to the President. Its main mission is to watch and intimidate the civilian opposition, as well as to prevent and dismantle rebellions.

Unlike the Armed Forces, it has rarely been praised as particularly competent, but it did play an important role during the proxy war with Sudan from 2005 to 2010.

Direction of Military Intelligence (Reinseignement Militaire)

The Military Intelligence of Chad used the French Military Intelligence as a blueprint. It is tasked with collecting and centralising military intelligence information for the National Army. Additionally, it also plays a meaningful role in counter-insurgency operations for the G5 Sahel Joint force.

3.3 The judiciary

Chad's legal system is based on the French Civil Code; it somewhat differs, though, as it has a mixed legal system of civil and customary law if it does not interfere with public order or constitutional rights.

The judiciary is composed of the Supreme Court, the Courts of Appeals, the Tribunals of first instances, and Justices of the Peace. It is managed by the High Council of the Judiciary (HCJ), which appoints and promotes judges and magistrates. The HCJ is chaired by the President of the Republic, with the Minister of Justice and the Chairperson of the Supreme Court serving, respectively, as first and second vice-chairs. The fact that the President chairs the HCJ has already raised some questions with regard to the principle of separation of powers.

The Chadian legal system comprises two types of jurisdictions: the administrative courts and the ordinary courts. The administrative courts are competent to entertain matters brought against the state by individuals or opposing state institutions. The ordinary courts, on the other hand, are competent to examine cases involving individuals. Although formally Chad has only one legal order, the reality is that there are two separate Chambers within each jurisdiction. In lieu of the Conseil d'Etat and a Court of Cassation, there is a Supreme Court in Chad, within which there is an Administrative Chamber playing the role of the Conseil d'Etat, and a Judiciary Chamber assuming the function of the Court of Cassation.

Besides the administrative and ordinary courts, the Constitution has established a Constitutional Council, which is an independent body. The Constitutional Council is established by the Constitution to ensure that treaties and international accords comply with the Constitution. Besides that, the Constitutional Council receives applications for the Presidency of the Republic, finalises the list of applicants, hears complaints relating to presidential and legislative elections, and proclaims the results. The Constitutional Council is composed of 9 counsellors, including 3 magistrates and 6 highly qualified lawyers for a non-renewable term of nine years, and they are irremovable. Since some of them are nominated by the President or some by the Speaker of the National Assembly (who usually belong to the same ruling party) doubts are cast on the independence of the work carried out by the courts and more generally by the judiciary system in Chad as it often mixes and intermingles with the executive branch of power.

Furthermore, article 174 of the Constitution also provides for the establishment of a High Court of Justice, which is competent to prosecute the President of the Republic and members of the government, as well as their accomplices, for acts of high treason. High treason includes any act infringing on the republican form and secularity of the state, and on the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the national territory. Also considered as high treason are serious human rights violations, the embezzlement of public funds, corruption, drug trafficking. The High Court of Justice is composed of 15 members, which include 10 members of the National Assembly, 2 members of the Constitutional Council, and 3 members of the Supreme Court designated by their respective peers.

The Current situation

As of 2017, Chad was ranked as 165th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index and it is ranked among the three least developed countries in the world (along with neighbouring Central African Republic and Niger), according to the UNDP Human Development Index.

Chad's recent history has been characterised by insecurity, endemic corruption, human rights abuses and a deeply entrenched patronage system which permeates all sectors of society. The government has taken legal and institutional steps to fight corruption and launch anti-corruption campaigns in recent years, resulting in the dismissal and arrest of several high-level officials.

Among the initiatives to tackle spiralling corruption, the government has dedicated a specific ministry, the Ministry of Good Governance, and a February 2000 anti-corruption law stipulates penalties for corrupt practices. Additionally, in 2014, the Chadian government launched investigations of several high-ranking officials, including Cabinet Ministers and the President's Chief of Staff.

President Déby, in many public addresses to the nation, has always pledged to continue the campaign to eliminate corruption from Chadian public life, criticizing the practice of taking liberties with public goods, and promising prosecution of those who accepted kickbacks or demanded bribes. Charges against those indicted, though, are often dropped for lack of evidence. For example, the former Minister of Justice was acquitted of corruption charges in 2014.

Finally, a number of local civil society organizations are also dedicated to revealing and fighting government corruption. One prominent local NGO tries to track government expenditures of oil revenue, for example.

Overall these initiatives are perceived by many external observers as politically motivated and there are no clear indications of a firm commitment to effectively eradicate corruption. Low salaries for most civil servants, judicial employees, and law enforcement officials, coupled with a weak state system and culture of rent seeking, have contributed to corruption.

Chad is not a signatory country to either the UN Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption or to the OECD anti-bribery convention.

4. Migrations and Human Rights Issues

4.1 Internal and International Migration

In total, there are 196,139 internally displaced people (IDPs) as of the first three months of 2018, according to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) set up by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in May 2015.

Since the beginning of 2014, the Lake Chad Basin Region has witnessed an increase in violence conducted by the insurgency group Boko Haram, leading to widespread displacement in the sub-region, including Chad. The violence has resulted in internal displacement (153,156 individuals), returns from Niger and Nigeria (40,000 individuals), and cross-border displacement of third country nationals (3,000 individuals).

The internal displacement situation in Chad poses many humanitarian and development challenges, both in terms of pressing immediate as well as longer term needs for the IDPs, returnees and the host populations. The displacement and current security situation are having negative impacts on the livelihoods, coping capacities, and resilience of IDPs, returnees and host communities. This has also put additional pressure on host communities who had to share the meagre resources they had. This situation is further compounded by unaddressed underdevelopment issues that result in very limited access to basic services, economic opportunities and poor infrastructure.

As highlighted by various reports, the current figures of population show that displacement reached a peak in 2014 and 2015. Further, the trend shows that the majority of IDPs have been displaced for over two years, while additional people continue to be displaced by the ongoing crisis.

The same Lake Chad Basin region hosts another 18,500 Chadian nationals who returned to their fatherland from neighbouring countries affected by the multiple crises (mainly from Niger and Nigeria). IOM also provides support for the vulnerable population affected by the crisis in the Lake region by constructing semi durable shelters including Cash-for-Work initiatives and reintegration. IOM has developed a plan for non-food items (NFIs) distribution to assist the most vulnerable population in terms of kitchen kits and NFIs (including some wash items). IOM is participating in the Humanitarian Country Team, ICC, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster, Information Management Working Group, UN Communication Group, and other coordination meetings. IOM is also the lead on the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.

Additionally, 380,000 refugees are registered and assisted in 17 make-shift camps by UNHCR in Chad as a result of the contemporary history of the war-torn country. UNHCR works closely with the Chadian Government to provide international protection and coordinate assistance and durable solutions to refugees in the country. The Commission Nationale d'Accueil et de Réinsertion des Réfugiés et des Rapatriés (CNARR) is UNHCR's main Government counterpart.

The vast majority of internally displaced people can be found in the South West, nearby the Lake Chad Basin, which is closely linked to Boko Haram insurgency in the area. Some minority

groups can also be counted in the Eastern part in relation to the Central African Republic and Sudan ongoing instability. Currently IOM Chad's core activities focus on the resettlement of Sudanese and CAR refugees in Eastern and Southern Chad, respectively.

Internal migration is another ever-changing phenomenon for Chad. The main reasons for the movement of people are food insecurity, failed harvests, inconsistent rains, which seriously impacted on migration patterns. Regional socio-economic challenges also contribute to raise the trends as more and more people escape from human traffickers. A counter-trafficking project has been launched to assist in developing responses to the human trafficking phenomenon in the country through capacity building and training in partnership with local NGOs. IOM Chad is a member of the United Nations Country Team.

Emigration is also a common pattern of the Chadian society especially among the youth, even though there are different trends and routes. Given the fact that regional instability has been a long-standing trait of the area, a great deal of Chadians emigrated to the South and West, namely to Cameroon and Niger which - before the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in 2014 - were the two most stable countries of this region. Although it has been a relatively more peaceful place since the peace deal reached in 2010, Sudan has never been a target country for migration as the situation there still is much worse than in Chad itself.

On the other hand, migration towards Libya has been on the increase over the last few years, mainly due to the hopes to get to the Libyan shores and eventually to Europe. However, this path poses major threats and challenges to all those who want to start it. All migrants must walk for kilometres in the desert areas of Northern Chad in a very risky environment as the Libya-Chad porous border is a war zone. Moreover, they can easily become victims of human smugglers, arm traffickers or rebel groups. Therefore, irregular migration is a more frequent pattern and follows the irregular migration route through the Central Mediterranean via Libya. Most of those who survive the crossing are likely to become asylum-seekers. Italy and Malta have become the most significant non-African destination for Chadians. IOM Chad is also engaged in the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) of Chadian nationals from Malta and Italy, as well as migration support for family reunification.

4.2 Human Rights Situation

Universal and regional human rights instruments ratified

Chad is a Member State of the African Union and of the United Nations and has human rights obligations at both regional and universal levels.

As a United Nations Member, Chad is subject to the oversight of UN Human Rights bodies – including the Human Rights Council (intergovernmental body that discusses and makes recommendations), the Universal Periodic Review and some special procedures (independent experts appointed to monitor human rights conditions).

The State is a party to some international human rights instruments. It ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Additionally, Chad ratified some Optional Protocols: Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture, Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on civil and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts and another on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. Chad has a duty to submit State reports to each UN treaty body associated with the treaties Chad has ratified. These reports must be submitted on a periodic basis and describe the steps Chad has taken to implement the treaty provisions.

The country is also a party to a host of regional human rights treaties such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) commonly known as African Charter; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, African Union Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights; African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced People in Africa. Its human rights policies and practises are monitored by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) which reviews the State's reports concerning the human rights situation. Chad has not accepted the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Chad has fallen behind in submitting its periodic reports to the ACHPR on human rights conditions in the country. The ACHPR conducted promotion missions to Chad in 2000 and 2013.

Chad's ad-hoc human rights national body

The state-run organisation named National Human Rights Commission is involved in the promotion and protection of

human rights, even though its activities have been rather controversial.

