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BURKINA FASO

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BURKINA FASO

Country Information Package
This Country Information Package
has been prepared by

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Within the framework of LET4CAP and with the financial support to the Internal Security Fund of the EU

LET4CAP aims to contribute to more consistent and efficient assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase.

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1. Country Profile
1.1 Country in Brief

**Formal Name:** Republic of Burkina Faso

**Previous formal names:** République de Haute-Volta

**Population:** 18,646,433

**Term for Citizens:** Burkinabe

**Area (sq km):** 274,200

**Capital City:** Ouagadougou

**Independence:** 5 August 1960 (From France)
Early History
Part of the territory corresponding to the current Burkina Faso was inhabited from the most remote antiquity. Archaeological discoveries at Bura, in southwest Niger, and in adjacent southwest Burkina Faso have documented the existence of the iron-age Bura culture from the 3rd century to the 13th century. Around 1,000 AD, invaders from present-day Ghana conquered central and eastern Burkina Faso and started to build the so-called Mossi Kingdoms.

The Mossi Kingdoms
According to founding myths, a princess called Yennenga was prevented by her father from marrying, but in defiance she married secretly. Her son, Wedraogo / Ouédraogo, began a successful military campaign in the Volta River Basin. He is considered the founder of the Mossi Kingdoms. There were four main Kingdoms: Ouagadougou, Tenkodogo, Fada N’gourma, and Zondoma (later replaced by Yatenga). They were independent and competed with each other. Ouagadougou and Yatenga had an especially fierce rivalry. Despite their competition, there were many similarities between the four Kingdoms. All of them had similar political structures: a powerful central government with a king at the top, followed by ministers and officials to help him. At the top of the hierarchy was the Emperor: the Mogho Naba, a symbol of the sun, he was revered as a God. Elected by senior dignitaries of the court, he was chosen from among the descendants of the king of Yatenga. Power was concentrated in the hands of the emperor, who was at the same time head of armies, supreme judge and the general collector of taxes and levies. The Mossi Kingdoms rose at the same time as the West African Mali and Songhai empires were reaching the peak of their powers. This led to conflict between these empires and the Kingdoms, with the latter able to defend themselves from invasion and forced Islamization. The Mossi Kingdoms grew up with and fought the great Islamic empires of the region. The territory of former Mossi Kingdoms, renamed Upper Volta, were incorporated into the colony of Haut-Sénégal-Niger and became part of French West Africa in 1895, the federation that united the colonial possessions corresponding to the current countries of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Benin and Niger. Based on the bureaucratic and administrative model of assimilation, French colonial domination was strongly centralized. French West Africa was governed by a Governor-general, appointed by Paris and assisted by a Vice-Governor-General and a dense network of administrators and mayors, one for each city. Early in the colonial period, there were in the West pockets of violent resistance to the French, such as the Samo revolts in 1898 and the Bwa clashes 1899, and most ethnic groups in the region took advantage of the anarchy by organizing raids on neighbours. In the central areas of the country, the Mossi staged a quick rebellion in 1899 after the death of their monarch in and the appointment of a new one. In 1908 there was a resistance movement near Koudougou, when a Muslim leader asked Mossi not to pay taxes and marched onto the capital with 2,000 troops. The French responded by burning villages, seizing goods and animals, imprisoning some chiefs, and lowering chiefly stipends. In 1914 conscription led to another bout of In 1915-16 there was another Muslim rebellion at the bend of the Black Volta. This uprising has been described as the largest armed movement of resistance to colonialism in Africa with tens of thousands of casualties. A decree of March 1, 1919 granted to Upper Volta the status of colony. Its territory covered the circles of Gaoua, Bobo-Dioulasso, Dedougou, Ouagadougou, Dori, Say and Fada N’gourma. Another decree of September 5, 1932 removes the colony of Upper Volta and divides its territory between the colonies of Niger, French Sudan (modern Mali) and Côte d’Ivoire.

French colonization
The French colonization of Burkina Faso was part of the second wave of colonial expansion started by Paris soon after the conquest of Algiers (1830). France, eager to build its second colonial empire by increasing its African possessions, began the conquest of West Africa with Senegal (1870). The territories of present-day Burkina Faso were conquered between 1896 (conquest of Ouagadougou) and 1904 (surrender of last Mossi Kingdom), thanks to a mixed strategy that employed both the military and the diplomatic instrument to subject the tribal kingdoms of the region. The territory of former Mossi Kingdoms, renamed Upper Volta, were incorporated into the colony of Haut-Sénégal-Niger and became part of French West Africa in 1895, the federation that united the colonial possessions corresponding to the current countries of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Benin and Niger. Based on the bureaucratic and administrative model of assimilation, French colonial domination was strongly centralized. French West Africa was governed by a Governor-general, appointed by Paris and assisted by a Vice-Governor-General and a dense network of administrators and mayors, one for each city. Early in the colonial period, there were in the West pockets of violent resistance to the French, such as the Samo revolts in 1898 and the Bwa clashes 1899, and most ethnic groups in the region took advantage of the anarchy by organizing raids on neighbours. In the central areas of the country, the Mossi staged a quick rebellion in 1899 after the death of their monarch in and the appointment of a new one. In 1908 there was a resistance movement near Koudougou, when a Muslim leader asked Mossi not to pay taxes and marched onto the capital with 2,000 troops. The French responded by burning villages, seizing goods and animals, imprisoning some chiefs, and lowering chiefly stipends. In 1914 conscription led to another bout of In 1915-16 there was another Muslim rebellion at the bend of the Black Volta. This uprising has been described as the largest armed movement of resistance to colonialism in Africa with tens of thousands of casualties. A decree of March 1, 1919 granted to Upper Volta the status of colony. Its territory covered the circles of Gaoua, Bobo-Dioulasso, Dedougou, Ouagadougou, Dori, Say and Fada N’gourma. Another decree of September 5, 1932 removes the colony of Upper Volta and divides its territory between the colonies of Niger, French Sudan (modern Mali) and Côte d’Ivoire.

Decolonization process and independence
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the economic unsustainability of the management of the colonies and the progressive aspiration for independence, inspired by the UN Charter and by the activism of local African political leaders, pushed the colonial empires towards disintegration. Initially, it was France itself that led the process of colonial reform and gradual self-determination of the indigenous peoples. In 1945, with the amendment of the Constitution and the birth of the Fourth Republic, France and its colonies were transformed into the French Union, a political structure composed by the French Republic (Metropolitan France), the Overseas departments and
the Overseas territories. In 1947, the Mossi renewed their pressure to have a separate territorial status, obtaining the creation for Upper Volta Oversea Territory on September 4. This change in status led to new rights for the inhabitants: the subjects of the colonial empire became French citizens and could elect their representatives in Parliament for the first time. However, the new status was not egalitarian, since two categories of citizens were maintained: citizens with French civil status and citizens with local status, with two separate constituencies in the Overseas territories: that of French nationals and that of the natives. In most territories the right to vote was limited to a few citizens with special administrative functions or civil/military decorations and local assemblies had limited power. A revision of the organization of French overseas territories began with the passage of the framework law of July 23, 1956 known as the "Loi Deferre". This law was followed by reorganizational measures approved by the French Parliament in 1957 which ensured a large degree of autonomy for each territory. Upper Volta thus became an autonomous republic within the French Community on December 11, 1958: the Republic of Upper Volta. In 1958, as part of the French constitutional reform, promoted by General De Gaulle and functional to the birth of the Fifth Republic, the French Union was transformed into a French Community, modelled on the British Commonwealth. In this sense, three alternatives were proposed to the Overseas territories: 1) to maintain their status; 2) to become an Overseas department and to be fully integrated into the French Republic; 3) to become independent of the French Republic and be a member of the French Community. Upper Volta Republic choose the third option, but shortly after, under the pressure of full independence parties, it began the process to secede from French political patronage. The leader of that process was Maurice Yamèogo, an ordained minister and a second generation Upper Volta civilian politician, allied himself with the Union Démocratique Voltaïque (UDV- Volta Democratic Union) nationalist party, a branch of the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA- Democratic African Rally). The Democratic African Rally is created during the Bamako Congress, from 18 to 21 October 1946 as federation of African political parties in French colonies. The RDA remained in the minds the most known political force of the period of decolonization of French territories, wanting to incarnate a new struggle for independence outside the traditional French political parties. The arrival of independence on 5 August 1960 in Upper Volta had a ceremonial value for the UDV, because at that time it had already controlled much of the political matters in the country after it received more autonomy from France in the fall of 1958. On 8 December 1960, UDV representative Maurice Yamèogo was elected with a landslide 99.5 percent of the votes to preside over the newly independent government and the new unitary constitution of the Upper Volta.

The Yamèogo Era (1960 – 1966)
Maurice Yamèogo established a strong presidential government. The 1960 constitution provided for election by universal suffrage of a president and a national assembly for five-year terms. Soon after coming to power, Yamèogo reduced the traditional power of the Mossi states and banned all political parties other than the UDV. No one seemed able to resist the man who was now nicknamed "Monsieur Maurice". Even the most intractable members of the opposition, led by Gérard Kango Ouédraogo finally re-joined the UDV. There was no longer any parliamentary opposition. Extremely distrustful, Yamèogo entrusted power during his overseas absences to the only European on his staff, the administrator of colonies Michel Frejus. The dictatorship was affirmed by the proclamation of 30 November 1960 of a new constitution which conferred extended powers on Yamèogo. Attempting to spare his main opponents, he used diplomatic means to remove some of them, like Ouédraogo, whom he appointed ambassador to Great Britain, or Henri Guissou, whom he dispatched to Paris. The few political prisoners were released in exchange for a simple declaration of support for the regime. A Security Court was established, with the accused appearing there without the right to be defended by attorneys. In foreign policy, Yamèogo was a fervent anti-communist. In December 1960, he co-founded the Brazzaville group with the "moderate" leaders of Francophone Africa, which combined with Anglophone leaders in May 1961 as the Monrovia Group. The Brazzaville and Monrovia Groups were strongly opposed to the "progressivist" Casablanca Group. In March 1961, the Brazzaville Group created the African and Malagasy Union (UAM), a resolutely anti-communist organisation which included a Defense pact. His foreign policy was characterized by ups and downs with both the neighbours, primarily the Ivory Coast, and the great Western powers. Maurice Yamèogo became the subject of a cult of personality as evidenced by stamps printed with his image. He was the sole leader of the Republic of Upper Volta and was the only candidate for the presidential election on 3 October 1965. He was "triumphanty" re-elected with 99.97% of votes. However, his authority soon weakened because of ethnic conflict and the poor performance of the economy. In December of 1965, President Yamèogo approved a 20% cut in the salaries of civil service employees accompanied by reductions in social security for retirees. His high austerity measures tested the patience of union leaders. 20 On 3 January 1966, workers unions protested the salary cuts, and Yamèogo’s kleptomania, and nepotistic practices. The civilian demonstrators called on the military to take over the reins of government. On that evening, Colonel Sangoulé Lamizana responded to the wishes of the demonstrators by placing Yameogo under arrest. On national radio, he declared himself head-of-state. The army’s intervention in politics contributed to national instability (in diverse ways) by challenging the traditional and ethnic-based civilian political structures. Against the wishes of civilian groups such as union members, students and teachers, each military regime attempted to consolidate its control over the country. With each passing president ascending form the ranks of the military, citizens outside of the army witnessed a rise in the hunger for power by young soldiers with socialist and/or communist ideological convictions.

The fourteen years of military rule under General Lamizana are summarized here in three stages. The first stage of his presidency (from 1966 to 1969) was to maintain the appearance
of order by presiding as the undisputed leader of the country. The country at this time was under military martial law and it was represented by civilians carefully selected by the military. In Lamizana’s second stage of his presidency (from 1969 to 1973), the appointment of a prominent civilian politician Joseph ki-Zerbo to the post of Prime Minister symbolized the military’s move to restore civilian multiparty politics. The third stage of Lamizana’s rule, (the last seven years from 1973 to 1980), saw the suspension of civilian-led democracy through Lamizana’s creation of the Mouvement National pour le Renouveau (MNR-Movement for National Renewal) party, and gradual restoration of military martial law. On 14 June 1976, the Voltsans ratified a new constitution that established a four-year transition period toward complete civilian rule. Lamizana remained in power throughout the 1970s as president of military or mixed civil-military governments. Lamizana’s rule coincided with the beginning of the Sahel drought and famine which had a devastating impact on Upper Volta and neighboring countries. A new constitution was written and approved in 1977 and Lamizana was re-elected by open elections in 1978. Lamizana came from the ethnic Samo minority group located in the north western region of Upper Volta. In seeking to mediate a peaceful return to civilian political rule in the country, Lamizana tried to preserve the dominance of the Mossi ethnic groups by serving as mediator between the nation’s various ethnic groups.

On the economic front, Upper Volta relied on loans from its neighbors and former colonial power, France, to fund economic and urban development. Lamizana worked to maintain positive relations with both countries. He leased lands, economic and urban development. Lamizana’s rule coincided with the beginning of the Sahel drought and famine which had a devastating impact on Upper Volta and neighboring countries. A new constitution was written and approved in 1977 and Lamizana was re-elected by open elections in 1978. Lamizana came from the ethnic Samo minority group located in the north western region of Upper Volta. In seeking to mediate a peaceful return to civilian political rule in the country, Lamizana tried to preserve the dominance of the Mossi ethnic groups by serving as mediator between the nation’s various ethnic groups.

On the economic front, Upper Volta relied on loans from its neighbors and former colonial power, France, to fund economic and urban development. Lamizana worked to maintain positive relations with both countries. He leased lands, favoured foreign development models over local ones to attract more business to help pay the interest on loans. Upper Volta tried to compete with the rest of the world in providing free commerce, trade, safety, and technical innovation. In October of 1980, a teachers union organized strikes to call for the political involvement of the more progressive elements in the army. The union expressed dissatisfaction with Lamizana’s inability to curtail corruption and nepotism in the country. Other dissatisfied members of the army noted the failures of Lamizana’s MNR which the teachers, workers, and students unions had pointed out. On 25 November 1980, Colonel Saye Zerbo overthrew Lamizana’s government and suspended the nation’s constitution.

