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UKRAINE

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UKRAINE

Country Information Package

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LET4CAP, co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union, aims to contribute to more *consistent* and *efficient* assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase.

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1. Country Profile

1.2 Modern and Contemporary History of Ukraine

Early History

Ukraine was the centre of the first eastern Slavic state, Kyivan Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries was the largest and most powerful state in Europe. Weakened by internecine quarrels and Mongol invasions, Kyivan Rus was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The cultural and religious legacy of Kyivan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian nationalism through subsequent centuries. A new Ukrainian state, the Cossack Hetmanate, was established during the mid-17th century after an uprising against the Poles. Despite continuous Muscovite pressure, the Hetmanate managed to remain autonomous for well over 100 years. During the latter part of the 18th century, the Russian Empire absorbed most Ukrainian ethnographic territory. Following the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine was able to achieve a short-lived period of independence (1917-20), but was reconquered and forced to endure a brutal Soviet rule that engineered two forced famines (1921-22 and 1932-33) in which over 8 million people died. In World War II, German and Soviet armies were responsible for some 7 to 8 million more deaths.

Soviet Ukraine in the postwar period

Postwar reconstruction, the re-imposition of totalitarian controls and terror, and the Sovietization of western Ukraine – violently opposed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) – were the hallmarks of the last years of Stalin's rule. Economic reconstruction was undertaken immediately as Soviet authorities re-established control over the recovered territories. The fourth five-year plan stressed once again heavy industry to the detriment of consumer needs. By 1950, Ukraine's industrial output exceeded the pre-war level. In agriculture, recovery proceeded much more slowly, and pre-war levels of production were not reached until the 1960s. A famine in 1946–47 resulting from postwar dislocations and drought claimed nearly one million casualties. The post-Stalin period, first thanks to the central authority of Khrushchev from Moscow and later to Petro Shelest's local leadership, saw a steady rise in Ukraine's cultural and at times economic autonomy. Ukrainian became again the language of many publications, and important literary and historical Ukrainian works were again allowed to go public. These slow changes came to an end in the 70s, when Brezhnev's protégé and Shelest's rival, Shcherbytsky, became Ukraine's new party leader. Under Shcherbytsky Soviet authorities began a crackdown on Ukraine's cultural revival, as well as on an embryonic dissident movement. Shcherbytsky's firm control of the country remained strong in spite of deteriorating economic conditions and the Chernobyl nuclear incident. The rise to power of Gorbachev and his policies centred on *perestroika* ("restructuring") and *glasnost* ("openness") began eroding Communist rule in favour of a nationalist and religious revival, however, although more gradually in Ukraine than in countries such as the Baltic republics. The 1989 USSR elections marked a steep decline in the power and influence of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which lost many seats to non-communist candidates. Shcherbytsky resigned as first secretary of the Party

and died a few weeks later. In 1990 the first parliamentary elections of the country further eroded the political supremacy of the Communist Party, with a majority of only 293 seats out of 500. In that same year Ukraine declared its "sovereignty" (although not independence). On 24 August 1991 the Ukrainian parliament formally declared the country's independence, confirmed by the population in a referendum held on 1 December.

Independent Ukraine

In an election coinciding with the referendum, Kravchuk was chosen as president. By this time, several important developments had taken place in Ukraine, including the dissolution of the Communist Party and the development of the infrastructure for separate Ukrainian armed forces. Ukraine also had withstood political pressure from Moscow to reconsider its course toward independence and enter into a restructured Soviet Union. A week after the independence referendum, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus agreed to establish the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Shortly thereafter the U.S.S.R. was formally disbanded.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were again held in Ukraine in 1994. In the first contest, candidates affiliated with the revived Communist Party emerged as the largest single group, winning approximately one-fifth of the seats. Factoring in the deputies of the Socialist and Agrarian parties, the latter of which drew its support from rural interests and farmers, the left now constituted a strong — although not united — bloc in the new parliament. In the presidential election the incumbent president Kravchuk was narrowly defeated by former Prime Minister Kuchma. The latter had promised economic reform and better relations with Russia. The two contests seemed to reveal a political polarization between eastern and western Ukraine. Kuchma and the left received their greatest support from the more heavily industrialized and Russophone regions of eastern Ukraine, whereas Kravchuk did particularly well in western Ukraine, where Ukrainian speakers and national democrats predominated. Nevertheless, the minimal number of irregularities in the elections and the peaceful replacement of the president were widely interpreted as signs that democracy was taking root in Ukraine. Once in office, Kuchma maintained many of his predecessor's policies. Significantly, while seeking more cordial relations with Moscow, he did not reorient the whole of Ukraine's foreign policy eastward. Ukraine continued to participate in the CIS but in much the same manner as it had previously. Moreover, Kuchma maintained Ukraine's pro-Western policies and aspirations. In 1994 Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace Programme run by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the country also established a "special partnership" with the organization in 1996. In 1995 Ukraine joined the Council of Europe as well. Kuchma faced a major challenge in dealing with a strong parliamentary opposition, particularly in respect to economic reform. Ukraine managed to achieve macroeconomic stabilization by 1996, the year in which it introduced its long-awaited currency, the hryvnya. However, the economy continued to perform poorly through the end of the decade. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures and unenforced economic legislation led business to be both

overregulated and rife with corruption. In addition, the country was able to attract only a limited amount of foreign investment. The Russian economic crisis of 1998 negatively affected Ukraine's economy as well. But in 1999 the introduction of tax-reform measures saw a growth in the number of small private businesses established or emerging from the country's significant shadow economy. At the turn of the 21st century the legitimate economy began to grow.

In the 1998 parliamentary elections the Communist Party actually improved its showing. In the 1999 presidential election, however, Kuchma defeated Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko by a resounding margin. Politically, Kuchma had benefited from the splintering of the left among several candidates. He also had campaigned vigorously, using all the means available to him, particularly the media. Indeed, a strong bias in favor of Kuchma became evident in the television coverage of the election. International observers were critical of Kuchma's handling of the media and some obvious electoral irregularities. His margin of victory, however, indicated that these factors alone had not determined the outcome of the vote. The result of the 1999 election was significant in two respects. First, it represented a rejection of the communist past. Some observers remarked that it even constituted a second referendum on independence. Second, the vote did not split neatly along geographical lines, indicating that — for that moment at least — the east-west divide seen in the 1994 elections was not as important a factor in Ukrainian politics as many analysts had suggested. During Kuchma's second term, conflicts between right- and left-wing forces sometimes threatened political stability. Nevertheless, newly appointed Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko shepherded economic reforms through the legislature. The economy grew steadily in the first years of the 21st century, but the political situation remained tense in Ukraine as it sought membership in NATO and the European Union (EU) while also pursuing closer relations with Russia — a delicate balancing act. In 2003 Ukraine accepted in principle a proposal to establish a "joint economic space" with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; however, Ukrainian-Russian relations were strained by Russian accusations of deteriorating conditions for the Russian minority in Ukraine, along with Ukrainian concerns over what it viewed to be Russian expansionist designs in Crimea. Yushchenko became an opposition leader following his dismissal as Prime Minister in 2001. The following year, audiotapes allegedly revealed Kuchma's approval of the sale of a radar system to Iraq, in violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution, and implicated him in the assassination of a dissident journalist in 2000. Opposition groups called for the impeachment of Kuchma, who denied the allegations.

The Orange Revolution

The presidential election of 2004 brought Ukraine to the brink of disintegration and civil war. Cleared to seek a third term as president by the Constitutional Court, Kuchma, the then-president, instead endorsed the candidacy of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, who was also strongly supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko — running on an anticorruption platform — emerged as the leading opposition candidate, but his campaign was prevented from visiting Yanukovich's stronghold of Donetsk and other eastern cities. In

September Yushchenko's health began to fail, and medical tests later revealed he had suffered dioxin poisoning, which left his face disfigured. In the first round of the presidential election, on October 31, Yushchenko and Yanukovich both won about two-fifths of the vote. In the runoff the following month, Yanukovich was declared the winner, though Yushchenko's supporters charged fraud and staged mass protests that came to be known as the Orange Revolution. Protesters clad in orange, Yushchenko's campaign colour, took to the streets, and the country endured nearly two weeks of demonstrations. Yanukovich's supporters in the east threatened to secede from Ukraine if the results were annulled. Nevertheless, on December 3 the Supreme Court ruled the election invalid and ordered a new runoff for December 26. Yushchenko subsequently defeated Yanukovich by garnering some 52 percent of the vote. Although Yanukovich challenged the validity of the results, Yushchenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005. Political turmoil occupied the first few years of Yushchenko's presidency. His first cabinet served only until September 2005, when he dismissed all his ministers, including Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, a fellow leader of the Orange Revolution. The next Prime Minister, Yury Yekhanurov, stayed in office only until January 2006. Parliamentary elections early that year saw Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party finish third, behind Yanukovich's Party of Regions and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc. When a proposed coalition of the so-called Orange parties in the parliament fell apart, Yushchenko was forced to accept his rival Yanukovich as Prime Minister. The ensuing power struggle between the president and the Prime Minister, whose political role had been enhanced by a constitutional reform that took effect in 2006, led Yushchenko to call for another round of parliamentary elections in 2007. Once again the president's party finished behind both Yanukovich's and Tymoshenko's parties. This time, however, a coalition with the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc held together, allowing the pro-West Orange parties to form a government with Tymoshenko as Prime Minister. As the government continued to balance the often conflicting goals of maintaining positive relations with Russia and gaining membership in the EU, dissent between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko contributed to the collapse of their coalition in September 2008. In October the president dissolved parliament. Parliamentary elections, at first scheduled for December, were later cancelled, and Yushchenko's and Tymoshenko's parties agreed to form a new coalition, together with the smaller Lytvyn Bloc, headed by Volodymyr Lytvyn.

The Yanukovich Presidency

The next presidential election, held on January 17, 2010, confirmed the political demise of President Yushchenko, who received only about 5 percent of the vote. The top two candidates, Yanukovich and Tymoshenko, garnered about 35 and 25 percent, respectively. Because neither had won a majority of votes, a runoff poll was held on February 7. The runoff results were split largely along regional lines, with most of western Ukraine supporting Tymoshenko and most of the east favoring Yanukovich. Winning 48.95 percent of the vote — a narrow lead over Tymoshenko's 45.47 percent — Yanukovich took the presidency. Although international observers determined that the poll had been fair, Tymoshenko declared the results fraudulent and refused to

recognize Yanukovych's victory; she and her supporters boycotted the inauguration of Yanukovych on February 25. The following week Tymoshenko's government was felled by a vote of no confidence and Mykola Azarov of the Party of Regions was installed as Prime Minister. President Yanukovych gained greater executive authority later in 2010 when the Constitutional Court overturned the 2006 reform that had enhanced the powers of the Prime Minister.

In April 2010, following a fractious parliamentary debate, Ukraine agreed to extend Russia's lease of the port at Sevastopol, originally set to expire in 2017, until 2042. In exchange, Ukraine would receive a reduction in the price of Russian natural gas. The Ukrainian government further improved relations with Russia in June 2010, when it officially abandoned its goal of joining NATO — a pursuit Russia had opposed. As the Yanukovych administration continued its pivot towards Moscow, EU leaders expressed concern about the preservation of the rule of law in Ukraine. In 2011 former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, the country's most popular politician, was convicted of abuse of power in connection with a 2009 natural gas deal with Russia and given a seven-year prison sentence. In February 2012 Tymoshenko's Interior Minister, Yuri Lutsenko, also was convicted of abuse of power and sentenced to four years in prison. Many observers believed both trials were politically motivated. When Ukraine co-hosted the UEFA European Championship football (soccer) tournament in summer 2012, a number of EU countries registered their concern for Tymoshenko by boycotting the event.

In the parliamentary election in October 2012, the ruling Party of Regions emerged as the single largest bloc, with 185 seats. Tymoshenko's Fatherland party claimed 101 seats, Vitali Klitschko's Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms (UDAR) won 40 seats, and the ultranationalist Svoboda ("Freedom") party had a surprisingly strong showing, winning 37 seats. Challenging the validity of the results, Tymoshenko embarked on a hunger strike. Although international observers called attention to irregularities in some contests, the European Parliament characterized the election as comparatively fair, and the main opposition parties accepted the official results. In December 2012 sitting Prime Minister Azarov formed a government with the support of Communist and independent deputies. In what was widely seen as an attempt to thaw relations with the EU, Yanukovych pardoned the imprisoned Lutsenko and ordered his release in April 2013.

The Maidan Protest Movement

Ukraine's pro-European trajectory was abruptly halted in November 2013, when a planned association agreement with the EU was scuttled just days before its scheduled signature. The accord would have more closely integrated political and economic ties between the EU and Ukraine, but Yanukovych bowed to intense pressure from Moscow. Street protests erupted in Kiev, and Lutsenko and Klitschko emerged as the leaders of the largest demonstrations since the Orange Revolution. Police violently dispersed crowds in Kiev's Maidan (Independence Square), and, as the protests continued into December, demonstrators occupied Kiev's city hall and called on Yanukovych to resign. As demonstrations gave way to rioting in January 2014, Yanukovych signed a series of laws restricting the right to protest, and hundreds

of thousands took to the streets of Kiev in response. Bloody clashes between police and protesters ensued, with dozens injured on each side. Demonstrations soon spread to eastern Ukraine, a region that traditionally had supported Yanukovych and closer ties with Russia. In February hundreds of protesters were released from jail as part of an amnesty deal; the thaw in tensions was short-lived, however, as opposition parliamentarians were rebuffed in their attempts to limit the powers of the presidency, and the battle in the streets took a deadly turn. More than 20 were killed and hundreds were wounded when government forces attempted to retake the Maidan on February 18. Protesters in the western Ukrainian cities of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk seized government buildings, and EU officials threatened sanctions against Ukraine unless the Yanukovych administration took steps to de-escalate the violence. The proposed truce failed to materialize, and on February 20 violence in Kiev escalated dramatically, with police and government security forces firing on crowds of protesters. Scores were killed, hundreds were injured, and EU leaders made good on their promise to enact sanctions against Ukraine.

The bloodiest week in Ukraine's post-Soviet history concluded on February 21 with a EU-brokered agreement between Yanukovych and opposition leaders that called for early elections and the formation of an interim unity government. The parliament responded by overwhelmingly approving the restoration of the 2004 constitution, thus reducing the power of the presidency. In subsequent votes, the parliament approved a measure granting full amnesty to protesters, fired internal affairs minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko for his role in ordering the crackdown on the Maidan, and decriminalized elements of the legal code under which Tymoshenko had been prosecuted. Yanukovych, his power base crumbling, fled the capital ahead of an impeachment vote that stripped him of his powers as president. Fatherland deputy leader Oleksandr Turchynov was appointed acting president, a move that Yanukovych decried as a coup d'état. The interim government charged Yanukovych with mass murder in connection with the deaths of the Maidan protesters and issued a warrant for his arrest. The Ukrainian economy, struggling prior to the Maidan protests, responded erratically to the shifting power situation, with the hryvnia sinking to historic lows. Credit agency Standard & Poor's cut the country's debt rating and downgraded its financial outlook, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sought to restore calm. The interim Ukrainian government installed Fatherland leader Arseniy Yatsenyuk as Prime Minister, and early presidential elections were scheduled for May 2014. Yanukovych resurfaced on February 28 in Rostov-na-Donu, Russia, as he delivered a defiant speech in Russian, insisting that he was still the rightful president of Ukraine.

The Crimean Crisis

As pro-Russian protesters became increasingly assertive in Crimea, groups of armed men whose uniforms lacked any clear identifying marks surrounded the airports in Simferopol and Sevastopol, occupied the Crimean parliament building and raised a Russian flag. Pro-Russian lawmakers dismissed the sitting government and installed Sergey Aksyonov, the leader of the Russian Unity Party, as Crimea's Prime Minister. Voice and data links between Crimea and Ukraine were severed, and Russian authorities acknowledged that they had moved troops into the

region. Turchynov criticized the action as a provocation and a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty, while Russian President Vladimir Putin characterized it as an effort to protect Russian citizens and military assets in Crimea. On March 6 the Crimean parliament voted to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, with a public referendum on the matter scheduled for March 16, 2014. The move was hailed by Russia and broadly condemned in the rest of Ukraine and in the West. On the day of the referendum, observers noted numerous irregularities in the voting process, including the presence of armed men at polling stations, and the result was an overwhelming 97 percent in favour of joining Russia. The interim government in Kiev rejected the result, and the United States and the EU imposed asset freezes and travel bans on numerous Russian officials and members of the Crimean parliament. On March 18 Putin met with Aksyonov and other regional representatives and signed a treaty incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation. Russian troops moved to occupy bases throughout the peninsula, including Ukrainian naval headquarters in Sevastopol, as Ukraine initiated the evacuation of some 25,000 military personnel and their families from Crimea.

As international attention remained focused on Crimea, Yatsenyuk negotiated with the IMF a \$18 billion loan package that was contingent on Ukraine's adoption of a range of austerity measures. He also signed a portion of the association pact that had been rejected by Yanukovych in November 2013.

Russia continued to solidify its hold on Crimea, and it abrogated the 2010 treaty that had extended its lease on the port of Sevastopol in exchange for a discount on natural gas. The price Russia charged Ukraine for natural gas sky-rocketed some 80 percent in a matter of weeks. While Russia openly exerted economic pressure on the interim government in Kiev, Russian officials publicly stated that they had no additional designs on Ukrainian territory.