National Human Rights Commission (Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés)

The ACHPR found Chad responsible for mass violations of the Charter during the conflict between State security forces and armed groups (1998-2009), including harassment of journalists; inhumane treatment of prisoners; and arbitrary arrests, killings, disappearances, and torture of members of the opposition party. Another complaint concerns the assassination of Bisso Mamadou by armed individuals. The Minister responsible was warned of the danger to Bisso, but he refused to issue protection. Subsequently, the Minister did not initiate investigation into the killing. Finally, some warnings were made about the assassination of Joseph Betudi, Vice-President of Ligue Tchadienne des Droits de l'Homme.

Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity

As reported by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in September 2007 the Security Council approved – in concert with the European Union – a multidimensional mission in the Central African Republic and Chad to a secure and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced people. This mission was the UN-led MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad), which had human rights components. Among its tasks, it contributed to the following aspects: the monitoring and promotion and protection of human rights, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence, to fight impunity; the strengthening the capacity of the governments of Chad through training in international human rights standards; the assistance in the promotion of the rule of law, support of an independent judiciary.

Following the closure of MINURCAT in December 2010 and given the wish of the Government to host a continued human rights presence with a mandate covering the whole country, the High Commissioner for Human Rights decided to appoint a Human Rights Adviser to Chad whose mission was to advise the UN Country team in its human rights support to the Government, the national institutions and the civil society. On 12th December 2011, the Prime Minister published a decree establishing a Governmental Committee on the implementation of International Human Rights Instruments. Its mandate was to follow-up on the implementation of human rights instruments and to draft all national reports in compliance with Chad's reporting obligations to UN treaty bodies and the African Union. The Committee was also responsible for harmonizing national legislations with international human rights instruments.

Although a Ministry of Human Rights and the Promotion of Liberties (MHRPL) has been established, limited resources imposed serious constraints on the implementation of its mandate. Constitutional reforms relating to the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission as an independent body in line with the Paris Principles on national human rights institutions is currently being undertaken.

Despite signs of improvement, nowadays the security, humanitarian and political environment continues to require sustained attention. Major violations of human rights continue to be reported. Sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment of children by armed groups, arbitrary and illegal arrest and detention, torture, poor conditions of detention and high levels of impunity are the major human rights challenges. The security forces in Chad are reported and known to act with impunity. Arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, rape, and beatings by security forces have been noted and often go unpunished. Illegal searches, wiretaps, and confiscations are authorized by the government, and extrajudicial killings are also common. Additionally, child abuse, slavery, forced labour, and trafficking in persons are other human rights abuses committed in the region.

Further, with regard to economic and social rights, access to health care, education, water and other basic services was not guaranteed for the majority of the population.

On the issue of child soldiers, early marriage and begging “Mouhadjirin”

The phenomenon of child soldiers has been one infamous characteristic of Chad over the last 30 years. Children are more likely to become child soldiers if they are separated from their families, displaced from their homes, living in conflict areas with limited access to education. Some children are abducted or forcibly recruited, others are driven to join by poverty, abuse and discrimination.

To counter this trend, the government has demonstrated a commitment to eradicate child recruitment within the National Army (ANT) in recent years with the implementation of an Action Plan to end the recruitment and use of children in 2011, jointly signed by the Government and the United Nations. Déby renewed his Government’s commitment to enact a legal prohibition on child recruitment by issuing and disseminating clear military instructions banning and penalizing child recruitment and ensuring free and regular access by child-protection actors to installations. Acting on this commitment, the Government of Chad signed a road map with the United Nations outlining ten priority measures to accelerate the implementation of the action plan. Such measures include the criminalisation of child recruitment, the establishment of an age-verification mechanism for recruitment into the army, training on child protection for all troops and reintegration programmes for all children released by the National Army. On 10th October 2013 President Déby issued a presidential directive unequivocally banning the recruitment and use of children in the National Army and establishing clear penalties for violators. This phenomenon, though, has not been eradicated yet.

Moreover, early marriage has been a practice encouraged in the State party’s law for many years. However, in March 2015, President Déby and First Lady Hinda Déby launched the African Union Campaign to End Child Marriage under the theme “All together, let’s put an end to marriage of children”. Similarly, in June 2015 the National Assembly ratified a long-awaited law that has increased the age of marriage from 15 to 18 years old. In June 2016, the Government of Chad also adopted a roadmap to ending child marriage and female genital

mutilation (2016-2018). The strategy has four strategic areas of focus: coordination, monitoring and evaluation; social mobilisation; capacity-building; multi-sectoral response.

Human rights organizations also mentioned the problem of the “Mouhadjirin,” migrant children who attend certain Islamic schools and whose teachers force them to beg for food and money. There was no reliable estimate of the number of mouhadjirin, but the phenomenon has been on the increase, especially around refugee camps.

Abuses by Mercenaries and Foreign Armed Groups

Human rights abuses have been committed by groups such as Boko Haram particularly in border communities in the Lake Chad region. These include killings, torture, abductions and repeated attacks that have resulted in irreparable damage to these communities. Women and children who were forcibly taken captives had been particularly subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. Many were used as suicide bombers, while others were forced to marry their abductors.

The UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the right of people to self-determination was mandated by the United Nations Human Rights Council on a mission from 16th to 23rd April 2018 to study mercenary-related activities and their impact on human rights in Chad. It also devoted a lot of attention to assessing the link between mercenaries and foreign fighters, particularly focusing on motivational factors, recruitment practices and the human rights impact of these actors. The motivational factors for individuals joining foreign-armed groups or mercenary activities vary. However, in Chad, poverty and lack of financial means appears to be a significant driving force of young people being vulnerable to groups like Boko Haram or Daesh. The poverty rate is estimated to rise to almost 40% by 2019. And over half of Chad’s population is under 18 years old and often unemployed. This has created fertile ground for armed groups to attract many young people with promises of financial gains. Chad has undertaken a number of positive measures including the ratification of the Organization of the African Union (OAU) Convention on the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa in 1977. Similarly, the new Penal Code of 2017 includes a specific provision criminalising mercenary, an offence punishable by 10 to 20 years imprisonment.

Arbitrary and illegal detention in jail

The Constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, but the Government has not always observed these prohibitions. In its Freedom in the World report, Freedom House stated that security forces “routinely ignore” constitutional protections regarding detention. Security forces arbitrarily arrest journalists, demonstrators, critics of the government and other individuals. On 21st March 2016, security force members arrested Mahamat Nour Ahmed Ibedou, spokesperson for the coalition “Ca Suffit” (Enough), for attempting to disturb public order, opposing legitimate authority, and organizing an unauthorized, unarmed gathering; Ca Suffit had organized demonstrations during the year calling for the president to cancel his candidacy for a fifth term. On 22nd March 2016 police arrested another four

prominent civil society activists aligned with Ca Suffit, sentenced to 6 months in jail.

Moreover, lengthy pre-trial detention is another major problem as authorities sometimes hold pretrial detainees without charge for years, particularly for acts allegedly committed in the provinces. The length of detention sometimes equals or exceeds the sentence for conviction of the alleged crime.

Enforced Disappearances

As reported by the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances, criminal legislation and investigation procedures have fallen behind the minimum standards required by the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. There were reports of politically motivated disappearances, abductions, or kidnappings, and allegations the government held detainees incommunicado. Following the 10th April 2016 presidential election, there were reports of 60 missing soldiers, who are to date missing in the country and have never returned home. They were allegedly arrested for voting against President Déby.

Accountability for Human Rights Violations

Much more remains to be done to improve the accountability for human rights violations in the country.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights continues to receive reports about torture, which is practiced by the National Police, defence and security forces, using brutal and cruel methods. Amnesty International noted that "cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishments, including beatings, continued to be widely practiced by security forces and prison guards with almost total impunity". On a similar note, concerns have equally been raised by Human Rights Watch at the lack of an independent mechanism to receive and investigate complaints regarding allegations of torture by Police and defence forces, as the draft Criminal Code defining torture has not been adopted, thus making it impossible for courts in the State party to prosecute acts of torture.

Moreover, corporal punishment is still practised in some Koranic schools, despite the provisions of article 113 of Act No. 16/2006 of 13 March 2006, which prohibit physical abuse and any other form of violence or humiliation against pupils and students.

In addition to such a fragile context, there were reports of rape, attempted rape, and sexual and gender-based violence in refugee camps. The perpetrators were either fellow refugees or unknown individuals living near the camps. Authorities only occasionally prosecuted perpetrators of sexual violence. The judicial system did not provide consistent and predictable recourse or legal protection, and traditional legal systems were subject to ethnic variations. To fill the void, UNHCR enlisted the support of a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) to support the cases of refugees through the judicial process. The special Police Unit called Detachment for the Protection of Humanitarian Workers and Refugees (Détachement pour la Protection des Humanitaires et des Réfugiés) or DPHR was unable to provide humanitarian escorts consistently due to lack of resources but was generally effective in providing protection inside refugee camps.

Death penalty

In 2015 the National Assembly voted unanimously to reauthorize the death penalty for acts of terrorism, six months after its abolishment. This action was an attempt to deter terrorism by resuming the capital punishment. In late August 2015, 10 people were executed in Chad, who were suspected of being members of the terrorist group Boko Haram following a swift process that for certain aspects may have not met international standards. From several human rights organisations came the condemnation and the encouragement to react to terrorist events within the limits of its obligations under the international law.

International Justice: The Habré's Case

The overarching expression of the Senegalese authorities' commitment to comply with their treaty obligations on torture is the establishment of a Special Court, dubbed the Extraordinary African Chambers to try former Chadian Habré. In 2017 he was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in widespread torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in Chad between 1982 and 1990.

Additionally, on 25th March 2015, a Chadian Criminal Court convicted 20 Habré-era security agents on charges of murder, torture, kidnapping, and arbitrary detention. The court also awarded 75 billion CFA francs (approximately US\$140 million) in reparations to 7,000 victims, ordering the government to pay half and the convicted agents the other half. The Chadian court also ordered the government to create a commission to oversee the payment of compensation. However, the Commission has never been created.

Further, in 2015 the Court ordered the Government to erect a monument "in not more than one year" to those killed under Habré and to create a museum in the former headquarters of the Directorate of Documentation and Security (DDS), Habré's political police, where victims were tortured. Neither of these projects has been started yet.

The Chadian government has yet to provide Court-orders reparations to more than 7,000 victims. Chad's lack of action is a failure of its obligations to Habré's victims.

5. The UN and Chad

5.1 The UN and Chad

Just a few months after its accession to independence, Chad became a member of the United Nations on 20th September 1960.