Rise and fall of Thomas Sankara (1980 – 1987)

Col. Saye Zerbo deposed President Lamizana and established the Military Committee of Recovery for National Progress as the supreme governmental authority, thereby eradicating the 1977 constitution. Since then, the country has been under military rule. By failing to respond to popular demands for the eventual return to civilian rule, the Zerbo regime lost its legitimacy with the people. Large numbers of migrant workers, peasants, students, teachers, and lawyers protested military rule and called for a return to democratic rule in Upper Volta. President Zerbo fell because he failed to address the growing political tension between Mossi chiefs and the radical Marxist-oriented young soldiers (notably Sankara, Lingani, Zongo and Compaoré) in the military and the Patriotic League for Development (Lipad). On 7 November 1982, just days before Colonel Saye Zerbo’s second year as president of the Upper Volta, Colonel Gabriel Somé Yorian and infantry soldiers loyal to the Mossi chiefs, and favouring relations with Cote d’Ivoire and France, arrested him. Many citizens were uncertain as to who would emerge from this volatile crisis caused by trade union protests against prolonged military intervention in civilian politics. Ouédraogo's tenure proved short-lived as well. Factional infighting developed between moderates in the CSP and radicals. Ouédraogo was ousted in a bloody coup led by Capt. Thomas Sankara, who cultivated ties with Libya and Ghana. Sankara’s revolt was part of a wave of junior officer coups that have swept across Africa in the 1970s and 80s. Revolting against the established order, and the leadership of the continent’s original generation of post-colonial revolutionary leaders, leaders who have shown themselves better at challenging European colonial powers than ruling their countries. He adopted a policy of nonalignment with Western nations. After the coup, Sankara formed the National Council for the Revolution (NCR), the supreme executive body of the country, with himself as president. The NCR, whose exact membership remained secret until the end, contained two small intellectual Marxist-Leninist groups. Sankara, Compaoré, Capt. Henri Zongo, and Maj. Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lengani, all leftist military officers, dominated the regime. Sankara also established Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) to mobilize the masses and implement the NCR’s revolutionary programs. The CDRs were not part of the army and fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. The units are commanded by local leaders, and are trained to act as a reserve military unit, but also to supplement local police and act as emergency responders. The CDRs, formed as popular mass organizations, deteriorated in some areas into gangs of armed thugs and clashed with several trade unions. Tensions over the repressive tactics of the government and its overall direction mounted steadily. Nevertheless, Sankara adopted a more liberal policy toward the opposition and increased the government's focus on economic development. In a symbolic rejection of Upper Volta's colonial past, Sankara changed the country's name to Burkina Faso in August 1984. The new name Burkina Faso is a composite of local languages and roughly translated as "the country of incorruptible men living in the land of their ancestors." With his symbolic changes Sankara sought by word, deed and example to mobilize the masses and launch a massive bootstrap development movement. Many of the strict austerity measures taken by Sankara, however, met with growing resistance. Despite his initial popularity and personal charisma, problems began to surface in the implementation of the revolutionary ideals. The internal political struggle and Sankara's leftist rhetoric led to his arrest and subsequent efforts to bring about his release, directed by Capt. Blaise Compaoré. This release effort resulted in yet another military coup d'état on Aug. 4, 1983. Sankara was restored to power. In 1986, he dissolved his military cabinet and appointed civil servants to government ministries. Subsequently Sankara proposed the formation of a single political party. Sankara put a tremendous focus on the nation achieving a self-sufficient food supply by modernizing the irrigation systems and even he considered the construction of a series of dams to collect the seasonal rain in
reservoirs. However, a severe lack of capital for construction remained a chronic problem, and the fact that only 2 of the country’s rivers, the Black Volta and Komoe, flow year-round. Further complicating the issue were the political/economic entanglements. Rather than focusing on exporting cotton for a profit, Sankara had been adamant that cotton be used to clothe the Burkinabe instead of acting as a commodity in the international market which only benefits the wealthy classes. Sankara’s economic policy included taking land away from the tribal leaders who have historically feudally lorded over the local farmers. This practice increased his popularity with the masses and were used for multitude of projects, but would infuriated the powerful chiefly clans whose ancestors have owned the land for generations. Sankara wanted to improve transit infrastructure to allow more citizens to migrate to urban centres and help to expand the manufacturing sector with an emphasis on making the country self-sufficient in textiles and food, while opening new factories dedicated to mechanization of agriculture. One of the more developed industries was mineral extraction, particularly with gold ore, which represented about half of all export revenues. There were significant ore deposits in an area known as the Agacher Strip in the north bordering Mali. Mali also claimed the region and its disputed nature has delayed any extraction of the gold and natural gas resources in the region. Moreover, education was a priority as it is one of the most effective means of empowering the proletariat. Local communities have been instructed to begin building primary and secondary schools throughout the country. A lack of qualified teachers was a real issue, and a new initiative for ‘Revolutionary Teachers’ to go out and instruct basic literacy and proper ideology was being considered. Drawing inspiration from other communist movements, Sankara instituted a system of special courts called the ‘Popular Revolutionary Tribunal’ (or TPRs). These courts were designed to punish the enemies of the people and revolution, and could bring anyone up on charges: lazy workers, corrupt officials, or scheming aristocrats. On 15 October 1987, Sankara, along with twelve other officials, was killed in a coup d'état organized by Blaise Compaoré. After the coup and although Sankara was known to be dead, some CDREs mounted an armed resistance to the army for several days. A majority of Burkinabe citizens hold that France’s foreign ministry was behind Compaoré in organizing the coup. Deterioration in relations with neighbouring countries was one of the reasons given by Compaoré for the coup. Compaoré argued that Sankara had jeopardised foreign relations with the former colonial power France and neighbouring Ivory Coast. Following the coup Compaoré immediately reversed the nationalizations, overturned nearly all of Sankara’s policies, returned the country back into the IMF fold and ultimately spurned most of Sankara’s legacy.

The long rule of Blaise Compaoré (1987 – 2014)

On Oct. 15, 1987, after Sankara and other officials were assassinated in a bloody coup, Capt. Blaise Compaoré seized control of the government. Compaoré, unlike his predecessor, began to attract foreign investment and expanded the private sector. The new President, Capt. Henri Zongo, and Maj. Jean-Baptiste Boukary Lengani formed the Popular Front, a new political organisation which formally pledged to continue and pursue the goals of the revolution and to “rectify” Sankara’s “deviations” from the original aims. The new government, realizing the need for public support, tacitly moderated many of Sankara’s policies. In 1989, as part of a much-discussed political “opening” process, several political organizations, including three non-Marxist groups, were accepted as legitimate runners in the democratic race. However, beyond the façade-declarations, the new President had concrete cesarist and authoritarian ambitions. On Sept. 18, 1989, while Compaoré was returning from a two-week trip to Asia, Lengani and Zongo were accused of plotting to overthrow the Popular Front. They were arrested and summarily executed the same night. Upon his return, Compaoré reorganized the government, appointed several new ministers, and assumed the portfolio of minister of military and Defense. In 1990, Compaoré's Popular Front held its first National Congress, which formed a committee to draft a national constitution. The constitution was approved by referendum in 1991. The year after, Compaoré was elected president, running unopposed following the opposition’s boycott of the election, which was due to Compaoré's refusal to accede to some of its demands. Compaoré was immediately accused of reviving the cryonisms of Burkina Faso's pre-revolutionary days through his consolidation of power. The opposition did participate in the following year’s legislative elections, in which the Organization for People's Democracy/Labor Movement (OPD/LM), a new party created by the merging of Popular Front with other leftist movements, won a majority of seats. In February 1996, the ruling ODP/MT merged again with several small opposition parties to form the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), the pillar of future Compaoré rule. This effectively co-opted much of what little viable opposition to Compaoré existed. Also among the changes to the electoral system, the president was now no longer restricted to a single term. Oct. 15, 1997, was marked by a formal declaration of ten years’ service by President Compaoré. "Sankarists" (supporters of the late Thomas Sankara), however, used the opportunity to revisit the late president's assassination and pay tribute to his achievements. Thousands of people made the pilgrimage to Sankara’s life, achievements and legacy, acknowledging him as a "national hero." As support for Sankara grew, deeper scepticism about the role of his former friend Compaoré in his death began to surface. A huge wave of mass protest was mounting underground and suddenly exploded. After the re-election of Compaoré as President in 1998, protests were triggered by the murder of the journalist Norbert Zongo in December 1998. Zongo, the founder and publisher of the independent newspaper L’Indépendant, had conducted research on the death of David Ouédraogo, a driver for Blaise Compaoré’s brother, François. The journalist was found shot dead, and his body completely burnt, in his burn-out car. The government declared that he had died in an accident. The next day thousands came out onto the streets and demanded an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Norbert Zongo and an end to impunity. Trade unions, human rights organisations, and students, joined forces in the ‘Collective of the Democratic Mass Organisations and Political
Parties’ or the “Collectif” in order to co-ordinate the protests made by civil society against impunity. New demonstrations occurred during a general strike launched on April 10, 1999, by the “Collectif” in protest against the lack of progress in the investigations into the death of Norbert Zongo. Three members of this group, including opposition leader Herman Yameogo, were arrested following these demands. In June, in an effort to appease demands of students and other protestors, President Compaoré announced the formation of an investigative committee to focus on crime. Presumably in response to increased dissatisfaction, the government began an initiative to promote unity and national reconciliation. By the end of 1999 and into 2000, however, the government of President Compaoré faced a growing crisis of legitimacy. In December 1999, tens of thousands of people gathered in the streets of the capital to remember Norbert Zongo. In a statement, “Le Collectif” demanded that Francois Compaoré and six guards suspected of killing Zongo be arrested, tried and called for an immediate and complete reform of Burkina Faso’s justice system. The military itself, long a base of support, fractured as older officers continued to support Compaoré but younger officers became increasingly and openly critical. Labour unions held general strikes in demand of higher wages and protesting job cuts and privatization. Even soldiers called a strike demanding housing allowance arrears. On July 15, 2000 soldiers demonstrated in the main city of Ouagadougou to pressure the government for the reimbursement of withheld housing allowances but suspended their protest after receiving assurances that the matter would be settled. By late 2002 and well into 2003, Burkina Faso was accused of harbouring dissidents and supporting rebels from neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire, as that country underwent political crisis. For its part, Burkina Faso said it was simply trying to avert a humanitarian crisis and that it had a vested interest in the situation in Cote d’Ivoire, which is home to millions of Burkinabe. As the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire increased, reports of xenophobia and attacks against foreigners, such as Burkinabe, were reported. The international tensions were used by Compaoré to justify a further offensive against internal opposition. In fact, in October 2003, 12 men were arrested in connection with an alleged plot to overthrow him. Those detained included Army Captain Luther Ouali Diapragi of the Burkina Faso Trade Ministry, Reverend Pascal Israel Pare, and 10 former members of the Presidential Guard. Defense Minister Kouame Louguet was later held in connection with the plot. Immediately following the arrests it was alleged that Cote d’Ivoire and Togo had provided assistance to the accusers. The governments of both countries denied having any part in the plot. The suspected coup plotters went on trial in early April 2004. The allegations of Cote d’Ivoire’s involvement in the attempted coup only strained relations further between the two neighbours. From 2004 into 2005, the main challenge facing Burkina Faso was famine. Thanks to locusts and drought, over half a million people lost their crops in Burkina Faso during this period. Because most people of this region of Africa rely on subsistence farming, it means that the majority will have little money to purchase food. In fact, the World Food Programme (WFP), has said that over one million Burkinabe will be in need of food assistance. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many would have to sell their cattle (their most prized possessions) in order to purchase grain at inflated prices. In the first week of June 2011, authorities in Burkina Faso managed to quell an army mutiny that had been ongoing for months. The situation began in April 2011 when Ouagadougou was rocked by massive violence at the start of the military mutiny. Officers attached to the presidential security brigade reportedly went on a violent rampage, vandalizing property and attacking civilians. Heavy gunfire was also reported outside the presidential palace and there were suggestions that the president fled the scene temporarily. At issue was the government’s failure to assent to the military officers’ demands for food and housing allowances, effectively spurring months of protests, which culminated with this angry and violent military mutiny. In a separate but related development, Burkina Faso had also experienced student protests aimed at registering discontent over high commodity prices and demanding greater justice. By the middle of the month, Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaore responded to the situation by promising a set of reforms, aimed at assuaging the frustrations of various segments of society experiencing financial pressures. The president also dissolved the government, headed by Prime Minister Tertius Zongo and dismissed Dominique Djendjere as chief of the national army. President Compaore appointed Luc Adolphe Tiao as the country’s new prime minister to replace Zongo and Colonel Major Nabere Honore Traore to replace Djendjere. The new prime minister’s most pressing task was to resolve the military mutiny destabilizing the country. The efforts resulted insufficient and, by the start of June 2011, the violence was flaring again. This time, the commercial centre of the country, Bobo Dioulasso, was the site of violence. Disgruntled army officers took to streets in angry rampage, resulting in mass shootings and looting as well as the destruction of the marketplace, finally spurring the country’s elite forces to intervene and bring a halt to the chaos. The end of the outbreak of violence came at a cost as several people, including a young girl, died as a result of the exchange of gunfire between pro-government forces and rebellious army troops. However, social peace and political stabilization were apparent. The popular malaise against the President continued to mount, driven also by the echo of the Arab Springs and the revolutions against the many autocratic regimes in Africa. In 2014, the revolt reached its climax, taking the name of Burkinabé Spring. The uprising was a series of demonstrations and riots that started in October 2014 and quickly spread to multiple cities. They began in response to attempts at changing the constitution to allow President Blaise Compaoré to run again and extend his 27 years in office. Pressure for political change came from civil society and in particular from the country’s youth. In the tumultuous day on 30 October, around 1,500 protestors broke through the police line and burnt down the parliamentary building and, shortly afterwards, they occupied the national television station in Ouagadougou. The parliament was forced to cancel its session and to annul the controversial vote on constitution amendments. Under pressure from both the protestors and the military, President Compaoré dissolved the government and in the evening withdrew his proposal for a change in the constitution. At first he refused to resign from office but was forced to do so.
by the military the next day. Shortly after, he declared the state of emergency and escaped to Côte d'Ivoire with the support of President Alassane Ouattara. For the following two weeks the role of head of state was assumed by a senior military officer, Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida, vice commander of the presidential guard (Régiment de Sécurité Présidentielle, RSP), the most influential elite unit within the army. On the basis of a transitional charter that was signed by representatives of the military, political parties, traditional authorities and civil society, former diplomat Michel Kafando was appointed transitional president on 17 November and he immediately appointed Lieutenant Colonel Zida as prime minister. National elections were planned for October 2015.

After Compaoré: The struggle for stability (2014 – ongoing)