The Clashes in the East and the Difficult Path to Reforms

In early April, however, a NATO press briefing revealed the presence of an estimated 40,000 Russian troops, massed in a state of high readiness, just across Ukraine's border. Subsequently, heavily armed pro-Russian gunmen stormed government buildings in the eastern Ukrainian cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, Horlivka, and Kramatorsk. Turchynov called on the United Nations to dispatch peacekeeping forces to eastern Ukraine to restore order, while he signaled his support for one of the key demands of the pro-Russian camp — a popular referendum on the conversion of Ukraine into a federation, a change that would convey greater autonomy at the regional level. As clashes between the Ukrainian military and pro-Russian gunmen intensified in the East, emergency talks between Ukraine, the United States, the EU, and Russia began in Geneva. Although all parties at Geneva agreed to work to defuse the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Russia commenced military maneuvers on its side of the border, and pro-Russian militants expanded their zone of control, seizing additional government buildings and establishing armed checkpoints. The U.S. and the EU unveiled a fresh round of sanctions against Russia, as dozens were abducted and held by pro-Russian forces, including eight members of an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission, numerous Ukrainian and Western journalists,

and several members of Ukrainian police and security services. Deadly clashes erupted in Odessa as well.

As self-declared separatist governments in Luhansk and Donetsk prepared to stage their own referenda on independence, Ukrainian security forces continued to contest territory with pro-Russian militias, and a particularly bloody clash in Mariupol left as many as 20 dead. The referenda, held in separatist-controlled cities on May 11, were dismissed by Kiev as “a farce” and were widely criticized throughout the West. Widespread irregularities were observed: masked gunmen directly supervised polls, voters casting multiple ballots were commonplace, and Ukrainian police reportedly seized 100,000 pre-completed “yes” ballots from armed separatists outside Slov'yansk. While stopping short of recognizing the results of the referenda, which overwhelmingly favoured independence, Putin said that he respected the will of the voters, even as the Kremlin called for negotiations. The EU responded by expanding its sanctions against Russian individuals and companies. Skirmishes between separatist militias and government forces continued in the east, while the remainder of the country prepared for presidential elections on May 25. Although voting was seriously disrupted in Luhansk and Donetsk, with pro-Russian gunmen occupying polling stations and seizing ballot boxes, turnout elsewhere in the country was strong. Ukrainian billionaire Petro Poroshenko won in a landslide, easily topping the 50 percent mark necessary to secure a victory in the first round of polling, while Tymoshenko finished a distant second, with 13 percent of the vote. Poroshenko was sworn in as president on June 7, and he immediately set forth a proposal to restore peace in separatist-controlled regions. Fighting continued, however, and Russia was again accused of directly supporting the rebels when a trio of unidentified Soviet-era tanks appeared in Ukrainian towns near the Russian border. On June 14, one day after government forces reclaimed the city of Mariupol, the Ukrainian army suffered its largest single-day loss of life to that point, when rebels shot down a transport plane carrying 49 people as it attempted to land in Luhansk. Poroshenko called a halt to military operations in the east, offering a temporary truce. Putin, citing a desire to help normalize the situation in eastern Ukraine, rescinded an order — issued before the annexation of Crimea — that authorized the use of Russian troops on Ukrainian soil. On June 27, amid strenuous Russian objections, Poroshenko signed the long-delayed association agreement with the EU, pledging closer ties with Europe.

In the following weeks the Ukrainian military re-captured the cities of Slov'yansk and Kramatorsk. Separatist militias began to deploy increasingly sophisticated weapons systems in response, leading to a new bloody stand-off. The conflict's civilian death toll jumped dramatically on July 17, when a Malaysia Airlines 777 carrying 298 people crashed in the Donetsk region. Both Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces were quick to deny responsibility for any role in the downing of the jet, which U.S. intelligence analysts confirmed was brought down by a surface-to-air missile. Investigators and recovery workers found their efforts hampered by the pro-Russian forces that controlled the crash site, and days passed before the majority of the bodies could be collected. As international attention continued to focus on the crash site, the government in Kiev ground to a standstill. Svoboda and UDAR withdrew their support from the ruling coalition, and Prime Minister Arseniy

Yatsenyuk, frustrated at the pace of legislative action, announced his resignation. This gave Poroshenko the chance of calling fresh election to be held on October 26, in order to consolidate his political leadership and dissolve the parliamentary influence of Yanukovich's Party of Regions. The results gave the majority of the seats to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, followed by Yatsenyuk's People's Front. On December 2 a new Yatsenyuk government was formed with the support of the so-called "European Ukraine" coalition, formed by the Poroshenko Bloc, People's Front, Self-Reliance, Fatherland and Radical Party. The coalition agreed on a reform-based political platform ranging from the economy to State institutions. Some of these commitments were effectively carried out in the following two years, such as the police reform.

In August Ukrainian forces suffered serious losses and seemed due to be pushed back again, as Nato confirmed Russian troops and heavy military equipment were entering the border. A tenuous ceasefire agreement (the Minsk peace plan, or "Minsk I") between the parties was signed in September, but soon collapsed after new clashes and the holding of autonomous elections by the separatists. A second deal was brokered in February by France and Germany ("Minsk II"), providing a 13-point roadmap to peace committing both sides and including a ceasefire, exchanges of prisoners, constitutional provisions for decentralisation and the withdrawal of

all foreign armed forces. The agreements left many dissatisfied and the roadmap was only slowly implemented, with occasional skirmishes still breaking the truce in the East. The voting in parliament of constitutional changes favouring decentralisation led to the exit in protest of the Radical Party from the governing coalition in September 2015. The Yatsenyuk government saw its approval rating falling over its perceived corruption and inability to implement promised reforms, and eventually fell in April 2016 after both Fatherland and Self-Reliance withdrew their support. On April 14 Volodymyr Groysman, often seen as Poroshenko's protégé, became the new Prime Minister, with the support of the Poroshenko Bloc, People's Front, Revival and People's Will. A notable political challenge for the Groysman government remains the role of former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili: named governor of the Southern Odessa region in 2015 and initially praised for his experience in modernising reforms, he has later fallen in disgrace after accusing the government of corruption and facing an attempted arrest, but still enjoys the favour of part of the population. In February 2017 clashes erupted once again on the front-line, in particular near the town of Avdiivka; tension has once again diminished since, with the most important exchange of prisoners since 2014 taking place on 2017 December 27.

1.3 Geography

Location: Ukraine is located in Eastern Europe. It is bordered by Belarus to the North, Russia to the East, the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea to the South, Moldova and Romania to the Southwest, and Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland to the West. In the far Southeast, Ukraine is separated from Russia by the Kerch Strait, which connects the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea.

Area: Ukraine's total area is approximately 603,550 square kilometres of landmass.

Land Boundaries: Ukraine is bordered by Belarus (891 km), Hungary (103 km), Moldova (940 km), Poland (428 km), Romania (362 km), Russia (1,576 km) and Slovakia (90 km). The total length of its borders is 4,390km.

Length of Coastline: Ukraine's coastline totals 2,782 kilometres, on the Black Sea and on the Sea of Azov.

Maritime Claims: Ukraine's territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles in the Black Sea and in the Sea of Azov. Its Exclusive Economic Zone extends for 200 nautical miles.

Topography: Most of Ukraine's territory consists of fertile plains (steppes) and plateaus, mountains being found only in the west (the Carpathians), and in the Crimean Peninsula in the extreme south.

Natural Resources: Ukraine's main natural resources are iron ore, coal, manganese, natural gas, oil, salt, sulphur, graphite, titanium, magnesium, kaolin, nickel, mercury, timber and arable land.

Land Use: Most of Ukraine's territory consists of arable land (56.1%); permanent crops occupy around 1.5% of the land.

Environmental Factors: Ukraine's most important environmental problems are the often inadequate supply of potable water, air and water pollution and deforestation. In the north-western area, affected by the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, there are still major issues of radiation contamination.

1.4 Territorial and Administrative Units

Ukraine is a unitary republic, not a federal state, although some measures of administrative decentralisation have been carried out in the wake of the Minsk agreements. The country is divided administratively into a number of regions called “oblasti”; two cities — Kiev and Sevastopol — carry the same status as an oblast. Crimea is an autonomous republic within Ukraine. In 2014 Crimea was occupied and annexed by Russia, but few countries and international organisations recognised the legality or legitimacy of the move. Government control over the Donetsk’s and Luhans’k oblasts is only partial and contended with pro-Russian separatists.

List of Ukrainian Regions:

- Autonomous Republic of Crimea
- Cherkasy Region
- Chernihiv Region
- Chernivtsi Region
- Dnipropetrovs’k Region
- Donetsk’s Region
- Ivano-Frankivs’k Region
- Kharkiv Region
- Kherson Region
- Khmelnytsky Region
- Kirovograd Region
- Kyiv Region
- Luhans’k Region
- Lviv Region
- Mykolayiv Region
- Odessa Region
- Poltava Region
- Rivne Region
- Sumy Region
- Ternopil Region
- The City of Kyiv
- Vinnytsya Region
- Volyn region
- Zakarpattia Region
- Zaporizhzhya Region
- Zhytomyr Region




Source: Nations Online Project

1.5 Population

According to 2017 estimates, Ukraine has a population of 42,434,767. The population is not evenly distributed on the territory: most Ukrainians reside either in the far eastern part of the country or in the west. The central regions, with the notable exception of the capital, Kiev, have a lower population density. The country-wide population density is of 70 inhabitants for square kilometre. According to data from 2017, 69.9% of Ukrainians live

in urban areas, the biggest cities being Kiev, Kharkiv and Odessa. The country has a negative population growth of -0.84% and the life expectancy at birth is of 71.68 years. According to 2016 estimates, the birth rate is 10.3 births/1,000 population, and the death rate is 14.7/1,000 population. The overall fertility rate is 1.47 per woman. As of December 2016, the infant mortality rate was 7.4 deaths/1,000 live births.




Population density in Ukraine. Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica

1.6 Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion

Ethnic Groups

When Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, a policy of Russian in-migration and Ukrainian out-migration was in effect, and the ethnic Ukrainians' share of the population in Ukraine declined from 77 percent in 1959 to 73 percent in 1991. But that trend reversed after the country gained independence, and, by the turn of the 21st century, ethnic Ukrainians made up more than three-fourths of the population. Russians continue to be the largest minority, though they now constitute less than one-fifth of the population. The remainder of the population includes Belarusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Roma (Gypsies), and other groups. The Crimean Tatars, who were forcibly deported to Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics in 1944, began returning to the Crimea in large numbers in 1989; by the early 21st century they constituted one of the largest non-Russian minority groups.

Historically, Ukraine had large Jewish and Polish populations, particularly in the Right Bank region (west of the Dnieper River). In fact, in the late 19th century slightly more than one-fourth of the world's Jewish population (estimated at 10 million) lived in ethnic Ukrainian territory. This predominantly Yiddish-speaking population was greatly reduced by emigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and by the devastation of the Holocaust. In the late 1980s and early '90s, large numbers of Ukraine's remaining Jews emigrated, mainly to Israel. At the turn of the 21st century, the several hundred thousand Jews left in Ukraine made up less than 1 percent of the Ukrainian population. Most of Ukraine's large Polish minority was resettled in Poland after World War II as part of a Soviet plan to have ethnic settlement match territorial boundaries. Fewer than 150,000 ethnic Poles remained in Ukraine at the turn of the 21st century.



Source: The Washington Post

Languages

The vast majority of people in Ukraine speak Ukrainian, which is written with a form of the Cyrillic alphabet. The language — belonging with Russian and Belarusian to the East Slavic branch of the Slavic language family — is closely related to Russian but also has distinct similarities to the Polish language. Significant numbers of people in the country speak Polish, Yiddish, Rusyn, Belarusian, Romanian, Moldovan, Bulgarian, Crimean Turkish, or Hungarian. Russian is the most important minority language. During the rule

of imperial Russia and under the Soviet Union, Russian was the common language of government administration and public life in Ukraine. Although Ukrainian had been afforded equal status with Russian in the decade following the revolution of 1917, by the 1930s a concerted attempt at Russification was well under way. In 1989 Ukrainian once again became the country's official language, and its status as the sole official language was confirmed in the 1996 Ukrainian constitution.

In 2012 a law was passed that granted local authorities the power to confer official status upon minority languages. Although Ukrainian was reaffirmed as the country's official language, regional administrators could elect to conduct official business in the prevailing language of the area. In Crimea, which has an autonomous status within Ukraine and where there is a Russian-speaking majority, Russian and Crimean Tatar are the official languages. In addition, primary and secondary schools using Russian as the language of instruction still prevail in the Donetsk Basin and other areas with large Russian minorities. The Crimean parliament moved to rescind the minority language law in February 2014, after the ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich, but interim President Oleksandr Turchynov declined to sign the bill into law. The ethno-linguistical divide follows a clear geographical pattern, the eastern part of the country being mainly populated by Russian speakers and the western one being


mainly populated by Ukrainian speakers. This divide has a number of important political consequences and is paramount to understand the 2013-2014 crisis.

Religion

The predominant religion in Ukraine, practised by almost half of the population, is Eastern Orthodoxy. Most of the adherents belong to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church related to the Kiev Patriarchate, although the branch referring to the Moscow Patriarchate is important as well. A smaller number of Orthodox Christians belong to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. In western Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church prevails. Minority religions include Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Islam (practised primarily by the Crimean Tatars), and Judaism. More than two-fifths of Ukrainians are not religious.

1.7 Health

The Ukrainian government expenditure on health amounted in 2017 to 7.1% of GDP, the per capita expenditure being of 584\$. Ukraine has a physician density of 3.25/1,000 population and a hospital bed density of 8.9 beds/1,000 population. According to UN figures, more than 95% of the population has access to improved drinking water resources and improved sanitation facilities.




Source: WHO


1.8 Education and Literacy

According to UNESCO figures, virtually all Ukrainians adults and youth are literate. Almost all Ukrainians attended primary and secondary school. The government expenditure on education amounts to 5.9% of the GDP.


EDUCATION



SCIENCE



LITERACY



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics

1.9 Country Economy

After Russia, the Ukrainian republic was the most important economic component of the former Soviet Union, producing about four times the output of the next-ranking republic. Its fertile black soil generated more than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output, and its farms provided substantial quantities of meat, milk, grain, and vegetables to other republics. Likewise, its diversified heavy industry supplied the unique equipment (for example, large diameter pipes) and raw materials to industrial and mining sites (vertical drilling apparatus) in other regions of the former USSR. Shortly after independence in August 1991, the Ukrainian Government liberalised most prices and erected a legal framework for privatization, but widespread resistance to reform within the government and the legislature soon stalled reform efforts and led to some back-tracking. Output by 1999 had fallen to less than 40% of the 1991 level.

Ukraine's dependence on Russia for energy supplies and the lack of significant structural reform have made the Ukrainian economy vulnerable to external shocks. Ukraine depends on imports to meet about three-fourths of its annual oil and natural gas requirements and 100% of its nuclear fuel needs. After a two-week dispute that saw gas supplies cut off to Europe, Ukraine agreed to 10-year gas supply and transit contracts with Russia in January 2009 that brought gas prices to "world" levels. The strict terms of the contracts have further hobbled Ukraine's cash-strapped state gas company, Naftohaz. Outside institutions — particularly the IMF — have encouraged Ukraine to quicken the pace and scope of reforms to foster economic growth. Ukrainian Government officials eliminated most tax and customs privileges in a March 2005 budget law, bringing more economic activity out of Ukraine's large shadow economy, but more improvements are needed, including fighting corruption, developing capital markets, and improving the legislative framework. Ukraine's economy was buoyant despite political turmoil between the Prime Minister and president until mid-2008, but then contracted nearly 15% in 2009, among the worst economic performances in the world.

Movement toward an Association Agreement with the European Union, which would commit Ukraine to economic and financial reforms in exchange for preferential access to EU markets, was curtailed by the November 2013 decision of President Yanukovich against signing this treaty. In response, on 17 December 2013 President Yanukovich and President Putin concluded a financial assistance package containing \$15 billion in loans and lower gas prices. However, the end of the Yanukovich government in February 2014 caused Russia to halt further funding. With the formation of an interim government in late February 2014, the

international community began efforts to stabilize the Ukrainian economy, including a 27 March 2014 IMF assistance package of \$18 billion. However, Ukraine's GDP plummeted in 2014 and 2015; only since 2016 the national economy has slowly begun to grow again at a pace of 2% per year, reaching \$93.27 billion.

Expenditure on GDP

(% real change)

Private consumption

2018=2.2, 2019=2.4

Government consumption

2018=2.5, 2019=2.5

Gross fixed investment

2018=2.0, 2019=5.5

Exports of goods & services

2018=-2.8, 2019=2.5

Imports of goods & services

2018=-2.6, 2019=3.5

Economic growth

(% unless otherwise indicated)

	2017	2018	2019
US GDP	2.2	2.2	2.3
OECD GDP	2.3	2.1	2.0
World GDP	2.9	2.8	2.8
World trade	4.6	3.5	3.7

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit

Origin of GDP

(% real change)

Agriculture

2018=2.6, 2019=2.5

Industry

2018=2.0, 2019=3.0

Services

2018=1.8, 2019=2.2

2. Political and Security Context

2.1 The Constitution of Ukraine

Ukraine adopted a new constitution in 1996. Until that time, the Soviet-era constitution had remained in force, albeit with numerous adjustments. The highest legislative unit of the Ukrainian government is the unicameral Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council of Ukraine), which succeeded the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian S.S.R. The president, elected by direct popular vote for a five-year term, is the head of state. The president acts as the commander in chief of the armed forces, oversees executive ministries, and has the power to initiate and to veto legislation, though vetoes may be overturned. The president also chairs the National Security and Defence Council and determines its composition. The head of the government is the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the president with the consent of the legislature. The president, with the consent of the Prime Minister, also appoints the members of the cabinet. The cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, coordinates the day-to-day administration of the government and may introduce legislation to the Supreme

Council. The president has the power to dismiss the Prime Minister and the cabinet.