Joining the UN was a necessary step on the road for development, which was done in the same year as many other West African and Sahel-located states such as Senegal, Mali, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso and Niger. Although the membership was hailed as a success, it didn't translate into shortening the serious gaps that it had as a former French colony.

Since 1960, the country has been elected only once as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2013/2014. However, the appointment of Chad as a non-permanent member was highly criticized by Human Rights Watch and other human rights advocates due to Chad's poor humanitarian records and for its recruitment of child soldiers, having often featured on a UN "list of shame" for this practice.

The presence in major bodies of the United Nations has demonstrated the need for the country to be constantly assisted, in order to accelerate the country's steady progress towards humanitarian, social and economic development as well as to be guided in overcoming the current hurdles that it is facing as a developing nation.

The UN agencies active in Chad are the following:

- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
- The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- The World Health Organization (WHO)
- The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
- The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Moreover, there are some UN-related organizations, such as:

- The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- The World Bank
- The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
- The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
- The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
- The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

There is frequent and targeted joint advocacy among the UN agencies in Chad for increasing awareness about the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 (SDGs), centring them within national development plans and strategies. This means a strong link to issues specific to children and women such as the Demographic Dividend, ending child marriage, female genital mutilation and addressing gender-based violence. On several issues the

participating UN agencies are working together with the EU in joint partnerships on the path to reaching Sustainable Development Goals, i.e. to achieve zero hunger by 2030. This is the case of a joint 3-year project (2016-2019) to reduce malnutrition which is being implemented by FAO, WHO, UNICEF and World Food Programme along with the EU financial support and the collaboration of Chad's government. This project also supports Chad's National Nutrition and Food Policy and the National Investment Programme in the Rural Sector. To fight against malnutrition is one of FAO's key goals. Through the local production of complementary fortified food, an improved access, availability and use of highly nutritious food for the most vulnerable, especially for young children, is pursued.

UNICEF's commitment in Chad is also of paramount importance. As Chad's facing overlapping crises, including food insecurity, displacement and epidemics, in 2018 4.4 million people will require urgent assistance, including drinking water and sanitation facilities. The nutrition situation deteriorated at the end of 2017. In the wake of clashes between armed groups in the region of Paoua, (northern Central African Republic), more than 18,000 Central African Republic refugees fleeing the violence have settled in southern Chad. As a result, almost 20% of children under 5 years old suffering from global acute malnutrition. Insecurity is also undermining the livelihoods of some 150,000 people who are internally displaced due to the Lake Chad crisis. In line with Chad's 2017-2019 strategic objectives, UNICEF is focusing on the provision of multi-sectoral packages for children including the promotion of early recovery activities. UNICEF continues to provide life-saving and life-sustaining assistance to children and their families by providing them with learning materials and access to education; psychosocial support for refugees, internally displaced persons and returnee children; identification and care for unaccompanied and separated children; family reunification services. UNICEF is leading the nutrition, education and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) clusters, and child protection sub-cluster, at national and sub-national levels. In addition, UNICEF supported the government of Chad in the development of its National Contingency Plan. On the HIV/AIDS matter, in 2017, two key national strategic documents were elaborated with the active support of UNICEF, namely the 2017-2022 Strategic Plan on the Elimination of the Mother-to-Child transmission and 2) the 2018-2022 National Plan against HIV/AIDS.

Moreover, Chad has partnered with the UN Peacekeeping to participate in peace operations in the unstable regional security complex over the last few years. MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) – which was established by UN Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25th April 2013 – has seen an increasing number of Chadian troops working as peacekeepers. Since the beginning of the operation in 2013, the security situation has worsened, and 200 Chadians lost their lives in the West African nation.

Currently, the country is a large contributor of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping, with 1,500 contingent troops, expert on mission, police and staff officers across UN 7 peacekeeping missions in Africa. These encompass the mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), in Darfur (UNAMID), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), in Mali (MINUSMA), in Somalia (UNSOS), in South Sudan (UNMISS) and Western Sahara (MINURSO).

Also noteworthy is Chad's participation in G5 Sahel Joint Force in the struggle against terrorism.

Official blueprint commitment between UN and Chad

In line with the five-year National Development Plan, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (2017–2021), the overarching objective is to improve inclusive growth, governance, environmental sustainability, and human capital, breaking inequalities and strengthening resilience to natural disasters and protracted humanitarian vulnerabilities. The initiative describes shared actions and strategies to achieve the goals of the developing country and it is based on 4 pillars:

- Inclusive growth and sustainable development
- Participatory governance and social cohesion
- Environmental resilience and disaster-risk reduction
- Human capital

The United Nations Framework Plan for Assistance in Development is bound to and supports Chad National Development Plan (2017-2021) called "Vision 2030. The Chad we want", aimed at implementing economic and social policy over the mid-long term, on the road to development in 2035. The vision 2030 was realised with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The vision of society embodied in "Vision 2030" is rooted in national cohesion and diversification of sources of sustainable economic growth, creating decent jobs and ensuring equitable access for Chadians men and women to basic social services. It will be necessary to give impetus to the country's development process aimed at emergence in 2030 through three subsequent National Development Plans (NDP 2017-2021, NDP 2022-2026, NDP 2027-2030). These plans will be implemented to accelerate the structural transformation in the social, governance and rule of law, economic and environmental fields.

The general objective of PND 2017-2021 is to lay the foundations for an emerging Chad. Specifically, it means working for a peaceful, respected and involved Chad in its regional and international environment; providing every citizen with the possibility to access water and health, housing, energy and mobility; and building a dynamic, highly economical and environmentally friendly Chad. The macroeconomic and budgetary targets assigned to the NDP 2017-2021 aim to achieve an average annual growth rate of 3.1% over the period 2017- 2021, according to the baseline scenario.

The main strategic axes of the program are

- Strengthen national unity
- Strengthen good governance and the rule of law

- Develop a diversified and competitive economy
- Improve the quality of life of the Chadians

Chad is a state that has signed several important international conventions and treaties on human rights. Additionally, it is among the 188 countries, which committed themselves to the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals 2030 approved by the UN General Assembly.

In 2018, Chad has become the first country outside the pan-European region to accede to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Water Convention) serviced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). In joining, the authorities of Chad have further committed to promote the Convention among member countries of basins to which Chad belongs, in particular in the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Niger Basin Authority.

25 UN-led agencies contribute to support and assist the country in the achievement of his goals. These agencies comprise FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNHCH, UNODC, Un Women, WHO, UNPF, UNIC, UNOWAS, OCHA, OHCHR, World Food Programme, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

5.2 The UN-led MINURCAT Mission

MINURCAT Mission (2007-2010)

In the wake of the fact that thousands of Sudanese refugees fled to Eastern Chad from the conflict in Darfur, from the conflict in the Central African Republic and an additional 200,000 Chadians were displaced by the proxy war with Sudan in the East of the country, since 2003 the situation generated increased tensions among the region's communities.

A report by the Secretary-General in February 2007 (S/2007/97), proposed a multidimensional force of between 6,000 and 10,900 responsible for protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, and good offices work to improve regional relationships among Chad and Sudan, and between CAR and Sudan. Chad, however, would only consider a civilian presence and fiercely resisted proposals for UN troops over a series of consultations with the Security Council. President Déby was determined to minimize external interference with his internal affairs. His preference was for an EU force that would be an extension of the French military presence in his country.

Responding to this, and to the activities of armed groups based in Eastern Chad and Darfur, including cross-border attacks, the Security Council adopted resolution 1778 on 25th September 2007, in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the CAR, authorizing the deployment a UN civilian and police operation called MINURCAT, and a European Union military force named EUFOR, to contribute to the protection of civilians, and to promote regional peace. The Council decided that MINURCAT had to include a maximum of 300 police and 50 military liaison officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel.

Additionally, Resolution 1778 authorized for one year the EU Force in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) to monitor the ceasefire between government and rebel forces, some of whom were backed by Sudan, to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement, and to deter violence in the region. For this reason, operations were focused on Eastern Chad along the Sudanese border and North-Eastern CAR. Notably, neither MINURCAT nor EUFOR included a political mandate or any support for good offices, in line with Chad's wishes. On the other hand, the EU authorized EUFOR via EU Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP (15th October 2007) to support MINURCAT, protect civilians and UN personnel, and facilitate humanitarian aid. The French-dominated EUFOR deployed with 3,000 of the mandated 3,700 personnel. The Irish nominally shared command of the mission, but France's supremacy was evident. Both MINURCAT and EUFOR faced challenges from the start. MINURCAT was late to deploy, and it affected EUFOR operating in an environment of distrust by the Chadian government.

From 2009, a military component was also added. With the adoption of resolution 1861 on 14th January 2009, the UN Security Council expressed concerns at armed activities and banditry in Eastern Chad and Western Sudan, which were threatening the security of the civilian population and the conduct of humanitarian operations. As a result, there were serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. By that resolution, the Council authorized the deployment of a military component of

MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR in both Chad and the CAR at the end of EUFOR's mandate in March 2009. The transfer of authority between EUFOR and the military component of MINURCAT took place on 15th March 2009. The authorized strength of MINURCAT was 300 police officers, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel, and an appropriate number of civilian personnel.

MINURCAT and EUFOR were complementary missions, with MINURCAT focusing on advisory and humanitarian goals, whereas EUFOR provided a military force. MINURCAT did, however, provide police training, and in 2008 hosted the first UN police personnel, who trained 25 Chadian police to support MINURCAT.

The proxy war between Sudan and Chad between 2005-2010 had several consequences for President Déby's calculations. First, the arms race was extremely costly to both countries, especially at a time of low oil prices. Second, the reciprocal attacks on one another's capitals had revealed their vulnerabilities and had reminded Déby of the historical pattern whereby regime change in N'Djamena had arisen from invasion from Sudan. Subsequent to the bilateral meetings between President Déby and President Bashir, in which they agreed to halt reciprocal destabilization and to resume security cooperation, the option open was to resume the pre-2003 status quo.


On 15th January 2010, the Government of Chad informed the Secretary-General through a note that it wished MINURCAT to withdraw from Chad as of 15th March 2010. This was followed by several rounds of intensive consultations between the Government of Chad and the United Nations Secretariat which resulted in an agreement providing for the extension of MINURCAT, with a revised mandate, until the end of 2010. At the same time, the Government of Chad undertook to exercise its sovereign responsibility to ensure the security and the protection of the civilian population in eastern Chad, including refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities, with a particular focus on women and children.