After the fall of the Compaoré regime, Burkina Faso had to face the uncertainties of the transition to democracy, a process made even more difficult by the dramatic economic situation, the loyalist regurgitations of the groups linked to the former President and the growth of jihadist subversion and of terrorist attacks. In the aftermath of the uprising against Compaoré, the military was not eager to relinquish its own grip on power. Moreover, the military appeared fully prepared and willing to show that it was now in control of the country. For the people of Burkina Faso, it was apparent that although they had successfully ousted Compaoré from power, a return to democratic and civilian governance was not likely to be secured in the immediate future. For many citizens of Burkina Faso, the actions of the military were being regarded as a betrayal of the public's trust as it exploited the power chasm. For his part, the self-declared military leader, Zida, offered contradictory statements as to whether he intended to acquiesce to the demands of the African Union. But with condemnations escalating at home from political and civil groups, and across the international community, he soon indicated that they would consult with the tribal leadership about a possible transition. A meeting between Zida and the Mogho Naba, the supreme leader of the Mossé (Burkina Faso's largest ethnic group), followed and an announcement was soon made that the armed forces would hand over power to civilians as soon as possible. By Nov. 9, 2014, following several days of negotiations between various stakeholders in the capital of Ouagadougou, a charter had been adopted outlining a transitional blueprint for Burkina Faso's return to democratic order. The plan also included provisions for the establishment of a 25-seat transitional government, whose individual members would not be able to stand for future elections, a 90-seat transitional parliament, and a pathway to fresh presidential and parliamentary elections, which would be held in 2015. Ahead of those elections, a consensus candidate would serve as interim president but banned from contesting these future elections. By 2015, the national purview was focused on the elections that were intended to return Burkina Faso to democratic order. High hopes to that end were somewhat marred by emerging tensions on the political scene. At issue was the call by Prime Minister Zida to disband Compaoré's praetorian guard, the Regiment of Presidential Security, which sowed the pot of dissonance within the presidential military service. Other issues of disagreement flaring ahead of the elections centered on the new electoral code, which shut out Compaoré loyalists who supported the ousted leader's constitutional change agenda. A court ruling in mid-2015 invalidated the electoral law, opening the door for Compaoré stalwarts to contest the forthcoming elections. But before the people or Burkina Faso could register their preferences via ballot and restore the country to democratic order, once again the country was plunged into turmoil via another irregular transition of power. In fact, on 16 September 2015 members of the Regiment of Presidential Security attempted to stage a coup d'état, detaining the country's government. Among those detained were the transitional President Michel Kafando, Prime Minister Yacouba Isaac Zida (who was also the former deputy commander of the Regiment), and numerous members of the cabinet. The general consensus was that the coup had been stimulated by the Regiment's fears that it would be locked out of the sphere of military and political power, although it was the presidential guard's very influence that had spurred the plan for its extinction in the first place. The Regiment was successful in seizing control of Ouagadougou and proclaimed the establishment of a new junta, headed by General Gilbert Diendéré, to oversee the transition to new elections. The coup leaders denounced the transitional government's electoral law, which barred supporters of Compaoré from participating in the elections, and promised to allow all prospective candidates to run. However, the junta failed to consolidate its authority across the country, and faced protests as well as intense pressure from regional leaders, and eventually from the regular army, to restore the transitional government. In the intervening days after the coup, international powers condemned both the undemocratic transfer of power and the detention of Burkina Faso's transitional executives, while protesters took to the streets to register their outrage over the turn of events. The unrest soon grew violent, with several people dying and at least 100 others wounded as a result. The African Union reacted to these developments by suspending Burkina Faso from its membership and issuing a Sept. 22, 2015 deadline by which the transitional government should be restored. Ultimately, after the regular army entered Ouagadougou to confront the Regiment, Kafando was restored as President on 23 September 2015. General elections were held in Burkina Faso on 29 November 2015. The elections were the first national elections since the 2014 uprising and the departure of President Blaise Compaoré. Congress for Democracy and Progress was banned from running a presidential candidate but was still able to participate in the parliamentary election. The presidential election was won by Roch Marc Christian Kaboré of the People's Movement for Progress, who received 53% of the vote in the first round. In January 2016, Kaboré named a new prime minister, Paul Kaba Thieba, an economist who worked for the West African central bank. However, the road to full stabilisation was dense of perils. On January 16, 2016, Islamist terrorists carried out an attack on a hotel in Ouagadougou at the Splendid Hotel, popular with Westerners and other foreign nationals. The attack went on for several hours with reports of hostages being held at the hotel and a least 20 people believed to have been killed, with several more said to
have been injured. Among the dead were six Canadians, three Ukrainians, two French nationals, and eight Burkinabe. Witnesses said that the assailants particularly targeted foreigners. In the aftermath of the attack, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed responsibility for the carnage. It was the first time Islamist Jihadist terrorists had carried out an attack in Burkina Faso, and the general consensus was that the attack may have been coordinated with Islamist Jihadists in Mali. Just as the country appeared to be edging toward more secure footing, the January 2016 terror attack struck Burkina Faso with another wave of turbulence. In October 2016, The Regiment attempted again to overthrow the government of Burkina Faso. At least 30 ex-members of the elite presidential guard planned an attack on three locations: the presidential residence, an army barracks and a prison in Ouagadougou. A new terror attack occurred in mid-August 2017 and left more than a dozen people dead and several others injured. The attack took place in Ouagadougou, with three gunmen opening fire on customers of the Hotel Bravia and the Aziz Istanbul Restaurant on Kwame Nkrumah Avenue. Suspicions rested on an al-Qaeda terror affiliate operating in the Sahel region of Africa.
1.3 Geography

Location: Burkina Faso is located in north-western Africa. It is bounded by Mali to the north and west, Niger to the northeast, Benin to the southeast, and Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Togo to the south.

Area: Burkina Faso has a total area of 274,200 sq. km, of which 273,800 is land and 400 water.

Land Boundaries: Burkina Faso has 3,611 km borders 3,611 km: Benin (386 km), Ivory Coast (545 km), Ghana (602 km), Mali (1,325 km), Niger (622 km) and Togo 131 km.

Length of Coastline: landlocked country

Maritime Claims: none

Topography: Burkina Faso’s terrain is made up of two major types of countryside. The larger part of the country is covered by a peneplain (a row plain created by protracted erosion) with, in some areas, a few isolated hills. The southwest of the country forms a sandstone massif, where the highest peak, Ténakourou, is found at an elevation of 749 metres. The massif is bordered by sheer cliffs up to 150 meters high. Burkina Faso is a relatively flat country. Its elevation extremes are a lowest point at the Mouhoun (Black Volta) River (200 m) and highest point at Ténakourou (749 m). The country owes its former name of Upper Volta to three rivers which cross it: the Black Volta (or Mouhoun), the White Volta (Nakambé) and the Red Volta (Nasinon). The Black Volta is one of the country’s only two rivers which flow year-round, the other being the Komoé, which flows to the southwest. The basin of the Niger River also drains 27% of the country's surface.

Natural Resources: Burkina Faso's natural resources include manganese, limestone, marble, phosphates, pumice, salt and gold.

Land Use: 21.93% of Burkina Faso land is arable, and 0.26% has permanent crops (2012 data)

Environmental Factors: Recurring droughts and floods are a significant natural hazard. Current environmental issues include: droughts and desertification, overgrazing, soil degradation and deforestation.
1.4 Territorial and Administrative Units

Burkina Faso is a unitary republic. It is divided into thirteen regions, forty-five provinces, and 351 departments. Since 2012, every department includes a single municipality covering all urbanized areas in the department and representing its population for local elections. Two very populated departments (Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso) are also further subdivided into arrondissements.

The thirteen regions are:

- Boucle du Mouhoun
- Cascades
- Centre
- Centre-Est
- Centre-Nord
- Centre-Ouest
- Centre-Sud
- Est
- Hauts-Bassins
- Nord
- Plateau-Central
- Sahel
- Sud-Ouest

Source: OIM, Migration au Burkina Faso : Profil migratoire 2016
1.5 Population

Burkina Faso has a population of 19 million people. About 12,000 Europeans reside in Burkina Faso, the majority of whom are French. Most of Burkina Faso's population is concentrated in the south and centre of the country, with a population density sometimes exceeding 48 inhabitants per sq. km. The proportion of children below the age of 15 in 2010 was 45.3%, 52.4% was between 15 and 65 years of age, while 2.2% was 65 years or older. Hundreds of thousands of people regularly migrate to Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire for seasonal work. The capital and largest city is Ouagadougou, with a population of 1.8 million. The median age is just under 17 years old. More than 65% of the population is under the age of 25, and the population is growing at 3% annually.

Mortality rates (11.2 deaths/1,000 population), especially those of infants and children, have decreased because of improved health care, hygiene, and sanitation, but women continue to have an average of almost 6 children. Even if fertility were substantially reduced, today's large cohort entering their reproductive years would sustain high population growth for the foreseeable future. Only about a third of the population is literate and unemployment is widespread, dampening the economic prospects of Burkina Faso's large working-age population. Urban population rate is 31.5%, with an increasing of 5.29% annually.

1.6 Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion

Ethnic Groups
Burkina Faso is a multi-ethnic country with more than 27 ethnic groups. Most ethnic groups in the southern and central parts of the country practice farming, artistry and metal work. The northern part is inhabited by the nomadic communities. The Mossi people are the largest ethnic group in the country and make up 50.2% of the entire population. They came into existence as a direct descent of the Maprussi people, and their history and establishment of the Mossi kingdom cannot be precisely determined as it had been kept as an oral tradition. The Fulani people, also known as Fula, Peul or Fulbe people constitute approximately 9.4% of the entire population. They are the largest widely spread Muslim ethnic group in Burkina Faso. They are bound together by their common language, culture, traditions, religion, and aim to spread Islam in West Africa. The Bobo people constitute 5.9% of the entire population and live in the town of Bobo-Dioulasso and its surrounding areas. Farming and agriculture form part of their day-to-day activities and act as the primary source of income. The Gurma people are also known as the Gourma or Gourmantche and constitute 5.8% of the entire population. They are mainly found in the Fada N’Gourma region in Burkina Faso, Togo, Benin, and Niger. The Mande People is an ethnic group widespread in the western part of Africa in fifteen countries. It forms 5.3% of the entire Burkina Faso’s population and speaks the Mande languages. They are majorly Sunni Islam’s but still adhere to the traditional African beliefs to some extent. Other minority groups are the Senufo, the Gurunsi, the Lobi and the Tuarag. The population of Burkina Faso has always been highly mobile. The landscape provides few natural barriers and the traditional economic activities of shifting cultivation, semi-nomadic pastoralism, and trade require some degree of migration. Today’s ethnic groups are the result of this high level mobility. Cultural exchange, assimilation and linguistic flexibility were frequently more important than cultural difference. Generally, community networks transcended ethnic boundaries; this is especially true for Fulani and Tuarag. The nation’s boundaries were inherited from the colonial powers. These had demarcated them in a sometimes arbitrary way, separating people from the same ethnic group while enclosing people without any cultural or historical affinities. In spite of this, a national identity has formed and there are currently no serious separatist movements and no major ethnic conflicts. Many of the country’s traditional societies have their own hierarchies. The Mossi society differentiates between aristocrats (Nakomse), commoners (Talse), and slaves or captives (Yemse). The Nakomse are people of power whose ancestors were horse-riding warriors and founders of the Mossi kingdoms. They were not necessarily rich in a materialistic sense, but they controlled people. They had many followers and they took slaves, which were frequently integrated into their families. The offspring of these slaves can hardly be differentiated from other people, yet their slave origin may still be remembered. In other societies too, a family’s slave origin is known; most obvious is the demarcation between nobles and slaves in the extreme north among the Tuarag. Apart from class stratification, individuals are also categorized by occupation. In the west, which is influenced by Mande tradition, blacksmiths and praise singers (Griots) form caste-like groups (Nymakallaw) and are sometimes feared for their occult powers. There are also groups of traders, the Dyula in the west and the Yarse among the Mossi, who are generally respected.

Languages
In the multilingual nation of Burkina Faso, an estimated 70 languages are spoken throughout the country. 66 of these languages are indigenous languages. Most people living in the country’s urban areas are multilingual, while the rural population uses their native languages for common activities. French is Burkina Faso’s official language. It is used in schools, the army, the media, and by people who attend school if they are not from the same ethnic group. French language was introduced in the country in 1919 during French colonial rule in the country. Mossi is the most widely spoken language of Burkina Faso, as it is spoken by nearly 40% of the country’s population. The language is spoken mainly in the central region of Burkina Faso, especially around the capital of Ouagadougou. The Fulfulde language serves as a lingua franca in many areas of Burkina Faso. The language is spoken by about 8.36% of the country's population. First language speakers of Fulfulde reside primarily in the east and north of Burkina Faso. The Mande language of Dyula is spoken in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and the Ivory Coast. Millions of people speak this language, which is an important trade language and is mutually intelligible with Bambara. The language uses Latin, Arabic, and the indigenous N’Ko script for writing. As of 2006, 4.4% of the population of Burkina Faso speak Dyula. It acts as a lingua franca in the country, and is mainly spoken in the western parts of Burkina Faso. Around 5.51% of the population of Burkina Faso speak the Gourmantche language. It is spoken as a first language by the Gurma people living mainly in the eastern parts of the country. Other languages spoken in Burkina Faso are Bissa, Dagara, Bwa, Bobo and S amo.

Religion
A tolerant country in matters of religion, Burkina Faso has no major conflicts between the religions. Approximately 45% continue to hold traditional beliefs. Burkina Faso is religiously diverse society with Islam being the dominant religion. According to recent census (2006) conducted by Government of Burkina Faso, 60.5% of the population adheres to Islam. The vast majority of Muslims in Burkina Faso are Malikele Sunni, deeply influenced with Sufism. The Shi’a branch of Islam also has small presence in the country. A significant number of Sunni Muslims identify with the Tijaniyah Sufi order. The Government also estimated that 23.2% practices Christianity (19.0% being Roman Catholic, 4.2% being Protestant), 15.3% follow Animism and African Traditional Religion. Statistics on religion in Burkina Faso are inexact, because Islam and Christianity are often practiced in tandem with African traditional religions. Islam has been strong for centuries among the Marka, Dyula, Fulani, and, since the colonial era, among the Mossi. In the last ten years, the country was affected by the grown of Wahabi interpretation of Islam, especially in the Fulani communities. A phenomenon, the latter, that influenced the ideological radicalisation of Fulani and the spread of a jihadi view among them. Christianity (12% of the population), spread by
missionaries in colonial times, is mostly rooted in the south, the
west, and among the urban elite. In traditional religion, there are
many religious offices and functions, but hardly any full-time
religious specialists. Each ethnic group has its own specialists. The
most important ones may be labelled earth priests, fortune-tellers,
rainmakers, or healers. Religious practitioners are chosen through
family tradition or because they are called by a spirit. Traditional
religion is tolerant, non-proselytizing and flexible. Witchcraft and
magic are powerful antisocial forces, but they are important in
every-day life and ensure adherence to cultural norms. The
sacrifice of chicken, guinea fowl or even bigger livestock is the
core ritual of traditional religious practice.
Burkina Faso faces numerous health challenges related to poverty, malnutrition, and inadequate hygiene and sanitation. Its health and development indicators rank among the worst in the world. Only 50% of the population has access to safe drinking water and only 40% to sanitation services of some kind. Moreover, only 5% has access to modern sanitation facilities. Only 20% of villages and livestock watering holes had modern water facilities. Burkina Faso is heavily dependent on international development organizations and foreign missionary groups for much of its health care. In 2011, health expenditures was 6.5% of GDP; the maternal mortality ratio was estimated at 300 deaths per 100,000 live births and the physician density at 0.05/1,000 population in 2010. In 2012, it was estimated that the adult HIV prevalence rate (ages 15–49) was 1.0%. Malaria and other arthropod-borne diseases are prevalent in Burkina Faso, as are a number of infectious diseases such as cholera, hepatitis, meningitis, and tuberculosis. The degree of risk for contracting major infection diseases is very high in Burkina Faso. Some of the most common food or waterborne diseases include diarrhea (bacterial and protozoal), hepatitis A, and typhoid fever, all of which pose serious threats to the communities. Dengue fever is also very common.
### Burkina Faso: WHO statistical profile

#### Distribution of causes of deaths in children under 5, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malnutrition</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other causes</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute respiratory infections</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prematurity</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diarrhoea</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth asphyxia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neonatal sepsis</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impairments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congenital anomalies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### DTP3 immunization among 1-year-olds

- 1990: 0%
- 2000: 40%
- 2010: 80%
- 2015: 90%

#### Children aged under 5 stunted

- 1990: 10%
- 2000: 20%
- 2010: 30%
- 2015: 40%

#### Utilization of health services

- Contraceptive prevalence: 100%
- Antenatal care (4+ visits): 90%
- Births attended by skilled health personnel: 80%
- Measles immunization (1+ visits): 70%
- Sore-positives TB treatment success: 60%

#### Per capita total expenditure on health

- 1990: $10
- 2000: $20
- 2010: $30
- 2015: $40

#### Adult risk factors

- Raised blood pressure (aged 25+): 2008
- Raised blood pressure (aged 25+): 2018
- Obesity (aged 25+): 2008
- Tobacco use (aged 15+): 2011

#### Population using improved water and sanitation

- Male: 10%
- Female: 9%
- 1990: 10%
- 2000: 20%
- 2010: 30%
- 2015: 40%

### Source
WHO
1.8 Education and Literacy

Burkina Faso has a 6-4-3 formal education structure. Primary school has an official entry age of six and a duration of six grades. Secondary school is divided into two cycles: lower secondary consists of grades 7 - 10, and upper secondary consists of grades 11 - 13. Basic education includes primary and lower secondary levels. "Post-primaire" refers to the lower secondary level and "secondaire" describes upper secondary level. In principle, basic education is free and compulsory. Students sit for the Certificat d Études Primaires (CEP) at the end of grade 6, the Brevet d Études du Premier Cycle (BEPC) at the end of grade 10, and the Baccalaurèat de l Enseignement Secondaire Général at the end of grade 13. Despite the efforts to improve education, the country had the lowest adult literacy rate in the world (25.3%). School conditions are usually reasonable with very basic equipment. Legally the size limit for one class is 65 students, but in many rural areas classes are much bigger because of the lack of schools. If a school is full, children may get turned away and will have to try again the next year. Following a diagnostic work carried out in 2016, the government of Burkina Faso decided to review its education sector plan (Programme sectoriel de l’éducation et de la formation - PSEF) and has developed a new one for the period of 2017-2030.
**Country Economy**