The early period of Ukrainian independence was marked by a weak presidency and a strong parliament. In fact, Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine's first democratically elected president almost seemed to downplay his role. After his election in 1994, President Leonid Kuchma set out to redefine the structures of power in Ukraine. In 1995 the parliament agreed to the so-called "Law on Power," which substantially enhanced the role of the executive branch of government, and in 1996 the new constitution gave the presidency considerably more power. A 2004 constitutional reform, which took effect in 2006, shifted some power away from the president to the Prime Minister, but in 2010 Ukraine's Constitutional Court declared that reform unconstitutional. The strong presidential powers outlined in the 1996 constitution were thus restored. Those changes were repealed in February 2014, after months of popular protest toppled the government of President Viktor Yanukovich, and the 2004 constitution was reinstated.

2.2 Elections

Crimean Status Referendum, 15 May 2014

Official data state that more than 90% of Crimeans favoured secession. Crimean officials said turnout was 83%. Despite the apparently high turnout, the minority Crimean Tatar community chose to boycott the vote, while others expressed their frustration over the lack of options presented on the ballot. A prominent “yes” campaign saw posters promoting the idea of Crimea and Russia together, but there was no sign of a “no” campaign and pro-Ukrainian media reportedly were restricted. On the day of the election, a steady stream of voters passed through the numerous polling booths, dropping their ballot papers into transparent boxes where there were few signs of votes against reunification.

Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama spoke by phone, with the White House saying it would ‘never recognise’ the referendum. The Russian president, however, insisted to his American counterpart that the vote accords to international law, adding that “ultra-nationalists and radical groups” threaten Russian “compatriots” in Ukraine. The White House condemned Russia’s “dangerous and destabilizing” actions and called the vote “illegal”, as did the EU and several European nations. Also the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN General Assembly variously stated their opposition to the legal validity of the referendum and of the subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea. Ukraine’s acting PM Arseny Yatseniuk vowed to apprehend separatists “under the cover of Russian troops” and “bring them to justice”. He said: “the ground will burn beneath their feet.”

Presidential Elections, 25 May 2014

The early presidential election was called after former president Viktor Yanukovych was voted out of office by parliament, following the Maidan events that started in November 2013 and which escalated into violence in February 2014. Further events unfolded after the ouster of Mr. Yanukovych, including the so-called ‘referendum’ on the Crimean peninsula and its eventual annexation by the Russian Federation, as well as continued unrest and violence in the east of the country, so-called ‘referenda’ in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and counter-insurgency operations launched by the government. This challenging political and particularly security environment seriously impacted the legal framework, preparations for the election, and the campaigns of candidates. It also rendered the holding of the election impossible on the Crimean peninsula and in large parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Despite the challenges posed, genuine efforts were made by the electoral authorities to conduct voting throughout the country. However, governmental structures and security forces were unable to ensure the safety of election officials, election materials and voters in the parts of the country affected by unrest and violence, despite several legislative acts being adopted to address this specific situation.

This presidential election was seen by a majority of national and international actors as an important first step in the de-escalation of a tense situation. At the same time, while the election featured in the political discourse, it was eclipsed by events in the east and the role of the Russian Federation in that part of the country. Despite efforts of the election administration to ensure voting throughout the country, polling did not take place in 10 of the 12 election districts in Luhansk oblast and 14 of the 22 election districts in Donetsk oblast. This was due to illegal actions by armed groups before and on Election Day, including death threats and intimidation of election officials, seizure and destruction of election materials, as well as the impossibility to distribute ballots to polling stations due to general insecurity caused by these groups. The majority of Ukrainian citizens resident in these oblasts were thus deprived of the opportunity to vote and to express their will. In the 10 election districts in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts where the election could be held, polling progressed without incident, although security was much in evidence and voter turnout was low. Elsewhere, only a few isolated attempts to disrupt voting were reported.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) began posting preliminary results on its website on election night. In line with a previous OSCE/ ODIHR recommendation, the CEC posted all figures from Precinct Election Commission (PEC) results protocols, including the number of registered voters and unused ballots, thereby giving candidates and observers the possibility to check all figures against copies of the protocols they received at polling stations. This increased transparency in the results tabulation process.

Parliamentary Elections, 26 October 2014

The early parliamentary election in 2014 was called by President Petro Poroshenko after the collapse of the first fragile pro-reform coalition in the Verkhovna Rada. Poroshenko’s goals were the establishment of a solid parliamentary presence supporting him and his agenda and the ousting of the deputies of Yanukovich’s Party of Regions. Similarly to the 2014 presidential election, the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine crisis disrupted voting in some oblasts and put much organisational pressure on the CEC.

The election was seen by OSCE as a further positive step of Ukraine towards democratic elections. Preparation, voting and vote counting were considered as overall fair, as well as the electoral competition, although with concerns over the media coverage and the handling of the candidate registration. Results tabulation was more negatively assessed, with many organisational difficulties and a few serious external interferences and manipulations of results. 5 districts out of 11 in the Luhans’k oblast and 12 out of 21 in the Donetsk oblast were able to at least partially carry out the necessary electoral procedures.

May 25 Presidential Elections

Candidate	Number of votes	% of votes
Olha Bohomolets	345,384	1.92
Yuriy Boyko	35,928	0.20
Andriy Hrynenko	73,277	0.41
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	989,029	5.49
Mykhaylo Dobkin	546,138	3.03
Oleksandr Klymenko	10,542	0.06
Valeriy Konovalyuk	69,572	0.39
Renat Kuzmin	18,689	0.10
Vasyl Kuybida	12,391	0.07
Oleh Lyashko	1,500,377	8.33
Mykola Malomuzh	23,771	0.13
Petro Poroshenko	9,857,308	54.70
Vadym Rabinovych	406,301	2.25
Volodymyr Saranov	6,232	0.03
Petro Symonenko	272,723	1.51
Yuliya Tymoshenko	2,310,050	12.82
Serhiy Tihipko	943,430	5.24
Oleh Tyahnybok	210,476	1.17
Vasyl Tsushko	10,434	0.06
Zoryan Shkiryak	5,021	0.03
Dmytro Yarosh	127,772	0.71

October 26 Parliamentary Elections

Party	2014		2012	
People's Front	22,1%	82	-	-
Bloc Petro Poroshenko "Solidarity"	21,8%	132	-	-
Union Self Reliance	11,0%	33	-	-
Opposition Bloc	9,4%	29	-	-
Radical Party Oleh Lyashko	7,4%	22	1,1%	1
All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland"	5,6%	19	25,5%	102
All-Ukrainian Union "Freedom"	4,7%	6	10,4%	38
Communist Party of Ukraine	3,9%	-	13,2%	32
Strong Ukraine	3,1%	1	-	-
All-Ukrainian Agrarian Union "Zastup"	2,7%	1	-	-
Right Sector	1,8%	1	-	-
Party of Regions	-	-	30,0%	187
Punch Vitali Klitschko	-	-	14,0%	40
Independents	-	97	-	44
Others	6,50%	-	5,8%	6
Unfilled	-	27	-	-
Total	-	450	-	450
Turnout	52,4%		58,0%	

Source: Parties and Elections in Europe

2.3 Political Parties



Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity"

The Petro Poroshenko Bloc was founded in 2001 as the Solidarity Party, but changed its name in August 2014. It was formally led by Yuri Lutsenko, but effectively by Poroshenko, who created the party. The adoption of a joint list of candidates with the UDAR party in the 2014 elections enabled it to use that party's large-scale structures, which the Poroshenko Bloc itself lacked. The two parties then eventually merged, and UDAR leader Vitali Klitschko became the new leader in 2015. Its programme can be generally defined as Christian-liberal and pro-European, but since the party in its current form was created shortly before the elections, candidates had widely different backgrounds and the bloc lacks ideological unity. It favours the electoral programme of President Poroshenko, supporting various reforms – among which decentralisation –, territorial integrity, European membership and a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Donbas.



Народний
фронт

People's Front

The People's Front was formed in March 2014, and since September of the same year has been under the direction of Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleksandr Turchynov. It absorbed many members, structures and votes from Fatherland, of which Yatsenyuk was previously one of the leaders together with Yulia Tymoshenko. Its programme is liberal-democratic, nationalistic and pro-European. It has declared its favour, albeit ambiguously, for the use of force to resolve the conflict in the Donbas. Despite Yatsenyuk not being Prime Minister anymore, the party supports the Groysman government together with the Petro Poroshenko Bloc.



Self-Reliance

The Self-Reliance party was born in December 2012 and has since been led by Andriy Sadovyi. It shares its name and historical references – namely the Ukrainian cooperative movement – with Sadovyi's NGO, founded in 2004. Differently from all other parties in the 2014 election, Self-Reliance's candidates had no parliamentary background, but came instead from the worlds of

community NGOs and medium-sized businesses. The party officially sees itself as liberal-conservative, and has strong relations with the Christian-democratic ideology. Some commentators tend to see it more as an incoherent political subject, shifting from conservatism to populism to liberalism. It left the governing coalition in 2016.



БАТЬКІВЩИНА
ВСЕУКРАЇНСЬКЕ ОБ'ЄДНАННЯ

Fatherland

The All-Ukrainian *Batkivshchyna* (Fatherland) Association was founded in 1999, and has been led since the beginning by Yulia Tymoshenko. Until September 2014 it was one of the principal political parties of Ukraine, supporting the first Yatsenyuk government in the immediate aftermath of the Maidan revolution while Tymoshenko, freed from jail, led a "lustration" campaign expelling 1,500 party members. However, Yatsenyuk and Turchynov soon left the party and since the split its potential has dwindled. Its programme is centre-right and pro-European, favouring wide-ranging reforms while featuring also populist and nationalist traits. It is currently out of the ruling coalition, although it initially supported the second Yatsenyuk government. It favours the use of force to resolve the conflict in the Donbas.



РАДИКАЛЬНА ПАРТІЯ
Radical Party

The Radical Party of Oleh Lashko was founded in 2010 as the Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party, and has had its present name and leadership since 2011. Its programme is liberal-nationalist and pro-European, often resorting to left-wing populism. It is a typical one-man party, centred around Oleh Lashko, while its real organisational potential remains limited. It favours the use of force to resolve the conflict in the Donbas, issue over which it left the reformist coalition in anger at the decentralisation attempts of the government.



Opposition Bloc

The Opposition Bloc was founded in September 2014 by the merger of six marginal groups (at the last minute the Party of Regions decided not to join, for reasons yet unclear). This enigmatic group is led by Yuriy Boyko, but probably controlled by Serhiy Lovochkin, the former Head of Yanukovych's presidential administration. It is widely seen as the heir of the Party of Regions,

and its programme is social-liberal and pro-Russian. The party draws most of its consensus from Eastern Ukraine, and advocates a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Donbas.



Svoboda

The All Ukrainian Union Svoboda party, led by parliament member Oleh Tyahnybok, is an ultra-nationalist party. It advocates against communism and the social policies of the former Soviet Union: party members helped topple the Kiev statue of Vladimir Lenin. Svoboda also participated in occupying Kiev's city hall in early December, a milestone in the protest movement's campaign against Yanukovich. The party is often criticized for being homophobic and anti-Semitic. Svoboda's fascist tendencies have

drawn criticism from Russia and Jewish groups. It favours the use of force to resolve the conflict in the Donbas.



Communist Party

The Communist Party of Ukraine was founded in 1993 (after the lifting of the ban on the activities of communist parties), relying on continuity with the Soviet CPU since 1918. While not entering the parliament in the 2014 election, the Communists have retained a visible presence in Ukrainian socio-political life, fielding outspoken and colourful individuals, such as their leader Petro Symonenko. The party enjoys support from retirees, but virtually none from younger voters and the first post-Soviet generation. Its programme is Communist and pro-Russian. Together with the Radical Party it is today the only party of the Ukrainian left. It effectively supports the separatist rebellion in the Donbas.

2.4 Key Political Leaders



Petro Poroshenko

Ukrainian oligarch Petro Poroshenko, who won outright victory in the May 2014 presidential election, has long supported the country's pro-European movement despite being unaffiliated to any political party. Born on 26 September 1965 in the town of Bolhrad near Odessa, he was raised in the central region of Vinnytsya and studied economics in Kiev. After building up his confectionery empire after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, he now also has interests in construction and the media, owning influential Ukrainian broadcaster Channel 5 TV.

The "chocolate king", as the owner of Ukraine's largest confectionery manufacturer Roshen is known, was a key backer of the 2004 Orange Revolution and once served as foreign minister under Yulia Tymoshenko, the Orange Revolution star whom he roundly defeated at the last election. The 48-year-old also served briefly as trade minister under President Viktor Yanukovich, whose downfall amid street protests in February paved the way for him to take the presidency. Ukrainian media interpreted the groundswell of support for Mr. Poroshenko at the election as a reaction to the opposition's dithering and in-ability to find common ground during and after the anti-government protests that toppled Mr. Yanukovich. If he or others let people down by not tackling endemic corruption, people power will hold them to account, he told Reuters news agency in an interview; however, critics would say he himself is part of the old system and questions have been asked about his decision to retain control of Channel 5.

The father of four portrays himself as a pragmatic politician who sees Ukraine's future in Europe but hopes to mend relations with Russia, using the diplomatic skills he developed as foreign minister. He advocates local governance reform and devolution of power to the regions, as well as economic reform and improving the investment climate. He appears to have solid backing from Washington and Brussels, eager to see stability return to Ukraine.



Volodymyr Groysman

Born in Vinnytsia in 1978, Groysman was a relatively small entrepreneur before entering politics. From March 2006 until February 2014 he was the Mayor of Vinnytsia, then he was elected into parliament on the party lists of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Between February and the November elections he was Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine for Regional Policy and Minister of Regional Development, Construction and Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine. Groysman was then elected Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada until his nomination as Prime Minister. He is often considered a protégé of Poroshenko's, whose influence on the government has been seen to increase after 2016.



Arseniy Yatsenyuk

Ukraine approved Yatsenyuk as the country's new Prime Minister in late February 2014 and then again in November of the same year. Yatsenyuk, one of the leaders of the country's second largest party, Fatherland, already in January 2014 had rejected an offer to become Prime Minister in a coalition government with President Viktor Yanukovich. Yatsenyuk said he would only have considered the political alliance if the president had made concessions, including constitutional reform. Yatsenyuk then left Fatherland to found People's Front, which was the most voted party in the proportional part of the elections and the second for number of seats in the Verkhovna Rada. His downfall began in February 2016, when the coalition supporting his government crumbled as he was accused of ineffectiveness in carrying out reforms and fighting corruption. He still maintains leadership of his party, however, and is fundamental for the political survival of the Groysman government.



Yuriy Lutsenko

Lutsenko, who served as Yulia Tymoshenko's interior minister, was imprisoned for abuse of office and embezzlement in 2012. His sentence was criticized as being politically motivated and after lobbying from the European Union, he was later released and pardoned. Lutsenko then played a prominent part in the pro-EU demonstrations in Ukraine, frequently delivering rousing speeches to protesters in Kiev and across the country. He became advisor to acting President Turchynov and President Poroshenko, and in August 2014 was elected leader of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. He was nominated Prosecutor General of Ukraine by the parliament in 2016, after a law was passed that allowed nomination even without a degree in Law. Lutsenko has since held the office.



Yulia Tymoshenko

As the leader of the Fatherland opposition party, Tymoshenko served as Ukraine's Prime Minister briefly in 2005, and again from late 2007 to 2010. She was one of the leaders of the country's Orange Revolution a decade ago. Before entering politics, she held a number of high-level positions in Ukraine's gas industry, including a stint as CEO of the Ukrainian Gasoline Corporation. Recognizable around the world for her iconic hairstyle — a crown-like braid — Tymoshenko has been a controversial figure in Ukraine. For years, allegations of corruption involving her dealings in the gas industry and politics swirled around her. In 2011, Tymoshenko was found guilty of abuse of power and

sentenced to seven years in prison. In the midst of the so-called Euromaidan (literally meaning "Eurosquare") protests Tymoshenko was freed from a prison hospital. She later appeared in Kyiv's Independence Square in a wheelchair, reportedly suffering from serious back problems, and announced her intention to run for president. Although weakened by the split in her own party, she still maintains the leadership of Fatherland.



Andriy Sadovyi

Sadovyi is the founder and leader of the Self-Reliance party, which finished third in the 2014 parliamentary election. He has not taken a seat in parliament, however, preferring to maintain his office as mayor of Lviv, which he has been holding since 2006. His past features less political roles and skirmishes than most of the other leaders', being instead centred on social and economic activities in Lviv. In July 2014 his house was hit by a grenade, but Sadovyi escaped death.



Yuriy Boyko

Boyko has been elected in parliament leading the electoral list of the Opposition Bloc. He has held important offices under President Viktor Yanukovich, namely Minister of Energy and Vice Prime Minister. He was Chairman of Naftohaz Ukrayiny before being made Minister of Energy for a first time when Yanukovich was Prime Minister, from 2006 to 2007. Stuck into an opposition role by the pro-European governing coalition, in November 2016 he has physically attacked Oleh Lyashko after being called a "Kremlin agent".

2.5 Media Landscape and Civil Society

Media Landscape

The media landscape is diverse and comprises a large number of state and private broadcast, print and online outlets. However, the lack of autonomy of the media from political or corporate interests often affects their editorial independence. Furthermore, poor professional standards leave room for a blurring between journalism and paid-for coverage. The primary source of public information in Ukraine is television, while Internet is increasing its role and importance as a source of information by offering a wide range of views. The state-owned broadcast media, which includes national, regional and municipal channels, has been transformed into a public-service broadcaster by the Law on Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine. The introduction of this law was a long-standing OSCE/ODIHR recommendation.

The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, and the media legal framework generally provides for media freedom. In a positive development, parliament adopted amendments to a set of laws to reinforce effective access to public information. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission media interlocutors in most parts of the country reported that media outlets' and journalists' freedom slowly grew over the pre-election period. By contrast, freedom of the media has been a constant major concern in the east of Ukraine, and to a lesser extent in the south: journalists and media operating there have faced constant and severe threats and harassment, including kidnapping and short detentions of journalists and seizure of media outlets. Ukraine has engaged in a media war with Russia, banning Russian channels, films, social networks and websites. Official bans or attacks and threats have also hit media outlets and journalists perceived to be pro-separatist or extremely critical of the authorities. De facto, however, official bans are not respected in several cases in Donetsk and Luhans'k oblasts. Instead, on several occasions, the signal of some national and regional Ukrainian broadcasters was taken off the air and replaced by Russian TV channels by anti-governments forces in these two oblasts. Particularly harsh is the climate against journalists and media outlets in Crimea, where Ukrainian and independent journalists are either expelled or face imprisonment.