On 25th May 2010, the Security Council by its Resolution 1923 (2010) revised the mandate of the Mission. Under the new mandate, the Government of Chad assumed full responsibility for the protection of civilians, under international norms. MINURCAT started gradual withdrawal of its military component as of 27th May 2010. The Council decided that MINURCAT contingent had to be reduced to 2,200 military personnel (1,900 in Chad and 300 in the CAR) and 25 military liaison officers and further mandated that MINURCAT had to count on 300 police officers and an appropriate number of civilian personnel. The Council called upon the Secretary-General to implement the initial withdrawal of the exceeding number of troops by 15th July 2010 and the final withdrawal of the remaining troops beginning on 15th October 2010, and to complete withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian MINURCAT components by 31st December 2010.

MINURCAT cost an estimated \$1.39 billion, with 8 total deaths. Withdrawn precipitously from Chad, MINURCAT was unable to craft a proper exit strategy that could consolidate any gains it had

made under its limited mandate. However, the UN country team and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) remained in the country to continue to work for the benefit of the Chadian people.

The Government of Chad said its special Gendarmerie Unit Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (DIS), which the UN helped to train and support, would ensure the protection of civilians near refugee camps after MINURCAT's departure. Overall, its control was not always effective, and prompt as required.



Source: French General Military Defence Staff

6. The EU - Chad Relations

6.1 A partnership built on aid

The European Union is committed to a policy of engagement, which encompasses aid in the political, economic and commercial as well as development and humanitarian sector with Chad, which is still considered as one of the least developed countries in the world.

The EU has played an important role in several contexts. It worked as a facilitator in prompting an agreement with a view to strengthening the democratic process, which was the basis for the legislative reform and the establishment of an electoral administration for elections in 2011. In so far as human rights are concerned, a Committee of inquiry, particularly supported by the EU, worked to uncover the actions and to determine accountability. Moreover, the EU also supported projects for the professionalisation of the media and their consolidation in the public debate, through the thematic European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) programme and the Instrument for Stability – Rapid Reaction Mechanism (IFS -RRM).

Despite a relatively stable internal situation since 2009, Chad remains a fragile country, in addition to being exposed on almost all of its borders to conflict zones and hotbeds of insecurity. It has faced a two-pronged crisis since the end of 2014: an economic and budgetary crisis following the fall in oil prices, and a security crisis resulting from the repeated attacks by Boko Haram and from the detrimental effects of the Libyan crisis. To counter these multiple crises, Chad has been playing a key role in stabilising the region, particularly through its role in military operations against Boko Haram and it is currently hosting over 400,000 refugees from neighbouring countries.

As a result, aid and migration-related issues remain the core of the bilateral relations. Overall, EU aid for Chad will amount to EUR 925 million for the period 2017-2021. This significant strengthening of European aid for Chad was announced at the Donors Round Table for the funding of Chad's 2017-2021 National Development Plan, held in Paris on 7th and 8th September 2017. The European aid announced covers support not only for essential sectors such as nutrition, food security and resilience, and sustainable agriculture, but also for democratic governance, security, promotion of the rule of law, employment and vocational training. This aims to strengthen food and nutrition security (EUR 156 million), country's internal security (EUR 20 million), consolidation of the state (EUR 19 million). The European Union's strategic objectives are to support the development of Chad through sustainable management of its natural resources and to contribute to consolidating peace and implementing reforms designed to enhance governance.

Moreover, the funding for the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) for Chad (EUR 542 million) for the period 2014-2020 focuses on three sectors:

- Food security nutrition and rural development (EUR 369 million)
- sustainable management of natural resources (EUR 53 million)

- consolidation of the rule of law (EUR 93 million)
- support for civil society (EUR 27 million).

Chad also benefits from the full range of European instruments to support its role in maintaining stability in the region, to address the economic, budgetary and humanitarian crisis and to support the country in implementing its national development plan for the benefit of the people of Chad, particularly the most vulnerable. For example, EU support has contributed to half the progress made by Chad in increasing its people's access to drinking water.

Chad also received over EUR 140 million of aid for projects financed under the Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and the phenomenon of displaced people in Africa.

6.2 Multi-layered and increased assistance

Economic relations

The oil economy is an important source of income for Chad. In 2011, the oil sector accounted for 23 % of GDP and provided 53 % of the State's budgetary revenues. However, the country remains one of the poorest in the world, and over half of its population lives on less than a dollar a day. Chad's economy is characterised by a large primary sector dominated by the oil sector, an embryonic secondary sector and a tertiary sector, which employs around 20 % of the active population. In this context, the EU supports the focuses of Chad's government via a set of projects, at both regional and national level. These focuses aim to modernise public finances, support trade and key sectors such as livestock, acacia gum, etc, and prompt Chad's adherence to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.

Trade

Despite recent efforts, the development of regional trade is still hampered by major delays and costs due to the country land-locked location. Chad primarily exports oil and agricultural products (livestock, cotton, peanuts and cereals) and its main partners are the U.S, China and the United Kingdom. The country primarily imports fuels and capital goods. Its five main suppliers are (in descending order): Cameroon, the United States, France, Nigeria and China.

In the context of trade relationship-building with the EU, Chad benefits from the "Everything But Arms" initiative granted to the least developed countries, allowing access to the European market without customs duties or quantitative restrictions.

Development

The EU strategy is to contribute to the management of public affairs and security, to encourage a sustainable economic growth cycle and a reduction in poverty. This generates areas of action: good governance; focusing on internal security forces, justice, public finance; development of the private sector and local governance; infrastructures, i.e. access to drinking water, improvement of transport conditions and the energy sector.

The Chad-EU cooperation policy is focused on issues and programmes linked to rural development, food security and sustainable management of the environment.

Civil society

One of the EU constant concerns when implementing projects in Chad is the improvement of the dialogue with civil society. The thematic programmes allow dialogue with civil society during information and training meetings. The challenges connected to civil society organisations concern the strengthening of their capacities, the improvement of their representativeness and legitimacy and their dynamism. The EU-led Civil Society Support Programme wants to broaden the spectrum of beneficiaries of European aid, by favouring support to emerging actors such as young people's and women's associations. Notably, the programme works to increase citizen participation in political and social life as well as intercultural and inter-religious dialogue.

Humanitarian aid

The European Union is Chad's leading humanitarian donor as the state still faces multiple humanitarian crises on a large scale. Among these, food and nutritional crises; population movements (connected with conflicts in neighbouring countries and military operations in the Lake Chad region) including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced individuals, directly affecting almost 600,000 people (mainly women and children); health emergencies (with epidemic potential: cholera, measles and other diseases, malaria); and natural disasters (floods, drought, pests). These disasters are increasingly frequent, with a negative impact on agricultural production and means of subsistence. They increase the vulnerability of disaster-stricken communities by limiting access to basic social services such as education.

Since 2003, when the first episodes of violence broke out, the EU has been providing humanitarian aid to Chad essentially in three regions:

- Eastern Chad on the border with Darfur, with assistance to refugees and the most vulnerable locals
- The Sahelian Strip, to prevent and answer to food crises, reduce malnutrition and provide help to households affected by the Libyan crisis
- The South, where returning refugees and Central African refugee camps are located

Furthermore, the European Union Civil protection and Humanitarian aid Operations (ECHO) is Chad's leading humanitarian donor and among the five most important donors of UNICEF. It has committed significant financial resources for Chad (more than €60 million in 2016 and €50 million in 2017), in order to address the most immediate needs of 1 million people.

The EU also provides aid in the fight against epidemics, particularly cholera, which in 2010 and 2011 caused several hundred deaths in Chad. The repatriation operation for Chadian workers in Libya is also supported by the EU.

6.3 The EU – Chad dialogue on migration

The EU's migration dialogue with Chad

Migration and mobility has traditionally characterised the Sahel and Lake Chad region, with very complex migration patterns. Migration flows often encompass migrant workers (regular and irregular), unaccompanied and separated children, as well as refugees or asylum-seekers. Additionally, in the Sahel and in the Lake Chad basin context, challenges are linked to extreme poverty, lack of stability, economic fragility, food insecurity, climate change, irregular migration, smuggling of migrants, human trafficking and corruption. Moreover, the situation is extremely volatile and includes widespread organised crime and violent extremism and terrorist attacks, which are thriving particularly where there is an insufficient presence of governmental authority and public administration. All of these factors are root causes of forced displacement.

With regard to the Lake Chad basin, the EU has three general objectives:

- prevent a general destabilisation of the region;
- reduce the physical threat from Boko Haram to the people of the region;
- contribute to a long-term solution to the root causes that have fuelled the insurgency

Dialogue between the EU and the region of Sahel/Lake Chad on security, stability and migration-related issues is currently being stepped up, based on existing or reinforced dialogues like the Sahel Strategy, the Sahel Regional Action Plan, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and the IOM Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration and different platforms such as the Rabat process and G5 Sahel Group. Reinforcement of dialogue at local level is essential to further develop cooperation and to reinforce the EU engagement in Chad.

Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, 2011

Given the proximity of the Sahel to the EU and its immediate neighbourhood, the EU is committed to work closely with the countries of the Sahel and Lake Chad regions to support their efforts to achieve peace, security and development. In 2011, the EU adopted its Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, as a response to increasing security and development challenges. The three core Sahelian states, and the focus of this Strategy, are Mauritania, Mali and Niger, though the geographical conditions – and therefore challenges – also affect Burkina Faso and Chad. The EU's development policy in the Sahel, drawn up in partnership with the countries concerned, is geared towards tackling the root causes of the extreme poverty and towards creating the grass-root conditions for economic opportunity and human development to flourish.

Sahel Regional Action Plan, 2015-2020

In April 2015 the EU adopted a 5-year Sahel Regional Action Plan, which provides the overall framework for the implementation of the European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the

Sahel, as adopted and revised in its Conclusions on 21st March 2011 and 17th March 2014, respectively. The fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking, radicalisation and violent extremism, remains the key objective of the EU.

In this holistic approach, including the contribution of the EU Institutions, the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the Sahel as well as of EU Member States, the EU has reiterated its commitment to support regional and country-led and owned initiatives, such as the National Indicative Programme for Chad (2014-2020) under the European Development Fund. This Action Plan identifies four priorities: preventing and countering radicalisation; creating appropriate conditions for youth; migration and mobility; border management, fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organised crime.