Burkina Faso is a poor, landlocked country that depends on adequate rainfall. Irregular patterns of rainfall, poor soil, and the lack of adequate communications and other infrastructure contribute to the economy’s vulnerability to external shocks. About 80% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and cotton is the main cash crop. The country has few natural resources and a weak industrial base. Cotton and gold are Burkina Faso’s key exports. Gold has accounted for about three-quarters of the country’s total export revenues. Burkina Faso’s economic growth and revenue depends largely on production levels and global prices for the two commodities. The country has seen an upswing in gold exploration, production, and exports. The fall of the Compaoré government in 2014 and failed coup in September 2015 disrupted economic activity and strained government finances. In 2015, President Kaborè was elected to office, and in 2016, the government adopted a new development strategy, set forth in the 2016-2020 National Plan for Economic and Social Development, that aims to reduce poverty, build human capital, and to satisfy basic needs. A new three-year IMF program (2018-2020), approved in 2018, will allow the government to reduce the budget deficit and preserve critical spending on social services and priority public investments. Many Burkinabè migrate to neighbouring countries for work, and their remittances provide a substantial contribution to the balance of payments. The agricultural economy remains highly vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall. The Mossi Plateau in north central Burkina Faso faces encroachment from the Sahara. The resultant southward migration means heightened competition for control of very limited water resources south of the Mossi Plateau. Most of the population ekes out a living as subsistence farmers, living with problems of climate, soil erosion, and rudimentary technology. The staple crops are pearl millet, sorghum, maize, and rice. The cash crops are cotton, groundnuts, karite (shea nuts), and sesame. Livestock, once a major export, has declined. The opening up of new industrial mines coupled with a slight rebound in gold and cotton prices and rising grain production paved the way for an acceleration of economic growth in 2016. Real GDP growth was estimated at 6.7% in 2017, up from 5.9% in 2016, due to gains in mining, higher investment in construction, a healthy commercial sector, and improvements in agriculture. The economy is projected to grow 6.6% in 2018, bolstered by a public investment program in the 2016–20 National Economic and Social Development Plan that covers energy, hydro-agricultural development, and road and telecommunications infrastructure. Higher prices for gold and cotton are also expected to boost economic performance. However, the outlook for growth depends on several sources of instability, including terrorism, adverse weather for farming, persistent social unrest, and price volatility for gold and cotton. Terrorism constitutes the most serious risk. Since 2015, Burkina Faso has suffered a series of terrorist attacks that killed more than 70 people and slowed the economic recovery. The capital Ouagadougou was struck in January 2016 and August 2017, and terrorist incidents and threats persist along the country’s northern borders with Mali and Niger. Poor-quality infrastructure, difficulty in accessing credit and a weak financial system make for a difficult business climate (146th out of 190 according to the World Bank’s 2017 Doing Business rankings).

**GDP (purchasing power parity):**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (US billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$3.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GDP growth rate:**

- 6.9% in 2017
- 6.6% projected for 2018

**Labor force:**

- 5.5 million

**Unemployment rate:**

- 7.7% in 2017

**Population below poverty line:**

- 48.3% in 2008

Source: CIA World Factbook
2. Political and Security Context
2.1 The Constitution of Burkina Faso

On the 5th of August 1960, Burkina Faso gained full independence from France and approved its first constitution. The latter provided for the election by universal suffrage of the President and the National Assembly for 5-years terms. The 1966 military coup suspended the constitution and only in June 1976 a new constitution was ratified, which established a 4-year transition period toward full civilian rule. The constitution, however, caused tensions; hence in 1977 a new constitution was approved. Following the October 1987 coup d’état, a new constitution was subscribed.

The current constitution of Burkina Faso was approved on the 2nd of June 1991 and established a semi-presidential government with a Prime Minister who is the Head of the Government and of a multi-party system, and a President who is the Head of the State. The President of the Republic is elected for a term of seven years. In 2000, however, the constitution was amended and reduced the presidential term to five years and set the term limit to two, thus preventing successive re-election. The amendment took effect during the 2005 elections. The President of Burkina Faso, who can delegate some of his powers to the Prime Minister, is elected by popular vote; while the Prime Minister is appointed by the President with the consent of the legislature. The Prime Minister directs and coordinates the governmental action and is responsible for the implementation of the policy of national defence as defined by the President. After his appointment the Prime Minister has 30 days for making a declaration of general policy before the National Assembly, which is followed by debates and the vote. Once the declaration is adopted, the Prime Minister is officially invested. The executive power is exercised by both the President and the Government; while the legislative power is in the hands of the Government and the Parliament. The Government drafts international agreements, bills and proposals of laws and regulatory texts. According to the constitution of Burkina Faso, the Parliament votes on laws, consents taxation and controls the actions of the government under the provisions of the constitution. The Parliament can be dissolved by the President of the Republic and consists of two Chambers: the National Assembly and the Senate. The Congress is the meeting of the two Chambers. The National Assembly has 111 members who are elected for a five-year term by proportional representation. Any member of Parliament can only be prosecuted or arrested in a penal or criminal matter with the authorization of at least one-third members of the chamber which they reside, with the exception of the case of in flagrante delicto. The Senate consists of representatives from local government divisions, customary and religious authorities, workers, employers, Burkinabes abroad and people appointed by the President of Burkina Faso and serve a term of six years. The Senators representing local communities are locally elected by their respective regions with universal indirect suffrage. While the Senators representing the customary and religious authorities, the workers, the employers and the Burkinabes abroad are designated by their respective structures. The constitution requires that anyone elected or appointed must be 45 years old by the day of the ballot. In May 2013, President Compaoré announced the establishment of a new Senate with 89 members, 29 of which would be selected by the president himself, and the rest appointed by local officials. The Presidents of both the Senate and National Assembly are elected for the duration of the legislation by an absolute majority of half the chamber in the first round of voting, or a simple majority in the second round. Their functions can be terminated during the course of a legislature at the demand of two-fifths and a vote of absolute majority of the members of the Assembly. Each chamber has financial autonomy, with the President of the chamber managing the credits allocated to them for the functioning of chamber.

Finally, the judiciary of Burkina Faso is independent of the executive and the legislature. Following the ousting of President Compaoré in 2014 (who tried to extend by another term the presidential mandate by amending the constitution) and the attempted coup d'état in 2015, a new constitution is being drafted. In November 2017 the draft constitution was submitted to President Kaboré for approval, following which it will either be approved by referendum or adopted by Parliament. The draft limits the presidential mandate to a maximum of two 5-year terms. Furthermore, this limit cannot be changed in any future amendment of the constitution. The Senate would be abolished and the powers of the National Assembly strengthened. Presidential powers are further reduced: the President would no longer chair the Superior Council of the Magistrature, thus resulting in increased independence of the judiciary. It also includes provisions to strengthen human rights protection, including economic, social and cultural rights, gender equality, protection for women and girls from violence, and abolition of the death penalty.
2.2 Elections

The latest general elections held in Burkina Faso took place on the 29th of November 2015. They were initially scheduled for October, however on the 16th of September, the now disbanded Regiment of Presidential Security staged a coup and held the capital for about a week. The elections represented the first national election in Burkina Faso since the 2014 Burkinabé uprising and the departure of President Compaoré (who ruled the country for 27 years). The party of the former President, the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), was not allowed to present a candidate for the presidential elections, but could participate to the parliamentary election.

The pre-election period was characterised by a controversy over a code that the legislature passed in April banning any member of the Parliament who supported the constitutional amendment to abandon term limits, from participating in the elections. The decision caused protests among the Congress for Democracy and Progress and its allied parties. Later, however, the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Court of Justice ruled against the exclusionary law, which was a violation of fundamental human rights based on a political stance. Hence, President Kafando declared he would comply with the judgment. However, a few days after, the transitional government charged Compaoré with high treason over his bid to change the constitution and run for a third term. Moreover, all government officials who supported the bid were accused of murder and assault. Such move was highly criticised as perceived as a way to exclude some candidates from running for the elections. Compaoré appealed to the Constitution Council, but his request of annulling the charges was ruled out. A total of 22 people submitted their application as presidential candidates, among them there were politicians who served under Compaoré. Notwithstanding the decision of the ECOWAS, the Constitutional Court maintained the exclusionary law and admitted 14 of the 22 candidates.

On the 16th of September 2015, the Regiment of Presidential Security, closely linked to Compaoré, detained President Kafando and Prime Minister Zida. The coup leaders announced that they were dismissing Kafando, dissolving the government and the transitional legislature, and setting up a new transitional body, the National Council for Democracy, aimed at leading the country to inclusive elections. They also denounced the transitional authorities for their undemocratic electoral law and for ignoring the recommendations of the ECOWAS. Later on it was affirmed that Compaoré was not involved in the coup, which was, instead, supported by the Army. However, on the 21st of September soldiers from the regular Army started marching towards the capital to end to coup. Given the superiority of the regular Army, the Regiment of Presidential Security surrendered: Kafando was reinstalled as President and Zida returned to his post as Prime Minister. Four days later a government decree disbanded the Regiment of Presidential Security and the political parties associated with the coup.

The electoral campaign started on the 8th of November and favoured wealthy candidates, while parties with fewer resources did not enjoy any kind of opportunity. On the 15th of December the Constitutional Council announced the official results: Kaboré (People’s Movement for Progress) won the election with 53% of the vote and he was sworn in as President on the 29th of December 2015. The National Assembly elected Salif Diallo, a leading member of the People’s Movement for Progress, as President of the National Assembly on the 30th of December.
**Burkina Faso**

**ELECTION FOR ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE**

**BURKINABÉ NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

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**RESULTS**

- Cast Votes: 3,317,193
- Valid Votes: 3,199,650
- Invalid Votes: 157,543
- Registered Voters: 5,517,015

**PARTIES:**

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Source: Election guide
2.3 Political Parties

People’s Movement for Progress (Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès, MPP)
The MPP was founded in January 2014 by former Congress for Democracy and Progress member Kaboré. He won the November 2015 general election and was appointed President of Burkina Faso. The MPP also won 55 seats in the National Assembly. The party is a member of the Socialist International and its ideology is of social democracy, progressivism and pro-democracy.

Union for Progress and Reform (Union pour le Progrès et le Changement, UPC)
The UPC was founded in 2010 by Zéphirin Diabré, after he left the ruling Congress for Democracy and Progress. It received almost 21% of the vote in the 2015 general elections, winning 33 seats. While its presidential candidate, Diabré gained the second place with 30% of the vote. The party describes itself as non-ideological, and its political position is pro-democracy.

Congress for Democracy and Progress (Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès, CDP)
The party was established in February 1996 from the merge of the Organization for Popular Democracy/Labour Movement and nine other parties supportive of it, as well as factions of the Group of Patriotic Democrats and the Burkina Socialists Bloc. From 1992, when the office of the Prime Minister was re-established, until Compaoré was ousted in 2014, all Prime Ministers of Burkina Faso were members of the CDP, along with most other national officials. Moreover, the party held the most seats in Parliament. During the CDP congress of May 2015 Komboïgo was elected as President of the CDP, while Compaoré was designated as Honorary President. Komboïgo was designated as the CDP's candidate for the presidential elections of October 2015. In the meantime, however, the party leaders were accused of being involved in the failed coup of September and Komboïgo as well as the party vice-president, Koné were arrested. Even if Komboïgo was barred from standing in the presidential elections, the CDP won 18 seats in the parliamentary election. The CDP is a left-wing political party focused on democratic socialism.

New Alliance of Faso (Nouvelle Alliance du Faso, NAFA)
The NAFA was established in January 2015 and many of its members were previously part of the Congress for Democracy and Progress. During the 2015 general elections the party received 4% of the vote, winning two seats in the national Assembly. The NAFA is a social democratic political party and its leader is Rasmané Ouédraogo.
Union for Rebirth / Sankarist Party (Union pour la Renaissance / Parti Sankariste, UNIR/PS)
The party was founded in November 2000. The name “Sankarist” appears to be a reference to both the late President of the party Thomas Sankara and its current leader Béniwèndé Stanislas Sankara. During the 2015 general elections the party received 3.8% of the vote, winning five seats in the National Assembly. The UNIR/PS is a left-wing party whose ideology is of Sankarism and socialism.

Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain)
It is a liberal political alliance consisting of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation and the former ruling party African Democratic Rally. The party stands for pluralism, equality, justice and liberty for all. It supports freedom of expression, calls for tolerance and the rule of law, condemns human rights abuses, and supports liberal economic views. It lists education, employment and individual enterprise as constituting the pillars of economic development. The party welcomes Burkinabè from all backgrounds aiming to consolidate national unity and democracy. The current leader of the party is Gilbert Noel Ouédraogo. During the 2015 general elections the party received 3.1% of the vote, winning three seats in the National Assembly.

New Era for Democracy (Nouveau Temps pour la Démocratie, NTD)
The NTD was established in March 2015 by former Minister of Urban Development Vincent Dabilgou. It is a centre-left party supporting social democracy. During the 2015 general elections the party received 2.2% of the vote, winning three seats in the National Assembly.
2.4 Key Political Leaders

Roch Marc Christian Kaboré
Mr Kaboré is the President of Burkina Faso since 2015. Born in 1957 in Ouagadougou, he started his professional career as a banker for the International Bank of Burkina. Then he began its political career as Minister, Special Adviser of the President, and Deputy in the National Assembly. In 1994 he became Prime Minister, but in 1996 he resigned and became Vice-President of the Congress for Democracy and Progress. In 2002 he was elected President of the National Assembly (until 2012) and in 2003 he became the President of the CDP. Kaboré, together with a number of other prominent figures in the CDP, announced his resignation from the party on 6 January 2014, saying that the party was being run in an undemocratic manner and opposing the plans to amend the constitution to eliminate term limits. On 25 January 2014, Kaboré founded a new opposition party, the People’s Movement for Progress. In the elections of November 2015, Kaboré won in the first round of voting, receiving 53.5% of the vote. He was sworn in as President on 29 December 2015.

Zéphirin Diabré
Mr Diabré served in the Government of Burkina as Minister of Finance during the 1990s. He was elected member of the Parliament under the banner of the Organization for Popular Democracy-Labour Movement, but gave up his seat to his deputy to occupy respectively the positions of Minister of Trade, Industry and Mines (1992-1994), ministers of the Economics and Finance (1994-1996), President of the Economic and Social Council (1996-1997). After years of changing his career path (he was a researcher at the Harvard University, deputy general manager of United Nations Development Programme, and then Africa and Middle East director of the AREVA group), in March 2010 he created the UPC, an opposition political party that advocates democratic change in Burkina Faso. Mr Diabré stood as a candidate in the November 2015 presidential election, placing second. He is an economist: he holds a doctorate in management sciences from the Faculty of Economics and Management of Bordeaux, France.

Bénéwendé Sankara
Twice unfortunate candidate for the presidential elections of 2005 and 2010 against Blaise Compaoré, Mr Sankara has long been described as an "advocate of lost causes" in Burkina. He was indeed the defender of student strikers persecuted by the former power and got himself involved in the case of Norbert Zongo, a journalist murdered in 1998 while investigating the disappearance of the driver of François Compaoré, younger brother of President Compaoré. He was also the lead advisor in the iconic Thomas Sankara case, re-opened in late March 2015 after two decades of politico-legal battles. He was the candidate of the Sankarist coalition during the November 2005 elections, and placed himself 3rd with 2.77% of the vote.