Maidan has helped to expand the Ukrainian media landscape and launched many independent initiatives. Euromaidan fostered the emerging phenomenon of 'citizen journalism' and helped to create a number of new independent news outlets, such as the Internet TV channel Hromadske TV, media platforms such as Spilno TV, and social media initiatives, such as EuromaidanPR. Channels such as Spilno TV aim to become a civil initiative to bring together different cultural and civil education projects. All of these arose as a response to citizen demands for an open and pluralistic public media sphere.

Civil Society

Euromaidan has become a catalyst for strengthening Ukrainian civil society. Not only has it given a new impetus to the existing civil society organisations, it has redrawn the boundaries of civil

society as a whole. Civil society in Ukraine — understood here as an arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purpose, and values, including trade unions and professional associations — has become more diverse. It includes an array of actors and institutional forms with varying degrees of formality, autonomy, and power. Euromaidan has brought about a decisive break with the typical 'post-Soviet' model of civil society, whereby formally registered non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with small and sometimes non-existent memberships, operated within a bubble of the donor-created 'aid industry' and enjoyed little support from society. Overall, post-Soviet societies were generally characterised by apathy, low social capital (meaning the quality and density of social networks and interactions beyond one's immediate family and friends) and profound mistrust of all public institutions.

Euromaidan has led to a number of qualitative changes that include the emergence of new actors and new patterns of social organisation, a rise in social capital and a change in attitude of the society towards the state. A large number of grassroots organizations have been established, each with their own goals and ways of working defined by public demand, voluntary action and networked structures; and — crucially — sustained by voluntary contributions. Euromaidan itself was a powerful and unprecedented volunteer movement that revealed an incredible capacity for organization on the part of civil society. The so-called 'Civil Sector of Maidan' that emerged after the first round of police violence on 30 November 2013 consisted of some 30 coordinators and almost a hundred activists, with the help of thousands of volunteers, engaged full-time in meeting the daily needs of a protest camp in the middle of a harsh winter and under constant threat of a police crackdown. Bottom-up mobilization, crowd funding, voluntary support from Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and volunteering were Euromaidan's defining features.

Overall, as in many other places around the world, Ukraine saw an expansion of the public sphere via the internet, a rise in independent journalism, and the emergence of new mobilization tools as well as types of volunteer activism. Taken together, these recent civil initiatives and protests helped to expose governance deficiencies and raised awareness about the need to change the system as a whole as opposed to merely acting at a more local level. They became important formative experiences for the activists involved (mobilization, organizational skills, crowd funding, legal support etc.) as well as for the public in general (an increase in awareness and in individual financial contributions). Euromaidan has become a catalyst and a unifying factor for all these disparate tendencies and it has changed the nature and reconfigured the boundaries of Ukrainian civil society. These changes were short-lived in Crimea, however, where Russian authorities have limited the freedom of expression and association and persecute all those individuals and groups suspected of pro-Ukrainian views.

2.6 Security Sector

The ongoing events and violence in various parts of the country have resulted in an increasing erosion of law and order. The armed groups in the Donbas do not recognize the authority of the Ukrainian Government. In the areas of the East that they control the rule of law has collapsed, also due to a humanitarian crisis which grows in size year after year. The police are de facto under the control of armed groups. Police investigations concerning crimes attributed to armed groups are not conducted. During evening hours, the police do not respond to phone calls made on the emergency line. Some courts continue operating, but even in these there have been examples of hearings being interrupted by armed groups entering the courtroom. Public buildings, such as those hosting the local or regional branches of the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Prosecutor, the State Security Service (SBU) and local government institutions, are occupied and have been often used to detain and torture civic activists, journalists or political opponents. Criminal proceedings or other legal measures initiated by the Ministry of the Interior and the Prosecutor General of Ukraine remain a dead letter in territories controlled by the armed groups. The armed groups claim that they are putting into place parallel ‘institutions’. For example, they claimed a ‘prosecution system’ had been set up, and that a ‘court martial’ temporarily carried out (unlawful) judiciary functions. They claim that a special (illegal) ‘military police’ is in the process of being created as well as a Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, replicated from the Russian equivalents.

The Ukrainian security operation involves the army, the National Guard, the National Security Service (SBU) and a number of volunteers’ battalions. The involvement of battalions of volunteers (Donbas, Azov, Aydar, Dnipro, Ukraina, etc.) raises important questions. While they nominally operate under the command of

the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence, they appear to enjoy a large degree of autonomy in their operation. There are allegations of human rights violations committed by these battalions. Currently four types should be distinguished: operational assignment battalions, special police forces battalions (both are under the Ministry of the Interior), battalions of territorial defence (under the Ministry of Defence), and self-organized battalions who do not subordinate or report to State institutions. On 3 July 2014 the Ministry of the Interior created a special department, tasked with overseeing the activity of its battalions. However, the legal basis for the functioning of other battalions is not as clear. The Ministry of the Interior said it was deeply concerned about these groups and has slowly acted to reach out to as many of them as possible with a view to integrating them into existing battalions. This would solve the question of their legality and would also allow for coordination of their activities. Heavy armament, including tanks, military aviation and helicopters are used in addition to artillery. The armed groups also use heavy weaponry, including missiles and tanks.

Incidents involving civilian deaths have occurred without any possibility to ascertain beyond any doubt whether the casualties were caused by Ukrainian forces or armed groups. The authorities of Ukraine can legitimately claim they have a duty to restore law and order, including, if necessary, by resorting to force. However, in any law enforcement operation security forces must act proportionally to the threat and must at all times respect the right to life. In addition, in the conduct of hostilities all those involved in the hostilities must comply with principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions. This is particularly important in an environment in which armed groups and civilians are intermingled.

3. Law enforcement structures and actors

3.1 The Police

Ukraine's law enforcement sector has recently undergone many important changes prompted by the Maidan protests. Ukrainian police was previously known as the *Militsiya* and was formed under Soviet rule. The *Militsiya* was directly under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and underwent harsh criticism in the aftermath of the protests. The Ministry and the police had often been blamed for corruption and ineffectiveness, as well as allegations of torture and abuse. Calls were made from many sides for a thorough reform that could tackle the various malpractices. The police reform became one of the cornerstones of the coalition agreement between the parties supporting the Second Yatsenyuk Government, after the October 2014 parliamentary election.

The Reform Process

The first plans for reforms were presented by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Arsen Avakov, on December 10, announcing the reduction of police personnel in Ukraine to 160,000 members. In the following months 2,000 new policemen and policewomen, selected from 33,000 applicants, were trained in a US-led program as members of a new police patrol in Kiev. In July 2015 they officially started patrolling the capital, wearing body cameras whose records were made public, in order to prove their honesty. The new units were welcomed with favour by the population, in particular for their perceived immunity from bribing. By September new patrol units had been established in Kharkiv, Odessa and Lviv, where, similarly to Kiev, the *Militsiya* remained present, although confined to precincts and administrative duties.

Meanwhile, the so-called Law On the National Police was approved in Parliament on July 20, to come into effect on November 7. On November 7 the *Militsiya* was officially replaced nationwide by the National Police of Ukraine; its former officers were renamed "temporarily acting members" of the new National Police, allowing for their progressive re-evaluation and re-training. This transition period ended in October 2016, when then-Head of the National Police, Khatia Dekanoidze, announced the end of the integrity checks, the dismissal of 26% of police commanders and the promotion of new policemen and policewomen to replace 4,400 demoted police members. Members of the new police receive higher salaries than the old *Militsiya* to decrease the risk of corruption. Upon formation, over a quarter were female, one of the highest rates in the world.

The National Police

The personnel of the National Police of Ukraine currently amounts to 130,000 members, of whom 119,000 are police officers. While the former *Militsiya* was directly controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the figures of the Minister and the Head of the *Militsiya* coinciding, the National Police has its own Head – currently Police General Serhiy Kniaziev.

The National Police is divided into several departments, the most important being:

- Criminal Operatives Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Criminal Intelligence Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Counter-Trafficking Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Department on Combating Drug-Related Crimes (within the Criminal Police);
- Surveillance Service Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Technical Operations Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Department for Hazardous Materials Actions (within the Criminal Police);
- Criminal Analysis Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Internal Security Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Cyber-Police Department (within the Criminal Police);
- Department on Combating Financial Crimes (within the Criminal Police);
- Preventive Activity Department;
- Water and Air Police Department;
- International Police Cooperation Department;
- Main Investigation Department;
- Analytical Support and Operations Department;
- Guard Police Department;
- Department of Patrol Police.

To these are added the following special units:

- Special Operations Police, deployed to special-status areas or regions hit by natural disasters;
- Rapid Operational Response Unit (KORD), designed for stand-offs involving hostages and for heavy fighting.

Territorial departments are present in each region, with the exception of the transregional Patrol Police Department, Internal Security Department, Cyber-Police Department, Department on Combating Financial Crimes and Guard Police Department.

Ranks

Ukrainian police members are thus ranked:

- Junior officers:
 - Constable, Police officer;
 - Corporal;
 - Sergeant;
 - Staff Sergeant;
- Senior officers:
 - Junior lieutenant;
 - Lieutenant;

- Senior lieutenant;
- Captain;
- Supervisory officers:
 - Major;
 - Lieutenant colonel;
 - Colonel;
- Staff officers:
 - Third division general;
 - Second division general;
 - First division general.

Current Risks to the Reform Process

The reform process has been suffering since the beginning from a range of possibly very serious drawbacks. Some commentators expressed concern at a reform they viewed as top-down, which left very little space for the contribution of the civil society in shaping the new police body and its duties. The true challenge, however, have been the continuous skirmishes between the new National Police and the Ukrainian judiciary.

The new police was established as an autonomous body, formally and substantially independent from the previously widespread control of the prosecutors. Since then many investigations have been launched into police officers for wrongdoings. Police members and supporters claim investigations are prompted by the desire to reassert control and discredit the police, rather than by actual wrongdoings. In February 2016, after an officer shot dead the passenger of a speeding BMW in a tense chase in Kiev, his being charged with willful murder sparked a wave of protests in the capital against the prosecutor's decision. Also the European Union and the United States have expressed their concerns over the role of the General Prosecutor's office. Various senior figures within the National Police have been sacked or resigned in the past years, blaming the resistances against the reform. Former Head Khatia Dekanoidze complained as well for the forced reinstatements of many officers who had been dismissed after the integrity checks. Added to the tight budget of the police, these developments make further work needed to ensure the complete success of the reform.

3.2 Other security forces

Security Service of Ukraine

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) replaced in 1990 the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic's branch of the KGB. It is tasked with the protection of the national sovereignty, constitutional order, territorial integrity, defence potential, legal interests and civil rights in Ukraine from intelligence and subversion activities of foreign special services and from unlawful interference attempted by organisations, groups and individuals, as well as with ensuring the protection of state secrets. It is directly under the control of the Presidency and consists of a Central Apparatus located in Kiev and split into several function-based departments, as well as 26 regional departments. Great importance has within it the Anti-Terrorist Center, which coordinates the actions of various ministries and state agencies in the fight against terrorism.

The 2014 revolution marked a turning point in the history of the Service, allegedly involved in the infiltration of the Maidan Square protests. The new SBU head, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, claimed most former leadership had fled to Russia or Crimea, leaving no files or weapons in the headquarters' buildings. Reportedly around 10% of the SBU members left to Russia or Crimea, and a great effort against infiltrations was put in place by Nalyvaichenko. In July 2015 he claimed no serious risk was still present, after the arrest of hundreds of operatives and the replacement of most of the central and regional leadership. The service, however, has not yet undergone a structural reform to differentiate itself from the pre-Euromaidan era.

National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine

The Anti-Corruption Bureau was established in 2014 by the Law "On the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine". The Bureau began its operations in 2015, with the appointment of Artem Sytnyk as its own Director and of Nazar Kholodnitskiy as Head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. Its declared mission is "cleansing government of corruption in order to enable formation and development of successful society and efficient state". To this aim, it prevents, exposes, stops, investigates and solves corruption-related offences committed by high officials. Both directors, as well as all the employees of the Bureau (with the exception of the Deputy Directors) were chosen through an open competition, a method which helped consolidate the trust of the public in the new institution.

National Guard of Ukraine

Disbanded in 2000 and merged into the Internal Troops, the Ukrainian National Guard was re-established in 2014 after the Crimean and Donbass crises under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It is currently composed of a mixture of

recruited personnel and volunteers, some of which are immediately deployed and others await call-up as reserves. Although mainly intended and deployed for the support of regular troops in clashes in the Donbass region, some National Guard units are also tasked with police functions, in particular Patrol Units and Public Security Protection Units. Important State Facilities Protection Units guard missile and nuclear plants.

Special Tasks Patrol Police

The Special Tasks Patrol Police is a law enforcement body composed of volunteers, hurriedly established in the aftermath of the 2014 revolution and the Crimean and Donbass crises. Its units' roles and duties vary greatly across Ukraine, but many have been involved in clashes with pro-Russian separatists.

Administration of State Guard of Ukraine

This law enforcement body is specifically tasked with the protection of State officials and institutions. It is formally subordinated to the President of Ukraine and under the control of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Special Forces of Ukraine

Ukrainian Special Forces units are employed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, The Ministry of Defense and the Security Service – whose unit is still named after the Soviet-era Alpha Group. During the 2014 events it is claimed some of these forces contributed to Yanukovich's attempts to suppress the protests. Their differing institutional loyalties mean that the various units had different fates. Many were disbanded or had their commanders sacked; most of the remaining ones were sent East to operate against pro-Russian separatists, in the absence of numerous enough regular-army units. The Berkut special forces unit, employed by the police and among the most infamous ones, was soon disbanded; plans were almost immediately set out to replace it and other special police forces with a new US-trained SWAT, the KORD – Corps of Operatively-Rapid Action – first deployed in 2016. Most of the candidates were former officers of pre-Euromaidan *Militsiya* special forces units such as Berkut, Sokil and Gryfon.

State Service for Medications and Drug Control

The Service is a law enforcement agency under the control of the Ministry of Healthcare. Besides its regulatory and policy-implementation powers in the field of drugs production and quality and safety licensing, it also plays a role in the fight against drug trafficking.

3.3 The judiciary

Similarly to the Ukrainian police, the judiciary of Ukraine has undergone some major reforms as well. The reforms have been implemented since the adoption of the “Law on the Court System and the Status of Judges” together with a series of amendments to the Constitution on 2 June 2016. The previous judicial system was structured over four levels of hearings: Local Courts, Courts of Appeal, three different High Courts and a Supreme Court. The High Courts were divided into an Administrative Court, a Commercial Court and a civil- and criminal-case Court. Judges were appointed by the President for a 5-year probe period at the end of which, if deemed worthy, they were confirmed for life by the Parliament in an attempt to insulate them from political pressure.

The General Prosecutor’s office wielded considerable power, retaining many of the powers of its Soviet-era predecessor. It was in particular responsible for overseeing the legality of actions of all State bodies, including the Courts. This led to a major influence of the executive power over the judiciary, prompting protests and widespread criticism, and which, added to common perception of corruption in the judicial system, generated a general mistrust of Courts and judges.

The Reform

The constitutional and legislative changes introduced in 2016 are meant to tackle corruption and political interferences in the judiciary. The four-tier system has been replaced by three levels of hearings: Local courts, Courts of Appeal and a Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is composed of a Grand Chamber and four Courts of Cassation, handling respectively civil, criminal, administrative and commercial cases. Two new specialized Courts have been added as well: the High Specialized Court on Intellectual Property and the High Specialized Anti-corruption Court. It is hoped this new system will reduce phenomena such as inconsistencies in the application of the law and “forum shopping”.

The independence of judges should be granted by the establishment of a new body, the Supreme Council of Justice, with the role of nominating new judges for appointment by the President of Ukraine. Judges will not be required to stand a probation period of 5 years anymore, their resilience to

corruption and political influence instead being strengthened by increasing their salary and limiting their immunity to functional immunity: judges are protected from liability deriving from their judicial actions only. At the same time judges are required to yearly submit a disclosure of their family ties and a declaration of integrity. They are required to justify all the sources of their funds and assets, risking their own dismissal from service otherwise.

The General Prosecutor’s functions have been significantly reduced. They are currently limited to the organisation and leadership of pre-trial investigations, the support of public prosecution in the Courts and the representation of the state’s interest in the Courts, according to the law. Excluding the still broad procedural oversight powers of the body in investigations, the other amendments aim at the establishment of an office much more similar to its Western counterparts and with a reduced influence over the judiciary. Finally, only state-licensed lawyers are allowed to represent their clients before Courts, and the access to the Constitutional Court has been broadened to all individuals and companies.

The Current Situation

As of 2016, Ukraine was ranked as 131st out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Although the new reforms have been welcomed as an important step towards ending widespread corruption, many challenges still lie ahead. As it was already claimed with reference to the activities of the National Police, many complained about the supposed resistance of the country’s judicial system against anti-corruption measures. The publication of the details of some judges’ wealth, in compliance with the new law, sparked protests against those whose properties were far superior to their annual salary. The National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption is carrying out investigations into some of these wealth disclosures, in order to establish the legality of the sources of the disclosed properties. Some relevant investigations and subsequent arrests have shown the first results of the country’s efforts, such as the opening of a criminal case against judge Yemelianov in 2017.