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the 'Trust Fund'), October 2015

The European Commission Decision on the establishment of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (the 'Trust Fund') was adopted on 20th October 2015. The Sahel and Lake Chad Window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund comprises of 9 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

This 'Trust Fund' aims at addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement, irregular migration and human rights abuses by promoting economic and equal opportunities, strengthening resilience of vulnerable people, security and development. The Trust Fund was formally constituted at the Valletta Summit on Migration held on 11-12 November 2015.

The EU-IOM Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration of Returnees along Central Mediterranean Migration Routes, December 2016

On 15th December 2016, the European Union, through the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), and with contributions from Germany (EUR 48 million) and Italy (EUR 22 million), developed a joint initiative with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to support the efforts of partner countries in Africa to strengthen migration management and to respond to the urgent protection needs and unacceptable loss of life of migrants. The EUR 140 million "EU Trust Fund for Africa and IOM Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration of Returnees along Central Mediterranean Migration Routes" is tailored to save lives by assisting those *en route*, offer voluntary return assistance especially from transit countries such as Chad; and, provide reintegration support to those returning migrants and other communities.

The EU-IOM Initiative is a 3-year programme, which will focus on the following:

- Increase protection and life-saving assistance for stranded migrants to address immediate needs for food and water, medical and psycho-social care, as well as temporary shelter
- Facilitate voluntary return from countries of transit or destination in Africa (notably Chad, Libya, Niger, Mali)
- Achieve sustainable reintegration support in their countries of origin
- Enhance government and stakeholder policies and responses

At the end of 2017, one year after launching the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, concrete results have been achieved: over 15,000 migrants have received voluntary return assistance and almost 15,000 returning migrants are eligible for reintegration support in their communities. Under the framework of the joint Task Force of the European Union, African Union and United Nations to address the migration situation in Libya, the work under the EU-IOM initiative will be accelerated, in particular with regard to voluntary humanitarian return from Libya and reception and reintegration support in countries of origin. On 14th December 2017, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini announced that the European Union will make an additional EUR 100 million available, to support the work of the IOM and the UNHCR, allowing them to continue operation on the ground.

Paris Summit on Migration, 28th August 2017

In late August 2017, the leaders of France, Italy, Spain, Germany and the EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini gathered to talk about migration with the Presidents of Chad, Niger and the Prime Minister of Libya's unity government.

European leaders agreed it would be useful to have countries such as Chad and Niger, which are points of passage to Libya, where a growing number of refugee camps is on the rise.

European and African leaders renewed their mutual commitment to tackle irregular migration flows, illegal human trafficking and support to contain the flow of people across the desert and the Mediterranean Sea. They welcomed the results already achieved in addressing the challenges of irregular migration as well as the EU on-going financial support to Sahelian states. Mogherini remembered that projects worth EUR 1 billion were destined for the countries of the Sahel alone.

In line with the Declaration on Solidarity and Security agreed in Rome on 6th July 2017, in a joint statement the European leaders declared that the following decisions were taken:

- an increased presence of State structures in the Northern part of Niger and Chad to rescue individuals in danger in the desert;
- strengthened border management and control with Libya;
- security measures and measures combating human, drug and arms trafficking, including thorough support to the G5 joint force. Security capacities already deployed in the area should contribute in the fields of surveillance, intelligence and protection;

- support Niger and Chad in the judicial field by reinforcing the Joint Investigation Team (or ECI) currently based in Niamey;
- stepped-up cooperation with Niger and Chad to better monitor and dismantle financial networks used by smugglers; launching training programmes in the field of criminal procedure and continuing existing support to Niger and Chad's justice ministries;
- protection missions in Niger and Chad, in liaison and in agreement with their Governments for resettlement of refugees. The process would allow refugees and migrants to immigrate legally to Europe if they are on an eligibility list provided by the UN refugee agency and registered with authorities in Niger and Chad. This happens in close liaison with UNHCR and in line with EU priorities, France, Germany, Italy and Spain;
- a joint mission to Niger and Chad to examine the conditions for implementation of the above-mentioned decisions, as well as to identify any other practical cooperation that would help these countries address the challenge of irregular migration

Additionally, Emmanuel Macron's government remarked on the French proposal of the establishment of hot spots in Chad and Niger to handle asylum requests. However, Macron's plans for asylum requests to be handled these states to try and stem the flow of refugees to Europe were branded "racist and inhumane" by left-wingers in the European Parliament.

On this occasion, the African leaders said fighting poverty must be a central part of any strategy. Further, Chad's President Déby said that Chad was committed to reducing the damage, the death of Africans in the desert and across the Mediterranean Sea as almost 90% of migrants from Niger reached Libya via Chad. He added that the "fundamental problem will always remain development" and that more resources were needed. Finally, he also pointed out that his country would not open offices that would attract people across Africa to ask for asylum to enter Europe. Instead, President Déby was in favour of centres, which would be accessible to people already recognised as refugees by UNHCR and who resided in the country.

In the wake of the meeting in Paris in September 2017, President Déby said he had received funding commitments of up to 15.2 billion euros (\$18 billion). By way of comparison, Chad's gross domestic product is less than ten billion euros per year.

Continued Assistance on Migration

The EU-Chad political dialogue on migration continues with high-level visits of EU Member States, technical missions and Assisted Voluntary Returns (AVRs).

In terms of aid, the National Indicative Programme for Chad outlines the main focal sectors of the EU cooperation with the country during the period 2014-20.

During 2015, 5 financial decisions were taken by the Commission under the 11th European Development Fund National Indicative Plan for Chad: Justice Reform (EUR 15 million), Pastoralism (EUR 20 million), Civil Society (EUR 12 million), Technical Cooperation Facility (EUR 4 million) and support to the National Authorising Officer (EUR 5 million). Also, at the request of the

Chadian Prime Minister, and in coordination with IMF and other international partners, an emergency support for a total amount of EUR 50 million (including EUR 22 million of budget support) was disbursed in December 2015 in order to help reduce the budgetary deficit – caused by declining oil revenues and increased expenditures related to the fight against terrorism – and facilitate Chad's attainment of the Heavily-Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPIC) completion point.

Current developments

One and a half years since the launch of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, over 3,500 migrants have been rescued from the desert and 15,000 assisted in returning home from dire situations across the Central Mediterranean routes, yielding substantial results. Interviews with beneficiaries of the programme were compiled in IOM's short film on the programme's results, "Issalam Taret", screened on the anniversary of the project. The footage indicates that many migrants would not have chosen to embark on the journey if, from the outset, they had been provided accurate information on the risks and realities it entailed. The IOM-produced "Wallah – Je te jure" lays out a similar picture of the plight of migrants travelling from West Africa to Italy. As a result, the programme is currently undergoing a shift, using returns as a way of managing migration flows to support local development.

As of March 2018, IOM handed over semi-durable shelters to 107 households at the Kobiteye returnee camp on the southern border of Chad that hosts over 5,500 Chadian returnees from the Central African Republic (CAR). Located some 600km south of the capital city N'Djamena, the Kobiteye site has been home to returnees since 2013. IOM Chad has been active in providing socio-economic and psychosocial support and this latest development was made possible with support from Japan. The provision of these semi-durable shelters to the most vulnerable individuals has marked a major improvement in their living conditions and safety. The representative from the Chadian Ministry of Planning and Cooperation expressed the satisfaction with IOM's mission in Chad with the durable solution for the Chadian returnees from CAR, which is in alignment with the country's National Development Plan.

This tri-party collaboration between the Chadian government, IOM and migrants displays a successful implementation of all available resources to facilitate re-integration of migrants into their respective communities in a way that benefits both the migrants and the society.

7. Other regional organisations and Chad

7.1 Multi-level forms of regional engagement

Chad's contemporary history reflects a host of overlapping crises, which have incredibly affected and downsized the economic potential of its oil industry, along with infrastructure constraints and a penalising geographic location in the middle of the Sahara Desert and Sahel region.

Nonetheless, at the regional level, Chad is involved in regional integration as a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the larger Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The development of regional trade, though, still remains hindered by major delays and costs due to the country being landlocked.

As for regional security challenges, Chad is a core member of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram's attacks in the Lake Chad Basin, of the G5 Sahel and its related military component, namely the G5 Sahel Joint Force to tackle terrorism in the wider Sahelian region.

Moreover, integrated in the international community's main representative bodies, Chad is also part of the African Union (AU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CSS), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the International Organization of La Francophonie.

President elect Idriss Déby was the Chairperson of the African Union from 30th January 2016 to 30th January 2017, whereas Chadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moussa Faki has been the Chairperson of the African Union Commission since March 2017.

CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Community

Chad is among the 6-member countries of the CEMAC, which represents one of the Central African regional communities established to promote cooperation and exchange among its members. It was founded in 1994 and became fully operational in 1999 in the context of a general revival of regional cooperation on the African continent. The 1999 N'Djamena Treaty defined its main tasks – to converge and monitor national economic policies; to coordinate sectoral policies and to progressively create a single market. The Monetary Union (UMAC) and the Economic Union (UEAC) present the Central African Economic and Monetary Community's two main pillars and they are supposed to guide and root the regionalisation process. Chad's President Déby is the current acting President of CEMAC and special sessions of the conference of Heads of State often take place in N'Djamena.

ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States

Formed at a summit meeting in 1981, the Economic Community of Central African States became operational in 1985, but it was inactive for several years due to the financial constraints and the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

Nowadays, ECCAS is an Economic Community of the African Union for the promotion of regional economic cooperation in Central Africa. Its objectives are to achieve collective autonomy, raise the standard of living of its populations and maintain economic stability through harmonious cooperation.

Chad is a member state of ECCAS along with Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, and Rwanda.

President Déby chaired the Presidency of ECCAS for several years from 2013.

CSS: The Community of Sahel-Saharan States

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States was formed in February 1998 in Tripoli (Libya) and became a Regional Economic Community during the 36th Ordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 2000.