Tahirou Barry
Mr Barry is a lawyer and the President of the Renaissance Nationale party. Born in Gagnoa in the Ivory Coast, he grew within the ranks of his party from 1999 and then took the lead in 2002. After some journalistic experiences, Tahirou Barry became the Director of Personnel at the University of Ouagadougou, a position he held for three years before joining a mining company where he currently holds the position of chief of staff. As a candidate of his party during the 2005 presidential elections, he placed himself 3rd with 3.09% of the vote.
Blaise Compaoré
He was the President of Burkina Faso from 1987 to 2014. He was born in Ouagadougou, he then reached the rank of captain in the Voltaic Army and eventually met Thomas Sankara in 1976 in a training centre in Morocco, with who he became close friend. Under Sankara's leadership (which lasted from 1983 to 1987) Compaoré was his deputy and a member of the National Revolutionary Council. He served as Minister of State at the Presidency and subsequently as Minister of State for Justice. Compaoré took power on 15 October 1987 in a coup during which Sankara was killed, and he overturned the Marxist policies pursued by Sankara. Compaoré won the elections in 1991, 1998, 2005 and 2010 (which were considered to have taken place under unfair circumstances). In June 2014 Compaoré’s ruling party, the CDP, asked him to organize a referendum that would allow him to alter the constitution in order to seek re-election in 2015. Such move caused many protests and led to the 2014 Burkinabé uprising. Compaoré reacted to the events by shelving the proposed constitutional changes, dissolving the government, declaring a state of emergency, and offering to work with the opposition to resolve the crisis. Later on, the military announced that it would install a transitional government in consultation with all parties and that the National Assembly was dissolved. On 31 October 2014, Compaoré resigned and fled to the Ivory Coast.

Paul Kaba Thieba
He is the Prime Minister of Burkina Faso since 2016, when he was appointed by President Kaboré, shortly after he took office. He faced his first test as Prime Minister when Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb militants attacked the Hotel Splendid in Ouagadougou on 15 January 2016: over 30 people were freed and more than 20 people died. In February 2017, during a cabinet reshuffle, the size of Thieba's government was slightly expanded, from 29 to 32 ministers. Before becoming Prime Minister, Thieba worked at the central Bank of West African States (since 1998 until 2014) and the West African Monetary Union (since February 2014 until January 2016).
2.5 Media Landscape and Civil Society

**Media Landscape**
Burkina Faso has about 150 radios and TV stations plus a number of newspapers and news websites. Radio is the most popular medium and the state broadcaster ‘Radiodiffusion Television du Burkina (RTB)’ operates alongside dozens of private and community radio stations. For what concerns foreign outlets, the BBC (99.2 FM in Ouagadougou), Voice of America and Radio France Internationale run full-time relays. Around 1.9 million people have internet access, around 10% of the population, as of 2016.

- Press outlets: Sidwaya (official daily), Le Pays (private, daily), L’Observateur Paalga (private).
- Television: Television Nationale du Burkina (state-run).
- Radio stations: Radio Burkina (state-run), Ouaga FM (private), Horizon FM (private), Radio Pulsar (private).
- News agency/websites: Agence d’Information du Burkina (official agency), Burkina 24 (news site).

According to Freedom House, the environment for media in Burkina Faso has improved since mass protests in 2014 brought an end to former president Blaise Compaoré’s 27 years in power. Since then, defamation has been decriminalized, reporters at the public broadcaster have experienced less political interference, and self-censorship among journalists has eased. Nevertheless, journalists experience pressure from government officials and the economic environment for media workers remains difficult. To cite an example, in September 2015, the transitional government adopted legislation that abolished prison sentences for libel and other press offenses, but prescribed fines of up to 3 million CFA francs for offenses. The official media regulatory agency, the High Council of Communication, is nominally independent. However, of its nine members, six are state appointees and only three are drawn from professional media groups, giving the government outsized influence over media regulation. While political interference at state-owned outlets has decreased since the end of Compaoré’s regime, journalists still experience pressure from officials. In July 2016, the Autonomous Syndicate of Information and Culture Workers condemned Communications Minister Rémis Fulgance Dandjinou for saying that journalists at state media not supportive of the government should resign, and that public broadcasts should prioritize coverage of state officials.

**Civil Society**
The constitution provides for the right to assemble, nonetheless demonstrations have often been suppressed or banned. In October 2015, Amnesty International reported that the Regiment of Presidential Security members fired on civilian protesters and bystanders during the unrest that accompanied the failed coup, killing 14 people and injuring hundreds more. While many nongovernmental organizations operate openly and freely, human rights groups have reported abuses by security forces.

The constitution guarantees the right to strike, and unions frequently and freely engage in strikes and collective bargaining. Although only a minority of the work force is unionized, unions play an important role in the politics of the country and have used general strikes to effectively shut down the public sector.
2.6 Security Sector

Burkina Faso, especially in the Northern territory, has seen a rapid deterioration of the security situation starting from late 2016 – early 2017. In fact, many attacks have been carried out in the area: targeted killings, assassination attempts, village and school incursions, and complex attacks against the Army or the police. The Ansarul Islam group is suspected to be behind most of the recent attacks. Ansarul Islam is a new armed group, a splinter cell of the Macina Liberation Front, linked to the Ansar al-Din movement in Mali, first known in December 2016 when it claimed responsibility for the attack on the Nassombou military base in Burkina Faso, which resulted in the death of 12 soldiers. It is formed mainly by Fulani militia men. The increase in threats and attacks has caused fear across the region and led to the closure of over 600 schools in Oudalan and Soum provinces. Insecurity is also impacting access to other social services such as health, food security and protection. More recently, in March 2018, the Nusrat al-Islam (Group to Support Islam and Muslims, GSIM) carried out a series of simultaneous attacks (gunfire and explosions) on the military headquarters of Burkina Faso and the French Embassy in the capital; killing dozens of people, and injuring other 90.

In recent years, Burkina Faso has experienced a surge in terrorist attacks and in the presence of terrorist armed groups based elsewhere in the wider Sahel region. This trend involves the whole region and has a cornerstone in the rise of GSIM, which was officially created in March 2017.

The GSIM is part of the global al-Qaeda network and can be likened to a “jihadist cartel” – with reference to Central and South-American drug cartels – in that it brings together and coordinates the activities of the Saharan brigade of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM · BS), the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), Ansar al-Din (The protectors of the Faith) and al-Mourabitun (the Sentinels). Ansar al-Din, born in 2012 on the side-lines of the Malian civil war, is the reference group for the Tuareg of the whole region. Moreover, thanks to the parental bonds and the tribal identity, Ansar al-Din has capillary contacts with the passeurs (smugglers of migrants) and with political and military leaders of non-jihadist Tuareg insurgency organizations. The MLF, formed in 2015 and active between Mali and Burkina Faso, regroups Fulani ethnic militia in the central-western part of the Sahel and is led by spiritual leader Amadou Kouffia and military commander Abou Yehiya. Just like Ansar al-Din, the MLF also exploits tribal networks and parental affiliations to control a large slice of territory between the southwest of Niger (Tillaberi and Tahoua regions), the north of Burkina Faso and the Malian districts. south of Gao. Unlike the groups mentioned so far, al-Mourabitun does not have a strong ethnic connotation, but rather welcomes Tuareg, Hausa, Fulani, Berbers and Arabs.

Overall, the growth of terrorist movements in the Sahara-Sahel region emerged from a mix of interconnected economic, political and social factors. First, extremist groups show the ability to create a financing system based on the control of illegal trafficking (drugs, weapons, archaeological assets, ivory, precious materials, human beings) and on the direct taxation of activities (livestock, agriculture, fishing, trade). Second, they have been building a strongly territorialized model of power, based on the direct administration of rural areas and villages under their control. The territorialisation process is fostered by the weakness of political institutions and the co-optation of discriminated ethnic groups’ agendas. Finally, terrorist networks have successfully established a welfare and education system which are often more effective than state services. This has been done exploiting the revenues of illegal trafficking.

The level of insecurity in the country is also worsened by two other factors: the presence of crime and possible scams. Across Burkina Faso there is the risk of armed groups stopping vehicles (including public buses) on major roads to rob them, particularly at night. Moreover, street crime poses high risks; most incidents involve snatchers of purses, wallets, jewellery and other valuables. Thieves are particularly active in crowds and in the areas near the UN Circle and the former Central Market in Ouagadougou. For what concerns scams, they come in many forms: friendship, business ventures, work and employment opportunities. Scams and fraud can pose great financial risk to the victims.

Finally, external threats also pose a menace to the country’s security scenario. Indeed, regional instability has contributed in the past to growing tensions between Burkina Faso and its neighbours. The most remarkable example concerns Burkina Faso’s border zones, which host rebel fighters from Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as refugees caught in the crossfire of regional conflicts. The rebel presence worsened relations with Côte d’Ivoire as its government accused Burkina Faso of supporting the insurgents. A rebel presence, though residual, can still be found in certain border areas.
3. Law enforcement structures and actors
3.1 The Police

National Police (Police Nationale du Burkina Faso)
The National Police of Burkina Faso is accountable to the Minister of Administration, Decentralization and Security. It has both administrative and judicial police powers, and it conducts criminal investigations. The National Police, in fact, is responsible for:

- ensuring the application of measures related to the maintenance of public order and peace;
- ensuring the execution of measures related to the security of the State and the institutions;
- ensuring the implementation of measures related to the safety of people and property;
- organizing the collection of intelligence for the government in the political, economic, social and cultural fields throughout the country;
- ensuring relationships with the policies of other countries.

The National Police shares some of these missions with other security services in Burkina Faso, including the Gendarmerie and the Municipal Police. The Director General of the National Police is responsible for the execution of the missions assigned to the National Police, and as such, he directs and coordinates the overall action of the National Police. He is also the head of INTERPOL’s national central office in Burkina Faso and he is assisted by a Police Commissioner.

Municipal Police (Police Municipale)
The Municipal Police directly answers to the mayor of a town, it enforces law and order, but do not have investigative powers. It maintains close links with the National Police (the latter provides training and administrative support) and they are often called to operate side by side. Moreover, the Municipal Police sometimes works with the Gendarmerie as well. The Police Municipale was firstly created in 1977 and then abolished in January 1984. It was then re-established in August 1998. All communes in Burkina Faso can decide whether to organise a municipal police.
3.2 Other security forces

**National Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale Burkinabè)**

The National Gendarmerie is a military public security force that acts under the authority of the Minister of Defence. Its missions and its organization are modelled on those of the French National Gendarmerie. The National Gendarmerie is responsible for:

- ensuring public safety;
- ensuring the enforcement of laws and regulations;
- ensuring the maintenance of order.

In the event of a state of siege or war, it participates in the operational defence of the territory under the authority of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

The National Gendarmerie is organised as follows:

- The general staff is the central organ of command and administration. It is led by a general officer or a senior officer of the Gendarmerie, he takes the title of Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie and is assisted by a general officer or a senior officer of the Gendarmerie called Assistant Chief of Staff.
- The gendarmerie region is a decentralized entity, headed by a Commander of the Region appointed by decree. The Regional Commander is assisted by a deputy appointed under the same conditions. There are three regions of the Gendarmerie:
  - 1st Gendarmerie Region with Kaya command post,
  - 2nd Gendarmerie Region, Bobo-Dioulasso Command Post,
  - 3rd Gendarmerie Region, Ouagadougou command post.

**Prison Guards**

They answer to the Minister of Justice and detain both civilian and military prisoners.

**Regiment of Presidential Security (Régiment de la Sécurité Présidentielle, RSP)**

The RSP was the secret service organization responsible for the security of the President of Burkina Faso, and it was autonomous from the Army. The elite unit was well known for its frequent involvement in the politics of the country, acting as the iron fist of President Compaoré. Apparently, many people in the country feared them. In November 2014, Lieutenant Colonel Zida (deputy commander of the RSP) briefly took over as Acting President following Compaoré's ouster. Later, he was appointed Prime Minister. On 16 September 2015, after its disbandment was recommended, the RSP staged another coup that took President Kafando and Prime Minister Zida hostages. The Army stepped in and Kafando was reinstated. The RSP was then disbanded on the 25th of September 2015.
3.3 The judiciary

According to the constitution of Burkina Faso, the judicial power is independent, confided in the judges and exercised on all the territory of the country by the jurisdictions of the judicial and administrative order, which are:

- the Court of Cassation (the superior jurisdiction of the judicial order),
- the Council of State (the superior jurisdiction of the administrative order),
- the Court of Accounts (the superior jurisdiction of control of public finances),
- the Tribunal of Conflicts (the jurisdiction of regulation of the conflicts of competence between the jurisdictions),
- the courts and tribunals instituted by the law.

The President of Burkina Faso is the guarantor of the independence of the judicial power and is assisted by the Superior Council of the Magistrature (SCM). The President of Burkina Faso is also the President of the Superior Council of the Magistrature. However, a draft amendment to the constitution, submitted to the President in late 2017, stipulates that the President chairs no more the Supreme Council, resulting in further guarantees of independence for the judiciary. The SCM makes proposals on the appointments and assignments of the presiding magistrates of the Court of Cassation, the Council of State and the Court of Accounts. The High Court of Justice is composed of Deputies that the National Assembly elects after each general renewal. It is competent to take cognizance of the acts committed by the President of Burkina Faso in the exercise of his functions and constituting high treason, of infringing the Constitution or of misappropriation of public funds. The High Court of Justice is equally competent to judge the members of the Government for acts qualified as crimes or misdemeanours committed in the exercise of their functions. In all other cases, they remain justiciable by the jurisdictions of common law and of the other jurisdictions. The impeachment of the President of Burkina Faso is voted by a majority of four-fifths of the votes of the Deputies composing the Assembly. Burkina Faso also has an Economic and Social Council, which is a consultative organ responsible for giving its opinion on the questions of economic, social and cultural character, brought to its attention by the President or the Government.

Even if the judiciary is formally independent, it has historically been subject to executive influence and corruption. The courts are further weakened by a lack of resources and the citizens’ lack of awareness of their rights. Moreover, discrimination against ethnic minorities occurs, but is not widespread.
4. Migrations and Human Rights Issues
4.1 Internal and International Migration

Burkina Faso is mainly a country of emigration, especially directed towards the countries of the West African sub-region such as Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Mali. This traditional pattern is generally labour-driven, was amplified by the colonial period and still continues today. However, recent political crises in the host countries have led to new trends. The destinations of Burkinabe emigrants have diversified, Côte d’Ivoire still being the main destination but others competing destinations and other migratory networks emerging. Besides, these crises sparked an important movement of return, and the traditionally negative net migration rate was even reversed at certain times.

In terms of immigration flows, Burkina Faso can be characterised as a country of transit for migrants from Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal travelling through Niger towards Algeria, Libya, and eventually to European countries. In fact, due to its geographical position, Burkina Faso is a West African crossroad between coastal countries and land-locked countries. The Government of Burkina Faso faces several challenges relating to the management of large flows of incoming and outgoing migrants including both regular and irregular migrants with concomitant challenges such as counter-trafficking, migration and development, migration and health, border management. Most foreign victims of trafficking are children from countries of the region, such as Benin, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, and Nigeria. Malian children are also trafficked through Burkina Faso into Côte d’Ivoire. According to the U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 2013, women from other West African countries, including Nigeria, Togo, Benin, and Niger, are fraudulently recruited for employment in Burkina Faso and subsequently subjected to situations of forced prostitution, forced labour in restaurants, or domestic servitude in private homes.