4. Migrations and Human Rights Issues

4.1 Internal and International Migration

In total, there are over 1,653,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) in the country. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring centre (IDMC) these are divided into two distinct groups, with most of them having fled from eastern Ukraine, and a minority from Crimea, mainly to the eastern regions that stand between Donetsk and Kiev. While the latter group of IDPs are mainly politically active supporters of the new Ukrainian government, the public perception of the former group is that of separatist sympathizers, unwilling to work and ready to cause trouble. In Crimea — following the secession referendum in March 2014 — threats or acts of violence on the basis of political allegiance, ethnicity or religion have fuelled much of the displacement. Politically active supporters of the Euromaidan movement that overthrew the last president, as well as the Crimean Tatars, an ethnic minority of over 240,000 on the peninsula with a history of anti-Russian sentiment due to being deported from Crimea by Stalin in the past, are being particularly targeted by the new Russian authorities and their supporters.

While many of the Crimean IDPs assumed their displacement would be temporary, the current reality is that they will most likely remain displaced on mainland Ukraine for longer, because they are not willing to return to Crimea as long as it is part of Russia. Moreover, they are unable to access their savings due to the closure of Ukrainian banks in the peninsula, and are unable to sell their assets because of new property registration systems that the Russian authorities are putting in place which

will prevent the displaced from selling their original property. This in turn will make it even harder for them to rebuild their lives in the longer term. On the other hand, most IDPs from the eastern part of Ukraine are women and children fleeing from conflict. Men also fled but in fewer numbers as some opted to remain and protect the family property, while others have been unable to pass through either separatist checkpoints, or the Ukrainian army; the former draft men to fight against the army, while the latter are suspicious of men for this same reason.

With the Ukraine government still reeling from Euromaidan events and the ousting of the former president, their capacity to respond was limited. Despite this, local and regional authorities were able to provide immediate aid and services, including temporary housing. Largely it has been the local NGOs, volunteer, and international organizations that have stepped up to assist IDPs in terms of helping them to find employment, finance and housing, as well as providing immediate humanitarian assistance. Housing and access to basic services and social benefits are still hard to obtain for IDPs, and no improvements are in sight yet; this even led some to return to their conflict-torn areas of origin due to not being able to afford to live in government-controlled areas.

External displacement represents a serious issue as well, with many Ukrainians leaving their fatherland and searching for a refuge in other countries. 427,000 Ukrainians have requested asylum in Russia since the beginning of the crisis, and another 20,000 have fled as asylum seekers to Italy or Germany.

4.2 Human Rights Situation

Universal and regional human rights instruments ratified

Ukraine is a party to most core international human rights instruments, including: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Ukraine is a party to a number of regional European treaties, including: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the abolition of the death penalty in times of peace; Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR concerning the general prohibition of discrimination; Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances; the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities; the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages; the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.

Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity

As reported by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, intense and sustained fighting, as a result of the continuing violence by the armed groups and the ongoing security operation being undertaken by the Ukrainian Government, has taken a heavy toll on the human rights and humanitarian situation in eastern Ukraine since the start of hostilities. The total number of people killed (civilians, military personnel and some members of armed groups), according to cautious HRMMU (United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine) estimates, is over 10,000, of which almost 3,000 are civilians. Intensified fighting, including the use of heavy weaponry (artillery, tanks, rockets and missiles), in the east of Ukraine continued to cause considerable loss of life among civilians as well as members of the Ukrainian armed forces and armed groups. The fighting lines still cross the suburbs of Donetsk and Luhansk cities, and a number of other settlements are arenas of fighting. There have been numerous reports alleging the indiscriminate use of weapons, such as artillery, mortars and multiple rocket launcher systems, in and around the densely populated areas. Ukrainian officials have reiterated that the Ukrainian armed forces never target populated areas. These officials suggest that all reported cases of such targeting should be attributed to the armed groups only. However, in those urban settlements, which have been controlled by the armed groups and insistently attacked by the Ukrainian armed forces, responsibility for at least some of the resulting casualties and damage to civilian objects lies with the Ukrainian armed forces. On the other hand, the armed groups are locating their military weaponry within or near densely populated areas, and launching attacks from such areas. This constitutes a violation of international humanitarian law by the

armed groups. However, such actions by the armed groups do not absolve the Ukrainian armed forces of the need to respect their obligations under international law, including upholding the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.

Arbitrary and illegal detention and enforced disappearances

a) Detention by Ukrainian armed forces and police

As the Government's security operation continues, a number of people suspected of collaborating with or belonging to the armed groups have been detained by the Security Service of Ukraine, by territorial battalions under the Ministry of Defence, or by special battalions under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The cases followed by the HRMMU suggest that there have been violations of the criminal procedural law during some of these arrests, particularly regarding detention by the volunteer battalions. People are being detained without being given any explanation, for example while they were leaving the security operation areas affected by the fighting and security operation, and questioned without being delivered to law enforcement agencies. The presumption of innocence and privacy rights of those detained have been violated when their apprehension was filmed and made public through the Internet and TV. Detainees' relatives were often not notified about the detention, and legal aid was rarely made available. According to the Criminal Code, an illegal detention is a crime, and as a consequence, the individual who is unlawfully detained must be immediately released. This does not seem to have been the case for those arrests which the HRMMU followed: in the few cases of what appeared to be arbitrary detention that were brought to the attention of a court, releases have been rare.

The HRMMU continues to receive reports of cases of enforced disappearances, summary executions and deaths of people in custody by Ukrainian forces in the areas restored to the control of the Government. These cases involve both civilians targeted because of their alleged affiliation to the separatists and armed people captured or caught *hors combat*. Even Ukrainian military officers have reportedly been assassinated due to their alleged role of whistle-blowers. Some judges overlook procedural irregularities in the arrest and detention of individuals suspected of "anti-Ukrainian" activities, and put little effort into the prosecution of Ukrainian armed men responsible for torture and executions. In one of the southern regions of Ukraine, for example, senior law enforcement officials stated that pro-unity (or pro-Maidan) activists were considered "heroes" and Ukrainian patriots and were given "immunity" from being arrested or prosecuted.

b) Detention by the armed groups

In the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR), local security services operate in a total vacuum of rule of law, which deprives people in their custody of their rights and leaves them without recourse to any remedies. Victims come from all walks of life: police, servicemen, border guards and security personnel; journalists;

judges, advocates and prosecutors; local executives, city and regional council officials; politicians and civil activists; volunteers involved in humanitarian action; and many persons not affiliated to any of the warring parties and who were not engaged in any public activity. Local “Ministries of State Security” use their powers under local “decrees” to detain individuals arbitrarily for up to 30 days and repeatedly extend this time limit. Detained people’s rights are violated, torture is reportedly practised and custody conditions are inadequate.

According to the adviser to the Minister of Defence on the release of captives and hostages, Ukrainian military personnel (who comprise on average 10-15% of all people in captivity of the armed groups) are kept separately from civilians, usually in decent conditions and treated according to the “rules of war” and “officers dignity”. According to him, other detainees are usually kept in basements and in very poor conditions. Their release almost entirely depends on the efforts of relatives, civil activists and international organisations. Negotiations on an exchange of detainees with the armed groups mostly involve a swap for Ukrainian servicemen. On 27 December 2017, the biggest swap since the beginning of hostilities took place as 230 prisoners of the Ukrainian armed forces were sent to separatist-held areas in exchange for 74 detainees held by the pro-Russian side.

Summary executions are reportedly widespread also on the pro-Russian side, with features similar to those of their opponents. Moreover, executions seem to be carried out also as a means of maintaining discipline among the ranks of the armed groups.

Accountability for Human Rights Violations

Much work is still needed in order to make the responsible for human rights violations accountable, regardless of their political role or affiliation. In July 2016, parliament passed a controversial amnesty law, absolving combatants involved in the “security operations” in eastern Ukraine of criminal responsibility for non-grave crimes. In August, President Petro Poroshenko vetoed the law. In the same months, Ukrainian difficulties in ensuring accountability were made clear by the case of the head of Aidar battalion, Valentin Liholit, who had been arrested on charges of abduction, robbery, and other violent crimes against civilians. At Liholit’s remand hearing, Aidar battalion members blocked the court building, while several members of parliament disrupted the hearing inside, demanding his release. The court released him, pending further investigation. Also in July, a former member of the Tornado police battalion was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for torture and rape, likely to be followed by twelve other former members of the battalion, including the commander, who were under investigation for sexual violence, robbery, and other violent crimes. At an August court hearing, Tornado supporters clashed with law enforcement, injuring 27 law enforcement officers.

Authorities have made some progress toward accountability for abuses during the 2014 Maidan protests by government forces against protesters. In June 2016, authorities charged four members of the Berkut riot police battalion with killing 3 protesters and injuring 35. However, the investigation been marred by bureaucratic hurdles. Trials continued also in relation

the 2014 political violence in Odessa. In May and June 2016, when courts ruled to release “pro-federalism” defendants from pretrial detention, “pro-unity” activists temporarily blocked the courts and threatened to harm the defendants. On both occasions police eventually rearrested the defendants. “Pro-unity” activists were not held accountable for disrupting court proceedings, and in one case, some were invited to testify against the defendants. On 24 October 2016 the Prosecutor General reduced the staff and the powers of the special department responsible for the Euromaidan abuses investigations, and created a new unit to investigate only former President Viktor Yanukovich and his close confidants. It is hoped that a renewed effort could be made possible by the creation of the new State Investigation Bureau, established to investigate crimes committed by law enforcement officials and the military.

The UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT) suspended its visit to Ukraine on 25 May 2016 after the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) denied it access to some of its facilities in eastern Ukraine where secret prisoners were reportedly held and probably tortured or ill-treated. The SPT resumed and completed its visit in September and produced a report which the Ukrainian authorities did not give their consent to publish.

Religious Freedom

Although Ukrainian constitutional and legal structures contribute to the free exercise of religion, there have been a number of reports of societal abuse of religious freedoms. Ukrainian government officials have spoken openly about the government’s commitment to religious freedom and non-intervention in religious affairs. Ukraine has no official state religion, and the public school system is not allowed to present any type of religious curriculum. The Ukrainian parliament has passed a number of laws to prevent religious discrimination, including hate crime laws and penalties for desecration of religious sites. Religious organisations are required to register with the central government; however, the guidelines and procedures are not transparent and cause considerable confusion. When societal abuses based on religious beliefs or practices have occurred in recent years, the targets were most often Ukraine’s Jewish and Muslim communities.

In 2010, Ukraine’s Jewish community reported multiple instances of anti-Semitism, including the desecration of the Ternopilin Jewish cemetery in April 2010 and the distribution of anti-Semitic literature in Sudak during January 2010. Criticism over anti-Semitism in Ukraine flared up again during the June 2012 World Cup, as spectators yelled slurs and performed Nazi salutes. Much of Ukraine’s religious tension occurred in the semi-autonomous region of Crimea, where the Muslim Crimean Tatars face discrimination at the hands of the Christian, ethnically Russian majority. Muslim Tatars struggled to secure land for mosques and cemeteries, although they won a major victory in February 2011 as the city of Sevastopol almost unanimously approved the building plans for what became the first mosque in Ukraine. After the Russian occupation the Tatar minority has been harshly repressed and its representation body, the Mejlis, has been suspended and then banned by Russian authorities.

Death Penalty

In 2000 Ukraine withdrew capital punishment from its list of official punishments in line with Council of Europe requirements.

In August 2014, the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic, or DNR, said it would bring in military tribunals with the right to pass the death sentence for a string of offences including treason, espionage, attempts on the lives of the leadership and sabotage.

5. The UN and Ukraine

5. The UN and Ukraine

Ukraine's attainment of sovereignty and independence in 1991 ushered in both an utterly new page in its historical development and a range of issues, which, if not resolved, would seriously undermine its chances for integration into the world community. Questions appeared about upgrading the country's overall infrastructure to conform to international standards, especially in economics, medicine, education and the social sphere, about attaining an open, democratic society, the protection of natural resources, human resource management, and the development of new information and communications technologies. In order to accelerate Ukraine's integration into the world community, the people's will was needed — and also the assistance of international organisations.

The United Nations was one of the first to provide such assistance, having opened its representative office in Kyiv in 1992. In June of 1999 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recognising that a number of agencies were working under one roof, gave the office UN House status. The official UN House in Ukraine opening ceremony took place on 14 June 2000. The UN System Resident Coordinator is the head of UN House. Operating on the full authority of the UN Secretary-General, the coordinator has full responsibility for and direction over all aspects and activities of the UN and its institutions in the country where the representative office is located. They work in partnership with governmental institutions, and with international and donor organisations. The Resident Coordinator's main purpose is to coordinate the efforts of UN institutions and international organizations to provide Ukraine with specific assistance, in order to accelerate the country's steady progress toward humanitarian, social and economic

development, and the world's democratic standards, and also in order to resolve current and future obstacles and to facilitate the Ukraine-world and world-Ukraine integration process.


The UN following agencies are active in Ukraine:

- the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);
- the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA);
- the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- the International Organization for Migration (IOM);
- the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR);
- the World Health Organization (WHO);
- the International Labour Organization (ILO);
- the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/ AIDS (UNAIDS).

Also active are UN related organizations, such as:

- the International Monetary Fund (IMF);
- the World Bank;
- the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC);
- the International Finance Corporation (IFC).

Ukraine is a state which to date has signed seven important United Nations international conventions and treaties on human rights. Ukraine is also among 188 other countries, which supported and obligated themselves to implement the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals approved by the UN General Assembly.



UN Agencies in Ukraine. Source: UN

Blueprint for collaboration between UN and Ukraine

On 30 November 2017 representatives of the UN system in Ukraine and the Government of Ukraine signed the Partnership Framework for 2018-2022, a five-year strategic document which identifies areas of cooperation and partnership between the UN system and the Government of Ukraine and replaces the UN Development Assistance Framework for Ukraine 2012-2016. The Government of Ukraine – UN Partnership Framework 2012-2016 emphasizes the principle of partnership and leading role of the Ukrainian side in setting priorities and goals of the UN assistance and mutual accountability for effective cooperation. This Partnership Framework sets the common strategic planning basis for UN development operations and assistance at country level for the next five years in four main areas:

- Sustainable economic growth, environment and employment;

- Equitable access to quality and inclusive services and social protection;
- Democratic governance, rule of law and civic participation;
- Human security, social cohesion and recovery with a particular focus on Eastern Ukraine.

20 UN agencies take part towards achievement of these goals, including FAO, IAEA, IFC, ILO, IOM, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNECE, UNEP, UNES- CO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNHCR, UNODC, UN Women, World Bank and WHO. The preliminary resources committed by the UN agencies towards the achievement of the set goals total USD 675 million.

5.1 The UN and the Ukrainian crisis

The first Security Council meeting on the situation in Ukraine was held on 28 February 2014. The meeting was called for by the Permanent Representative of Ukraine by a letter dated 28 February, “due to the deterioration of the situation in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea”.

On 15 March, the draft Resolution S/2014/189 was vetoed by the Russian Federation. Noting that “Ukraine had not authorized the referendum on the status of Crimea”, the Council would have declared “that the referendum [had] no validity, and [could not] form the basis for any alteration of the status of Crimea”. If the resolution were adopted, the Council would have “called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of Crimea on the basis of this referendum”. On 27 March, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine — A/RES/68/262. The General Assembly “underscored that the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol”. For this reason, the Assembly “called upon all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on the basis of the above-mentioned referendum and to refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as recognizing any such altered status”.


OHCHR deployed a Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) as of 14 March, upon the invitation of the Government of Ukraine. The objectives of the HRMMU are to: monitor the human rights situation in the country and provide regular, accurate and public reports by the High Commissioner on the human rights situation and emerging concerns and risks; recommend concrete follow-up actions to relevant authorities, the UN and the international community on action to address the human rights concerns, prevent human rights violations and mitigate emerging risks; establish facts and circumstances and conduct a mapping of alleged human rights violations committed in the course of the demonstrations and ensuing violence between November 2013 and February 2014 and to

establish facts and circumstances related to potential violations of human rights committed during the course of the deployment. Mr. Armen Harutyunyan was appointed to lead the mission. HRMMU is currently deployed in Kyiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kramatorsk, Luhans’k and Odesa, and continues to monitor the situation in Crimea, in a manner consistent with the General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 on the Territorial Integrity of Ukraine. Various UN agencies are continuously involved as well in the relief efforts for war-torn areas.

The Security Council unanimously adopted S/RES/2166(2014) on 21 July 2014, which deplored “the downing of a civilian aircraft on an international flight, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, on 17 July in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine, with the loss of all 298 passengers and crew on board”. The Security Council on 17 February 2015 also adopted a resolution endorsing the 13-point accord on ending the Ukraine crisis agreed in Minsk – including a cease-fire – and called on all parties to the conflict to fully implement the cessation of hostilities. The Council also reacted to the surge in violence near the town of Adviiivka in early 2017. A press statement on 31 January 2017 condemned the escalation and the Council held a meeting on the theme on 2 February 2017, but it did not lead to further resolutions.

The HRMMU has continued to execute its mandate until now, reporting human rights violations on both sides of the conflict. Its last report, covering the facts from 16 August to 15 November, estimates 10,303 losses due to the clashes since the beginning of the conflict, with further 24,778 injured. A total of 23 reports on human-rights-related matters have been issued to date, denouncing much of the violations already exposed in particular in section 4.2: these include violations of rights to life, property and physical integrity, illegal detentions, enforced disappearances, violations of humanitarian law and of minorities’ rights, scarce accountability and hindrances to freedom of expression. Also a minimum of social rights is hardly respected, with living conditions deteriorating after four years of violence and pensions suspended or terminated for many civilians living in separatist-held areas. The HRMMU stressed how the humanitarian situation is now reaching unbearable levels, with no end in sight.

Ukraine: Civilian casualties along the contact line, 16 August - 15 November 2017



Clashes from 16 August to 15 November 2017 in Eastern Ukraine. Source: UN OHCHR

6. The EU - Ukraine Relations

6.1 A priority partner

The EU is committed to a policy of sequenced engagement with Ukraine and to a close relationship that encompasses gradual progress towards political association and economic integration. Ukraine is a priority partner country within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, which entered into force in 1998, provides a comprehensive framework for cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in key areas of reform.

An Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, was negotiated in 2007-2011 and initiated in 2012. On 10 December 2012, the Council of the European Union adopted Conclusions on Ukraine that affirmed the EU's commitment to signing the Agreement as soon as Ukraine had taken determined action and made tangible progress towards achieving the benchmarks set out in the Conclusions. An updated version of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda was also endorsed by the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council on 24 June 2013. On 21 November 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine took a decision to suspend preparations to sign the Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. The EU took note of the unprecedented public support in Ukraine for political association and economic integration with the EU. On 21 March 2014, after the Maidan


protests, the EU and Ukraine eventually signed the political provisions of the Association Agreement, underlining its commitment to proceed to the signature and conclusion of the remaining parts of the Agreement, which together with the political provisions constitute a single instrument. These steps confirm Ukraine's free and sovereign decision to pursue Ukraine's political association and economic integration with the European Union. Following the completion of technical preparations, the EU and Ukraine signed the remaining provisions of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in Brussels on 27 June of the same year. The Agreement has fully come into effect on 1 September 2017. The first effects of this progressive integration of the EU and Ukrainian market are already visible, with trade in goods increased by 23%.

The EU strongly condemns Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea as well as its involvement in the Donbas crisis, and maintains tough sanctions on the Russian economy and on Russian and Ukrainian individuals linked to it. European leaders and institutions have often voiced their support for the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the territorial integrity of Ukraine, stabilised through a progressive policy of decentralisation. Many cooperation programmes aim at the development of thorough reforms in many sectors of the Ukrainian economy, civil society and institutions.

European Union, Trade with Ukraine

Total goods: EU Trade flows and balance, annual data 2006 - 2016

Source Eurostat Comext - Statistical regime 4



6.2 Increased support and cooperation

Since spring 2014, the EU has pledged its political and financial support to Ukraine's ambitious reform timetable. Ukraine and the EU have jointly defined the Association Agenda, a reform agenda focused on constitutional, judicial, electoral, economic and administrative reforms, as well as the fight against corruption, whose progress the EU watches closely. Financial support amounts to €12.8 billion for the next few years to support the reform process.

Programmes committed and under implementation include, *inter alia*:

- €3.41 billion in loans as EU macro-financial assistance (MFA). The last €600 million will be disbursed upon the successful implementation of the measures specified in the memorandum of understanding jointly agreed by Ukraine and the EU;
- €3 billion in loans signed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) between 2014 and the end of 2016 to support infrastructure development and reforms in the transport, energy, agriculture, education and municipal sectors, as well as substantial financial and technical support for SME development;
- €2.7 billion in investment from 2014 to 2016 from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to help develop and reform, *inter alia*, the banking sector, agribusiness, and small businesses in Ukraine, including facilitating the purchase of \$300 million of gas for the 2015-2016 heating season;
- €879.2 million in grants including:
- A €355 million state building contract supporting the fight against corruption as well as the reforms of the public administration, the judiciary, the constitution and the electoral framework.
- A €10 million civil society programme to reinforce its capacity to support and monitor the reform process.

- A €110 million programme aimed at developing the private sector regulation;
- A €90 million decentralisation programme supporting local governance;
- A €15 million anti-corruption programme supporting the fight against corruption by the new dedicated institutions, the parliament, the media and civil society;
- A €28.5 and a €37.5 million technical cooperation facility (in 2016 and 2017 respectively) to raise Ukrainian public authorities' capacities in designing and implementing reforms;
- A €104 million Public Administration Reform programme;
- A €52.5 million programme providing support to justice and law enforcement reforms.
- €76.7 million from the to support election observation and confidence building measures, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), conflict-affected populations, restoration of governance and reconciliation in crisis-affected communities as well as police reform.

The EU has also increased its support for the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Ukraine, with funds from the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) from 2014 onwards. Assistance packages support or have supported the OSCE Election Observation missions and the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), as well as other confidence-building measures in Ukraine to be implemented by other organisations and civil society. €88.1 million have been also provided as humanitarian aid for conflict-affected population under government control and internally-displaced persons.

6.3 EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine

The European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched on 30 November 2005 following a request made jointly to the European Commission by the presidents of the Republic Moldova and Ukraine in order to counter a range of illicit cross-border activity, including trafficking of human beings, smuggling and other illegal trade.

The cooperation between the Mission and its Moldovan and Ukrainian partners is outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (the MoU), signed on 7 October 2005. EUBAM provides on-the-job training, technical assistance and advice to the Moldovan and Ukrainian border guard and customs services, reinforcing their capacity to tackle customs fraud, detect cases of smuggling and THB (trafficking in human beings), and carry out effective control and surveillance on the border between the two countries. The Mission provides dedicated training courses on key customs and border-control issues such as risk analysis and anti-smuggling techniques, organises study visits to EU member States in order to observe EU best practice and engage in information exchange, and at all stages tries to encourage improved inter-agency cooperation and harmonisation within each State, and on the cross-border level between the counterpart services of Moldova and Ukraine. EUBAM conducts regular joint border patrols with its partners, as well as special Joint Border Control Operations (JBCOs). Its support was critical in the creation of the Pre-Arrival Information Exchange System (PAIES), which since April 2008 has given the customs services of Moldova and Ukraine a way by which they can share, quickly access, and coordinate information on imports and exports, thereby helping to tackle customs fraud and other illicit activities.

EUBAM participates in two standing working groups with the host countries' border services: one focuses on illegal migration and THB, and the other on weapons smuggling, contraband and customs fraud. It also provides neutral, technical advice on implementation of the Joint Declaration (signed by the prime-ministers of Moldova and Ukraine in Dec 2005), which introduced a new customs regime whereby companies based in Transnistria can gain access to EU trade preferences for their exports provided they register with the customs authorities in Moldova. The pan-European Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy is a central part to the EU's security policy, and in Moldova and Ukraine EUBAM is also supporting its partners in the implementation of IBM action plans. Meanwhile, a Common Border Security Assessment Report (CBSAR) allows EUBAM and its partners to identify emerging trends and assess risks along the Moldova-Ukraine border; and technical expertise is made available to partners in both countries involved in demarcating the common border. The Mission is also assisting its partners with the implementation of visa liberalisation action plans. One of the Mission's top priorities is to support initiatives aimed at combating corruption. To this extent EUBAM is involved in a wide range of out-reach activities, in particular engaging civil society and the youth of Moldova and Ukraine. The Mission communicates with border communities through road shows and school presentations on a regular basis, and

disseminates public information material on border-control issues and customs procedures, hosting anti-corruption and summer schools for university students as well.

The Mission's aims are to:

- work with Moldova and Ukraine to harmonise border control, and customs and trade standards and procedures with those in EU Member States;
- improve cross-border cooperation between the border guard and customs agencies and other law enforcement bodies; facilitate international coordinated cooperation;
- assist Moldova and Ukraine to fulfil the obligations of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) they have signed as part of their Association Agreements with the EU;
- contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict through confidence building measures and a monitoring presence at the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border.

The EUBAM mandate allows the Mission to:

- Be present and observe customs clearance and border guard checks;
- As part of its advisory role, to examine border control documents and records (including computerised data);
- Provide assistance in preventing smuggling of persons and goods;
- Request the re-examination and re-assessment of any consignment of goods already processed;
- Make unannounced visits to any locations on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including border units, customs posts, offices of transit, inland police stations, revenue accounting offices and along transit routes;
- Move freely within the territories of Moldova and Ukraine;
- Use all roads and bridges without payment of taxes and dues;
- Cross the Moldovan-Ukrainian state border with only the strictly necessary control and without any delay;
- Have access to appropriate telecommunications equipment;
- Import and export goods which are for official use of the Mission.

EUBAM is comprised of 80 seconded and contracted staff mostly from EU member States, and approximately 120 staff from Moldova and Ukraine. Experts from EU countries typically have backgrounds in the border guard, customs service or police forces in their home countries; many are seconded by their governments to serve for periods in the Mission. As professionals committed to supporting the partner services of

the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and as ambassadors of the European Union, all EUBAM personnel adhere to the Mission's core values of neutrality, partnership, reliability, results, service and transparency.

6.4 EUAM Ukraine

The European Council established on 22 July 2014 the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), a civilian mission under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton said: "The Ukrainian Authorities have embarked on the critical path of civilian security sector reform and have requested the support of the European Union. The EU is deploying this mission to assist Ukraine in this reform, including police and the rule of law. It will provide strategic advice for the development of effective, sustainable and accountable security services that contribute to strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, for the benefit of all Ukrainian citizens throughout the country". The Council decision allocated a budget of € 2.68 million for the start-up phase of the mission, i.e. until 30 November 2014.

Mr. Kęstutis Lančinskas is currently Head of Mission. EUAM Ukraine is an unarmed, non-executive civilian mission. EU advisers focus on supporting the elaboration of revised security strategies and the rapid implementation of reforms, in coordination and coherence with other Ukrainian and EU efforts, as well as with the OSCE and other international partners. The headquarters of EUAM Ukraine are in Kiev, but other regional branches are present in Lviv and Kharkiv, with a third being set in Odesa. On 20 November 2017, the Council extended the mandate of EUAM in Ukraine until the 31 May 2019 and approved a budget of €32 million.

Mandate (article 2, Council Decision 2014/486/ CFSP of 22 July 2014):

1. In support of Ukraine's commitments to security sector reform, the non-executive civilian CSDP mission shall mentor and advise relevant Ukrainian bodies in the elaboration of renewed security strategies and in the consequent implementation of relevant comprehensive and cohesive reform efforts, in order to:

- create a conceptual framework for planning and implementing reforms that result in sustainable security services delivering the rule of law, in a manner that contributes to enhancing their legitimacy and to increased public confidence and trust, in full respect for human rights and consistent with the constitutional reform process;
- reorganize and restructure the security services in a way which permits recovering control and accountability over them.

To achieve its objectives, EUAM Ukraine shall operate in accordance with the parameters set out in the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) approved by the Council on 23 June 2014 and in the operational planning documents.

2. Within its initial mandate, the mission shall assist in a comprehensive civilian security sector reform planning process,

supporting rapid preparation and implementation of the reform measures.

Priorities

The mission has singled out five areas of priority interest:

- criminal investigation, i.e. strengthening the ability to fight organised crime and corruption. Strong and transparent criminal investigation capabilities are deemed essential to preserve the rule of law and protect citizens against crime, as well as strengthening the democratic process and public trust;
- human-resource management, in order to ensure the most optimal deployment of professionals to achieve reform. Main goals are the establishment of transparent recruitment processes, promotional systems favouring merit, disciplinary systems and training programmes;
- public order, ensured by State authorities maintaining peace and the right to assemble in accordance with international human-rights standards;
- delineation of competencies, a strategic approach which refers to the division of labour and the responsibilities of civilian security sector agencies;
- Community policing, in order to ensure that citizens have a right to say how they would like to be policed. Community policing involves building trust within communities through direct interaction and dialogue.

Three cross-cutting issues have also been individuated, which are equally important to each of the five priority areas. The EUAM mission deems as fundamental efforts aimed at prioritising human rights and gender equality, fighting corruption and improving governance. The final goal is to establish an efficient, accountable and trustworthy civilian security sector.

EUAM Ukraine has been cooperating with a number of agencies and institutions to date, namely the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, the Prosecutor General's Office, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, the Council of Judges of Ukraine, the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Assets Recovery and Management, the National Police, the Patrol Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Fiscal Service, the Security Service and the State Border Guards Service. Particularly relevant has been the legislative and organisational support of the mission to the establishment and strengthening of the new National Police, with many projects ranging from the restructuring of the police departments to the increase in responsiveness of police teams.

7. Other regional organisations and Ukraine

7.1 OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and other forms of engagement

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was deployed following a request to the OSCE by Ukraine's government and a consensus agreement by all 57 OSCE participating States (March 2014). The mission mandate was extended by Permanent Council Decision No. 1129 on 17 July 2014.

Mandate

The monitors are unarmed and mandated to contribute to reducing tensions and to help foster peace, stability and security. The Mission engages with authorities at all levels, as well as civil society, ethnic and religious groups and local communities to facilitate dialogue on the ground. The Mission gathers information and reports on the security situation, establish and report facts in response to specific incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles. The mandate of the Mission covers the entire territory of Ukraine; any change in deployment must be agreed by all 57 participating States. The Special Monitoring Mission has not conducted any election observation activities. Other missions from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) observed the preparations and campaigns ahead of the 25 May 2014 early presidential election and 27 November 2014 early parliamentary election. This election observation missions were sent to Ukraine following an invitation from Ukraine's authorities.

Tasks

- gather information and report on the security situation in the area of operation;
- establish and report facts in response to specific incidents and reports of incidents, including those concerning alleged violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments;
- monitor and support respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities;

- establish contact with local, regional and national authorities, civil society, ethnic and religious groups, and members of the local population, in order to fulfil the tasks;
- facilitate the dialogue on the ground in order to reduce tensions and promote normalization of the situation;
- report on any restrictions of the monitoring mission's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate;
- coordinate with and support the work of the OSCE executive structures, including the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, in full respect of their mandates, as well as co-operate with the United Nations, the Council of Europe and other actors of the international community.

Structure

The Mission currently consists of some 700 civilian monitors from more than 40 OSCE participating States, as well as 100 other international staff and around 400 local staff from Ukraine. The mission may be expanded up to 500 monitors. Each participating State can second monitors to take part in the Mission. The Mission is headed by the Chief Monitor, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan of Turkey. The Chief Monitor is assisted by a Principal Deputy Chief Monitor, Alexander Hug of Switzerland, and a Deputy Chief Monitor, Aleška Simkić of Slovenia. The Chief Monitor is responsible for ensuring that sufficient provisions are in place to safeguard the security and safety of mission members; security situation is constantly assessed and operations adjusted accordingly. Monitors are deployed in teams: each team consists of a team leader and nine or more monitoring officers. The monitors work in shifts to ensure cover on the ground 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The monitors report their observations to the OSCE and its participating States daily.



Initiative	What? Was consensus required?	Why / what for?	Who?	Where?	When?	How?
Special Monitoring Mission (21/3/14 - ongoing)	Large OSCE monitoring project. Consensus was required to deploy.	To create objective picture of the situation, monitor implementation of OSCE commitments, reduce tensions and foster stability	Ukraine requested, all other 56 pSs agreed. Now, 250 civilian unarmed monitors from OSCE pSs (can increase up to 500 monitors) + local staff	Deployed to Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, Luhansk	Agreed on 21/3/14, will last for six months, can be extended if necessary, if decided by all 57 pSs	Meets authorities, NGOs, ethnic and religious groups, local communities; gathers info on security situation on the ground, establishes and reports facts in response to specific incidents. Daily reports: osce.org/ukraine-smm/daily-updates
Presidential election observation mission (20/3/14 – 26/5/14)	Regular election observation mission by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. No consensus required to deploy.	To monitor election process compliance with OSCE commitments, advise on improvements. Preliminary statement on	Ukraine requested, run by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 100 long-term and 900 short-term observers + core	All over the country	Invite received on 3/3, mission launched on 20/3, preliminary results presented on 26/5.	Monitor media, campaigning, talking to NGOs, authorities, to see if election is in line with OSCE standards, give recommendations



		26/5: www.osce.org/nade/119078	team (similar to previous elections in UA)			
Human rights assessment mission (18/3 – 12/5/14)	Joint mission of ODIHR and HCNM to assess human rights situation in Ukraine, with a focus on minority rights. No consensus was required to deploy	Numerous complaints of human rights violations by all sides of the conflict prompted the launch of the mission.	Experts from OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities	A number of cities, including Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Mikolayiv, Odessa and Simferopol	From 18/3 until 1/4/14, report presented on 12/5, available at www.osce.org/odihr/118454	Meeting with all interested parties, including with civil society representatives and governmental officials at all levels.
National dialogue project (10/3 – 30/4/2014)	Small OSCE project to gather information about further OSCE activities, promote dialogue. No consensus was required to deploy.	To help reduce tensions, identify areas for further OSCE work to support dialogue, to contribute to peaceful political transition.	Requested by Ukraine, implemented by Project co-ordinator in Ukraine. 15 international OSCE staff (incl. from CIS, EU countries)	Five teams deployed for four weeks in five locations: Odessa, Kharkiv / Luhansk, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk and Lviv	Started on 20/3/14, field work completed by 17/4, results were presented to OSCE States in Vienna on 30/4, see www.osce.org/ukraine/118166	Gathered info on issues of concern (political, humanitarian and minority issues) that can be addressed through dialogue and future OSCE activities.

Initiative	What?	Why / what for?	Who?	Where?	When?	How?
Military verification activities (March - ongoing)	Activities under Chapter IX and Chapter X of the Vienna Document 2011 (including inspections of military staff from OSCE pSs). No consensus needed.	Inspect and assess the military situation	AT, BE, CA, CZ, DK, FR, GE, DE, LU, MD, NL, PL, RO, SK, SE, UK, US (11 activities in Ukraine). BE, EE, FI, FR, DE, LV, NO, PL, CH, UA and US (5 activities in Russia).	In Russia and in Ukraine	Since the start of 2014	Sent teams of inspectors. Eleven activities in Ukraine, five activities in Russia.
Military visits to dispel concerns (concluded)	Visit of predominantly military experts from OSCE participating States (not OSCE staff) under Vienna Document 2011. No consensus needed.	Ukraine voluntarily hosted the visit to dispel concerns about unusual military activities.	Ukraine requested under Vienna Document 2011, 30 pSs sent 56 unarmed military/civilian experts.	First visit (5-10/3) - Eastern UA, attempted to get into Crimea. Later (10-20/3) - South-East UA (Donetsk, Kherson)	5/3 – 20/3/14	Monitoring of military security aspects of situation on the ground.
Requests for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities (concluded)	Requests under Vienna Document 2011. No consensus needed.	Request explanation to consult about unusual military activity	Requests made by Canada, Estonia, Ukraine and the US to Russia.	Vienna	April 2014, joint FSC/PC meetings held on 7/4, 17/4 and 30/4/14. Russia did not participate.	The countries submit request for explanation, the reply to be transmitted within 48 hrs. Following the reply, requesting State may ask for a bilateral meeting and initiate joint FSC/PC meetings.