Chad has played a crucial role in this Community since 2013, when President Déby was elected Chairman of the Organisation, setting up several meetings in N'Djamena and shaping its policies. Déby is still serving to date as President. The revival of the Community is focused on two main areas of deepened collaboration, namely regional security and sustainable development. Today's goals are the following:

- the establishment of a comprehensive Economic Union on the implementation of a community development plan, which comprises agriculture, industry, energy, social, culture, health sectors;
- the removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of member countries such as measures to foster free movement of individuals, capital, interests and goods;
- the promotion of external trade through a common investment policy;
- the harmonisation of educational, pedagogical, scientific and cultural systems

NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development

As an agency of the African Union for the socio-economic development of the continent, NEPAD is both a vision and a strategic framework for Africa in the 21st century. NEPAD is a new intervention led by African leaders to tackle the critical challenges faced throughout Africa: poverty, development and marginalization at the international level.

Chad was one of the 15 nations to be elected members of Head of States and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) in 2013-2014. The HSGOC provides leadership to the NEPAD process and sets policies, priorities and programmes of action, besides overseeing the NEPAD Agency and the Steering Committee. The HSGOC comprises 20 African states – NEPAD's five initiating countries (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) and 15 members elected on the basis of the AU's five regions, usually for two-year terms.

NEPAD's primary objective is to provide a new mechanism, spearheaded by African leaders, to achieve these results:

- eradicate poverty
- place African countries on a path of sustainable growth and development

- halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process
- accelerate the empowerment of women
- fully integrate Africa into the global economy

LCBC: Lake Chad Basin Commission

The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was established on 22nd May 1964 by four countries bordering Lake Chad: Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, but the number of member countries has grown to 6 since the accession of the Central African Republic in 1996 and Libya in 2008. The headquarters of the Organization is in N'Djamena.

The LCBC's mandate is the sustainable and equitable management of Lake Chad and other shared water resources in the eponymous basin, the preservation of the ecosystems of the Lake Chad Conventional Basin, the promotion of integration and the preservation of peace and tranquillity, cross-border security in the Lake Chad Basin. The LCBC is a member organization of the African network of basin organizations (ANBO) and the International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO). The Commission is financed by the contributions of the Member States, but an autonomous funding debate is under way.

MNJTF: Multinational Joint Task Force

The Multinational Joint Task Force is a combined multinational force comprising military units from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, which formed a coalition to confront a common threat, i.e. to end the Boko Haram insurgency. It is headquartered in the Chadian capital N'Djamena.

The task force was first organised as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, to checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement, but it was expanded in 1998 to include units from neighbouring Chad and Niger to deal with common cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region. In late 2000s, security forces were increasingly challenged by jihadist militant groups such as Boko Haram and Ansaru. Consequently, the Joint Task Force's mandate was further expanded in April 2012 to include counter-terrorism operations. Since then, the Joint Task Force has been an offensive and stabilisation mechanism with the objective of combating Boko haram and other groups labelled as terrorists operating around the Lake Chad Basin.

Its establishment under its current structure was determined by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) on 7th October 2014. On 25th November 2014 the African Union's (AU) peace and security Council fully endorsed its activation. However, in January 2015 the MNJTF headquarters in Nigeria was overrun by militants of Boko Haram, who then proceeded to massacre locals and destroyed the town, displacing many citizens. In the light of that episode, a new Concept of Operations was created under the supervision of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the move of the Headquarters to N'Djamena. Throughout the years, the MNJTF has benefited from the Nigerian army's manpower and weapons, Chad's veteran soldiers, and the long experience of one of Cameroon's army units that enjoys unconventional funding, the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR). The current mandate of MNJTF is to "create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko

Haram and other terrorist groups; facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of internally displaced people and refugees; and facilitate humanitarian operations". Additionally, it has been trained to conduct military operations to prevent the expansion of the terrorist groups activities, to prevent the transfer of weapons or logistics, and tasked with specific actions in the areas of intelligence, human rights and information.

G5 Sahel and its G5 Joint Force

The idea for G5 Sahel regional body – comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad – was conceived in February 2014. Designed to respond to the security and development challenges facing the Sahel region, it has been supported by France, the most militarily active European country in this part of the world. The G5 is a very fluid and constantly changing organisation. At the time of its creation, the G5 described itself as a multidimensional grouping with a strong development component. However, this aspect has gradually slipped into the background as the G5 members have turned their attention to security. The priority has, therefore, shifted towards the construction of a joint armed force. Launched in February 2017, the G5 Sahel joint force (FC-G5S) forms part of the regional G5 Sahel organisation. The G5 Sahel joint force acts in a region containing a proliferation of more than 20 active armed and terrorist groups, making it extremely difficult to focus on a common target.

The G5 Sahel joint force separates the Sahel into three sectors: an Eastern sector for Niger and Chad, with two battalions; a central sector covering Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, in which three battalions have been deployed; and a Western sector corresponding to Mauritania and Mali, where two battalions are operating. The battalions consist each of 650 men. The different zones are equipped with their own tactical command post.

The FC-G5S is a counter-insurgency operation and represents yet another example of recent attempts made by African countries to take on responsibility for their own security, even though its member countries are still relying on foreign financial backing. Along with these efforts, the G5 is increasingly employing militias or proxies to fight those it has designated as the enemy. Chad will certainly refrain from taking part fully unless President Déby considers that the country's vital interests are under threat. The complaints coming from Chad derive from the fact that too much is being asked of it, as the country already supplies 1,390 men to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and about 2,000 men to the MNJTF.

During the G5 summit held in July 2017, France, Germany and the European Union added a new element to the group called "Alliance for the Sahel", which is still a work in progress. Tasked with coordinating the initiatives and mobilising donors, this Alliance was created without the G5 officially abandoning its own development objectives. More broadly, the G5 states will also have to fight against a trafficking that forms the backbone of the economy in certain disadvantaged regions, for which they have few alternative proposals.

President Déby is currently serving as President of the G5 Sahel.

8. Other Practical Info

8.1 Local Customs Cultural Awareness

Chadians live in one of the least developed countries in the world. Everyday life is often unpredictable due to increasingly frequent dry spells, terrorist threats from Boko Haram and like-minded organisations as well as unstable contexts in neighbouring countries. Citizens have adopted a day-by-day approach towards life and the various challenges they must face every day. Furthermore, local customs reflect the fact that Chad is a predominantly Muslim country, hence be aware of your actions to ensure that they do not offend other cultures or religious beliefs, especially during the holy month of Ramadan. Photographing of military sites, government buildings and airports is prohibited; other photography requires a Ministry of Information government permit. You should carry your identification at all times as failure to produce ID can lead to detention by the Police or delays.

Social Etiquette

a) Meeting Etiquette

The typical greeting is a handshake. Greetings between women are normally verbal, whereas between man and woman shaking hands would most likely not occur in social situations since a verbal greeting or nod of acknowledgement is generally the norm. You must always use your right hand when greeting. When greeting a group, shake hands eldest to youngest and men before women. Chadians will usually make small talk when beginning virtually every conversation. Following this though, people tend to be direct, sometimes more so than Americans and other Westerners would consider polite.

Chadians tend to stand quite close when speaking one another, in other words less than an arm's length of personal space tends to be the norm, even though more distance is allowed between men and women during conversations. Male colleagues will often touch each other on the arm or shoulder while speaking to emphasise something or to be close; women will do this as well, although perhaps not as much.

Eye contact is definitely important in conversation patterns, although it is possible that locals will not always look you in the eye as a sign of respect. Overly direct eye contact may be viewed as rude and a threat. Beckoning is done with all fingers but the thumb, hand facing down pulling the fingers towards your palm.

b) Gift Giving Etiquette

Gifts have a twofold role in the Chadian culture. Officials will often ask for cadeaux (gifts) as a bribe; smaller-time officials such as military police may ask for 'money for tea' or something along these lines as a bribe. Gifts are usually opened in private and not when the gift-giver is present.

c) Dining Etiquette

There is a strong dining etiquette in Chad. If you are visiting a home uninvited never arrive at mealtimes. If you are invited to a meal expect to sit on a mat on the floor and tuck your feet in. Men and women eat separately, and your feet must not point

toward other guests or the food. All food must be eaten with the right hand and guests should not begin eating until the host advises them to do so. There are some taboos connected with dining etiquette such as the following: giving eggs to children will turn them into thieves in adulthood; pregnant women should not be given too much food to avoid them producing fat babies. Your left hand should never be used for offering or accepting food, nor should the sole of your foot be exposed in the presence of a Muslim.

Business Etiquette and Protocol

a) Meeting and Greeting

Chadians appreciate an opportunity to "get to know" potential partners before beginning concrete discussions. During business meetings, it is very important to greet people by rank and be sure to shake everyone's hand as a matter of respect. Small talk along the lines of 'how's the family?' is expected and considered impolite if not asked. It is helpful in Chad to supplement written communication with as many face-to-face contacts as possible.

The best way to address people is by using their professional titles right away. People tend to stick to formality quite a bit, referring to officials by their titles as a respectful gesture.

There is no set protocol with the giving and receiving of business cards as most people do not have cards. If you do, always give and receive cards with the right hand.

b) Communication Style

In general, communication is indirect, especially when speaking with someone older or someone you do not know. Pushing your hand forward with an open palm and all fingers out is a strong insult. Shaking hands with your left hand is seen as rude throughout the region, not only in a very conservative culture. Foreigners should avoid smoking and drinking in public and never wear shorts at public venues. Similarly, women must dress conservatively, covering their legs and arms.

c) Business Meetings

In a business setting as well as in everyday life, there is definitely a concept of 'African time', with things often starting much later than originally planned. Given this, being late is not considered rude. It is always advisable to let the person who called the meeting take the lead on getting down to business. The art of negotiation in business is very complex in Chad: a knowledge of French is essential since French and Arabic are the official languages and there are no professional translators readily available. Chad is made up of different religious groups too. If you happen to be in negotiation with the Chad-Arab Taubou or Daza group, it is the wife who makes all the major decisions and all their lawful customs are based on compensation and revenge. Should you negotiate with them, make sure you are well prepared as Arabs are born to trade and are formidable at the negotiating table.

8.2 Medical Travel Recommendations for Chad

Medical care is limited within the capital N'Djamena and it is difficult to find outside of major cities. Chad has limited public ambulance services and they are extremely expensive. Public health sector strikes are common. All hospitals require payment in cash for services upon entry. Ensure you have enough cash when going to the hospital for care.

Carry a card in the local language identifying your blood type, chronic conditions or serious allergies.