The prolonged crisis in Mali caused a refugee influx in Burkina Faso. Recently, increased insecurity in Mali, in most of the return zones, is preventing refugees to return to their country of origin. At the same time, the security environment in the Sahel region is rapidly deteriorating and there is a possibility that Malian refugees will spontaneously relocate to safer areas. The refugee population in Burkina Faso is composed of a mix of Malians and other nationalities. Some 32,000 Malian refugees are living in the Sahel region, mainly in the camps of Mentao and Goudebou in the northern and more rural part of the country, and a further 8,800 Malians are living out of camps in the Sahel region and in other urban settings. The terrorist attacks and other security incidents that the country has experienced since 2016 have led to the stigmatization of Malian refugees by the host communities, especially in the Sahel. Other challenges include poor food security perspectives for Malian refugees in the Sahel region and political challenges, such as regular strikes and sit-ins.

Violence in the Sahel region flared up in 2017 due to activities of Ansarul Islam and other criminal groups, leading to an upsurge in new displacements. According to OCHA, there are at least 4,700 Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs), but this figure could be highly underestimated.
4.2 Human Rights Situation

Universal and regional human rights instruments ratified

In 2017, a draft Constitution was submitted to the President for approval, following which it will either be approved by referendum or adopted by Parliament. It included provisions to strengthen human rights protection, including economic, social and cultural rights, gender equality, protection for women and girls from violence, abolition of the death penalty, and to increase the independence of the judiciary.

Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity
The main threat to life and security in Burkina Faso come from internal militia-style armed groups and insurgent / jihadist groups based abroad but able to carry out cross-border attacks. The self-defence militia called “Kogleweogo”, mainly comprising farmers and cattle breeders, continues to commit human rights abuses including beatings and abductions, despite the Justice Minister’s pledge in December 2016 to regulate the militia’s activities. Recently, armed groups carried out attacks close to the Mali and Niger border, killing dozens of civilians, and in the capital in March 2018. They also attacked police and military personnel, expats, and foreign embassies.

According to Amnesty International, detainees at MACO prison in Ouagadougou complained of torture and other ill-treatment, mainly during arrest or in police custody, often in order to extract confessions. Several prisoners said they were held in custody for over two weeks without charge.

Arbitrary and illegal detention and enforced disappearances
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention and provide for the right of persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but security forces do not always respect these provisions. According to international human rights organizations (IHROs), during a cross-border operation near the border with Mali in June 2016, soldiers detained approximately 74 men, ages 20 to 70. The soldiers accused the men of supporting the Burkina Faso armed group Ansaroul Islam, which also had bases in Mali. In December 2017 the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention called on the authorities in Burkina Faso to release former Ministry of Security Djibril Yipéné Bassolé, who was arrested in September 2015 after the failed coup.

There is a heightened threat of kidnapping in northern parts of Burkina Faso and near the borders with Mali and Niger. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have stated their intention to kidnap foreigners and may cross the borders from Mali and Niger to carry out kidnappings.

Accountability for Human Rights Violations
According to several IHROs, the findings of an investigation into the attempted coup in September 2015 were referred to the Indictments Division for a decision. At least 106 people - including 40 civilians, one of whom was a foreign national – were charged, including with threatening state security, crimes against humanity and murder during the coup attempt. More than 20 of them remained in detention at the end of the year.

Despite the government's recent legislative efforts to strengthen human rights protection, there is still limited government action to hold accountable those responsible for violence against women and children, including female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and early marriage. According to Amnesty International, no progress was made towards implementing the government’s pledge in 2016 to increase the legal marriage age of girls and women. Over 50% of girls between 15 and 17 were married in the Sahel region in the north of the country. Rates of female genital mutilation continue to lessen although it remains widespread despite being outlawed.

Religious Freedom
The constitution states the country is a secular state, and both it and other laws provide for the right of individuals to choose and change their religion and to practice the religion of their choice. The ethics commission of the High Council of Communication (CSC), the governmental body in charge of regulating media, summoned and questioned officials of the Al Houda and Femina FM radio stations in August 2016 for content it stated was undermining the principle of religious tolerance. According to the CSC, Al Houda and Femina FM broadcast offending sermons. The spread of attacks carried out since 2016 by terrorist groups in other Sahel countries risks contributing to worsening relations between Muslim and Christian communities in the country, since these terrorist organizations’ propaganda aims at exacerbating ethnic-religious tensions. In fact, in 2017 armed men went to several schools in the north and threatened teachers to make them adopt Islamic teaching.
Consequently, hundreds of schools closed, including in Soum, Oudalan and Loroum.

_Death Penalty_
Burkina Faso is a _de facto_ abolitionist state. The year of last known execution is 1988. Although current Burkinabé law allows executions by shooting, a constitutional reform is under scrutiny that contains a provision abolishing death penalty. 12 people are known to be under sentence of death at the end of 2017.
5. The UN and Burkina Faso
The United Nations has a consolidated presence in the country, which dates back to the 1960s. In 1960 the then Upper Volta applied for and obtained UN membership together with several other African countries in the Sahel region. From the beginning, the role of the UN has been focused on the main vulnerabilities of the country, which derive from a complex mix of factors. A key factor is pertaining to the country's history and to the legacy of French colonization, which did not leave those social-political structures and those investments in infrastructure and basic services that can be found in other countries emerging from the French colonial experience in sub-Saharan Africa such as Senegal and Chad. A second factor relates to the geographic and climatic characteristics of the country, which is particularly affected by extreme weather phenomena which affect the entire Sahelian area with recurrence, such as drought and famine. In particular, a severe drought in the late 1960s deeply affected Burkina Faso’s economy, agriculture (it even disrupted the production of the drought-resistant sorghum and millet), livestock and human population. For these reasons, several UN offices and branches started to work in the country during that period. UNICEF began to provide assistance to Republic of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) in 1961 following a Framework Agreement between the Government of Upper Volta and the United Nations Children's Fund. This assistance, coordinated and executed from the Regional Office in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) touched the following intervention areas: health, social services, education and rural water supply. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is present in Burkina Faso since 1966. It seeks to forge partnerships at all levels of society and promote the country's resilience. A specific focus on issues related to health, education, standard of living and empowerment of local communities has been involving several UN agencies in Burkina Faso to date. In fact, according to the UNDP Human Development Report 2016 Burkina Faso’s Human Development Index (HDI) value for 2015 is 0.402, which puts the country in the low human development category and positions it at 185 out of 188 countries and territories. However, when the value is discounted for inequality (IHDI index), the HDI falls to 0.267, a loss of 33.6 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices. Besides, in recent years regional security has become a growing concern, as referred to in UN Security Council resolution 2056 (2012) and the UN Integrated Regional Strategy for the Sahel. Accordingly, Burkina Faso has increased its efforts by participating in the peacekeeping mission MINUSMA (Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali) and broadening the role of UNODC in the country. The UN following agencies are active in Burkina Faso:

- the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
- the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF);
- the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA);
- the International Organization for Migration (IOM);
- the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR);
- the World Health Organization (WHO);
- the International Labour Organization (ILO);
- the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/ AIDS (UNAIDS);
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);
- the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC);
- International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD);

Also active are UN related organizations, such as:

- the International Monetary Fund (IMF);
- the World Bank;
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

Burkina Faso supported and obligated itself to implement the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals approved by the UN General Assembly, as well as the Sustainable Development Goals. As of March 2018, the country participates in several UN peacekeeping missions: MINUSMA, UNAMID, MINUSCA, MONUSCO, MINUJUSTH, and UNISFA.

Blueprint for collaboration between UN and Burkina Faso

5.1 The UN and the 2014-15 political crisis

From October 2014 to December 2015, Burkina Faso underwent one of the most eventful periods in its post-independence history. After 27 years in power, the departure of President Blaise Compaoré ushered in the establishment of a transitional regime, peaceful presidential and legislative elections. This twist of events carried high expectations for the new government to deliver on commitments made during the transition, that reflect the new social contract and restore confidence. The most prominent commitments are related to the reform and renewal of the justice system, reconciliation and national unity, and the effective application of transparency/anti-corruptions measures. High expectations called for participatory, inclusive approaches to governance based on rule of law, that are captured in the popular slogan "plus rien ne sera comme avant" (things will never be the same again).

Since the very beginning of the crisis, the UN called for all parties to try and solve the situation through a solution in line with the national constitution. In fact, proposed constitutional changes that led to the outbreak of the crisis would have allowed President Compaoré another five years in power. In the following months, the UN closely followed the situation, maintaining a constant dialogue and coordination with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. These were the foremost international organizations involved in mediating between factions.

In November 2014, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon congratulated the people of Burkina Faso on the consensus adoption of a Charter of the Transition, which provided the legal framework for a civilian-led transition, eventually culminating in elections in November 2015.

Following a coup d'état September 2015 in Burkina Faso, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned in the strongest terms the ongoing crisis in the country. He called for all Burkinabé officials under detention to be released immediately and demanded the resumption of the country's political transition, in accordance with Burkina Faso's Constitution and Transitional Charter. Kafando was reinstalled as President at a ceremony on 23 September in the presence of ECOWAS leaders. On 24 September, in a statement (SC/12057-AFR/3215), the members of the UN Security Council commended the engagement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Heads of State and Government, as well as the efforts of the African Union, in supporting a solution to the crisis and restoring constitutional order in Burkina Faso. In the same statement, the Council members also reiterated their full support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, Mohamed Ibn Chambas. The members of the Security Council urged all actors in Burkina Faso to refrain from any violence and commended those who had exercised restraint in this regard. They called for the resumption of the transition without delay, including the holding of free, fair and credible elections, in accordance with the Constitution and Transitional Charter of Burkina Faso.

In December 2015, following the inauguration of Burkina Faso's new president, the UN Secretary-General stated that the event marked a significant development for the whole sub-Saharan Sahel region on the path away from tension and disputed elections. He then also commended the opposition for their prompt acceptance of the election results. Ban highlighted the country's many priorities and challenges, including an inclusive national reconciliation process and security sector reform. The Secretary-General pledged continued UN commitment to supporting the country along the path of peace, democratic governance and equitable socioeconomic development.
6. The EU – Burkina Faso Relations
6.1 A key strategic partner in the Sahel region

The EU - Burkina Faso relations date back to 1959. The attention of the European institutions has been concentrated on the African continent since the very beginning of the emergence of common institutions. Specifically, relations with the West African region in which Burkina Faso is geographically included were regulated through the Yaoundé Agreements (1963-1974), the Lomé Conventions (1975-1996), and the Cotonou Agreement (2000), also known as the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. The latter is expected to remain in force until 2020 and was revised twice in 2005 and 2010. The Cotonou Agreement, coupled with the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), is the primary basis for relations between EU and Burkina Faso. Relations are backed by regular political dialogue, as provided for in Article 8 of the Cotonou ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. This political dialogue addresses the different aspects of development, including policies on peace-building, security, conflict prevention and resolution, regional cooperation, respect for human rights, democratic principles based on the rule of law and open and responsible management of public affairs.

The strengthening of relations through the abovementioned tools has allowed the EU to play a more prominent role in the political dynamics of the region and of the country. In fact, the EU was supporting Burkina Faso during recent crisis situations, such as in the failed coup of 15 September 2015 and in terrorist attacks in January 2016 and March 2018. In such cases, the EU and its countries have worked towards helping the country get back to a normal situation. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Mogherini strongly condemned the attempted coup, which has been deemed as an unacceptable attack on the ongoing process of transition. The EU has actively supported the transition period and the electoral process in 2015 and 2016. The EU contributes to the GISAT-BF (International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso), and to the G5 Sahel force in the domain of fighting terrorism in the West African region. A major part of the EU funding is allocated to governance in support of the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) for Burkina Faso, the promotion of good governance in its different aspects, the rule of law, and democratic, financial and local governance.

Trade

According to the conclusions of the Fourth EU-Africa Summit for Heads of State and Government, held on 2-3 April 2014 in Brussels, the EU considers trade and investment with Burkina Faso as ways of reducing poverty and promoting economic and social development. In Burkina Faso, the EU Delegation is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Regional Indicative Programme, which aims to strengthen regional integration notably by boosting trade relations between countries in the sub-region and between the EU and the sub-region. This should enable the West African region (WAEMU and ECOWAS) to increase its trading activities in the region and to be competitive in global trade. The smooth integration of West African countries into the global economy is in fact a major priority on the regional agenda.

Overall, West Africa is the EU's largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa. The EU is West Africa's biggest trading partner. The EU is the main export market for West African transformed products (fisheries, agribusiness, textiles, etc.), while West Africa's exports to the EU consist mainly of fuels and food products and its imports from the EU consist of fuels, food products, machinery, and chemicals and pharmaceutical products. EU – West Africa trade in services is expanding, covering notably transportation and logistics, travel, and business services. West Africa is the most important investment destination for the EU in Africa. In 2010, ACP countries represented 4.7 % of the EU's foreign trade, equivalent to some 134 billion euros (export and import).

Commercial trade between the EU’s 28 countries and Burkina Faso is still unfortunately somewhat limited. The total volume of imports and exports with Burkina Faso in 2010 only came to 526.5 million euros. Similarly, the EU remains the main trade partner for Burkina Faso, accounting for more than 32 % of its foreign trade.

Locally, several initiatives are being undertaken by the EU Delegation to Burkina Faso with a view to promoting commercial trade and investments:

- Creation of a group of trade and investment advisers (GCCI) to develop economy-development synergies.
- Set-up of an advisory working group (GTC) for trade and investment opportunities with/in the EU.
6.2 Humanitarian aid and financial cooperation

In Burkina Faso, the European Commission's humanitarian aid service is represented by an office and staff responsible for monitoring projects and the situation in the country. The office is located within the EU Delegation in Ouagadougou and is assisted from time to time by the Regional Office of Dakar, in specific technical fields (nutrition, health, food assistance, water and sanitation, etc.). ECHO is continuing its funding for projects in the areas of health, nutrition, food security and support for refugees and dealing with other humanitarian crises. ECHO’s strategy for combating malnutrition was introduced in 2005 in the Sahel, following the serious food crisis in Niger. Since then, ECHO has been committed to fighting this scourge in other countries in the sub-region with the highest malnutrition rates, exceeding the alert thresholds of 10% of children under 5 years of age and sometimes the emergency thresholds of 15%: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Nigeria and north Togo. The EU has allocated 200 million euros for humanitarian aid in Burkina Faso since 2007.

ECHO has helped intensify efforts to care for children suffering from severe malnutrition, with 127,000 children looked after in 2014. In Burkina Faso, this help also aims to reduce malnutrition rates over the long term throughout all Sahel countries. Apart from curative care, ECHO funds malnutrition prevention activities including through a range of community actions such as testing, cooking advice and social welfare. Major efforts are also undertaken to promote access to healthcare for the most vulnerable, by funding subsidies for caring for children under 5 years of age as well as pregnant and breastfeeding women. In a bid to break the vicious cycle of food crises, the EU strives to tie in its emergency humanitarian aid with its development aid. It has notably been a driving force behind the creation of AGIR, a global alliance including 17 countries from West Africa, sponsors and the aid community, the goal being to end hunger in the region by 2032.

Cooperation between the EU and Burkina Faso has continued to strengthen over recent decades. The following ambitious objectives are being set in accordance with Article 1 of the Cotonou ACP-EU Partnership Agreement:

- economic and social development;
- smooth and gradual integration of the country into the global economy;
- poverty reduction as part of sustainable development, in accordance with international goals, notably taking account of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Cooperation between the EU and Burkina Faso works towards achieving these objectives, at the same time enhancing its effectiveness by focusing on the following:

- Improvement in the coordination and harmonisation of the aid provided by the different donors.

The EU has been supporting civil society in Burkina Faso for several years now, with a view to in particular strengthening its capacities (developing structures, benefiting from experiences and good practices, consultation between civil society organizations and with the decentralised or regional government, and consultation among organizations themselves). Throughout the 2014-2020 period, the EU is providing support to Burkina Faso’s civil society through the three sectors of focus in the National Indicative Programme (governance; health; food and nutrition security; sustainable agriculture and water), in an indicative amount of €21 million euros.