Initiative	What?	Why / what for?	Who?	Where?	When?	How?
OSCE Chair's Personal envoy on Ukraine	Tim Guldemann, Swiss Amb to Germany, appointed by Swiss Chair. No consensus needed.	To work with authorities, other stakeholders, to get information, decide on how OSCE can help	He travelled with support staff and HCNM, works closely with Swiss Embassy in Ukraine and PCU	Can travel around the country, was in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine in start-March	Appointed on 24/2, was in UA several times	Meet with authorities, stakeholders, gather first-hand information, develop ways for OSCE to help
High Commissioner on National Minorities	Finnish Astrid Thors, special institution of OSCE	To give early warning in cases of possible conflict related to national minorities	Traveled to UA with CIO Personal Envoy	Travelled to Kyiv and Simferopol in start March; Donetsk, Luhansk and Odessa from 23 to 28 March 2014, and Kyiv from 1 to 3 April	Was in UA on 3-6/3, 2 nd visit: 24-28 March, 3 rd visit – start April	To assess first-hand the situation on the ground, especially regarding the Crimean peninsula
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media	Dunja Mijatovic, special institution of OSCE	Monitor implementation of media freedom commitments	Traveled to UA with several staff	Traveled to UA on 4/3-7/3/14, and 14/4-16/4/14	4/3-7/3/14, 14/4/14-16/4/14	To look at media situation on the ground

Source: <http://www.osce.org/home/116922?download=true>

7.2 CIS and Ukraine

In 1991 Ukraine was among the founding countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, an international organisation born after the fall of the Soviet Union to maintain a linkage between a number of former Soviet republics. The Creation Agreement remained the main constituent document of the CIS for the following two years, before the CIS Charter was signed and ratified by most members. Turkmenistan and Ukraine, however, did not ratify the Charter, thus becoming Associate States instead of fully Member States.

Ukraine's attitude toward the CIS was made clear by then-Foreign Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Ohryzko in 2008, when he declared "Ukraine does not recognize the legal personality of this organization, we are not members of the CIS Economic Court, we did not ratify the CIS Statute, thus, we cannot be considered a member of this organization from international legal point of view. Ukraine is a country-participant, but not a member country". Ukraine has kept working with the CIS on a number of selected issues. In 2012, for example, it entered the CIS Free Trade Area, together with Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Moldova.

The Maidan protest were partly ignited by and interrupted projects to enter the Eurasian Economic Union, an attempt at constituting a single market and customs union among some CIS Member States, currently comprising Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Belarus. After Ukraine signed an association agreement with the European Union CIS Free Trade Area states decided to introduce customs checks for goods entering from Ukraine in order to tackle the issue of Ukraine's dual position in both trade areas. The Free Trade Agreement still formally holds between Ukraine and the other countries, while Russia denounced its validity towards Ukraine on 1 January 2016. Ukraine put in place restrictive measures on Russian trade as well.

While the Ukrainian crisis unfolded Ukrainian MPs tried more than once to pass bills demanding the complete denunciation of the CIS association; although they were never successful, Ukraine has terminated the presence of its representatives in the CIS Executive Committee's building since September 2015, marking a new low in its relationship with the organisation.

7.3 The OECD and Ukraine

The OECD has been working with Ukraine since 1991, with the aim of supporting the country's efforts to transform its economy and integrate more deeply into international markets and institutions. Its co-operation with Ukraine has been greatly intensified since 2014, after a Memorandum of Understanding between the OECD and the Government of Ukraine was signed; the Memorandum was renewed in 2016. Under the Action Plan agreed for the implementation of the Memorandum, the OECD works to support reforms in Ukraine. The Plan provides for over 30 OECD reviews and projects in Ukraine and also sets explicit goals with respect to Ukraine's participation in major OECD Committees and other bodies, as well as its adoption of OECD principles and standards in such areas as corporate governance, tax administration, investment policy and competition. The current work of the OECD in Ukraine encompasses a wide range of policy areas.

Agriculture

In June, the OECD launched the 2017 Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation report which includes a chapter on Ukraine. The report confirms that agriculture remains one of the most important economic sectors in Ukraine and highlights the need to develop a modern land cadastre as a condition for agricultural land market reform.

Competition

In March 2017, the OECD launched Ukraine's Competition Peer Review, which reviews the Antimonopoly Committee's (AMC) progress in implementing the recommendations found in the peer reviews of the OECD (2008) and UNCTAD (2013) with a particular emphasis on post-Maidan developments regarding the competition regime, institutional arrangements and the work product. Relevant recommendations from the peer reviews are reiterated.

Ukraine is also part of the Eurasian Competitiveness Programme, which carries out country-specific projects and involves Ukraine in its regional work through peer reviews and the regular assessment of small-and-medium enterprise (SME) policies in Ukraine.

Corporate affairs

The government has undertaken a reform of the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises on the basis of the OECD Guidelines for the Corporate Governance, including mandatory independent audit and information disclosure requirements. This has already led to major changes in the governance of some of Ukraine's largest companies, including the railway monopoly and Naftohaz, the state oil and gas company.

Education

In March 2017, the OECD launched a review that addresses the challenges posed by integrity weaknesses in Ukraine's education system and provides recommendations to eliminate risks and restore public trust. In 2018, Ukraine will participate in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) for the

first time, and the OECD is reviewing Ukraine's capacity to help prepare the country to successfully implement this large-scale assessment.

Environment

The OECD is working with Ukraine to help "green" SMEs, exploring ways to mobilise commercial credit for green investments, as well as analysing instruments for financing water supply and sanitation. In March 2017, the OECD launched the first National Policy Dialogue on Water in Kyiv in collaboration with the Ministry of Ecology of Ukraine. Also, Ukraine is part of the EaP GREEN Programme, which assists the six countries of the European Union Eastern Neighbourhood Partnership in progressing faster towards a green economy framework.

Integrity

Since 2014, the OECD has been directly involved in supporting some of Ukraine's most important anti-corruption reforms, including the creation of the Business Ombudsman Council and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). Through the Anti-Corruption Project, the OECD is also involved in a diverse range of capacity-building activities, assistance in the drafting of legislation, and in the establishment and development of the National Asset Recovery and Management Office. Ukraine has also been a member of the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ACN) since its establishment in 1998. ACN is a forum to exchange information about new developments and trends in the area of preventing and fighting corruption, international standards and practice.

Investment

With OECD assistance, Ukraine revised its investment incentive schemes to make them more transparent and to evaluate their costs and benefits, bringing the country's policies and practices into line with the standards adopted by OECD members. In March 2017, Ukraine became the 47th adherent to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises.

Public governance

The OECD contributed to the elaboration of the draft Public Administration Reform Strategy and the preparation of the new civil service law adopted in 2015. Further work includes support for measures to strengthen policy making, accountability, service delivery, public finance management and public procurement. The OECD is also involved in supporting Ukraine's decentralisation reform.

Taxation

The OECD offers regular training to Ukrainian officials in the detection and pursuit of financial and tax crimes. Ukraine is a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of

Information for Tax Purposes and is also an Associate to the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project.

8. Other Practical Info

8.1 Local Customs Cultural Awareness

Ukrainians live in a country where everyday life is often unpredictable and unstable and they have learned to adapt to constantly changing rules and laws. The influences of the Russian Orthodox Church plus a long history of turbulent economic times, unstable governments, and adverse climatic conditions produce a rather fatalistic approach towards life. Ukrainians are extremely generous and hospitable. All social occasions include food. Visitors are always offered something to eat as well as a beverage. It is considered the height of rudeness to eat in front of another person and not offer them something.

Social Etiquette

a) Meeting Etiquette

The typical greeting is a warm, firm handshake, maintaining direct eye contact, and repeating your name. When female friends meet, they kiss on the cheek three times, starting with the left and then alternating, while close male friends may pat each other on the back and hug.

Ukrainian names are comprised of:

- First name, which is the person's given name;
- Middle name, which is a patronymic or a version of the father's first name formed by adding "-vich" or "-ovich" for a male and "-avna", "-ovna", or "-ivna" for a female. The son of Alexi would have a patronymic such as Alexivich while the daughter's patronymic would be Alexivina;
- Last name, which is the family or surname.

In formal situations, people use all three names; friends and close acquaintances may refer to each other by their first name and patronymic.

b) Gift Giving Etiquette

Ukrainians exchange gifts with family and close friends on birthdays and the Orthodox Christmas. 'Name days' (birth date of the saint after whom a person was named) are also celebrated rather than birthdays by some. Gifts need not be expensive. It is the act of giving the gift that is important, since it symbolizes friendship. If you are invited to a Ukrainian's home for a meal it is polite to bring something; cake, flowers, or a bottle of imported liquor. Flowers should only be given in odd numbers and avoid yellow flowers. Gifts are generally not opened when received.

c) Dining Etiquette

Table manners are generally casual, the more formal the occasion, the stricter the protocol. When in doubt, watch what others are doing and emulate their behaviour. Table manners are Continental, i.e. hold the fork in the left hand and the knife in the right while eating. The oldest or most honoured guest is usually served first. It is suggested to try everything since refusing a dish is considered very rude. You will often be urged to take second helpings.

Toasting is part of the culture and generally occurs whenever three or more people share a meal. Ukrainians are suspicious of

people who do not drink. Having said that, it is better to offer a medical condition as an excuse rather than starting to drink and failing to keep pace with your Ukrainian counterparts. A common toast is "za vashe zdorovya", which means "to your health". The host gives the first toast, usually to the guest of honour, who may return the toast later in the meal. Most toasts are given with vodka. You need not finish the glass, but you must take a sip. Do not clink your glass with others during a toast if you are not drinking an alcoholic beverage. Glasses are filled no more than two-thirds full, never refill your own glass. Empty bottles are not left on the table, but are immediately removed.

Business Etiquette and Protocol

a) Meeting and Greeting

Ukrainian businesspeople are generally less formal than in many other countries. Shake hands with everyone upon arriving and leaving. Handshakes are quite firm. Maintain eye contact during the greeting. It is common to repeat your name while shaking hands. Academic and professional titles are commonly used with the surname. If someone does not have an academic or professional title, use the honorific "Pan" for a man and "Pani" for a woman with the surname. Most business colleagues refer to each other by first name and patronymic (middle name which is a version of the father's first name formed by adding "-vich" or "-ovich" for a male and "-avna", "-ovna", or "-ivna" for a female). When using someone's complete name, including the patronymic, the honorific title is not used. The way someone is addressed often depends upon the situation. Titles and surnames are used in meetings and may give way to first names or diminutives in social situations. Business cards are exchanged without ritual. Have one side of your business card translated into Ukrainian. Include advanced university degrees on your business card. Present your card so the Ukrainian side faces the recipient. If someone does not have a business card, note the information in your appointment book or portfolio.

b) Communication Style

Although direct communication is valued in Ukraine, there is also an emphasis placed on delivering information in a sensitive manner. Often, the level of the relationship will determine how direct someone is. Obviously the newer a relationship, the more cautious people will be. Once a relationship has developed, people will then feel more comfortable speaking frankly.

c) Business Meetings

Meeting schedules are not very rigid in the Ukraine. There may be an agenda, but it serves as a guideline for the discussion and acts as a springboard to other related business ideas. As relationships are highly important in this culture, there may be some time in the meeting devoted to non-business discussions. Engage in small talk and wait for the other party to change the subject to business.

8.2 Medical Travel Recommendations for Ukraine

State medical facilities in Ukraine are generally poor. Private clinics and hospitals offer a better standard of care, though these do not always meet western standards and practices. If you are involved in an accident or taken ill, it is likely that you will be taken to a state hospital unless you can show that you have comprehensive medical insurance cover. English is not always widely spoken and non-Ukrainian patients may face communication difficulties.

If you need emergency medical assistance during your trip, dial 103 or 112 and ask for an ambulance. You should contact your insurance/medical assistance company promptly if you are referred to a medical facility for treatment.

Recommended Vaccinations:

- Diphtheria;
- Polio;
- Tetanus;
- Measles (Kiev experienced an outbreak in 2006);
- Hepatitis A;
- Typhoid.

Diarrhoea

Diseases from food and water are the leading cause of illness in travellers. Prevention consists mainly in: “Boil it, wash it, peel it, cook it... or forget it”. Follow these tips for safe eating and drinking:

- wash your hands often with soap and water, especially before eating. If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand gel (with at least 60% alcohol);
- drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes;
- make sure food is fully cooked; avoid eating fruits and vegetables unless they have been peeled or cooked.

Most episodes are self-limiting, clear up within 48 to 72 hours and do not require treatment with antibiotics. The primary goal of treating any form of diarrhoea (viral, bacterial, parasitic or non-infectious) is preventing dehydration or appropriately re-hydrating persons presenting with dehydration.

In particular:

- oral re-hydration solutions (ORS) or similar solutions should be used for re-hydration and absorbed in small, frequent volumes;
- an age-appropriate unrestricted diet is recommended as soon as dehydration is corrected;
- no routine laboratory tests or medications are recommended;
- anti-motility agents such as Loperamid should be considered only for adult patients who do not have a fever or bloody diarrhoea; anti-motility agents may reduce diarrhea output and cramps, but do not accelerate cure.

Gas Heater

You should never go to sleep with your gas heater switched on. The pressure may drop resulting in the flame extinguishing. As a result gas will then leak from the heater. Carbon monoxide poisoning can also be a problem with old appliances.

Road Traffic Accidents

Remember to:

1. wear your safety belt;
2. follow the local customs and laws regarding pedestrian safety and vehicle speed;
3. obey the rules of the road;
4. use helmets on bicycles and motorbikes;
5. avoid boarding an overloaded bus or mini-bus;
6. if not familiar with driving in Ukraine, hire a trustworthy local driver;
7. do not drink and drive.

8.3 Other Travel Info

Time

Time zone: Eastern European Time (UTC+2) Summer (DST): Eastern European Summer Time (UTC+3)

Money

The official currency of Ukraine is the Hryvnia (UAH). US Dollars and Euros are the easiest currency to exchange in Ukraine. Sterling may also be exchanged at a more limited number of sites. You will need to present your passport to exchange money. You should be given a receipt (NBU form N° 377). Keep the receipt as you may need to produce it if you exchange money back on departure. ATMs are also available and credit cards are widely used in cities. Outside of cities you should make sure you have sufficient cash in local currency.

Climate

The climate of Ukraine can be described as dry and continental climate with warm, dry summers and fairly severe winters.

January is the coldest month with daytime temperatures usually around 0°C, but in some cases winter months can be quite colder with temperatures far below zero, about -20°C or lower and strong, cold north-easterly winds, called Bora. Heavy snowfall or even snowstorms are also possible on some days. There are more than 290 sunny days in the year.

In summer daytime temperatures reach 25-30°C, but sometimes quite higher, 35°C or more, especially in the inland areas. The summer months enjoy dry weather with sunny spells most of the time, rain often falls with sometimes heavy thunderstorms, but mostly along the coastal areas of the Black Sea. These thunderstorms often occur at the end of the day. July is the warmest month with an average Temperature of 24°C. Annual precipitation is about 400-600 mm, but lower in the inland areas of Ukraine.

8.4 Radio Transmissions

The radio is not a secure means of communication as it can be listened to by practically anyone. It is useful to establish a set of simple code words, which should be known by everyone in the network. In no case should military information be transmitted.

Basic Rules

Discipline: listen before transmitting. Brevity: be brief and to the point. Rhythm: use short complete phrases that make sense. Speed: not too fast, not too slow. Volume: don't shout. Preparation: know what you are going to say before transmitting.

Prior to transmission

- Check the power source and cables to ensure there is a power supply.
- Check the antenna and cables ensuring a tight and correct connection to the radio set.
- Connect the audio accessories and check the functioning of switches.

Transmitting

- Make your message brief but precise.
- Break the message into sensible passages with pauses between.
- Make sure no-one else is transmitting at the same time.
- When transmitting maintain a high standard of articulation, normal rhythm and moderate volume. Do not shout. Hold the microphone close to your mouth.
- Avoid excessive calling and unofficial voice procedure.

Four Golden Rules

Clarity; Brevity; Security; Simplicity.

Respect these rules; your radios may be the only link to the outside world. Don't interfere with radios unless you are a trained technician. Don't use the radio like a telephone, keep transmissions short. Organize your thinking and your message before transmitting. Security matters are best dealt with by using simple code words; likewise when dealing with sensitive issues.

Procedure Words

A proword is a word or phrase, which has been given a special meaning in order to speed up the handling of messages. The only authorised prowords are listed below:

Prowords explanation:

BREAK

I now indicate a separation of the text from other portions of the message.

CORRECT

You are correct, or what you have transmitted is correct.

CORRECTION

I have made an error in this transmission. I will continue from the last correct word.

I SAY AGAIN

I am repeating my transmission again.

MESSAGE

A message follows: prepare to copy or record it.

MORE TO FOLLOW

The transmitting station has additional traffic for the receiving station.

OUT

This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required.

OVER

This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is expected. Go ahead transmit.

READ BACK

Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as received.

ROGER

I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.

SPEAK SLOWER

You are speaking too fast. Please speak slower.

STAND-BY

Do not transmit until contacted: I need extra time.

THIS IS

Give call sign, i.e. "Delta one".

WAIT

I must pause for a few seconds, please wait.

WAIT OUT

I must pause longer than a few seconds, I will return.

WILCO

I have received your signal, understand it, and will comply (do not use roger and wilco together).