There are two medical clinics in N'Djamena that offer "international standard" medical care and have private ambulances: International SOS and Europ Assistance. These are not walk-in clinics, and advance membership is required to access services. N'Djamena has three other hospitals, two of which should only be used in an extreme emergency:

- **Hopital General de Reference.** This is the main public hospital in N'Djamena. It is poorly supplied, and sanitary conditions do not meet international standards. Blood transfusion at this facility is not safe. No cardiac services are provided.
- **Hopital Mere et Enfant de N'Djamena.** Pediatric services are limited due to lack of trained physicians, nurses, and technical staff. It does not meet Western standards. Blood transfusion at this facility is not safe.
- **Hopital de la Renaissance.** It is a new hospital in N'Djamena in which most of its staff is Chadian and work under the supervision of French physicians and nurses. It has five operating rooms, eight intensive care beds, and a fully staffed emergency room. Its capacity is 240 beds. Specialty care varies based on specialists' presence in town; they offer dental services, gastro intestinal surgery, orthopaedic services, and general surgery. Blood products are not readily available. Children cannot be seen at this facility.

International SOS Clinic, Europ Assistance, and Hopital de la Renaissance are the only facilities capable of stabilizing and transporting patients via air ambulance to a site capable of handling emergency and trauma care. Response time is between 12-24 hours. Evacuation is limited to two patients per aircraft.

Recommended Vaccinations:

- *Hepatitis A*
- *Malaria*
- *Typhoid*
- *Cholera*
- *Hepatitis B*
- *Meningitis*
- *Polio*
- *Yellow Fever*

Malaria and other widespread illnesses

Malaria is a serious and sometimes fatal disease. Plasmodium falciparum malaria, the type that predominates in Chad, is

resistant to the antimalarial drug chloroquine. Because travellers to Chad are at high risk for contracting malaria, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) advises that travellers should take one of the following antimalarial drugs: mefloquine (Lariam-TM), doxycycline, or atovaquone/proguanil (Malarone -TM).

Other widespread illnesses in Chad include diarrhea and upper respiratory infections. HIV/AIDS is becoming an increasingly serious problem as infection rates are at alarming levels (up to 25 percent in high-risk groups). Meningitis outbreaks usually occur annually and several other diseases (cholera, diphtheria, chicken pox, typhoid) periodically appear.

Food and drink-related diseases

Diseases from contaminated food and water are common in Chad. Prevention consists in the following suggested actions: eat only food that is cooked and served hot, fruit and vegetables that you can wash in clean water or that you can peel yourself. Drink bottled water that is sealed, water that has been disinfected, ice made with bottled or disinfected, carbonated drinks, hot coffee or tea and pasteurised milk. Tap water is generally not safe to drink. Bottled water should be the only water consumed unless a purifier or some other form of distillation is used. Standing water provides a breeding ground for mosquitoes that spread malaria throughout the central and southern regions of Chad. Malaria is endemic in Chad and malaria prophylaxis is highly recommended.

Mosquito-borne diseases

Bugs like mosquitoes, ticks and fleas can spread a number of diseases in Chad. To prevent bug bites, you should cover exposed skin by wearing long-sleeved shirts, long pants, and hats; use an appropriate insect repellent; use permethrin-treated clothing and gear (such as boots, pants, socks, and tents). Do not use permethrin directly on skin; stay and sleep in air-conditioned or screened rooms; use a bed net if the area where you are sleeping is exposed to the outdoors.

Other animals

Most animals avoid people, but they may attack if they feel threatened, are protecting their young or territory, or if they are injured or ill. Animal bites and scratches can lead to serious diseases such as rabies. Follow these tips to protect yourself: do not touch or feed any animals you do not know. Do not allow animals to lick open wounds, and do not get animal saliva in your eyes or mouth. Avoid rodents and their urine and feces. If you wake in a room with a bat, seek medical care immediately. Bat bites may be hard to see. All animals can pose a threat, but be extra careful around dogs, bats, monkeys, sea animals such as jellyfish, and snakes. If you are bitten or scratched by an animal, immediately wash your hands and the wound with soap and clean water and go to a doctor right away.

Stay safe outdoors

If you plan outdoor activities, take the following steps to stay safe: stay alert to changing weather conditions and adjust your plans if

conditions become unsafe. Eat and drink regularly, wear loose and lightweight clothing to avoid heat-strokes, which are common and could be deadly. If you are outside for many hours in heat, eat salty snacks and stay hydrated.

If you happen to be near water, swim only in designated swimming areas, do not dive in shallow water, do not swim in freshwater in developing areas, wear shoes on beaches where there may be animal waste.

Remember to wash your hands regularly and thoroughly with water and soap, especially before handling food. If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand sanitiser.

Safe transportation

In many places cars, buses, large trucks, rickshaws, bikes, people on foot, and even animals share the same lanes of traffic, increasing the risk for crashes.

Be smart when you are traveling on foot:

- Pay attention to the traffic around you, especially in crowded areas
- Remember, people on foot do not always have the right of way in other countries

Follow basic safety tips:

- Wear a seatbelt at all time
- Sit in the back seat of cars and taxis
- Avoid driving at night; street lighting in certain parts of Chad may be poor
- Travel during daylight hours only, especially in rural areas
- If you choose to drive a vehicle in Chad, learn the local traffic laws and have the proper paperwork

About flying:

- Avoid using local, unscheduled aircraft
- If possible, fly on larger planes (more than 30 seats); larger airplanes are more likely to have regular safety inspections
- Try to schedule flights during daylight hours and in good weather

8.3 Other Travel Info

Time

Time zone: Chad is one hour ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT+1) and belongs to West Africa Time Zone (WAT). Chad does not operate Daylight-Saving Time (DST).

Money

The official currency used in Chad is called the Central African CFA Franc. CFA stands for Financial Cooperation in Central Africa (Coopération Financière en Afrique Centrale). It is issued by the Bank of the Central African States (Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale), located in Cameroon, for the members of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale).

The type of currency is available through money exchange offices and in banks. It is advisable to bring US dollars or euros rather than sterling into the country. CFA Franc can be very difficult to exchange outside the French Monetary Area. Travellers cheques may be exchanged at one or two banks in N'Djamena – to avoid additional exchange rate charges, travellers are advised to take traveller's cheques in euros. MasterCard and Visa are accepted at very few hotels in N'Djamena and it may not be possible to obtain cash advances at banks on credit cards. It is always best to carry cash for the majority of transactions.

The Central African CFA franc currency is shared Central African countries, namely Cameroon, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.

Climate

Chad's wide range in latitudes (that extends southward from the Tropic of Cancer for more than 15°) is matched by a climatic range that varies from wet and dry tropical to hot arid.

Chad has one relatively short rainy season. The dry season, which lasts from December to February everywhere in the country is relatively cool, with daytime temperatures from 20 to 30 degrees Celsius and night-time temperatures that drop to 15 degrees Celsius. From March onwards it becomes very hot until the first heavy rains fall.

In the capital N'Djamena, for example, daytime temperatures average more than 38 degrees between March and June. Heavy rains begin at N'Djamena in July, and average daytime temperatures drop to 27 degrees Celsius, but night-time temperatures remain around 20 degrees until the onset of N'Djamena's dry, cool season in November.

However, there are three climatic zones in Chad:

- The Saharan Zone: The North is hot and arid, receiving no rain. Crops such as dates, beans and fruit can be grown in oases scattered across the region. Oases are also known as 'wadis'. Here, water from the underground is used to cultivate trees and some crops. Across the North, East and Central arid or semi-arid areas, farmers rely on grazing livestock across wide

areas. Cattle are the most prized animals, but in the driest areas, nomadic groups often raise goats and camels. With recurring droughts across the Sahel region, traditional farming is threatened by a shortage of rain and pastureland. Once farmers have lost their livestock, it is hard for them to start over.

- Central Sahel region is hot and subtropical, with a wet season from May to November which normally brings over 350 mm of rain and in some places much more. The main cereal crops are sorghum and millet. Farmers also grow root crops such as potatoes and cassava/manioc, as well as groundnuts/peanuts, beans and vegetables.
- The Southern region. In the South rainfall is higher and on average receives over 1,000 mm. Temperatures in the capital N'Djamena average around 24 degrees Celsius in January and 33 degrees Celsius in May. During the rainy season, the cloud cover lowers the temperature to approximately 27 degrees in July and August.

Cotton is the most widespread crop, which can only be grown in areas with the largest rainfall in the South or where there is a reliable source of water.

Changing weather patterns

Every year the length of the rainy season can vary considerably (by more than 40%). As a result, it is very common for dry years to alternate with wet years. Meteorologists say rain patterns are changing across the Sahel and dry spells are increasingly frequent, due to a rise in water temperatures in the Gulf of Guinea, which has shifted the flow of rain clouds southwards.

8.4 Radio Transmissions

The radio is not a secure means of communication as it can be listened to by practically anyone. It is useful to establish a set of simple code words, which should be known by everyone in the network. In no case should military information be transmitted.

Basic Rules

Discipline: listen before transmitting. Brevity: be brief and to the point. Rhythm: use short complete phrases that make sense. Speed: not too fast, not too slow. Volume: don't shout. Preparation: know what you are going to say before transmitting.

Prior to transmission

- a. Check the power source and cables to ensure there is a power supply.
- b. Check the antenna and cables ensuring a tight and correct connection to the radio set.
- c. Connect the audio accessories and check the functioning of switches.

Transmitting

- a. Make your message brief but precise.
- b. Break the message into sensible passages with pauses between.
- c. Make sure no-one else is transmitting at the same time.
- d. When transmitting maintain a high standard of articulation, normal rhythm and moderate volume. Do not shout. Hold the microphone close to your mouth.
- e. Avoid excessive calling and unofficial voice procedure.

Four Golden Rules

Clarity; Brevity; Security; Simplicity.

Respect these rules; your radios may be the only link to the outside world. Don't interfere with radios unless you are a trained technician. Don't use the radio like a telephone, keep transmissions short. Organize your thinking and your message before transmitting. Security matters are best dealt with by using simple code words; likewise when dealing with sensitive issues.

Procedure Words

A proword is a word or phrase, which has been given a special meaning in order to speed up the handling of messages. The only authorised prowords are listed below:

Prowords explanation:

BREAK

I now indicate a separation of the text from other portions of the message.

CORRECT

You are correct, or what you have transmitted is correct.

CORRECTION

I have made an error in this transmission. I will continue from the last correct word.