The EU is a member of the Alliance for the Sahel, launched and signed by the EU, France and Germany in July 2017. It is currently composed of 9 members: France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, the EU, UNDP, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the World Bank. It aims to coordinate and deliver aid quicker and more efficiently in the region. It will have a particular focus on peripheral, cross border and fragile zones of the Sahel. Since its launch, the Sahel Alliance has identified priority six priority areas: youth employment; rural development, agriculture and food security; climate, notably energy access, green energy and water; governance; support for return of basic services throughout the territory, including through decentralisation; security.

Overall, EU support to Burkina Faso involves: the European Development Fund with 628 million euros (2014-2020) to support for good governance, health, food security, agriculture, water, employment, culture, sustainable energy, public services, including budget support; the EU Trust Fund for Africa with 154.5 million euros (since 2016) plus regional projects; humanitarian aid with 6.5 million euros (2017).
6.3 EU – Burkina Faso security cooperation

Over the last few decades the EU has invested heavily in the Sahel. One of the vehicles to promote development is the EU Sahel Strategy, which is focused on the development-security nexus and hinges on four pillars for its implementation, including migration and mobility and border management, and the fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime. The EU Sahel strategy is implemented via the Regional Action Plan. The Plan is complemented by other initiatives that concern security issues. These include the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative; the G5 Sahel; the Bamako ministerial platform of the UN, African Union, World Bank, and EU to coordinate the Sahel strategies; the Nouakchott Process launched in 2013 to promote collective security in the region under African Union auspices; and the revitalization of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to tackle common border issues, taking into account the increased threat to the Sahel region from terrorist organizations’ activities.

As mentioned above, the EU actively promoted and is financially supporting the creation and deployment on the ground of the G5 Sahel force. The G5 Sahel is an institutional framework of Group five Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad) created in February 2014. Its headquarters are in Mauritania. The G5 Sahel aims to guarantee conditions of development and security in the space of the member countries, offer a strategic intervention framework to improve the living conditions of the population and promote inclusive and sustainable regional development. The peculiarity of G5 Sahel is the creation of a Defence and Security Committee, which is the body that brings together the Chiefs of Defence Staff and those responsible for security issues by the Member States. The issue of security is crucial for the G5 Sahel agenda. So crucial to push the member states to create a joint military force. The G5 Sahel Cross-Border Joint Force was officially launched on 2 July 2017. The force was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in April 2017 and was strengthened by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2359 in June. The G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force cannot alone secure the Sahel, and national forces, operating within their own borders, will still bear the greatest responsibility for eliminating the terror and trafficking threat. But the force is an important first step toward greater regional cooperation and will address an immediate challenge of preventing fighters and traffickers from evading pursuit by slipping across national boundaries. The force would comprise up to 5,000 military and police personnel drawn from national battalions. It would incorporate the existing Liptako-Gourma task force established earlier in 2017 by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region. The Joint Force is intended to complement the mandates of MINUSMA. The force is one of the EU’s main pillar for Common Security and Defense Policy in the region, where the EU supports concrete regional-led security initiatives. The EU has provided an initial 50 million euros to establish the African-led G5 Sahel Joint Force. This EU funding is provided through the African Peace Facility and can only cover non-lethal equipment.

In February 2018 the EU has doubled its commitment to some 116 million euros. The EU is itself a key security player in the region, with its 3 active Common Security and Defence Policy missions; EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EU training mission (EUTM) in Mali.
7. Other regional organisations and Burkina Faso
7.1 African Union and Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is a founding member to the predecessor of the African Union (AU), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), that was established on May 25, 1963 in Addis Abeba.

In recent decades, the African Union has progressively tried to carve out a role of greater influence in the political dynamics of the African continent. In particular, the organization has demonstrated to be rather active in several political and institutional crises arising within some of its member states, and has sometimes taken on a mediating role with the dual objective of avoiding the violent degeneration of the crisis and of building a platform of political consensus at regional level to facilitate the achievement of shared solutions. Burkina Faso has at least partly modified its approach accordingly.

The country has shown commitment to solve the Ivorian post-electoral crisis (2010-13) through AU channels. In fact, in late 2010, when Ivorian authorities refused to accept the elections’ results released by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the AU set up a panel composed of the presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, South Africa and Tanzania to seek a diplomatic solution to the stalemate. On 31 January 2011 the AU’s Peace and Security Council set up a high-level panel composed of heads of state from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, South Africa and Tanzania to seek a lasting solution to the Ivorian crisis. In undertaking its responsibilities, the panel met with the two main political rivals, Gbagbo and Ouattara, as well as with the key representatives of the Constitutional Council, the IEC and the UN Secretary General’s special representative in Côte d’Ivoire.

In dealing with the 2014-15 political crisis in Burkina Faso, the AU’s involvement focused on supporting the country’s constitution, restoring the full authority of a civilian government, and coordinating international efforts. In October 2014, just before a vote in Parliament that would have changed the constitution in order to allow President Compaoré to serve another term, the AU upheld the principle of maintaining unaltered the constitution. In November 2014, the AU strongly condemned the ensuing military take-over and the suspension of the constitution. The AU gave Burkina Faso one week to appoint a civilian transitional government. It decided not to impose sanctions following the nomination of Michel Kafando as interim head of state, but it expressed concern about the role of the military in the country. In November 2014, former Togolese prime minister Edem Kodjo was appointed as a special envoy to coordinate efforts between the AU, ECOWAS and the United Nations. Kodjo played a supporting role in drafting the constitutional transitional charter that was adopted on 16 November 2014. Later, the AU created the International Follow-up and Support Group for the Transition in Burkina Faso (GISAT-BF), which it co-chairs with ECOWAS.

The AU followed the same guidelines in approaching the September 2015 attempted coup. In fact, AU even labelled the coup leaders as terrorists and it immediately suspended Burkina Faso from all AU activities, imposing a travel ban on the coup leaders.
Burkina Faso is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established in 1975 with the Treaty of Lagos. Together with Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau, the country is also member to one of the two sub-regional blocs of ECOWAS, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). UEMOA is an 8-member, mainly francophone organization created in 1994 which functions as a custom union and a currency union between member states of ECOWAS. In fact, it was established to promote economic integration among countries that share the CFA franc as a common currency. In 2017, Burkina Faso was one of the most enthusiastic states to support Morocco’s bid to join ECOWAS.

In addition to the economic field, ECOWAS is also active in areas that are more directly political and diplomatic. In fact, the organization has a peacekeeping force deployable for missions authorized by the UN and, in a manner not unlike the AU, in the last decades it has carved out a role of mediation in the main crises that have broken out in the region.

During the Ivorian crisis, ECOWAS involvement was requested by President Gbagbo in December 2006. He called on the Chair of ECOWAS, the then Burkinabe President Blaise Compaoré, to directly mediate peace talks between Gbagbo and the belligerents. The parties met in Ouagadougou from March to February 2007 and made commitments to successfully resolve the conflict, restore peace and security and the free movement of people throughout the national territory and signed what became known as the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement.

With regard to the Burkinabé political crisis in 2014-15, ECOWAS made clear from the very beginning that it would not recognise unconstitutional accessions to power, and called for the necessity to respect the principles of democratic and constitutional government. Following a visit of an ECOWAS delegation to the country, the organization proposed a draft political agreement that called for the release of the detainees, the restoration of transitional institutions and the withdrawal of the military from the government.
8. Other Practical Info
8.1 Local Customs Cultural Awareness

Burkinabé culture places a lot of weight on age and life experience. Burkinabés never publicly disagree with someone who is older or more senior to themselves. In public, people are reserved. Showing emotions in public is a sign of immaturity. Burkina Faso’s intercultural adaptability and readiness for change is apparent, however, it would be imprudent to introduce rapid change. Tradition is valued, thus change is not readily embraced simply because it is new. People take offence to anything that might be seen as a criticism of their customs. In urban areas, social classes differ from one another by their material goods and finances (house, car, children who are studying abroad). However, Burkinabés are very discrete. It is very frowned upon in Burkina.

Gender equality is not a reality in Burkina. Burkina Faso’s society is still dominated by men: males hold most of the positions of responsibility. Men are as likely to bring up the subject as women, but in a joking manner as it is rather sensitive. People from Burkina Faso are religious. That is not to say that they are necessarily practising; but they do believe in something. What is not accepted is not believing in anything. Atheism is very frowned upon in Burkina.

In Burkina culture, the group is always more important than the individual. It means that society is community-based. Therefore, the family is the basis of society and in the workplace it is the group. Giving special privileges or considerations to someone, in social and work relations, is seen as a danger for the solidarity of the group.

Social Etiquette

a) Meeting and Greeting

Formality is appropriate in the beginning. People are wary of foreigners’ (especially Westerners’) ability to work within the local hierarchy. Addressing people using the formal form of “you” [in French “vous”] is recommended in the beginning. As time goes on, relations will become more familiar. A handshake with the right hand is the most common form of greeting among people of the same sex. For men, handshakes are often combined with a snap on the release for those who are friends. Even between men and women a handshake with the right hand is the most common form of greeting. A verbal greeting or nod of acknowledgment is acceptable as well. However, between members of the opposite sex, people tend to keep their distance so as not to give the wrong impression to others who may see them speaking. There’s much less distance between members of the same sex. Less than an arm’s length is the norm. Ignoring people who greet you is considered extremely rude.

On holidays there’s usually a handshake accompanied by head taps – touching the sides of your head to another person’s 4 times, 2 on each side. For children to elders or for lower class to upper class adults – a handshake with the right hand while the left hand supports the right elbow to show respect.

Last names are very important and hold a significant place in social interaction. It says a lot about the person, his/her background, and even family history. If a person to whom you are speaking has a name that indicates that he/she is a joking parent or cousin, he/she will joke around and tease you a lot. The standard greeting is ‘Laafi be me’, pronounced lafee bay may. It’s a question meaning ‘Peace/health is with you?’ The answer is ‘Laafi Bala’...meaning peace/health always, and then ‘Laafi’...peace/health.

b) Gift Giving Etiquette

Gifts are not expected but appreciated in business situations. It’s best to give and receive gifts with both hands. If invited over for dinner or a drink to a Burkinabe home, you should always bring the host/hostess a gift. Flowers and/or chocolate are acceptable gifts.

c) Dining Etiquette

Table manners are very informal. However it’s advisable not to use the left hand for serving or offering food, as it’s considered the dirty hand. When hosted for lunch or dinner you are not expected to eat everything has been served.

Business Etiquette and Protocol

a) Meeting and Greeting

When meeting with Burkinabés, It’s best as a foreigner to show up on time for a meeting even though you may end up waiting. Small talk is almost always expected. It's good to ask how one’s health, family, morning, day, week, life is, etc.

The person who called the meeting will usually begin the meeting unless there is a higher official present – such as a mayor, Prefect, etc.

The way time is seen is relative: there is always a good reason to not be on time. Time is elastic. What is not done today will be done tomorrow. Time must be given due time.

To beckon someone, you wave with the palm down, clapping your fingers into your palm. Some people may hiss at a person very loudly to get their attention. To express agreement with something, there is a clicking noise people make in their throats.

b) Communication Style

Most Burkinabe are very indirect communicators. If someone is unhappy with what is said or doesn’t want to answer a question, they just kind of say “uh-hum...” and then there’s awkward silence because they will just not speak any more.

The social topic most often used in Burkina Faso, no matter what age group or gender, is the family. In fact, asking about the family of the person with whom you are speaking is well regarded. This demonstrates interest in the person, the family being the main reference point of society. It’s convenient to
inquire about how the immediate family is doing (partner, children, parents), asking them especially about their health and then about more distantly related family members. Questions on the extended family (uncles, aunts, grandparents) are well accepted. Work or business often come as second topics, but it would be advisable not to dwell on it whether the person to whom you are speaking is vague about this. In a rural area, it is possible to ask about how the fields and crops are doing.

Subjects to avoid are all those that require a decision or a commitment on the part of the interlocutor. The first meeting is exclusively knowing each other not for making decisions. Questions about money, for example, should be avoided at the first meeting. Impatience is a sign of disrespect and can even evoke doubt. Asking about the person’s ethnic background and other questions related to this topic are acceptable. Politics, religion and sexuality are delicate subjects and should only be broached if the interlocutor takes the initiative. Discussing religion should be avoided especially for whoever is not a believer. A sense of humour is very much appreciated and it is common to see people of one ethnic group tease people of another.

It is important to avoid physical contact until a certain degree of familiarity has been established, especially in male/female relations. Proximity, however, is a sign of trust. It is not necessary to continuously look at people when speaking to them. This can create an uncomfortable situation and it may be interpreted as a challenge. Looking at a person is a sign of increased interest. Straightforwardness is appreciated in public as long as it does not create an uncomfortable situation or make someone lose face. Raising your voice is not recommended at any time. This shows aggressive behaviour seeking confrontation.

Employees are not expected to work late. What is not finished today can always be done tomorrow. However, global and intercultural expansion means that some managers are beginning to understand the importance of adherence to schedules and deadlines.

Physical appearance and clothing are very important. This is why at work it is appropriate to be well dressed, wearing clean clothes that are well ironed. The way to dress depends on whether the workplace is in the city or in a rural area. In the city, men generally wear pants and a long- or short-sleeved shirt or a clean t-shirt. Some men also wear a jacket and tie. Men do not wear shorts, but it is becoming more and more common to see young people wearing clean jeans. In rural areas, men often wear pants and a t-shirt. It would even be acceptable for a male expatriate to wear long shorts in a rural area, but not in the city. Women mostly wear dresses, shirts or a "pagne" (a skirt or dress made out of traditional materials) in either the city or in a rural area. Both shirts with and without sleeves are worn to work by women. Dresses and skirts should fall below the knee. Few women wear pants. For foreign woman, it is advisable to wear a dress or skirt that falls below the knee, but wearing pants is also possible and acceptable.

It’s usually best to address people by their professional titles or Mr., Mrs. or Miss. There is no set protocol with the giving and receiving of business cards but it is always advisable to give and receive cards with the right hand.

It is advisable not to publicly chastise or criticize employees. Anything serious to be discussed with a particular employee, it is often beneficial to use a trusted intermediary. As in most hierarchical cultures, managers are expected to take a paternalistic attitude to their employees. This may include going to funerals or other rites of passage in an employee’s family. During a business meeting, the amount of time devoted to discussion about business is significantly less than the rest of the conversation and often comes only at the end of the discussion. For someone from Burkina Faso, the quality of a business relationship depends on the person’s manners as much as it does on expertise. People take advantage of informal occasions such as visiting people’s homes, dining together or having discussions over tea to talk about business.

c) Business Meetings

Burkinabés do not want to upset others in order to enforce strict adherence to a deadline. Although appointments and schedules need to be in advance as a sign of respect for the individual, these schedules are viewed as flexible so successful cross cultural management will require some patience.

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8.2 Medical Travel Recommendations for Ukraine

Medical facilities in Burkina Faso are very limited. For serious medical treatment, evacuation is necessary. Make sure you have adequate travel health insurance and accessible funds to cover the cost of any medical treatment abroad and repatriation. Malaria and other tropical and water-borne diseases are common. There are numerous endemic diseases, especially in rural areas (cholera, typhus, tuberculosis, etc.).

From August 2016 a Dengue epidemic is underway that is affecting all areas of the country. It is a viral fever, generally benign, transmitted mainly by the mosquito Aedes Aegypti. Dengue occurs 3 to 14 days after the infective sting with fever, muscle and joint pain, headache and cutaneous rash. It can lead to hemorrhagic complications and - potentially - to death. The use of repellents and mosquito nets is highly recommended.