WRONG

Your last transmission was incorrect the correct version was ...

Phonetics

The international phonetic alphabet listed below shall be used. Numerals shall be transmitted digit by digit except round figures such as hundreds and thousands.

Examples:

Message examples:

To give you confidence, make sure you practise using the radio before you find yourself in urgent need of using it. An example of the kind of language you must learn to use is shown right. It is an example of a radio check:

Call

Five - Two, Five - Two, this is Hotel - Three - Niner, Hotel - Three - Niner. Radio check. Over.

Reply

Hotel - Three - Niner, from Five - Two. I read you loud and clear. Over.

Call

Five - Two from Hotel - Three - Niner. Loud and clear. Over.

Reply

From Five-Two. Roger. Out.

What to do in an emergency

Call for help as follows:

emergency. emergency. emergency.

Five-two five-two. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. emergency. do you copy? over. (Note: emergency is repeated three times).

Wait for response and then proceed. For a lesser degree of urgency, use the word “security” instead of “emergency”. Any station hearing an “emergency” or “security” call, should immediately stop transmitting and listen out. If you need to interrupt another radio conversation wait for a pause (immediately after you hear “over”); call: break. break. this is

hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. I have an emergency. please stand by.

Pause transmission and listen to ensure the other communication has ceased, then proceed with emergency call.

12 wun too;

44 fo-wer fo-wer;

90 niner zero;

136 wun three six;

500 fi-yiv hundred;

7000 seven thousand;

16000 wun six thousand;

1278 wun too seven ate;

19A wun niner alfa

CHARACTER	MORSE CODE	TELEPHONY	PHONIC (PRONUNCIATION)
A	• —	Alfa	(AL-FAH)
B	— • • •	Brao	(BRAH-VOH)
C	— • • —	Charlie	(CHAR-LEE) or (SHAR-LEE)
D	— • •	Delta	(DELL-TAH)
E	•	Echo	(ECK-OH)
F	• • — •	Foxtrot	(FOKS-TROT)
G	— — •	Golf	(GOLF)
H	• • • •	Hotel	(HOH-TEL)
I	• •	India	(IN-DEE-AH)
J	• — — —	Juliett	(JEW-LEE-ETT)
K	— • —	Kilo	(KEY-LOH)
L	• — • •	Lim a	(LEE-MAH)
M	— —	Mike	(MIKE)
N	— •	November	(NO-VEM-BER)
O	— — —	Oscar	(OSS-CAH)
P	• — — •	Papa	(PAH-PAH)
Q	— — • —	Quebec	(KEH-BECK)
R	• — •	Romeo	(ROW-ME-OH)
S	• • •	Sierra	(SEE-AIR-RAH)
T	—	Tango	(TANG-GO)
U	• • —	Uniform	(YOU-NEE-FORM) or (OO-NEE-FORM)
V	• • • —	Victor	(VIK-TAH)
W	• — —	Whiskey	(WISS-KEY)
X	— • • —	Xray	(ECKS-RAY)
Y	— • — —	Yankee	(YANG-KEY)
Z	— — • •	Zulu	(ZOO-LOO)
1	• — — — —	One	(WUN)
2	• • — — —	Two	(TOO)
3	• • • — —	Three	(TREE)
4	• • • • —	Four	(FOW-ER)
5	• • • • •	Five	(FIFE)
6	— • • • •	Six	(SIX)
7	— — • • •	Seven	(SEV-EN)
8	— — — • •	Eight	(AIT)
9	— — — — •	Nine	(NIN-ER)
0	— — — — —	Zero	(ZEE-RO)

9. Useful contacts

9. Useful contacts

Emergencies

In case of emergency in Ukraine, call the following emergency numbers:

Fire – 101

Police – 102

Ambulance – 103

Ukrainian police and emergency services are still generally below Western European and U.S. standards in terms of training, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Visitors to Ukraine should note that Ukrainian law enforcement and emergency response officials generally do not speak English, and translators are generally not readily available.

Embassies

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Embassy of Ireland in Ukraine
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Selected Security Council Resolutions

17 FEBRUARY 2015 S/RES/2202

This was a resolution that endorsed the "Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements" signed on 12 February 2015.

21 JULY 2014 S/RES/2166

This resolution condemned the downing of Malaysia Airline flight 17 and called for an investigation of the crash.

Selected Security Council Letters

13 APRIL 2014 S/2014/264

This was a letter from Russia requesting urgent consultations on the situation in Ukraine on 13 April 2014.

28 FEBRUARY 2014 S/2014/136

Ukraine requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council citing the situation in Crimea as a threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

26 FEBRUARY 2014 S/2014/132

This was Ukraine's official official statement, particularly regarding non-interference in internal Ukrainian affairs, in response to the 24 February Russian statement on the political situation in Ukraine. (On 22 February, after signing a deal with the opposition to end the political crisis the president fled Kiev to an undisclosed location. The parliament voted to remove the president and on 23 February it granted expanded powers to its interim speaker to carry out the duties of the president of Ukraine. On 26 February Russia carried out a large-scale military exercise in regions bordering Ukraine.)

Selected General Assembly Documents

28 MARCH 2014 A/RES/68/262

This was the General Assembly resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Selected Human Rights Council Documents

27 JANUARY 2015 A/HRC/28/64/Add.1

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Annex

Council Decision 2014/486/CFSP

23.7.2014 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 217/42

COUNCIL DECISION 2014/486/CFSP

of 22 July 2014

on the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 28, Article 42(4) and Article 43(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 14 April 2014, the Council expressed its readiness to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, support of police and rule of law and to elaborate a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) in Ukraine, examining all options, including through a possible Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission.

(2) On 8 May 2014, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine sent a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) expressing an interest in the deployment of a CSDP mission in Ukraine.

(3) On 12 May 2014, the Council recalled its readiness to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, it welcomed the PFCA in Ukraine and gave the European External Action Service (EEAS) the task of preparing a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a possible civilian CSDP mission. It also underlined the importance of coordination and complementarity with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international actors.

(4) On 23 June 2014, the Council approved the CMC for a possible CSDP action in support of civilian security sector reform.

(5) On 11 July 2014, the Foreign Minister of Ukraine sent a letter to the HR accepting the deployment of a CSDP mission.

(6) EUAM Ukraine will be conducted in the context of a situation which may deteriorate and could impede the achievement of the objectives of the Union's external action as set out in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Mission

The Union shall conduct an Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) to assist Ukraine in the field of civilian security sector reform, including police and rule of law.

Article 2

Mandate

1. In support of Ukraine's commitments to security sector reform, the non-executive civilian CSDP mission shall mentor and advise relevant Ukrainian bodies in the elaboration of renewed security strategies and in the consequent implementation of relevant comprehensive and cohesive reform efforts, in order to:

create a conceptual framework for planning and implementing reforms that result in sustainable security services delivering the rule of law, in a manner that contributes to enhancing their legitimacy and to increased public confidence and trust, in full respect for human rights and consistent with the constitutional reform process;

reorganise and restructure the security services in a way which permits recovering control and accountability over them. To achieve its objectives, EUAM Ukraine shall operate in accordance with the parameters set out in the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) approved by the Council on 23 June 2014 and in the operational planning documents.

2. Within its initial mandate, the mission shall assist in a comprehensive civilian security sector reform planning process, supporting rapid preparation and implementation of the reform measures.

Article 3

Chain of command and structure

1. EUAM Ukraine shall have a unified chain of command for crisis management operations.
2. EUAM Ukraine shall have its Headquarters in Kyiv.
3. EUAM Ukraine shall be structured in accordance with its planning documents.

Article 4

Planning and launch of EUAM Ukraine

1. The mission shall be launched by a Council Decision on the date recommended by the Civilian Operation Commander of EUAM Ukraine once it has reached its initial operating capability.
2. The tasks of the Core team of EUAM Ukraine shall be to prepare the installation of the mission in terms of logistics, infrastructure and security and to provide the input needed to draw up the operational planning documents as well as the second budgetary impact statement.

Article 5

Civilian Operation Commander

1. The Director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) shall be the Civilian Operation Commander for EUAM Ukraine. The CPCC shall be at the disposal of the Civilian Operation Commander for the planning and conduct of EUAM Ukraine.
2. The Civilian Operation Commander, under the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and overall authority of the HR, shall exercise command and control of EUAM Ukraine.
3. The Civilian Operation Commander shall ensure, with regard to the conduct of operations, the proper and effective implementation of the Council's decisions as well as the PSC's decisions, including by issuing instructions as required to the Head of Mission and providing him with advice and technical support.
4. The Civilian Operation Commander shall report to the Council through the HR.
5. All seconded staff shall remain under the full command of the national authorities of the seconding State in accordance with national rules, the Union institution concerned, or the European External Action Service (EEAS). Those authorities shall transfer Operational Control of their staff to the Civilian Operation Commander.
6. The Civilian Operation Commander shall have overall responsibility for ensuring that the Union's duty of care is properly discharged.

Article 6

Head of Mission

1. The Head of Mission shall assume responsibility for, and exercise command and control of, EUAM Ukraine at theatre level. The Head of Mission shall be directly responsible to the Civilian Operation Commander and shall act in accordance with the instructions given by him.
2. The Head of Mission shall be the representative of EUAM Ukraine in its area of responsibility. The Head of Mission may delegate management tasks in staff and financial matters to staff members of EUAM Ukraine under his overall responsibility.
3. The Head of Mission shall exercise administrative and logistic responsibility for EUAM Ukraine, including over assets, resources and information placed at the disposal of the mission.
4. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for disciplinary control over staff. For seconded staff, disciplinary action shall be exercised by the national authority in accordance with national rules, by the Union institution concerned or by the EEAS.

Article 7

Political control and strategic direction

1. The PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR, political control and strategic direction of EUAM Ukraine. The Council shall authorise the PSC to take the relevant decisions in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 38 TEU. That authorisation shall include, in particular, the powers to appoint a Head of Mission, upon a proposal of the HR, and to amend the

concept of operations (CONOPS) and the operation plan (OPLAN). The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of EUAM Ukraine shall remain vested in the Council.

2. The PSC shall report to the Council at regular intervals.
3. The PSC shall receive, on a regular basis and as required, reports by the Civilian Operation Commander and the Head of Mission on issues falling within their respective areas of responsibility.

Article 8

Staff

1. EUAM Ukraine shall consist primarily of staff seconded by Member States, Union institutions or the EEAS. Each Member State, each Union institution, and the EEAS shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it, including travel expenses to and from the place of deployment, salaries, medical coverage and allowances other than applicable daily allowances.
2. Each Member State, each Union institution, and the EEAS shall be responsible for answering any claims linked to a secondment from, or concerning, a member of staff seconded by it, and for bringing any action against that person.
3. International and local staff may also be recruited on a contractual basis by EUAM Ukraine if the functions required cannot be provided by personnel seconded by Member States. Exceptionally, in duly justified cases, where no qualified applicants from Member States are available, nationals from participating third States may be recruited on a contractual basis, as appropriate.
4. The conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of international and local staff shall be laid down in the contracts to be concluded between EUAM Ukraine and the staff members concerned.

Article 9

Status of EUAM Ukraine and its staff

The status of EUAM Ukraine and its staff, including where appropriate the privileges, immunities and further guarantees necessary for the completion and smooth functioning of EUAM Ukraine, shall be the subject of an agreement concluded pursuant to Article 37 TEU and in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Article 10

Participation of third States

1. Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union and its single institutional framework, third States may be invited to contribute to EUAM Ukraine, provided that they bear the cost of the staff seconded by them, including salaries, all risk insurance cover, daily subsistence allowances and travel expenses to and from Ukraine, and that they contribute to the running costs of EUAM Ukraine, as appropriate.
2. Third States contributing to EUAM Ukraine shall have the same rights and obligations as Member States in terms of the day-to-day management of EUAM Ukraine.
3. The Council hereby authorises the PSC to take the relevant decisions on acceptance of the proposed contributions and to establish a Committee of Contributors.
4. Detailed arrangements regarding the participation of third States shall be covered by agreements concluded in accordance with Article 37 TEU. Where the Union and a third State conclude or have concluded an agreement establishing a framework for the participation of that third State in Union crisis-management operations, the provisions of that agreement shall apply in the context of EUAM Ukraine.

Article 11

Security

1. The Civilian Operation Commander shall direct the Head of Mission's planning of security measures and ensure their proper and effective implementation by EUAM Ukraine in accordance with Article 5.
2. The Head of Mission shall be responsible for the security of EUAM Ukraine and for ensuring compliance with minimum security requirements applicable to EUAM Ukraine, in line with the policy of the Union on the security of personnel deployed outside the Union in an operational capacity under Title V TEU.
3. The Head of Mission shall be assisted by a Mission Security Officer (MSO), who shall report to the Head of Mission and also maintain a close functional relationship with the EEAS.
4. As regards security, EUAM Ukraine staff shall receive mandatory security training, adapted to the risk as it is evaluated in the zone of deployment. They shall also receive regular in-theatre refresher training organised by the MSO.

5. The Head of Mission shall ensure the protection of EU classified information in accordance with Council Decision 2013/488/EU (1).

Article 12

Watch-Keeping Capability

The Watch-Keeping Capability shall be activated for EUAM Ukraine.

Article 13

Legal arrangements

EUAM Ukraine shall have the capacity to procure services and supplies, to enter into contracts and administrative arrangements, to employ staff, to hold bank accounts, to acquire and dispose of assets and to discharge its liabilities, and to be a party to legal proceedings, as required in order to implement this Decision.

Article 14

Financial arrangements

1. The financial reference amount intended to cover the expenditure related to EUAM Ukraine until 30 November 2014 shall be EUR 2 680 000. The financial reference amount for the subsequent periods shall be decided by the Council.
2. All expenditure shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union. Participation of natural and legal persons in the award of procurement contracts by EUAM Ukraine shall be open without limitations. Moreover, no rule of origin for the goods purchased by EUAM Ukraine shall apply. Subject to the Commission's approval, the Mission may conclude technical arrangements with Member States, the host State, participating third States and other international actors regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUAM Ukraine.
3. EUAM Ukraine shall be responsible for the implementation of the mission's budget. For this purpose, EUAM Ukraine shall sign an agreement with the Commission.
4. Without prejudice to the provisions on the status of EUAM Ukraine and its personnel, EUAM Ukraine shall be responsible for any claims and obligations arising from the implementation of the mandate, with the exception of any claims relating to serious misconduct by the Head of Mission, for which the Head of Mission shall bear the responsibility.
5. The implementation of the financial arrangements shall be without prejudice to the chain of command as provided for in Articles 4, 5 and 6 and the operational requirements of EUAM Ukraine, including compatibility of equipment and interoperability of its teams.
6. Expenditure shall be eligible from the date when the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 is signed.

Article 15

Project Cell

1. EUAM Ukraine shall have a Project Cell for identifying and implementing projects. EUAM Ukraine shall, as appropriate, facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States under their responsibility in areas related to EUAM Ukraine and in support of its objectives.
2. Subject to paragraph 3, EUAM Ukraine shall be authorised to seek recourse to financial contributions from the Member States or third States to implement projects identified as supplementing in a consistent manner EUAM Ukraine's other actions, if the project is: provided for in the financial statement relating to this Decision; or integrated during the mandate by means of an amendment to the financial statement requested by the Head of Mission. EUAM Ukraine shall conclude an arrangement with those States, covering in particular the specific procedures for dealing with any complaint from third parties concerning damage caused as a result of acts or omissions by EUAM Ukraine in the use of the funds provided by those States. Under no circumstances may the contributing States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by EUAM Ukraine in the use of the funds provided by those States.
3. Financial contributions from third States to the Project Cell shall be subject to acceptance by the PSC.

Article 16

Consistency of the Union's response and coordination

1. The HR shall ensure the consistency of the implementation of this Decision with the Union's external action as a whole.
2. Without prejudice to the chain of command, the Head of Mission shall act in close coordination with the Union's delegation in Ukraine to ensure the consistency of Union action in Ukraine. Without interfering in the chain of

command, the Head of Delegation in Kyiv shall give political direction at local level to the EUAM Ukraine Head of Mission. The EUAM Ukraine Head of Mission and the Head of Delegation in Kyiv shall initiate consultations as necessary.

3. Cooperation shall be established between EUAM Ukraine and the European Union Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine).

4. In addition, systematic cooperation, coordination and complementarities with activities of other relevant international partners, in particular OSCE, should be sought in order to ensure effective action.

Article 17

Release of information

1. The HR shall be authorised, if necessary and as required for EUAM Ukraine, to release EU classified information up to 'RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED' level generated for the purposes of EUAM Ukraine to the third States associated with this Decision, in accordance with Decision 2013/488/EU.

2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, the HR shall also be authorised to release to the host State any EU classified information up to 'RESTREINT UE/EU RESTRICTED' level generated for the purposes of EUAM Ukraine, in accordance with Decision 2013/488/EU. Arrangements between the HR and the competent authorities of the host State shall be drawn up for this purpose.

3. The HR shall be authorised to release to the third States associated with this Decision any EU non-classified documents connected with the deliberations of the Council relating to EUAM Ukraine and covered by the obligation of professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's Rules of Procedure (2).

4. The HR may delegate such authorisations, as well as the ability to conclude the arrangements referred to in paragraph 2, to EEAS officials, to the Civilian Operation Commander and/or to the Head of Mission in accordance with section VII of Annex VI to Decision 2013/488/EU.

Article 18

Strategic review

The initial mandate of EUAM Ukraine shall be two years. A strategic review shall be conducted a year after launching the mission.

Article 19

Entry into force and duration

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

It shall apply for a period of 24 months starting from the date on which EUAM Ukraine is launched.

Done at Brussels, 22 July 2014.

For the Council

The President

C. ASHTON

(1) Council Decision 2013/488/EU of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (OJ L 274, 15.10.2013, p. 1).

(2) Council Decision 2009/937/EU of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ L 325, 11.12.2009, p. 35).