I SAY AGAIN

I am repeating my transmission again.

MESSAGE

A message follows: prepare to copy or record it.

MORE TO FOLLOW

The transmitting station has additional traffic for the receiving station.

OUT

This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required.

OVER

This is the end

of my transmission to you and a response is expected. Go ahead transmit.

READ BACK

Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as received.

ROGER

I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.

SPEAK SLOWER

You are speaking too fast. Please speak slower.

STAND-BY

Do not transmit until contacted: I need extra time.

THIS IS

Give call sign, i.e. "Delta one".

WAIT

I must pause for a few seconds, please wait.

WAIT OUT

I must pause longer than a few seconds, I will return.

WILCO

I have received your signal, understand it, and will comply (do not use roger and wilco together).

WRONG

Your last transmission was incorrect the correct version was ...

Phonetics

The international phonetic alphabet listed below shall be used. Numerals shall be transmitted digit by digit except round figures such as hundreds and thousands.

Examples:

Message examples:

To give you confidence, make sure you practise using the radio before you find yourself in urgent need of using it. An example of the kind of language you must learn to use is shown right. It is an example of a radio check:

Call

Five - Two, Five - Two, this is Hotel – Three - Niner, Hotel – Three - Niner. Radio check. Over.

Reply

Hotel – Three - Niner, from Five - Two. I read you loud and clear. Over.

Call

Five - Two from Hotel – Three - Niner. Loud and clear. Over.

Reply

From Five-Two. Roger. Out.

What to do in an emergency

Call for help as follows:

emergency. emergency. emergency.

Five-two five-two. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. emergency. do you copy? over. (Note: emergency is repeated three times).

Wait for response and then proceed. For a lesser degree of urgency, use the word "security" instead of "emergency". Any station hearing an "emergency" or "security" call, should immediately stop transmitting and listen out. If you need to interrupt another radio conversation wait for a pause (immediately after you hear "over"); call: break. break. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. I have an emergency. please stand by.

Pause transmission and listen to ensure the other communication has ceased, then proceed with emergency call.

12 wun too;

44 fo-wer fo-wer;

90 niner zero;

136 wun three six;

500 fi-yiv hundred;

7000 seven thousand;

16000 wun six thousand;

1278 wun too seven ate;

19A wun niner alfa

CHARACTER	MORSE CODE	TELEPHONY	PHONIC (PRONUNCIATION)
A	• —	Alfa	(AL-FAH)
B	— • • •	Bravo	(BRAH-VOH)
C	— • — •	Charlie	(CHAR-LEE) or (SHAR-LEE)
D	— • •	Delta	(DELL-TAH)
E	•	Echo	(ECK-OH)
F	• • — •	Foxtrot	(FOKS-TROT)
G	— — •	Golf	(GOLF)
H	• • • •	Hotel	(HOH-TEL)
I	• •	India	(IN-DEE-AH)
J	• — — —	Juliett	(JEW-LEE-ETT)
K	— • —	Kilo	(KEY-LOH)
L	• — • •	Lim a	(LEE-MAH)
M	— —	Mike	(MIKE)
N	— •	November	(NO-VEM-BER)
O	— — —	Oscar	(OSS-CAH)
P	• — — •	Papa	(PAH-PAH)
Q	— — • —	Quebec	(KEH-BECK)
R	• — •	Romeo	(ROW-ME-OH)
S	• • •	Sierra	(SEE-AIR-RAH)
T	—	Tango	(TANG-GO)
U	• • —	Uniform	(YOU-NEE-FORM) or (OO-NEE-FORM)
V	• • • —	Victor	(VIK-TAH)
W	• — —	Whiskey	(WISS-KEY)
X	— • • —	Xray	(ECKS-RAY)
Y	— • — —	Yankee	(YANG-KEY)
Z	— — • •	Zulu	(ZOO-LOO)
1	• — — — —	One	(WUN)
2	• • — — —	Two	(TOO)
3	• • • — —	Three	(TREE)
4	• • • • —	Four	(FOW-ER)
5	• • • • •	Five	(FIFE)
6	— • • • •	Six	(SIX)
7	— — • • •	Seven	(SEV-EN)
8	— — — • •	Eight	(AIT)
9	— — — — •	Nine	(NIN-ER)
0	— — — — —	Zero	(ZEE-RO)

9. Useful contacts

9. Useful contacts

Emergencies

In case of emergency in Chad, call the following emergency numbers:

Fire – 18

Police – 17

Ambulance – 2251-4242

Police response and services vary depending on the service area, with more capabilities in major cities; it is generally good in N'Djamena but remains limited in peripheral areas. Police and emergency response times are much slower than in Western countries. Another limitation in calling to report an emergency is the lack of actual street addresses: one must describe the location of the emergency using city landmarks, which may be difficult for expatriates. French and Chadian Arabic are the preferred languages for communication as the vast majority of Chadian police officers do not speak English.

Embassies

Embassy of the Republic of South Africa in Chad
Chief: D. Naidoo
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Quartier Mardjan Daffac, 1124 Rue 3035 Avenue Gaourang, BP 1243, N'Djamena, Chad
Phone: (+235) 22 52 22 09
Fax: (+235) 22 52 22 59
Email: ndjamena@foreign.gov.za
Website: <http://www.dirco.gov.za/>

Embassy of Algeria in Chad
Chief: Nadjib Mahdi
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Rue de Paris, BP 178, N'Djamena, Chad
Phone: (+235) 22 52 35 92
Fax: (+235) 22 52 37 92
Email: amb.algerie@intnet.td

Embassy of Burkina Faso in Chad
Chief: Mbatna Bandjang
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Farcha, N'Djamena
Phone: (+235) 22 52 70 19
Fax: (+235) 22 52 70 19
Email: ambburkinatchad@gmail.com

Embassy of Cameroon in Chad
Address: Quartier Klémat - Rue des Poids Lourds, BP 58
Phone: (+235) 22 52 28 94
Fax: (+235) 22 52 68 00
Email: ambcam@intnet.td

Embassy of the Central African Republic in Chad
Address: Près du Rond-Point de la Garde - Rue 1036
Phone: (+235) 22 52 32 06
Fax: (+235) 22 52 32 05

Embassy of Germany in Chad
Chief: Gabriela Guellil
Address: Av. Félix Eboué, N'Djamena.
Phone: (+235) 22 51 62 02
Fax: (+235) 251 48 00
Email: info@ndjamena.diplo.de
Website: <https://ndjamena.diplo.de/>

Embassy of France in Chad
Address: Rue l'Adjudant-chef Zouala Agoyna, BP 431
Phone: (+235) 22 52 25 76
Fax: (+235) 22 52 28 55
Email: admin-francais.ndjamena-amba@diplomatie.gouv.fr
Website: <https://td.ambafrance.org/>

Embassy of United States in Chad
Chief: Ms. Geeta Pasi
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador
Address: Chagoua Round Point BP 143
Phone: (+235) 22 51 50 17. For emergency (+235) 22 53 91 02
Email: NdjamenaACS@state.gov
Website: <https://td.usembassy.gov/embassy/ndjamena/>

Embassy of Malta in Chad
Address: Immeuble STAR – Avenue Charles de Gaulle
Phone: (+235) 25 22 603
Fax: (+235) 25 22 604
Email: chadembassy@orderofmalta.int
Website: <https://www.orderofmalta.int/fr/contacts/chad/>

Embassy of The Vatican City in Chad
Address: rue de Béguinage, BP 490
Phone: (+235) 22 52 31 15
Fax: (+235) 22 52 38 27
Email: nonceapo@intnet.td; nonciature.tchad@yahoo.fr

Embassy of Russia in Chad
Address: Avenue Colonel Nelde Rigobert, BP 891
Phone: (+235) 22 52 57 19
Fax: (+235) 95 73 22 45
Email: amrustd@yandex.ru
Website: <http://www.tchad.mid.ru/>

Embassy of Turkey in Chad
Chief: Erdal Sabri Ergen
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Rue de Marseille
Phone: (+235) 22 53 12 53
Email: ambassade.ndjamena@mfa.gov.tr
Website: <http://encemine.be.mfa.gov.tr/Mission>

Embassy of the Egypt in Chad
Chief: Abir Bassiouny Radwan
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Avenue Georges Pampidou Aupres du Rond Point de la sonasut
Phone: (+235) 22 51 09 72
Fax: (+221) 22 51 14 74
Email: embassy.ndjamena@mfa.gov.eg

Embassy of Nigeria in Chad
Chief: Abdullahi Omaki
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: 35, Avenue Charles de Gaulle, BP 752
Phone: (+235) 22 52 24 98
Fax: (+235) 22 52 30 92
Email: nigndjam@intnet.td
Website: www.nigerian-embassy.com/ng/Nigeria-in-NDjamena

Embassy of Sudan in Chad
Chief: Abbas Arabi Abdallah
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Rue de la Gendarmerie, BP 45
Phone: (+235) 22 52 50 10
Email: sudanindj@hotmail.com - amb.soudan@intnet.td

Consulates

Royal Danish Consulate in Chad
Honorary Consul: Jean François Pautot
Address: Tchami Toyota, Rue Felix Eboue, BP 455
Phone: (+235) 514 941
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This was a resolution adopted by the UN Security Council in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the CAR. It authorised the deployment of a UN civilian and police operation MINURCAT and a European Union military force (EUFOR)

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This Security Council Resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council to extend until 15th May 2010 the mandate of MINURCAT. It also authorised the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR in both Chad and the Central African Republic. The transfer of authority between EUFOR and the military component of MINURCAT will take place on 15th March 2009.

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This letter dated 21st May 2010 was written by the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council where the government of Chad assumed full responsibility for the security and the protection of the civilian population in Eastern Chad, including refugees, internally displaced people, returnees and host communities, with a focus on women and children.

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This Security Council Resolution decided to extend the mandate of MINURCAT until 31st December 2010. It also took note of the This letter dated 21st May 2010 was written by the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council where the government of Chad assumed full responsibility for the security and the protection of the civilian population in Eastern Chad. Requests the Government of Chad and the Secretary-General to establish a joint Government of Chad/United Nations high-level Working Group to assess on a monthly basis the situation on the ground with respect to protection of civilians, the measures adopted by the Government of Chad to implement the tasks set out and to the capacity of the DIS to provide security inside and around refugee camps.

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