Malaria is spread over the whole territory and in some cases it is particularly severe and resistant to quinine chloride. Prophylaxis, subject to medical advice, is recommended even if not efficient in all cases, which is why precautionary measures are necessary. It is also suggested to adopt preventive measures against mosquito bites during the stay in the country.

Burkina Faso is included in the "meningitis belt" which extends transversely from the Atlantic coast of West Africa. In this 'belt', epidemics from Neisseria meningitidis occur periodically during the dry season months (from December to May). The main strains of N. meningitidis are first of type A, followed by C and W135. During the stay, even if vaccinated, it is advisable to immediately refer to a health facility in case of fever or headache.

AIDS is widespread, especially among the youth population and in urban environments. Due to the presence of cases of bird flu, it is not recommended to go to markets, farms or other places where you could come into contact with the birds and however you need to make sure that chicken and egg dishes are properly cooked.

There have recently been cases of Lassa fever with some deaths. The disease is transmitted to humans by contact with food or objects contaminated with rodent excrement. Person-to-person transmissions and laboratory infections may also occur, particularly in a hospital setting without adequate control measures. Timely diagnosis and treatment are essential.

In the country there were cases of "Zika virus", a viral disease transmitted by the "aedes aegypti" mosquito, also responsible for "dengue" and "Chikunguya". According to World Health Organization (WHO), cases of schistosomiasis were reported in this country in 2012. It is a parasitic infection. Schistosoma larvae are released from infected freshwater snails and can penetrate intact human skin following contact with contaminated freshwater. Travellers may be exposed during activities such as wading, swimming, bathing or washing clothes in freshwater streams, rivers or lakes. Schistosomiasis infection may cause no symptoms, but early symptoms can include a rash and itchy skin (‘swimmer’s itch’), fever, chills, cough, or muscle aches. If not treated, it can cause serious long term health problems such as intestinal or bladder disease. All travellers who may have been exposed to schistosomiasis should have a medical assessment.

As of 19 January 2018, European Commission added Burkina Faso to the list of countries affected by product withdrawal of infant powder milk products because of salmonella contamination.

Recommended Vaccinations:
- Cholera
- Hepatitis A;
- Hepatitis B
- Meningococcal Disease
- Rabies
- Tetanus;
- Typhoid;
- Yellow Fever

Diarrhoea

Diseases from food and water are the leading cause of illness in travellers. Prevention consists mainly in: “Boil it, wash it, peel it, cook it... or forget it”. Follow these tips for safe eating and drinking:
- wash your hands often with soap and water, especially before eating. If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand gel (with at least 60% alcohol);
- drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes;
- make sure food is fully cooked; avoid eating fruits and vegetables unless they have been peeled or cooked.
Most episodes are self-limiting, clear up within 48 to 72 hours and do not require treatment with antibiotics. The primary goal of treating any form of diarrhoea (viral, bacterial, parasitic or non-infectious) is preventing dehydration or appropriately re-hydrating persons presenting with dehydration.

In particular:
- oral re-hydration solutions (ORS) or similar solutions should be used for re-hydration and absorbed in small, frequent volumes;
- an age-appropriate unrestricted diet is recommended as soon as dehydration is corrected;
- no routine laboratory tests or medications are recommended;
- anti-motility agents such as Loperamid should be considered only for adult patients who do not have a fever or bloody diarrhoea; anti-motility agents may reduce diarrhea output and cramps, but do not accelerate cure.

Gas Heater
In case you use gas cylinder for domestic purposes, you should never go to sleep with your gas heater switched on. The pressure may drop resulting in the flame extinguishing. As a result gas will then leak from the heater. Carbon monoxide poisoning can also be a problem with old appliances.

Road Traffic Accidents
Remember to:
1. wear your safety belt;
2. follow the local customs and laws regarding pedestrian safety and vehicle speed;
3. obey the rules of the road;
4. use helmets on bicycles and motorbikes;
5. avoid boarding an overloaded bus or mini-bus;
6. if not familiar with driving in Ukraine, hire a trustworthy local driver;
7. do not drink and drive.
8.3 Other Travel Info

Time
Time zone: GMT (UTC+0)

Money
The official currency of Burkina Faso is the The West African CFA franc. Credit cards are accepted by a few of the larger hotels and restaurants in Ouagadougou. You are unlikely to be able to use them anywhere outside the capital. Other brands of credit cards are not accepted. There are a few ATMs in Ouagadougou (Visa only). Euro and US Dollar are not accepted but are easily convertible. Credit cards can only be used in some banks and in some hotels in Ouagadougou. A limited use is recommended due to possible fraud. Acceptance of traveller’s checks is limited, while there are no restrictions on foreign currencies. Travellers’ cheques are exchangeable in banks in Ouagadougou. Euro travellers’ cheques are exchanged at the fixed rate prevailing between the CFA Franc and the Euro. Exchange rates on travellers’ cheques in other currencies can be poor. In general, and in particular outside Ouagadougou, you should make sure you have enough cash to cover any eventuality.

Climate
Typically Sahelian climate characterized by a single short rainy season from June to September, when the average temperature is around 30 degrees. In the months of October and November the temperature increases while the climate gets drier. The months of December and January are characterized by the Hattattan (desert wind): sand storms are possible, the temperature decreases considerably, especially at night. From February to May the climate is always drier and the temperatures are getting higher until reaching 40/45 degrees in the months of April and May. We recommend light and fresh clothes.
8.4 Radio Transmissions

The radio is not a secure means of communication as it can be listened to by practically anyone. It is useful to establish a set of simple code words, which should be known by everyone in the network. In no case should military information be transmitted.

Basic Rules
Discipline: listen before transmitting. Brevity: be brief and to the point. Rhythm: use short complete phrases that make sense. Speed: not too fast, not too slow. Volume: don’t shout. Preparation: know what you are going to say before transmitting.

Prior to transmission
a. Check the power source and cables to ensure there is a power supply.
b. Check the antenna and cables ensuring a tight and correct connection to the radio set.
c. Connect the audio accessories and check the functioning of switches.

Transmitting
a. Make your message brief but precise.
b. Break the message into sensible passages with pauses between.
c. Make sure no-one else is transmitting at the same time.
d. When transmitting maintain a high standard of articulation, normal rhythm and moderate volume. Do not shout. Hold the microphone close to your mouth.
e. Avoid excessive calling and unofficial voice procedure.

Four Golden Rules
Clarity; Brevity; Security; Simplicity.

Respect these rules; your radios may be the only link to the outside world. Don’t interfere with radios unless you are a trained technician. Don’t use the radio like a telephone, keep transmissions short. Organize your thinking and your message before transmitting. Security matters are best dealt with by using simple code words; likewise when dealing with sensitive issues.

Procedure Words
A proword is a word or phrase, which has been given a special meaning in order to speed up the handling of messages. The only authorised prowords are listed below:

Prowords explanation:
BREAK
I now indicate a separation of the text from other portions of the message.
CORRECT
You are correct, or what you have transmitted is correct.
CORRECTION
I have made an error in this transmission. I will continue from the last correct word.
I SAY AGAIN
I am repeating my transmission again.
MESSAGE
A message follows: prepare to copy or record it.
MORE TO FOLLOW
The transmitting station has additional traffic for the receiving station.
OUT
This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required.
OVER
This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is expected. Go ahead transmit.
READ BACK
Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as received.
ROGER
I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.
SPEAK SLOWER
You are speaking too fast. Please speak slower.
STAND-BY
Do not transmit until contacted: I need extra time.
THIS IS
Give call sign, i.e. “Delta one”.
WAIT
I must pause for a few seconds, please wait.
WAIT OUT
I must pause longer than a few seconds, I will return.
WILCO
I have received your signal, understand it, and will comply (do not use roger and wilco together).
WRONG
Your last transmission was incorrect the correct version was ...

Phonetics
The international phonetic alphabet listed below shall be used. Numerals shall be transmitted digit by digit except round figures such as hundreds and thousands.

Examples:
Message examples:
To give you confidence, make sure you practise using the radio before you find yourself in urgent need of using it. An example of the kind of language you must learn to use is shown right. It is an example of a radio check:

Call

Reply
Hotel – Three - Niner, from Five - Two. I read you loud and clear. Over.

Call
Five - Two from Hotel – Three - Niner. Loud and clear. Over.

Reply
From Five-Two. Roger. Out.

What to do in an emergency

Call for help as follows:
emergency. emergency. emergency.
Five-two five-two. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. emergency. do you copy? over. (Note: emergency is repeated three times).
Wait for response and then proceed. For a lesser degree of urgency, use the word “security” instead of “emergency”. Any station hearing an “emergency” or “security” call, should immediately stop transmitting and listen out. If you need to interrupt another radio conversation wait for a pause (immediately after you hear “over”); call: break. break. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. I have an emergency. please stand by.
Pause transmission and listen to ensure the other communication has ceased, then proceed with emergency call.

12 wun too;
44 fo-wer fo-wer;
90 niner zero;
136 wun three six;
500 fi-yiv hundred;
7000 seven thousand;
16000 wun six thousand;
1278 wun too seven ate;
19A wun niner alfa
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTER</th>
<th>MORSE CODE</th>
<th>TELEPHONE</th>
<th>PHONIC (PRONUNCIATION)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>*-</td>
<td>Alpha</td>
<td>(AL-FAH)</td>
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<td>B</td>
<td>- * *</td>
<td>Bravo</td>
<td>(BRAH-VOH)</td>
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<td>C</td>
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<td>Charlie</td>
<td>(CHAR-LEE) or CHAR-LEE</td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>- * *</td>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>(DELL-TAR)</td>
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<td>E</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Echo</td>
<td>(EK-C-OH)</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>Fox Trot</td>
<td>(FOXS-TROT)</td>
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<td>G</td>
<td>- - -</td>
<td>Golf</td>
<td>(GOLF)</td>
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<td>Hotel</td>
<td>(HOUH-TEL)</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>(IN-DZE-AHR)</td>
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<td>J</td>
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<td>Juliet</td>
<td>(JEW-L-EH-TT)</td>
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<td>Mike</td>
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<td>Oscar</td>
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<td>Papa</td>
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<td>Quebec</td>
<td>(KEH-BEEK)</td>
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<td>R</td>
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<td>Romeo</td>
<td>(ROW-ME-ORH)</td>
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<td>Sierra</td>
<td>(SEE-AIR-PAH)</td>
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<td>Tango</td>
<td>(TANG-GO)</td>
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<td>U</td>
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<td>Uniform</td>
<td>(YOU-NEE-FORM) or (YOU-NEE-FORM)</td>
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<td>Victor</td>
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<td>(SEV-EN)</td>
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<td>Nine</td>
<td>(NIN-NEE)</td>
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<td>Zero</td>
<td>(ZEURO)</td>
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9. Useful contacts
9. Useful contacts

Emergencies
In case of emergency in Burkina Faso, call the following emergency numbers:

- Fire – 18
- Police – 17
- Ambulance – 112
- Water emergency – 1111
- Electricity emergency - 1130

As Burkina Faso is a French-speaking country, very few English-speakers will be found when approaching local authorities or emergency services.

Embassies

Representative Office of the Republic of Austria in Burkina Faso.
Chief: Mr. Christian Geosits
Representative of Austria to Burkina Faso
Address: Secteur 13, quartier Zogona, Rue 13.15, Porte No 13101 BP 106, Ouagadougou
Phone: (+226) 25 36 07 49
Fax: (+226) 25 36 37 32
Email: ouagadougou@ada.gv.at
Website:

Embassy of the Kingdom of Belgium in Burkina Faso
Chief: Mr. Lieven De la Marche
Ambassador of Belgium in Burkina Faso
Address: 417 Avenue Kwamé N’Krumah 01 BOX 1624
Phone: (+226) 25 312 164 / (+226) 25 304 060 / (+226) 25 312 165 / (+226) 70 200 804 (Emergency number outside opening hours)
Fax: (+226) 25 310 660
Email: ouagadougou@diplobel.fed.be
Website: burkinafaso.diplomatic.belgium.be

Embassy of the Kingdom of Denmark in Ukraine
Chief: Mrs. Ulla Næsby Tawiah
Ambassador of Denmark In Burkina Faso
Address: 316, Avenue Pr. Joseph Ki-ZERBO, 01 BP 1760, Ouagadougou 01
Phone: (+226) 25 32 85 78
Fax: (+38 044) 200-12-81
Email: ouaamb@um.dk
Website: burkinafaso.um.dk

Embassy of the French Republic in Burkina Faso
Chief: Mr. Xavier LAPEYRE DE CABANES
Ambassador
Address: Avenue du Trésor, BP 504, Ouagadougou
Phone: (226) 25 49 66 66
Fax: (+38 044) 494-42-71
Email: ambassaden.ouagadougou@sida.se
Website: http://www.swedenabroad.se/kyiv

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Burkina Faso
Chief: Dr. Claus Bernard Auer
Chargé d’Affaires
Address: 14 rue Kafando Romuald, La Rotonde, 01 B.P. 600 Ouagadougou 01
Phone: (+226) 25 30 12 61 / (+226) 25 30 67 32
Email: info@ouagadougou.diplo.de
Website: www.ouagadougou.diplo.de

British Consulate in Ouagadougou
Chief: Mr Patrick de La lande
Consul
Address: Initiatives Conseil International Impasse Thevenoud, 330 01 BP 6490 Ouagadougou 01
Phone: (+226) 50 30 88 60
Fax: (+226) 50 31 25 43
Email: Website:

Honorary Vice Consulate
Chief:
Address:
Phone: (+226) 50374315
Fax: (+226) 50374316
Cell: (+226) 70 20 36 34/78 80 10 10
Email: consulat.italie@fasonet.bf
Website:

Office of Cooperation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in Burkina Faso
Chief: Monsieur Max LAMESCH
Head of the Office of Cooperation
Address: 37, Avenue Kwamé N’Krumah11, B.P. 1609 CMS Ouagadougou 1
Phone: (+226) 25 30 13 38 / (+226) 25 30 13 39
Fax: (+226) 25 30 13 40
Email: ouagadougou.amb@mae.etat.lu
Website:

Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in Burkina Faso
Chief:
Address: 187, Avenue de l'Europe, 11 BP 755, CMS, Ouagadougou 1
Phone: (+226) 25 49 61 70
Fax: (+38 044) 494-42-71
Email: ambassaden.ouagadougou@sida.se
Website: http://www.swedenabroad.se/kyiv

Delegation of the European Union
Chief: Jean Lamy  
Head of Delegation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary  
Address: Avenue Kwamé N’Krumah, 01 BP 352 Ouagadougou 01  
Phone: (+226) 50.49.29.00  
Fax: (+226) 50.49.29.99  
Email: delegation-burkina-faso@ec.europa.eu  
Website: https://ecas.europa.eu/delegations/burkina-faso_fr

International Organisations

Burkinabé Red Cross Society  
Chief: Mrs. Dénis BAKYONO  
President  
Address: 01 BP. 4404 Ouagadougou, Centre Region  
Phone: (+226) 25 36 13 40  
Fax: (+226) 50 36 31  
Email: croixrouge.bf@fasonet.bf  
Website:http://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/where-we-work/africa/burkinabe-red-cross-society/

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  
Chief: Mr. Mohamamed Diakité  
ECOWAS Special Representative Ti Burkina Faso  
Address: Rue de la Chance No. 3.119, Ouagadougou  
Email: diakimed@yahoo.fr  
Website: http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/burkina-faso/

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office in Burkina Faso  
Chief: Pierre Frank Laporte, Cheick Fantamady Kanté  
Country Director, Country Manager  
Address: 179 Avenue du President Save Zerbo, Ouagadougou  
Phone: (+226) 50 49 63 00  
Fax:  
Email:  
Website: http://www.worldbank.org/uk/country/burkinafaso

International Fund for Agricultural Development  
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